Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko made a surprising official visit to Mali on August 12, 2024, marking his first trip to Bamako since his political party came to power in Senegal’s last presidential election in March. This visit has raised several questions about the implications of Dakar’s current openness toward the new Sahel-Sahara alliance, especially Mali, and the potential impacts this rapprochement might have on the geostrategic landscape in the Sahel and West Africa.
Dakar’s Notable Moves:
Recent weeks have witnessed significant movements by the Senegalese government regarding the Sahel-Sahara region. These can be outlined as follows:
1. Repeated Senegalese Visits to Mali:
Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko paid an unannounced visit to Mali on August 12. This marked his first visit to one of the countries in the new Sahel Union, which includes Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Sonko met with Malian civilian Prime Minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga and also held a meeting with the head of the ruling military council in Bamako, Assimi Goïta. The Senegalese Prime Minister emphasized that West African countries must overcome their differences to re-establish the Mali Empire, pledging that Senegal would not allow Mali’s destabilization or the imposition of new sanctions, criticizing ECOWAS for imposing sanctions on Bamako.
Sonko’s visit to Mali came just three months after Senegalese President Bassiro Diomaye Faye’s visit to Bamako in May, during which he expressed his country’s desire to reintegrate Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso into the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
2. Senegal’s Support for the Sahel States Against Ukraine:
Relations between the new Sahel Union countries and Ukraine have significantly deteriorated in recent weeks, as these countries accused Kyiv of involvement in an attack targeting members of the Russian African Legion and Malian soldiers in Bamako in July. This led to Mali and Niger announcing a severance of ties with Ukraine, amid growing concerns about the spillover of the Russian-Ukrainian war into Africa.
In this context, Senegal announced the summoning of the Ukrainian ambassador, Yuriy Pivovarov, accusing him of spreading videos supporting the recent attack in Mali, as Dakar attempts to show support for the Sahel countries in their current stance against Kyiv.
Key Implications:
Senegal’s recent moves toward closer ties with the new Sahel Union, particularly Mali, reflect several important implications, which can be outlined as follows:
1. Dakar’s Efforts to Reintegrate the New Sahel Confederation States into ECOWAS:
The Senegalese Prime Minister’s visit to Mali was part of Dakar’s efforts to convince the new Sahel Union, which formed a joint confederation in early July, to return to ECOWAS. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso had announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS in January after the organization imposed sanctions on these countries, which had experienced military coups that ousted their governments.
Senegal is currently striving to reintegrate Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso into the regional bloc ECOWAS, established in 1975 and comprising 15 countries before the three states’ withdrawal. The issue of reintegrating these countries into the regional bloc has been one of the central topics on the agenda of Senegal’s current president, Bassiro Diomaye Faye, since he came to power following the recent presidential elections in Dakar in March.
2. Senegal’s Shift Away from France:
Some analysts link Senegal’s current rapprochement with the new Sahel Union to the ideology of Senegal’s new president, Bassiro Diomaye Faye, which is starkly different from that of his predecessor, former president Macky Sall. Faye’s ideology aims to undermine French dominance in Senegal, a political doctrine embraced by his party, the African Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics, and Fraternity (PASTEF). The party believes that Senegal is still considered a French colony, with France exploiting Dakar’s resources, and seeks to reassess the relationship between the two countries.
This aligns with reports suggesting that Faye’s rise to power in Senegal represents another setback for French influence in West Africa, given the new Senegalese president’s opposition to French political and cultural dominance in his country. Economically, Faye aims to withdraw from the French-backed unified currency (the West African CFA franc) used by several former French colonies, pushing instead for a new currency for ECOWAS or creating an independent Senegalese currency.
In this context, Senegal’s current rapprochement with the Sahel countries, particularly Mali, reflects one aspect of the new government’s approach in Dakar to detach from France and adopt a new strategy aimed at diversifying the country’s external allies and opening up to all regional players in the Sahel and West Africa.
3. Adopting a Balanced Approach in Senegal’s Foreign Policy:
The security situation in the Sahel and Sahara is of particular importance to Senegal, which shares a long border with Mali of about 500 kilometers. Therefore, the escalating security tensions in the Sahel have a significant impact on Senegal, which also maintains strong economic ties with Bamako.
This aligns with the balanced foreign policy adopted by Senegal under its current president, Bassiro Diomaye Faye, who seeks to diversify the country’s regional and international partnerships and relations. Despite Dakar being a key partner of the West in West Africa, Faye is currently pursuing a more open approach to various regional powers, including the Sahel countries close to Russia, as well as other major international players active in Africa, such as China.
4. Aligning with the New U.S. Approach in Africa:
Some analysts believe that Senegal’s recent moves in the Sahel and Sahara are consistent with the new U.S. strategy in the region. The United States has begun adopting a new approach aimed at easing tensions with the Sahel countries that have experienced military coups and have drawn closer to Russia. After the previous confrontational U.S. strategy led to counterproductive results, pushing the ruling military councils in the Sahel to abandon their former alliances with the West in favor of Moscow, Washington is now seeking a less aggressive stance and attempting to penetrate these countries through its allies in the region. Senegal, along with Rwanda, might be among the key actors that the new U.S. strategy could rely on.
This could explain the recent visit by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell to Senegal in mid-July, as Washington seeks to bolster its strategic presence in the Sahel and West Africa, with Dakar being a key regional partner for the United States in West Africa on both economic and security fronts.
Potential Implications:
Several potential implications could arise from the Senegalese Prime Minister’s visit to Mali and Dakar’s current moves toward closer ties with the new Sahel Union, which can be outlined as follows:
1. Increasing Senegal’s Closeness to the New Sahel Union:
Some reports suggest that the coming period may witness further Senegalese moves to strengthen ties with the new Sahel Union. The current authorities in Dakar have significant aspirations to maintain friendly relations with their regional partners. Senegal’s closeness to the new Sahel Union could be beneficial for the overall stability of the region in West Africa. This aligns with the statements made by Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko following his recent visit to Mali, where he emphasized that relations between the two sides would see increased cooperation in the coming period.
2. A New Economic Bloc as an Alternative to ECOWAS:
The new Senegalese authorities have aspirations to create a new independent currency for ECOWAS that would end France’s dominance over the West African CFA franc. If these efforts fail, Dakar may push for the formation of a new regional bloc, as an alternative to ECOWAS, aimed at eliminating France’s economic dominance. This is further supported by the presence of some ECOWAS members who back Senegal’s initiatives.
It is worth noting that, after World War II, France introduced its former colonies into a common currency union known as the West African CFA franc, which allowed Paris to dominate and control this currency and the economies of its former colonies. These countries maintained their common currency after the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975, while Anglophone countries retained their national currencies. Since the early 21st century, there have been attempts to launch a unified currency for ECOWAS, known as the “Eco,” but so far, all attempts to launch this unified currency have failed, especially due to the ongoing conflict between two subgroups within ECOWAS: the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), formed in 1994 by Francophone countries such as Mali, Niger, Senegal, Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo, aimed at balancing the economic influence of Anglophone countries (especially Ghana and Nigeria), and the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ).
3. Doubts About Senegal Joining the New Sahel Union:
Some analysts do not rule out the possibility of Senegal joining the new Sahel Union, especially since this alliance aims to form an economic union with a new common currency, through the creation of a stability fund and an investment bank to stimulate regional development for the union’s member states. This model currently enjoys the support of Senegal and other countries such as Togo and Chad. Therefore, some analysts suggest the possibility of Senegal, Chad, and Togo joining the new Sahel Union to benefit from the potential economic gains of this new economic integration.
However, other analysts doubt Senegal’s likelihood of joining the new Sahel Union, given Dakar’s desire to maintain its relations with Western powers, especially the United States. Joining this union would represent a significant setback in Senegal’s relations with Western powers, which contradicts the balanced approach pursued by Senegal’s current president,
Bassiro Diomaye Faye, who seeks to diversify the country’s regional and international partnerships.
Conclusion:
Senegal’s recent rapprochement with the new Sahel Union, especially Mali, is part of Dakar’s efforts to reintegrate these countries into the regional bloc ECOWAS. This move also reflects Senegal’s strategy to adopt a balanced approach in its foreign policy, diversify its international and regional partnerships, and detach from French influence. As Senegal continues to navigate this complex landscape, the coming period may witness further developments in its relations with the Sahel Union and its position within West Africa.
