On Thursday, September 5th, 2024, President Macron appointed Michel Barnier as Prime Minister and tasked him with forming a new government.
Michel Barnier, a seasoned politician (72 years old), comes from the ranks of the Republican Right. He has served in several previous governments and was a European Commissioner. Barnier held positions such as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Agriculture, and he was also a key figure in the European Union, most notably as the chief negotiator during the Brexit talks. He is a familiar face, respected in both Brussels and France. His appointment, in part, seems to be a reassuring message to European circles, deeply concerned about the volatility and chaos of the French political scene, coupled with a subtle plea for patience with France.
Within the Republican Party, Barnier is more senior than second-tier figures but not quite among the top-tier leadership. His European convictions, especially his belief in the European project, run deep. Unlike the Parisian elite, Barnier is well aware of public sentiment in the provinces, and he is highly skilled in negotiations. Culturally, he is deeply conservative, but he also values social policies.
The mandate given to Barnier upon his appointment was to unite as many political factions as possible behind his government. While anything is possible in France, it is likely that his government will not include prominent figures from either the left-wing alliance or the far right. It’s clear that the leftist coalition will not support him and will exert maximum effort to bring him down. This means that the key to his government’s survival in parliament lies with Marine Le Pen’s party, which has stated that it will wait for the government’s policy statement before deciding on its stance. Therefore, Barnier’s challenge is how to secure the support of Le Pen’s party without alienating the center-left.
The situation remains uncertain. This particular president, Macron, is used to governing alone with a tight circle of advisors and intervening in all matters of governance. However, his parliamentary base has weakened considerably. The centrist coalition that backed him before the dissolution of the National Assembly is extremely angry with Macron for his decision to dissolve the previous assembly, and several key figures in this coalition are eyeing the upcoming presidential election, whether it happens on schedule or earlier.
Barnier’s base is not large. The Republicans have 47 seats, while the centrist bloc holds 163. The parliamentary majority requires 289 seats, meaning the next government will not enjoy an outright majority. It’s unclear if Barnier even has the guaranteed backing of all his party’s members and deputies. The question remains: Is there a majority in parliament ready to bring his government down? As mentioned earlier, the keys are in the hands of Le Pen’s party and, to a lesser extent, the center-left, which resents Macron’s courting of right-wing factions. We also can’t rule out the possibility that the center-right and the Republicans might abandon Barnier for trivial or significant reasons.
We do not yet know how Macron and Barnier will interact. As mentioned, Macron is accustomed to ruling solo and is known to flip between extremes. We also don’t know who will have the upper hand in appointing key ministers, such as the Ministers of Finance, Interior, and Justice (Macron will likely appoint the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, or at least reserve the right to veto Barnier’s choices).
What is certain is that both Macron and Barnier are committed to the European project, and they share concerns about the state’s finances, seeking to maintain fiscal discipline. They also agree on preserving Macron’s reforms, the most sensitive of which is the pension reform law. What remains unclear is Macron’s stance on immigration laws and how far he is willing to go to appease the far right—keeping in mind that any appeasement will be temporary and could lead to splits within the centrist coalition.
Le Pen’s party has made its demands clear: an electoral law reform to adopt a proportional list system, a tough stance on immigration, and measures to improve the French people’s purchasing power. It’s evident that they won’t get everything they want, especially regarding the last demand.
How did we end up in this situation, with both a weak president and a weak prime minister? A scenario in which the prime minister comes from the smallest parliamentary bloc, pursuing unpopular policies, and the fate of governments is determined by Marine Le Pen’s party, despite a general consensus to exclude them?
The selfish or misguided calculations of all political players are to blame. Macron knew that a time of austerity was approaching, which is why he dissolved the National Assembly and called for new elections—either to gain a fresh mandate before implementing the budget or to hand power to the far right, allowing them to lose popularity and become entangled in a debt crisis. Macron didn’t anticipate that the left-wing factions would successfully create a unified governing program and build an alliance. The presence of this third player disrupted his plans.
On the other hand, both the far right and the left put forth completely irrational governing programs. The centrist coalition’s platform wasn’t entirely realistic either, but its optimistic promises cannot be compared to the absurdity of the others. What united the extreme right and left was their advocacy for massive increases in public spending, in a country already grappling with a severe debt crisis. Both sides also insist on repealing Macron’s pension reform, which raised the retirement age to balance the pension budget. Given that the two extremes hold a majority of parliamentary seats together, they could have supported each other to overturn most of Macron’s reforms before turning on each other and bringing down each other’s governments.
The leftist coalition had two options: revise its program to seek an understanding with the centrist bloc, or stick to its unrealistic agenda. The strongest party within the coalition, “France Unbowed,” favored the second option, arguing that the program was a promise made to the electorate and should not be altered. This supposed idealism concealed a strategic goal: to create a governance crisis that would force Macron to resign and call for early presidential elections at a time most favorable to the left—while the center remains unprepared for a presidential race. The Socialist Party hesitated for a time, torn between seizing the opportunity to return to power and abandoning a program they knew wasn’t ideal. Eventually, they adopted the stance of “France Unbowed,” claiming that an alliance with the unpopular president would be unforgivable to voters. Some analysts suggested that the real reason was that certain key figures in the Socialist Party couldn’t win in their districts without the support of “France Unbowed,” which explains their decision. The options were reconsidered periodically—the party was divided—but the overall stance remained unchanged.
It is difficult to fully understand Macron’s calculations. Clearly, the left’s position benefited him, giving him a pretext to refuse to let leftists form the government. However, this refusal allowed his critics to accuse him of disrespecting democracy, of trying to circumvent the election results, and of persisting with policies that the electorate clearly rejected. His opponents argue that this refusal stems from his authoritarian tendencies rather than objective reasons. They claim that he should have appointed the leftist People’s Front’s candidate as prime minister and let the parliament withdraw confidence from her. However, this argument can be dismissed—as we’ve mentioned, Macron feared a secret agreement between the far right and the left to overturn his reforms.
The left’s decision to follow “France Unbowed” in rejecting any compromise, thus refusing to engage in governance, handed the fate of the government over to Marine Le Pen’s party and the Republicans. The centrist coalition cannot seek allies on its left. It must obtain tacit approval from Marine Le Pen and a promise to give the new government a chance. To assert its strength, Le Pen’s party has already objected to two prime ministerial nominees in recent days, effectively ending their chances.
Why do we describe the scene as mysterious? As mentioned, we do not know if Macron will allow Barnier to form the government independently. Nor do we know if Barnier will succeed in crafting policies that satisfy both the far right and the center-left. What are Le Pen’s non-negotiable demands? Does she have an interest in pushing Macron to resign? Many within the centrist coalition, alongside Le Pen and Mélenchon, want to get rid of Macron, but they also know there’s no clear successor. Every prime minister who has served during Macron’s presidency wants to run for president.
France can’t afford to waste any more time. The new government—which has yet to be formed—must prepare the most difficult budget in the history of the Fifth Republic, and there are factions eager to take to the streets again.
