The “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle was not the first and will not be the last time that the relationship between Hamas and Iran was discussed, a discussion that in one of its directions reaches the description of the relationship as a dependency relationship, which Hamas denies and Iran also denies. This paper examines questions related to this issue. It is a paper extracted from a book by the researcher about this relationship that she will publish soon.
introduction
The “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle was not the first and will not be the last time that a discussion took place regarding the relationship between the Palestinian resistance and Iran, and Hamas, due to its political and military weight on Palestinian land, has the largest share of this discussion, which is divided into three directions: The first: it is seen in The relationship with Iran is a natural matter, as it is an Islamic country and Hamas, in its foreign policy, goes to all countries of the world to mobilize support and approval, in addition to the official Iranian positions that are consistent and supportive of the Palestinian cause since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, and another trend that tends to be justified, as it has reservations about this relationship, but it takes a turn He apologetically seeks an excuse for Hamas; It did not find the support it found from Iran from the Arab countries. As for the third, it is the one that raises the banner of treason and accuses Hamas of being an Iranian arm and an agent. These voices were partly linked to a political effort that tried to give the movement the character of terrorism. This paper examines questions related to the relationship between Hamas and Iran in this regard. It is a paper extracted from a book by the researcher about this relationship that she will publish soon.
Iran’s defensive mosaic
Iran is described as one of the first countries to prioritize asymmetric warfare as its primary response to threats from traditionally superior adversaries. This was explained by the leader of the Revolutionary Guard, Mujtaba Dhu al-Nouri, in an interview conducted with him in 2010 in his response to the potential threat of a joint American/Israeli attack on Iran. He said: “The entire country will turn into an area of operations in a mosaic manner, so that the enemy will not have even a safe point in the heart of the desert… Also, none of the 32 American and Israeli bases in the region will be safe from Iranian missiles… and their interests will be threatened and exposed to danger in the future.” Dozens of countries around the world at the same time” (1) .
The idea behind this mosaic is to achieve greater decentralization of command and operations and delegate combat to relatively independent local units. This mosaic depends on the defense sector; Where small, agile forces operate locally rather than contributing to the strategic concentration of forces at the national level (2)
Over the decades, Tehran has built a network of relationships using a multi-pronged regional strategy. In the process of strengthening Iran’s influence abroad, titles emerged, the most important of which are: Islamic unity, strategic depth, and combating terrorism and Takfiri groups (3) .
Within its mosaic system, Iran can pursue several goals simultaneously and use these groups to perform many tasks and play multiple roles. In this sense, the groups that make up the “Iranian Threat Network” are versatile and operate like a multi-functional Swiss army knife (4).
This diversity is beneficial to Iran because it allows the regime to pursue and achieve different goals, allocate resources as needed to its clients, maintain secrecy, and build a larger network. There is a level of flexibility and innovation in the strategy of the non-state ally, even if this is done under the umbrella of the legacy of the first slogans of the Islamic Revolution (5) .
If Iran is stripped of its asymmetric capabilities and tools in the gray zone (6) , including its network of allies, the balance of power in the Middle East will be heavily tilted against Tehran (7) . In this sense, Iran’s allied network of non-state actors is the main challenge that Iran poses to the United States, especially the US military in the region. Beyond Iran’s ballistic missile forces and potential future nuclear development, the allied network is among a few of the formidable defense capabilities the country has developed since 1979.
This network of non-state actors is an essential component of Iran’s defense doctrine and one of the main tools the regime possesses to deter adversaries, strengthen its homeland’s defenses, increase its strategic depth, expand its regional influence, and project power beyond its borders (8 ) . In this sense, this network complements Iran’s other asymmetric capabilities—principally, its nuclear ballistic missile program—as force multipliers that compensate for shortfalls in the country’s conventional capabilities that have been weakened by the sanctions Iran has experienced over the decades following the Islamic Revolution. A conviction arose among Iranian leaders that the United States is a brutal force that cannot reconcile with the natural role of the Islamic Republic in the region. They argue that Washington seeks to secularize the Middle East and its strategy has endangered the entire region by causing “the disintegration of certain Islamic countries through organized riots and the strengthening of sectarianism.”
With regard to Palestine, Iran’s interest in the Palestinian issue has produced more complex results and is driven by three considerations. First, because the Palestinian issue is the historical focus of “resistance” in the Arab region and the Islamic world, Iran needed to show sufficient commitment to the issue to enhance its resistance credentials.
Second: At the time of the founding of the Islamic Republic, and the outbreak of the war with Iraq, Syria (bordering Israel and Palestine) was the only Arab country that sided with Iran. As Iran sought to spread its vision of the shape of the conflict with Israel as a competing regional power, the Palestinian issue proved to be a tempting and influential entry point for Tehran. Third: In order to be seen as a regional power, Iran needed to develop the capabilities to compete with what it saw as its main regional rival (Israel) (9) .
This prompted Iran not to prioritize ideological considerations in order to partner with Sunni Arab Palestinian groups. However, Iran’s positions toward the main Palestinian groups differ compared to other movements allied with Iran.
In cases of tension between the United States and Iran, and understanding the risks associated with direct confrontation with a militarily and technologically superior opponent, the Islamic Republic chooses to work through proxies to maintain plausible deniability and raise the cost of response for the United States of America (10 ) .
Weaknesses in the conventional military domain had to be compensated for on the battlefield by superior preparation and morale, and thus Iran’s asymmetric strategy was born. Some of the Guard’s founders already had experience in asymmetric warfare; They fought alongside the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Lebanese resistance movements against Israel in the seventies (11) .
It is enough for Hamas to fight Israel
Iran saw Hamas as a movement capable of confronting the Israeli occupation and consistent in its broad outlines with its position on Israel. In line with its grand strategic vision of protecting the vulnerable, Iran used the power and capabilities of the Quds Force to provide training, logistical support (weapons and equipment), and financial support to Hamas in its operations against Israel (12) .
Kamal Kharazi explains the Iranian focus on the relationship with Hamas by saying: “Certainly, Hamas’s position in the Palestinian arena played a major role in the Islamic Republic’s decision to establish and strengthen the relationship with the movement, and it has proven to be a resistance movement with a deep presence inside the Palestinian territories and capable of confronting the Zionist occupation. The 22-day war that took place in 2008 demonstrated Hamas’ ability to defeat the Zionists, and if all Palestinian factions were capable of playing the role that Hamas plays, we would provide them with the same support” (13 ) .
Many, including leaders in Hamas, spoke about the fact that Iran needs Sunni legitimacy in the Islamic world and that Palestine and the relationship with Hamas are the best gateway to that, but Kharazi responds to this reading by saying: We do not need Palestine in this sense, meaning that we do not look at Palestine in a way that… Rather, we consider it a gateway to defending a sublime principle that does not leave the framework of defending the oppressed, and opposition to the occupation of Muslim land. So what if this land is Palestine?! This is a realistic matter, as what happened in Palestine is that the Zionists came and occupied a land that did not belong to them and took it from its owners by force, and established a false state on this land, and it is the duty of all Muslims, regardless of their sect, to come to the defense of Palestine (14 ) . Accordingly, “The Islamic Republic has no special expectations from the Palestinians in exchange for providing them with support. Obtaining this is not part of our policy towards Palestine, but rather we believe that it is our duty to do so while they resist the occupation” (15 ) .
As for the question regarding Hamas’s position within the Iranian defense mosaic and whether it is part of it, the IRGC Foundation’s answer to the researcher’s question in this regard provides a different description, which reads: “Our decision is to defend Hamas, and if the battle with Iran occurs, Hezbollah will certainly participate.” The Popular Mobilization Forces will participate, as will Ansar Allah and Zainabiyoun, which is a defensive strategy that we have built. As for Hamas, it is enough to fight Israel, and it is not required to fight on behalf of Iran if we are attacked. The only battle that Hamas is expected to fight is the war with Israel in the Palestinian arena and to liberate The occupied Palestinian territories, not in any other arena, there is one enemy, which is Israel” (16) .
Hamas: We are independent in decision-making
Early on, the movement paid attention to its relations and foreign policy, and it was clear that the movement had drawn up a set of principles and policies as a controlling framework for its foreign relations , and in doing so it benefited from the experience of the Palestinian factions in particular and the liberation forces in general, which we find in the written interview conducted by Mohsen Saleh with Osama Hamdan. In the year 2014 (17) , these principles can be summarized in the following points:
The movement’s political relations are not separate from the system of struggle against the occupation, but rather are integrated with the act of resistance, including armed resistance.
The movement’s relations must be based on a clear strategic vision in terms of goals.
It is necessary to manage the movement’s relations in an institutional manner to ensure the integrity of the political path and the continuity and good performance of political relations, which protects the political decision at the level of external relations from the negative impact of the changes that occur in the internal environment of the movement and in its leadership.
The base of interests in political movement relations is always based on the interests of the Palestinian people. Therefore, the movement dealt with the experience of Palestinian political relations from a national critical standpoint, benefiting from its advantages and trying to avoid its pitfalls.
The Palestinian people’s affiliation to their Arab and Islamic nation, which represents their strategic depth, without neglecting the human dimension and the support of the free people of the world for the Palestinian cause.
Searching for commonality in relations, strengthening points of convergence, and diverging views on issues other than the Palestinian issue should not be an obstacle to building relations.
Independence of decision, and rejection of subordination in any external movement relations.
The rule of Islamic ethics and controls remains the governing movement’s performance and relations.
The foundations upon which the relationship between the Palestinian Islamic resistance and Iran are based are based on two basic factors, according to what Mahmoud Al-Zahar (18) sees :
The first factor: religious, not sectarian, doctrinal principles, which are that a Muslim is the brother of a Muslim and does not oppress him or let him down. These are rules that were absent in the Arab and Islamic world due to the dominance of the secular idea and changing political interests (19) .
The second factor: is the perceived interest, which is the Zionist and Crusader West targeting the Islamic world (Sunnis and Shiites) and even secularists. Perhaps the clearest example is the Jewish presence in Palestine, Western influence in the Gulf and the armed presence in Asian Islamic countries, as was the case in Afghanistan (20 ) .
Although Hamas’s relationship with Iran, from an intellectual standpoint, cannot be considered the same as the relationship with Lebanese Hezbollah; But for Iran, “Hamas’ position on the Zionist entity, its commitment to the Palestinian issue and its position in the Islamic world brought it close to the positions, goals and interests of the Islamic Republic” (21) , hence the political, moral and material support that Iran provides to the Hamas movement. Through its support for the Hamas movement, Iran was able to influence the political equations in the region.
Support: Are there any conditions?
This opens the door to questions about the conditions of support provided by Iran to Hamas?
Hamas responds to this by saying that it was clear from the beginning of the relationship, as were the Iranians, that this support is linked to the Palestinian cause and the option of resistance, and is not linked to other issues.
And that “despite much that was said and despite attempts to confuse, the movement was not ready to accept conditional support, and there are countries that know themselves who proposed conditional support and we rejected it” (22) . In the face of what the movement describes as “an attempt to confuse and say that Iranian support is conditional support for the Hamas movement,” the movement was saying that the continuation of this might push it to talk about conditional support that was being offered to it from other countries (23 ) .
The same matter is confirmed by Mojtaba Abtahi, stressing Iran’s position: We do not have any conditions for serving the mujahideen in Palestine, and we do not ask them for anything, except that the Palestinian issue remains the first issue ( 24) ; Therefore, when the brothers in Hamas took a position on what happened in Syria, and I mean Mr. Khaled Meshaal and Mr. Abu Marzouk, we told them: Our relationship with you is for the sake of Palestine, and if you do not stand with us at this stage regarding Syria, we will not sever the relationship with you, and the Hamas office remained in Tehran, and you can ask the movement about that. For our part, we have clear instructions from the Supreme Leader, Mr. Khamenei, not to exert any pressure on our brothers, whether in Hezbollah or Hamas. In firm language, Abtahi concludes his answer on this issue: “We do not finance any issue of the Palestinian issue, but rather we put all issues in the service of the Palestinian cause, which is what Mr. Khamenei stresses every time he meets with the leaders of the resistance, most recently this summer when he met with all Spectrums of Palestinian resistance and stressed that the first issue is the Palestinian issue” (25) .
Abdullahian and Haniyeh meeting in Doha (Reuters)
The movement asserts that: “The Iranians have never stipulated any conditions of their own in exchange for supporting Hamas, and “Iran knows that if it had stipulated, Hamas would not have accepted that” ( 26) . It did not impose conditions and knew that Hamas rejects conditional support and the support it receives . The Hamas movement from Iran and others is not conditional, according to the assertions of Khaled Meshaal, the movement’s head abroad, who markets Hamas’ exit from Syria by a decision from the movement’s leadership itself as evidence of the absence of a condition in support (27), and that “the relationship with any party does not mean To match the visions” (28) .
Mishal gives Iran an advantage over other countries in the field of support: “Iran is distinguished from the countries that support our people and our resistance in that it has a margin of military support, both in terms of support and manufacturing” (29), and perhaps this is due to the fact that Iran framed support for the resistance and the Palestinian cause with a strategic vision related to the role of Iran in the region and its position in the Islamic world, and has defined its strategic interests by supporting the Palestinian cause. Al-Zahar believes that the most important factor governing the relationship between the movement and Iran is “the degree of credibility that Hamas has achieved as an anti-Zionist movement and a national liberation movement from the Israeli occupation, as well as the degree of consistency in the Iranian position in support of the Palestinian cause, in addition to the sincerity of the Hamas leadership in its positions and official relations with the allies” ( 30 ) .
There is a factor related to what Al-Zahar calls “the clarity of the enemy,” as he believes: “There is no doubt that the clarity of the enemy to Hamas, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and the entire Arab nation, which rejects foreign interference in the affairs of Palestine and others, is what has strengthened and deepened the relationship, just as everyone’s belief in the battle of the “Promise of the Hereafter,” especially after The Battle of Saif al-Quds, which embodied a practical model of how to liberate Palestine and defeat the Zionist enemy for the benefit of the entire region” (31) .
Some people tend to read the Iranian positions in support of the Palestinian cause as an Iranian investment in the Arab vacuum and the Arab countries’ abandonment of support for the Palestinian cause. There are those who believe that this falls within the category of political interests, but Sheikh Saleh Al-Arouri does not believe in this opinion. Rather, he believes that “Iran’s relationship The Palestinian issue is principled and authentic, and it was a fundamental focus in the discourse of the revolution and the outlook on the Zionist project. The relationship with the United States and Israel was at the heart of the dispute between Khomeini and the Shah, and the victory of the revolution was followed by practical steps that served to support the Palestinian cause” (32) .
Sheikh Al-Arouri explains his view on this issue by saying: “Iran has always been keen to be present on the Palestinian issue, and this keenness is neither seasonal nor opportunistic, nor is it based on reaction, but rather is linked to the spirit of the revolution, and therefore whether or not the Arab presence is present has nothing to do with the issue of the relationship with Iran.” (33) .
However, there are characteristics that characterize the Iranian position, according to what Al-Arouri explains: “Experience in the relationship has confirmed that the ceiling of Iranian support is not reached by any of the countries in the region, whether politically or financially” (34 ) .
Al-Aqsa Flood: Is Hamas fighting the battle alone?
At dawn on October 7, 2023, the Islamic Resistance Movement “Hamas” surprised the Israeli army in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip, and was able to control a large military base and a number of Israeli sites and observation points spread along the borders of the Strip . Commando units affiliated with the movement also took control of about 20 Israeli settlements within the so-called “Green Line.” This unprecedented operation, according to data announced by the Israeli army so far, resulted in the killing of more than 1,200 Israeli soldiers and civilians, and the wounding of about 3,000 people, including many senior officers. Hamas and other factions also captured more than 130 Israelis .
The Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood witnessed unprecedented surprises , the first of which was the timing, as it chose Saturday at the end of the Jewish holidays and at the height of the attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque. It was an unexpected timing for the occupation army. The battle also revealed the intelligence and military failure of the occupation. This is because a battle of this size, importance, and planning had been prepared for many months, to say the least. However, the “Israeli” security services failed to anticipate it, despite the leaks that indicated that Egypt had warned Israel of an operation being planned days before this battle.
The operation highlighted the ability of Palestinian resistance fighters to penetrate and infiltrate towards the settlements surrounding the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian interior occupied in 1948, after neutralizing a number of military bases and points on the border and taking some communication systems out of service . The resistance fighters resisted using land, sea and air, including gliders, which were used with great skill in the first hours of the attack and were able to mislead the radars .
A New York Times investigative report states that Hamas militants entered into a highly organized and meticulously planned operation, indicating a deep understanding of Israel’s vulnerabilities. To reconstruct the events of that day (Saturday, October 7, 2023), journalists conducted interviews with more than 20 survivors, soldiers, and military and intelligence officials, and also reviewed Hamas planning documents and video footage of the attacks . Gaza militants knew exactly how to find and enter targets, and accounts provide details of how Hamas was able to surprise and overwhelm the most powerful army in the Middle East; It stormed the border, overrunning more than 30 square miles and taking more than 150 hostages, killing more than 1,300 people on the bloodiest day for Israel in its 75-year history .
The investigation indicates that, thanks to careful planning and extraordinary awareness of Israel’s secrets and weaknesses, Hamas and its allies were able to invade Israel’s front with Gaza shortly after dawn. This shocked an occupation that had long considered the superiority of its army to be its creed. Using drones, Hamas destroyed key observation and communications towers along the border with Gaza; Which led to the imposition of wide blind spots on the Israeli army. The Hamas group had a surprisingly sophisticated understanding of how the IDF operated, where certain units were stationed, and even how long it would take for reinforcements to arrive.
The Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood shattered Israel’s aura of invincibility, and it also upended assumptions that Hamas, long designated a terrorist group by Israel and many Western countries, has gradually become more interested in running Gaza than using it to launch major attacks on Israel.
A Hamas planning document found by Israeli emergency responders in one village showed that the attackers were organized into well-defined units with clear objectives and battle plans. The document is dated October 2022, indicating that the attack had been planned for at least a year.
The Battle of “Al-Aqsa Flood” began where the Battle of “Saif Al-Quds” ended in 2021, according to what was confirmed by “Abu Ubaida” in a video message , who described what was achieved as “considered an honorable achievement in the history of the conflict, which will remain engraved in the memory of generations, and will have “A great impact on the resistance of our people and our nation.”
The Wall Street Journal report spoke of Iranian security officials helping Hamas plan the unprecedented attack it carried out, but the US administration found no evidence of a direct role for Iran in the “Al-Aqsa Flood.” In Tehran, the leader of the revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, provides continuous support to the Palestinian resistance, and his position on it affected the quality and level of support he provided to it, even military. His speech is almost devoid of mentioning the Palestinian issue, and he is keen on a regular basis to meet with its leaders. However, in his comment on the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” he stressed that it was a purely “Palestinian act,” describing it as a courageous and sacrificial initiative of the Palestinians at the same time. It was a response to the crimes of the usurping enemy that had continued for years. Khamenei – in a speech broadcast on official Iranian television – described the attack launched by Hamas as a devastating earthquake, and said: “We accept the hands of those who planned to attack the Zionist regime.”
He added, “This devastating earthquake destroyed some vital structures – in Israel – that will not be easy to repair. The actions of the Zionist regime are responsible for this disaster.”
Khamenei said, in his speech during the graduation ceremony of officers at an Iranian military college: “Supporters of the Zionist regime have spread rumors over the past three days saying that Iran is behind the Hamas operation, but they are wrong.” This was interpreted as closing the door to pressure on Iran and luring it into a confrontation, and others interpreted it as an affirmation of the independence of the decision of the Hamas movement, which its opponents have long accused of being dependent on the Iranian decision.
The former leader of the Revolutionary Guard, Hussein Kanaani Moghaddam, speaks to Al Jazeera Net and believes that the Hamas movement has benefited in the current battle from the resistance’s experiences in previous battles, and it can be said: The military strategy of the Palestinian resistance was built and developed in a joint operations room with the participation of the forces of the axis of resistance. It was launched after studying the tactics used in other wars, but he adds that Tehran frankly declares that it supports all parties that fight the occupying entity, and is in contact and coordination with its allies in the axis of resistance, even if it is not currently entering the battle. Moghaddam is inclined to believe that the possibilities of the occupation launching a ground operation on Gaza – in the context of the scorched earth policy aimed at eliminating resistance in the Strip – are possible, but they are slim due to its dire repercussions, especially on the occupation, and Iran, although it has not yet participated directly in confronting the Israeli occupation. However, this does not mean a final decision not to participate if Israel crosses the red lines.
Walla and Axios report : Iran has sent a message to Israel through the United Nations: We will have to intervene if the attacks continue in Gaza, during a meeting between the Iranian Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, in Beirut, the United Nations envoy to the Middle East. The Iranian message says: Iran is not interested in turning the conflict in Gaza into a regional war, but he stressed that Iran has red lines and will be forced to respond if the Israeli army’s operation in Gaza continues. The Iranian response indirectly, whether through militias in Syria and Iraq or by providing support for Hezbollah’s entry into the fighting, will turn the current crisis in Gaza into a regional war .
Iran spoke of Hezbollah’s escalation scenarios that could cause an earthquake in Israel.
a summary
Cooperation, coordination, and receiving support is something that the Hamas movement does not deny, nor does the Islamic Republic deny. It is part of the axis of resistance, but it is special compared to other members of the axis. There are assurances from the Hamas movement as well as from Iran that there are no conditions on the issue of support, despite disagreements that have occurred regarding some issues, including those related to the internal Palestinian arena, such as Hamas’ participation in the elections, and others related to regional issues, the most severe of which was the dispute over Syria, which is the dispute. Which fundamentally affected the level of the relationship without leading to a complete rupture, and the hotline between the military body of the movement and the Revolutionary Guard remained in place at the insistence of both sides.
The red lines mentioned by the Iranian warning may be multiple, but one of them precedes these lines, which is the displacement of the people of Gaza and the liquidation of the Hamas movement, because that means losing the most prominent and influential component in confronting Israel, especially with the sacrifice and skill the movement has made in performing in a way that has proven to the Iranians that The help they provided was not in vain. Even from the perspective of the balance of power, this will reduce Iran’s ability to influence the region’s issues and will increase the possibilities of reducing its influence in the region. It will also damage its reputation with its allies, whose alliance with Iran Israel is trying to make costly.
Iran has often been accused of investing politically in the Palestinian issue. If its investment is useful, it represents an invitation to the Arab countries to also intervene and invest in this issue. However, if this investment is costly, it is evidence of the centrality of the Palestinian issue in the Iranian discourse that prevailed in the Islamic Republic after The revolution, in both cases, is an argument against the Arab countries with which Hamas has often sought to establish strong relations, and some of which have set difficult conditions for this.
About the author
Fatima Al-Sammadi
A Jordanian researcher and university professor specializing in Iranian affairs, she holds a doctorate from Allameh Tabatabai University in Iran. She has a number of books and researches related to Iranian affairs. She currently works as a senior researcher at the Al Jazeera Center for Studies and supervises studies related to Iran, Turkey, and Central Asia .
REFERENCE
1-Hojjat al-Islam Mojtaba Dhul-Nour in a detailed interview with Khabarnagar Fars: 32 America and Israel are in the area of a security point opposite Mushkhai, Iran Nest (Hajjat al-Islam Mujtaba Dhul-Nour in a detailed interview with Fars correspondent: 32 American and Israeli bases in the region will not be safe in the face of Iranian missiles ), Fars News Agency, 3/30/1389 AH (accessed: September 10, 2023): https://2u.pw/LMcPWxZ
2- Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli, Ibid, p1
3-Vakil, Sanam, “Understanding Tehran’s Long Game in the Levant”, International Relations, Volume 15, No. 60, 2018, pp. 105-120. p110
4- Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli , Ibid
5- Ibid
6-The gray zone means the situation that falls between a state of peace and a state of war.
7- Ilan Goldenberg, Nicholas Heras, Kaleigh Thomas and Jennie Matuschak, Countering Iran in the Gray Zone,What the United States Should Learn from Israel’s Operations in Syria, Center for a New American Security, April 14, 2020 (accessed: May 20, 2020): https://bit.ly/35OimeJ
8-ARIANNE M. TABLE, JEFFREY MARTIN, BECCA WASSER, Ibid
9- Ibid
10- Wehrey, Frederic, David E. Thaler, Nora Bensahel, Kim Cragin, Jerrold D. Green, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Nadia Oweidat, and Jennifer J. Li, Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-781-AF, 2009. As of November 7, 2019, (accessed: March 30,2023): https://bit.ly/3nzJPOe
11-Ibid
12-Ibid, p. 180
13- Interview by the researcher with the former Iranian Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Strategic Council for Foreign Relations, Dr. Kamal Kharazi, Doha, February 2019.
14-From the interview with Kharazi.
15- From the interview with Kharazi.
16-Interview by the researcher with a member of the Revolutionary Guard and Secretary-General of the Conference to Support the Uprising, Mojtaba Abtahi, Tehran, October 2, 2023.
17-Mohsen Saleh, The Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, Studies in Thought and Experience, (Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations: Beirut) 2015, pp. 534-535.
18-Written interview of the researcher with Hamas leader Dr. Mahmoud Al-Zahar, November 2022.
19-From the interview with Al-Zahar.
20-From the interview with Al-Zahar.
21-From a recorded interview of the researcher with Dr. Hussein Sheikh al-Islam, Tehran, 2019. Sheikh al-Islam was a diplomat and deputy in the Shura Council; As he served as Iran’s ambassador to Syria, he was one of the students who seized the American embassy building with the victory of the Islamic Revolution, and worked until his death from Corona disease, in March 2020, as an advisor to the Iranian Foreign Minister at the time, Javad Zarif.
22- From an interview by the researcher with Hamas leader Osama Hamdan, Doha, 2016.
23-From the interview with Osama Hamdan.
24-From the researcher’s interview with the leader of the Revolutionary Guard 3 and the Secretary-General of the Conference to Support the Intifada, Mujtaba Abtahi.
25-From the interview with Abtahi.
26-Interview by the researcher with the representative of the Hamas movement in Tehran, Dr. Khaled Al-Qadoumi via Skype, August 23, 2022
27-From an interview on the : https://qudspress.com/?page=show&id=76033
28-The previous reference.
29-The previous reference.
30-From the interview with Al-Zahar.
31_From the interview with Al-Zahar.
32-Interview by the researcher with the leader of the Hamas movement, Sheikh Al-Arouri, on December 24, 2019.
33-From the interview with Sheikh Al-Arouri.
34-The previous reference.
