In recent years, anti-French rhetoric has intensified in Francophone African countries, sometimes accompanied by violent protests against French companies and diplomatic and cultural organizations. In some cases, French residents have even faced threats, as there is a growing perception in these countries that French policies represent a form of neo-colonialism. This sentiment is reflected on social media and in the statements of proponents of the New African Unity Movement.
A study published by the “French Institute of International Relations” in 2023, authored by Thierry Vircoulon and others, analyzes the anti-France discourse on social media and certain African media outlets. It also examines how the idea of a “French conspiracy against Africa” has gained widespread acceptance across the continent, with some African leaders using it as a political tool to bolster their domestic standing. The study also highlights the significant role of the “New African Unity” movement and its connections with international powers, particularly Russia.
Sharp Criticism:
There are three major criticisms of French policy in Francophone Africa. First, the CFA franc is seen as a tool of French dominance. Second, many believe that development aid serves to reinforce Paris’s influence by supporting loyal regimes rather than benefiting the populations of these countries. Third, the presence of French military bases is perceived as a form of neo-colonialism. These criticisms can be outlined as follows:
Military Intervention: Military intervention is a prominent feature of France’s African policy, drawing the most criticism. Since independence, Africa has been France’s preferred region for military interventions through defense and military cooperation agreements and a permanent military presence. Between 1960 and 1963, France signed numerous defense agreements with newly independent Francophone African states. Over time, the number of French military bases has significantly decreased, with only four permanent bases remaining (Dakar, Abidjan, Libreville, Djibouti). Despite this historical reduction, France’s tendency to intervene militarily has not diminished. The French Ministry of Defense has reported about 52 military interventions in Africa between 1964 and 2014. The most criticized campaigns include Operation Turquoise (Rwanda, 1994), Operation Unicorn (Ivory Coast, 2002-2015), and Operation Harmattan (Libya, 2011). The first tarnished France’s global reputation by linking it to the last genocide of the 20th century, while the second and third campaigns resulted in the ousting of African presidents, reinforcing the belief that Paris creates regimes and removes them by force, sparking demands for new independence.
The CFA Franc: In 1960, the African Financial Community Franc (FCFA) replaced the French Financial Community Franc (1958-1960) in Africa, based on monetary cooperation agreements between Paris and several African countries. These agreements maintained a fixed parity between the CFA franc and the French franc, and later the euro. A portion of the currency reserves of the member states in the CFA zone is deposited with the French Treasury, and France is represented on the boards of the Central Bank of West African States and the Bank of Central African States. While the CFA franc has been criticized for technical reasons by economists, the political critiques are more intense, as the CFA franc is seen as a new form of colonialism. Although the renaming of the CFA franc to the “Eco” was announced by the French and Ivorian presidents in Abidjan in December 2019, it is viewed as a mere cosmetic change. The limited reforms that followed did not convince critics, and the 2019 reform did not end accusations of “monetary colonialism.”
Development Aid: France’s development aid policy lacks credibility within Africa. At the France-Africa summit in October 2021, young African representatives denounced this policy as aimed at securing hidden returns on investment, whether economic, political, or military. This aid has strengthened the perception of collusion between donors and those in power. It is also criticized as self-serving, while for most of the public in recipient countries, it is seen as a duty that should not serve the donor’s interests, meant instead to rectify the past and alleviate crises.
Employing Conspiracy Theories:
Criticism of French policy in Africa has been the central element of the “France Conspiracy against Africa” narrative, which has been used by those in power or in opposition within African political circles in the following ways:
1- Avoiding Responsibility for Failure: For several decades, criticizing French policy has been a dominant theme among African leaders and opposition figures. African countries may be bankrupt, their administrations failing, their economies in ruins, and facing strong discontent among their populations, yet their governments often choose to blame France and make it a systematic scapegoat for their past, present, and even future misfortunes. By condemning the “French conspiracy,” these governments offer a ready-made explanation for public anger and thereby absolve themselves of responsibility.
French policy resentment has been politically exploited by African leaders on many occasions, especially in recent years. For example, when Boko Haram emerged in northern Cameroon in 2014, some political and media outlets in the country claimed it was a conspiracy against the regime orchestrated by France and the Cameroonian elites in the region. The “French conspiracy” is not only used to explain conflicts but also to justify anti-democratic excesses by some presidents. In 2017, former Chadian President Idriss Déby claimed that the constitutional change allowing him to stay in power was arranged without his knowledge by French authorities and that he relinquished power due to pressure from the French government. On the side of African opposition, the same rhetoric often prevails regarding the “French conspiracy,” accusing those in power of colluding with French policy.
2- Accusing France During Crises: The Central African Republic, in particular, provides fertile ground and an ideal model for the maturation of strong anti-French sentiment and its political exploitation. In this country, such resentment persisted for decades under government authorities and has now become a necessary feature in public discourse. Many former Central African presidents have condemned the French conspiracy whenever they felt threatened by armed rebellions. Similarly, anti-France rhetoric re-emerged among leaders in Bangui during President Touadéra’s tenure, leading to certain stances, especially on social media, exacerbated by the government’s alliance with Russia and the Wagner Group.
In the Central African Republic and other African nations, the intensification of anti-French rhetoric coincided with these countries’ alignment with Russia. The year 2018 saw the birth of an anti-Francophone and pro-Russian media landscape in Central Africa, largely attributed to the role played by Wagner Group in amplifying anti-French sentiment through excessive media coverage. This alignment of media amplification of anti-French rhetoric with rapprochement with Russia was also observed in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
3- Social Media: Bloom Social Analytics collected all references to Burkina Faso, Mali, and terms associated with these countries (names of capitals, local figures, etc.) on social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, Instagram) between June 2022 and January 2023, along with all interactions. More than 3 million posts were collected, generating over 57 million interactions (likes, shares, etc.). In Burkina Faso, for instance, the pro-Russian audience on YouTube forms the center of anti-French interactions, fueling conversations through video comments. Analyses show that this audience often attacks French media (via comments under posts), amplifies the content of pro-Russian Pan-African unity supporters, or supports and encourages the military junta in Burkina Faso.
Movements of Opposition
The “Pan-African Unity” movement—an intellectual and political African and North American movement—advocates for Africa’s true independence and solidarity among African peoples and those of African descent. This movement is currently witnessing a resurgence, often referred to as the New Pan-African Unity. Anti-French rhetoric is amplified by supporters of this movement, who present a blend of ideas combining conspiracy, populism, misinformation, and xenophobia. These ideas have been broadcasted through social media, quickly evolving from criticizing French policies to expressing hatred towards France. There is also significant alignment of interests between members of the New African Unity movement and Russia, with some accusing them of being in Moscow’s service.
In this context, Kémi Séba is one of the most well-known figures among the new African nationalists. He became prominent in the early 2000s, with his first active participation taking place a few years earlier in the French branch of an American organization that defends Black nationalism. He later left the movement and adopted the Kemetic ideology, taking the name Kémi Séba “The Black Star” in 2002. “Kemetism,” born in the United States, is based on rewriting the history of ancient Egypt, claiming that the early pharaohs were Black and emphasizing the superiority of Black civilization over others. Kemeticists especially draw on the works of Senegalese intellectual Cheikh Anta Diop, who promotes an Afrocentric perspective.
Kémi Séba faced legal action in France, prompting him to move to West Africa in 2011. There, he worked with various media outlets and NGOs, eventually founding the organization Urgences Panafricanistes in 2015. Since then, his audience has grown, making him the most famous advocate of the new African nationalism in the French-speaking world. Among his key ideological beliefs are that Black and White people should live separately, the Black diaspora should be relocated back to Africa, and Africa must completely free itself from all forms of Western oversight to achieve genuine independence.
Similarly, Nathalie Yamb, known as “The Lady of Sochi,” is another figure in the new African nationalist movement advocating for the elimination of French influence in Africa. This Swiss-Cameroonian activist uses a far more restrained rhetoric compared to Kémi Séba. Active on Twitter and Facebook, she regularly posts videos, though her activism remains largely focused on grassroots anti-French efforts, without clearly outlining what her vision of Pan-African unity entails.
Additionally, several other anti-French organizations have emerged across various French-speaking African countries. In Mali, the Yerewolo-Debout sur les Remparts association became an active movement in 2020, organizing anti-French protests as tensions between Paris and Mali’s military junta became public. In Burkina Faso, several anti-French movements have also coalesced around the ruling military council in recent years, such as the “Pan-African Leaders’ Assembly” and the “Union of Pan-African Movements of Burkina Faso,” led by Nestor Boudassé, known as “Mandela the First.”
In conclusion, anti-French rhetoric has become a cornerstone of African political discourse. Nonetheless, the “France’s Conspiracy Against Africa” theory has become a tool used by some African governments to denounce French policy while evading responsibility. Various actors, including supporters of the New Pan-African Unity movement, have contributed to spreading this rhetorical protest widely.
Thierry Vircoulon, Alain Antil et François Giovalucchi, « Thématiques, acteurs et fonctions du discours anti-français en Afrique francophone », Ifri, juin 2023.
