Middle Eastern studiesPolitical studies

Arab-Israeli Relations: From Secret Relations to Normalization

In 2020 and 2021, Israel signed a set of normalization agreements, within the course of the “Deal of the Century,” which resulted in the establishment of public diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and shortly thereafter with Sudan and Morocco. This facilitated the defense/military rapprochement, trade and tourism between Israel and a number of Gulf and Maghreb countries, albeit to varying degrees, and enabled the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations. The Negev Summit, in March 2022, which brought together the Arab foreign ministers from Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates with the Israeli foreign ministers, Yair Lapid, and the American, Anthony Blinken, stressed the need for cooperation in the military / security fields, the exchange of intelligence information, and cooperation in the fields of technology, economic projects, and for the forum to become permanent (1). In parallel, Israel’s secret relations continued to grow with an increasing number of Arab countries, especially in the areas of internal and regional security. In February 2020, Benjamin Netanyahu revealed that Israel maintains secret relations with many Arab and Islamic countries, with the exception of only three countries (2).

After his victory in the last Israeli elections, November 2022, Netanyahu received congratulations from a group of Arab leaders and agreed with a number of them (the Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan) to promote the expansion and consolidation of relations. However, Netanyahu’s return to power raises many questions about the future of Israeli-Arab relations and how they can interact, whether in the short or long term, especially since Netanyahu’s alliance includes extreme right-wing and religious parties that reject peace with the Palestinians and openly declare their hostility to the Arabs and their desire to expel them.

This reality raises two central questions related to the future of Arab-Israeli relations. First: To what extent can the Israeli position on resolving the Palestinian issue affect the dynamics of Arab-Israeli relations and their future, especially in light of the rising influence of religious and extreme right-wing currents on governance and politics? Second: What are the determinants and prospects for Arab-Israeli cooperation? What is Israel seeking to achieve in its Arab relations, apart from progress in the peace process with the Palestinians?

From secret relations to normalization

Since its inception in 1948, Israel’s relationship with the Arab countries has undergone various upheavals and fluctuations, during which it moved from wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982) to secret cooperation and peace agreements, and then to the normalization of relations with a number of Arab countries.

The stage of secret relations: Israel established secret relations with countries, sects, minorities, or prominent personalities in the Arab region even before its establishment. Although most of these relations were severed after the 1948 war, some secret relations continued due to Israel’s desire to break its isolation and achieve security and political breakthroughs in the region. Israel’s secret relations were usually characterized by their temporary nature and their management by security and intelligence officials, most of whom are from the Mossad, and not by official agencies or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3). Despite the many benefits that Israel reaped from its secret relations – security penetration and information gathering – it did not guarantee it public recognition and acceptance of its legitimacy in the region, nor did it help it achieve balance and deterrence in its regional and international relations.

Peace agreements: Israel’s secret relations with Egypt, which were established between the two countries through Morocco and Romania, became public for the first time after the signing of the Camp David Peace Agreement in 1978, which created an opportunity for official recognition and military, economic and civil cooperation between the two parties. The agreement did not neglect the Palestinian issue and dealt with it in the first agreement, which stipulated under the title “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East” the implementation of a plan for self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while the second section contained a detailed agreement to normalize bilateral relations (4). For the first time, regarding the permanent solution in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel recognized “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements,” and agreed that the Palestinians would participate in determining their future through negotiations between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians (5).

In 1987, the first Palestinian Intifada broke out; This constituted great political and economic pressure on Israel, which ultimately pushed it to negotiate with the PLO and sign the Oslo Accords, on September 13, 1993, at the White House, which included a Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, commonly referred to as the “Oslo Accords.” . Israel accepted for the first time the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians, and the two sides entered into long negotiations to achieve a political solution based on the principle of the two-state solution.

The Oslo Accords opened the door wide for Israel to officially enter the Arab countries. The former Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, wanted the agreements with the Palestinians to provide a framework for political, economic and commercial openness to Arab countries and the world. In other words, progress in peace with the Palestinians was key to entering the Arab world and establishing public relations. Progress in negotiations with the Palestinians led to Jordan’s signing of the Wadi Araba Peace Treaty with Israel, 1994, and to a brief boom in Israel’s relations with a host of other Arab states. Israel initiated negotiations with Syria with the aim of laying a comprehensive basis for an Arab-Israeli peace process, but they ultimately failed.

After the assassination of Rabin, in November 1995, by a Jewish extremist who opposed the Oslo Accords for religious reasons, Palestinian relations began to turn towards crisis. The Likud party, which has historically opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state or withdrawal from the West Bank, came to power in 1996. By 2000, the prospect of ending the Arab-Israeli conflict seemed remote and the Palestinians and Israelis engaged in several rounds of negotiations, all of which failed to produce breakthroughs. essential until it stopped in 2014 and a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict became far from reach.

The wave of normalization: With the peace process at a standstill, the Arab countries agreed to the “Arab Peace Initiative,” also known as the “Saudi Initiative” and adopted by the Arab League at its summit held in Beirut in 2002, with the aim of encouraging the Israelis to make concessions towards resolving the Palestinian issue. In exchange for normalizing relations with Arab countries. The initiative stipulated that the normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel would be conditional on the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, and Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied Syrian Golan Heights and the lands still occupied in southern Lebanon. No Israeli government responded to the Arab initiative, and Netanyahu rejected it (6).

The transformations in the Middle East (the Arab revolutions, the change of some Arab regimes/leaders, and the growing influence of Iran) contributed to the shifts in Israeli policy and public discourse towards the Arab countries. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government, which had avoided making progress on the peace process with the Palestinians, began arguing that a breakthrough toward normalization with the Arab states could be achieved even without advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace and thus making concessions to the Palestinians. The Israeli vision is based on the fact that reaching a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can only be achieved through a broad regional agreement that includes “Sunni Arab countries” (7). In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly, September 2016, Netanyahu explained that there are fundamental changes in the Arab world towards Israel and that many Arab countries have come to recognize the fact that Israel is “not their enemy” but can be considered their “ally.” Netanyahu set Iran and Islamic extremism represented by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as a common goal with the Arab countries. As for the other common goals, they were represented in security, prosperity and peace (8). Within this context, Israel began to present itself not as a threat or destabilizer in the region, but rather as a reliable partner and ally in confronting Iran and “extremist” Islamic movements (9).

As a result, Israel turned its secret relations (10) with some Arab countries into normalization agreements. In September 2020, Israel signed the Abrahamic Accords, known as the “Deal of the Century,” with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and shortly thereafter with Sudan and Morocco. The signatories to the agreements stressed that regional cooperation with Israel is inseparable from the Palestinian cause, and the UAE and Bahrain justified their steps by saying that they came to stop the Israeli annexation of the West Bank. In the same vein, the King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, confirmed in December 2020 that Morocco’s position on the Palestinian issue has not changed, supporting the principle of the two-state solution (11).

Relations between Israel and the printing countries deteriorated rapidly, and many tourism, trade, and economic agreements were signed, and most importantly, security/military cooperation agreements between Israel and Bahrain, and a defense cooperation agreement between Israel and the Arab Maghreb, which is considered the first with an Arab country. The Negev Summit, in March 2022, which brought together the Arab foreign ministers from Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates with the Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and the American Anthony Blinken, constituted a new stage in Israel’s relations with the Arab country. The meeting discussed the formation of a “regional security structure” and agreed that the meeting would become a “permanent forum” aimed at cooperation in the military/security fields, intelligence exchange, cooperation in technological fields, and economic projects (12).

Rejection of the two-state solution

Israel’s relations with the Arabs bear internal structural contradictions. While Israel, and specifically the right, seeks to expand relations with Arab countries, it is at the same time showing strictness towards a peaceful solution with the Palestinians. Instead of a two-state solution, successive Israeli governments have been working since 2000 to expand settlements and Judaize the city of Jerusalem and change the geographical facts in the West Bank with the aim of resolving all the central issues (the fate of the city of Jerusalem, borders, settlements, refugees, and security sovereignty) unilaterally and outside the framework of negotiations. binary. This coincides with fundamental changes in the internal Israeli balance of power and the emergence of the influence of the sovereign current, which was established in 2010 as a pressure group (lobby) to support Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank through ideological theorizing and political and field activity on the one hand, and the decline in support for the two-state solution among Israelis from 71 %, in 2010 (13), to 32% currently, on the other hand (14). And with the result of the recent Israeli elections, in which the parties that reject the two-state solution and seek to accelerate the implementation of deep geographic and demographic changes in the West Bank (for example, annexing parts of the West Bank or Judaizing Al-Aqsa) won, progress is not expected in any serious peace process with the Palestinians. ; The overwhelming majority of Israeli parties either reject the two-state solution and want to annex the West Bank, or accept it within the Israeli conditions, which the Palestinians usually reject.

Table of the results of the Israeli elections: the number of seats for each winning party, its religious orientations, and its position on settlement with the Palestinians

party nameNumber of seatsideological orientation
  political orientationreligious orientation
Likud32Right to extreme right: does not accept the two-state solution and supports the continuation of the status quo with the Palestinians or the annexation of the West Bank.mild
There is a future, Yesh Atid.24Center to liberal right: accepts the two-state solution within Israeli conditions.secular
Religious Zionism14Far right: Does not accept the two-state solution and adopts a position in favor of strengthening practical Israeli measures to annex the West Bank.A religious Zionist opposed to the secular trend
national camp12The party includes a group of Israeli generals and supports the continuation of the status quo with the Palestinians, but accepts the principle of a two-state solution within Israeli conditions.secular
Shas11Yamin: Supports the continuation of the status quo with the Palestinians.strict religious fundamentalism
United Torah Judaism7Yamin: Supports the continuation of the status quo with the Palestinians.strict religious fundamentalism
Yisrael Beytenu6Yamin: Supports the continuation of the status quo with the Palestinians, but accepts the principle of a two-state solution within Israeli conditions.Hardcore secular
The Unified Arab List5  Support the principle of the two-state solution. Islamic Arabic
 Front and Arab alliance for change5 Supports the principle of the two-state solution.Arab political alliance
the work4Center-left: Supports the principle of a two-state solution within Israeli conditions.secular

Orientation for peace with the Arabs

In exchange for rejecting the two-state solution, a large majority of Israelis seek to normalize relations with the Arabs in a way that serves Israeli interests in three main files:

First: Pressure on Iran: Israeli research, political and security institutions agree that cooperation with Arab countries will be an essential element in accumulating pressure on Tehran and its allies in the region (15). Taking advantage of the growing tensions between Iran and a group of Arab countries, Israel is working to establish Iran as a common enemy, and thus mobilize support to confront its influence and its nuclear project. Tel Aviv fears the US administration’s intentions towards Iran’s nuclear file, and the prevailing belief within the military and political institutions is that Washington will not lead a military coalition against Iran. Instead of complete dependence and excessive dependence on the United States of America in the Middle East, Israeli parties are calling for increased self-reliance and the formulation of a more comprehensive and engaging strategy to adapt to the new phase of regional strategic competition through cooperation and alliance with Arab countries (16). There are Israeli parties that believe that complete dependence for security on the United States in the Middle East could cause enormous strategic and economic damage to it, especially if the United States decides to reduce its presence in the region (17). This does not mean, of course, that Israel wants to completely abandon the strategic alliance with the United States, but it wants to be ready to deal with all scenarios in the region, including reducing the US military presence or dealing with an escalation or a sudden military attack, such as a missile attack or by drones. Thus, Tel Aviv could create common military and strategic interests with a number of Arab countries, especially the UAE, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and perhaps Saudi Arabia later if it could, to deal with the vast Iranian influence and create a strategic balance of power in the region. This does not mean, of course, that Israel wants to completely abandon the strategic alliance with the United States, but it wants to be ready to deal with all scenarios in the region, including reducing the US military presence or dealing with an escalation or a sudden military attack, such as a missile attack or by drones. Thus, Tel Aviv could create common military and strategic interests with a number of Arab countries, especially the UAE, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and perhaps Saudi Arabia later if it could, to deal with the vast Iranian influence and create a strategic balance of power in the region. This does not mean, of course, that Israel wants to completely abandon the strategic alliance with the United States, but it wants to be ready to deal with all scenarios in the region, including reducing the US military presence or dealing with an escalation or a sudden military attack, such as a missile attack or by drones. Thus, Tel Aviv could create common military and strategic interests with a number of Arab countries, especially the UAE, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and perhaps Saudi Arabia later if it could, to deal with the vast Iranian influence and create a strategic balance of power in the region.

Second: Marketing Israeli arms: Tel Aviv is looking forward to marketing its military and security products with Arab countries, thus expanding its investment options to serve its developed industrial economy. Some estimates indicate that there are a thousand Israeli companies engaged in the sale of weapons, which vary between robots, unmanned aircraft, command and control systems, as well as radars and electronic warfare equipment, missile and air defense products, as well as manned aircraft, avionics, and surveillance equipment; As well as intelligence and communication systems (18). Although Tel Aviv is still afraid of transferring advanced technology to Arab countries, with the aim of preserving its advanced defense technologies and qualitative superiority in the region, military cooperation and the sale of defense systems to Arab countries can achieve an important breakthrough for Arab security/military systems and help them gather information and consolidate dominance and influence.

Many reports indicate that the Israeli arms companies were the main winners from the normalization agreements. Where arms companies expanded in the new Arab markets and became a major source of the arms market. Tel Aviv and Israeli arms companies are looking to respond to the increasing demands for the purchase of advanced Israeli defense systems and weapons, in light of the increasing security risks and missile attacks, especially by drones. After Israel signed defense agreements and security understandings with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco, arms manufacturers concluded contracts with these countries worth more than three billion dollars, while the new market helped push Israel’s military exports to a record level of $11.3 billion in 2021. According to the Ministry of Defense Israeli, military sales to the Gulf countries with which normalization agreements were signed amounted to 7% of total exports for the year 2021 (19). In the details, Israel signed a deal with Morocco to build drone factories, and Morocco bought the Israeli Skylock air defense system and dozens of drones from Israeli industries. In the same vein, the UAE has purchased an advanced mobile air defense system, produced by Rafael and known as “Spider”, which is used to shoot down missiles and drones. The UAE aims to use this system to repel attacks by drones and missiles, especially those that could be launched by the Houthi group from Yemen (20).

Third: Energy Resources: A new dynamic is emerging that could have major geopolitical implications, represented by the integration of Israel into a modest but potentially important source of natural gas, in light of the global energy crisis and European countries’ efforts to stop importing Russian gas. For decades, Israel’s dependence on energy imports has been a major concern for its political and military elite. As it did not have any known reserves and lived in constant tension with its Arab surroundings. Therefore, it had to rely on imports from sources such as Colombia, Russia, South Africa and South America. After the discovery and development of the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields in the Mediterranean and, more recently, Karish and Tanin, Israel has been able to reduce coal-fired electricity generation from 60% to 30%. It also aims to completely end the use of coal by 2025 with increasing reliance on renewable solar energy.

Benefiting from its new reserves of offshore gas, Israel has reached an agreement to demarcate the maritime borders with Lebanon, and recently concluded agreements to sell gas to Egypt and Jordan. Israel also joined the Cairo-based East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which includes Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. While the immediate purpose of this forum is to explore how to export gas from the region to both Europe and other markets, it has also gained strategic importance as an international organization recognized by the United Nations and reflects broader regional consensus(22). And through joint energy projects, Tel Aviv aspires to expand its other economic opportunities, such as the energy-for-water partnership between Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, which was announced in November 2021.

scenarios

A set of scenarios interact in Israel’s relations with the Arab countries, which can be summarized as follows:

Hegemony in the region: Israel aims in the future to develop its regional defense, economic and cultural relations with a number of Arab countries, through small but steady and continuous steps that ensure the promotion of Israel’s interests and its regional hegemony, especially in the field of security and defense. Selling arms to Arab countries will not only guarantee Tel Aviv additional financial resources for its treasury, but will also influence defense and security priorities in Arab countries. However, with the passage of time, the increase in cooperation networks and relations with Arab countries may lead to the creation of new situations in which Israel contradicts the interests of its Arab allies. Israel, especially the right, does not proceed in its relations with Arab countries on the basis of common and mutual interests, but rather seeks in the first place to achieve Israeli regional hegemony and to establish Israel as a leader in the region, which may create future geopolitical contradictions and strategic rivalries, even among Tel Aviv’s allies, especially With regard to cooperation in the field of the Iranian file; Not all countries in the region share all goals with Tel Aviv, and there are differences in political and geostrategic interests that may prevent the formation of a solid military alliance against Iran.   

Settlement with the Palestinians: Despite the optimism that the Arab and Israeli parties are trying to show about the burgeoning cooperation, the rise of the Israeli right to power in Israel, with its principled rejection of peace with the Palestinians, will constitute a real challenge in transforming relations with Arab countries into a real peace. The main problem stems from the structural, social, and demographic shifts within Israeli society, which currently tend to support the right and religious parties on the one hand, and reject peace with the Palestinians, on the other hand. Without a solution to the Palestinian issue, Israel will face mounting challenges towards bringing about a radical revolution in its Arab relations. The normalization agreements have diminished the chances of public opinion pushing Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians, and the pressure on the Palestinians is likely to increase with the rise of hard-line religious and Yemeni parties to power. In light of the exclusion of the two-state solution, the next government coalition, which will rely on the votes of the right-wing and extremist religious parties, will have two basic options: either maintaining the status quo or escalating the military option with the Palestinians. In both cases, widespread popular and military protests could erupt – which, by the way, have been going on for more than a year – which could lead to the disintegration and collapse of the Palestinian Authority. In this case, the Arab countries will find themselves forced to act. It is likely that some Arab countries will continue their relations with Israel regardless of its policies towards the Palestinians. However, other countries may oppose Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians, especially if the new government annexes parts of the West Bank or Judaizes Jerusalem. In this case, some of Israel’s allies in the region (such as Jordan) may find themselves opposing Israel’s steps and thus freezing or withdrawing from bilateral relations. Either maintain the status quo or escalate the military option with the Palestinians. In both cases, widespread popular and military protests could erupt – which, by the way, have been going on for more than a year – which could lead to the disintegration and collapse of the Palestinian Authority. In this case, the Arab countries will find themselves forced to act. It is likely that some Arab countries will continue their relations with Israel regardless of its policies towards the Palestinians. However, other countries may oppose Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians, especially if the new government annexes parts of the West Bank or Judaizes Jerusalem. In this case, some of Israel’s allies in the region (such as Jordan) may find themselves opposing Israel’s steps and thus freezing or withdrawing from bilateral relations. Either maintain the status quo or escalate the military option with the Palestinians. In both cases, widespread popular and military protests could erupt – which, by the way, have been going on for more than a year – which could lead to the disintegration and collapse of the Palestinian Authority. In this case, the Arab countries will find themselves forced to act. It is likely that some Arab countries will continue their relations with Israel regardless of its policies towards the Palestinians. However, other countries may oppose Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians, especially if the new government annexes parts of the West Bank or Judaizes Jerusalem. In this case, some of Israel’s allies in the region (such as Jordan) may find themselves opposing Israel’s steps and thus freezing or withdrawing from bilateral relations. In both cases, widespread popular and military protests could erupt – which, by the way, have been going on for more than a year – which could lead to the disintegration and collapse of the Palestinian Authority. In this case, the Arab countries will find themselves forced to act. It is likely that some Arab countries will continue their relations with Israel regardless of its policies towards the Palestinians. However, other countries may oppose Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians, especially if the new government annexes parts of the West Bank or Judaizes Jerusalem. In this case, some of Israel’s allies in the region (such as Jordan) may find themselves opposing Israel’s steps and thus freezing or withdrawing from bilateral relations. In both cases, widespread popular and military protests could erupt – which, by the way, have been going on for more than a year – which could lead to the disintegration and collapse of the Palestinian Authority. In this case, the Arab countries will find themselves forced to act. It is likely that some Arab countries will continue their relations with Israel regardless of its policies towards the Palestinians. However, other countries may oppose Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians, especially if the new government annexes parts of the West Bank or Judaizes Jerusalem. In this case, some of Israel’s allies in the region (such as Jordan) may find themselves opposing Israel’s steps and thus freezing or withdrawing from bilateral relations. It is likely that some Arab countries will continue their relations with Israel regardless of its policies towards the Palestinians. However, other countries may oppose Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians, especially if the new government annexes parts of the West Bank or Judaizes Jerusalem. In this case, some of Israel’s allies in the region (such as Jordan) may find themselves opposing Israel’s steps and thus freezing or withdrawing from bilateral relations. It is likely that some Arab countries will continue their relations with Israel regardless of its policies towards the Palestinians. However, other countries may oppose Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians, especially if the new government annexes parts of the West Bank or Judaizes Jerusalem. In this case, some of Israel’s allies in the region (such as Jordan) may find themselves opposing Israel’s steps and thus freezing or withdrawing from bilateral relations.

Joint air cooperation: Although the idea of ​​​​establishing an “Arab NATO” that was previously proposed and received limited support from the countries of the region seems far-fetched now in view of the geopolitical realities, air defense cooperation and the sale of Israeli weapons to counter air, missile and drone threats could be a preferable option. by Israel and its allies. In June 2022, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz officially announced the establishment of a “joint air defense alliance in the Middle East” to confront what Tel Aviv and its allies describe as Iranian threats (23). Unconfirmed reports also indicate that Israel has deployed radar systems in the UAE and Bahrain (24). The Negev Summit has already discussed military cooperation in the field of air defense (25). However, it remains unlikely that cooperation will turn into a broad air defense alliance, due to the difference in capabilities, goals, and geopolitical interests between Israel and the Arab countries.   

Increasing military sales: Israeli interest in Arab arms markets, especially defensive ones, is increasing, and the sales circle will most likely expand in the future to include border protection, electronic defences, and protection of airports and power stations (26). With Israel’s desire to sell more weapons, some Arab countries may fear expanding the circle of Israeli military purchases, for fear of increasing dependence on Israel in its military structure, and thus Israel’s penetration of its security sphere. Also, arms deals with Israel could eventually lead to the region entering an arms race that will likely multiply rather than reduce the risks to Arab countries, especially since Iran is closely monitoring Israeli-Gulf cooperation (27).

Expanding cooperation in the field of energy and investments: Israel is currently working on exporting natural gas to Egypt and Jordan and aims to expand its cooperation to include countries in the region that have aspirations to become a hub for the global natural gas market, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates(28). In the future, cooperation with Arab countries will favor Israel’s access to and investment in strategic ports and roads as a gateway to the Asian and European markets, which will expand Tel Aviv’s options as an industrial country in eliminating the effects of domestic and international market fluctuations and energy prices.

Conclusion

Israel’s relations with some Arab countries are currently flourishing in the diplomatic, military, tourism and economic fields, but it is unlikely that these relations will turn into a deep revolution. It is not expected that a comprehensive shift in relations will occur before a solution to the Palestinian issue is reached. Since peace with the Palestinians is no longer on the table in the near future within the Israeli political agenda, a setback in Arab-Israeli relations remains likely, especially if Israel escalates its policies against the Palestinians in a way that leads to the disintegration of the Palestinian Authority or the outbreak of a new intifada. In other words, the Israelis themselves could spoil the development of their relations with the Arabs if they do not make concessions towards peace with the Palestinians.

Source: Al Jazeera Studies – the article entitled Israel’s Relations with the Arab Countries: Towards a New Regional Equation, published on 11/17/2022

About the author

Mahmoud Jaraba

Dr.. Mahmoud Jarabaa, a researcher specializing in Palestinian affairs and its regional intersections. He holds a PhD in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany. Jaraba is currently a researcher at the Erlangen Institute for the Study of Islam and Law in Europe, and previously worked at a number of research centers such as the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, the Max Planck Institute for Anthropological Research, and the Bavarian Academy for Human Sciences.

Reference

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  6. DW, Report: Netanyahu confirms his rejection of the Arab Peace Initiative in its current form, June 14, 2016 (accessed November 13, 2022):  https://kurzelinks.de/opgs
  7. See more about this strategy: Mahmoud Jarabaa, A New Phase of Arab-Israeli Normalization and Its Prospects, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, December 25, 2018, (accessed November 13, 2022):  https://kurzelinks.de/vi9p

Prime Minister’s Office, PM Netanyahu’s Speech at the United Nations General Assembly,

  1. 22.09.2016,  https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/speechun220916
  2. Uzi Rabi, Israel and the Arab Middle East—A New Geopolitical Architecture, The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, June 2022, https://jstribune.com/rabi-israel-and-the-arab-middle-east/
  3. See, Aya Batrawy, Quiet ties and secret talks paved way for UAE-Israel deal, AP, 19.08.2020, https://kurzelinks.de/oxti 
  4.   Taj al-Din al-Abdalawi, King of Morocco assures Abbas of his country’s commitment to defending the rights of the Palestinians, Anadolu Agency, December 10, 2020 (accessed November 13, 2022):  https://kurzelinks.de/ks2p
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  6. See for more: Lehi Ben Shitrit and Mahmoud Jaraba, The Deal of the Century: The Rise of the Sovereign Movement in Israel and the Failure of the Two-State Solution, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, February 26, 2020, (accessed November 13, 2022):  https://studies.aljazeera .net/ar/article/4581
  7.  Tamar Hermann and Or Anabi, On the Eve of the Jewish New Year: How Optimistic Are Israelis and What Are Their Opinions on Iran and the Two-State Solution?, The Israel Democracy Institute, 25.09.2022, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/46000
  8. Amos Gilead, The challenges and opportunities for Israel’s national security in the coming year, Institute for Policy and Strategy, September, 2021, https://kurzelinks.de/oni4 
  9. Amos Yadlin and Assaf Orion, Israel’s New Strategy Why a Post-American Middle East Means a Greater Role in Regional Security, Foreign Affairs, February 18, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2022-02-18/israels-new-strategy 
  10. Caroline Glick, Israel’s Choice: Independence or Appeasement, Israel Today, 23.09.2022, https://www.israeltoday.co.il/read/israels-choice-independence-or-appeasement/ 
  11.   Adnan Abu Amer, In numbers… This is how Israel markets its armament deals across the world, Al-Jazeera Channel, May 7, 2021 (accessed November 13, 2022):  https://kurzelinks.de/d5ym
  12. Dion Nissenbaum, Israel’s Defense Industry Is Big Winner Two Years After Abraham Accords, The Wall Street Journal, 09.10.2022, https://kurzelinks.de/y01j  
  13. The Times of Israel, Israel said ready to sell advanced air defense system to UAE, 23.09.2022, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-said-to-sell-advanced-air-defense-system-to-uae/    
  14. Victoria Coates, New Energy Dynamics: The Decline of OPEC, the Rise of the US—and of the Eastern Mediterranean, The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, 08. 2021, https://jstribune.com/victoria-coates-opec-energy-israel-greece-eastmed/   
  15. Ibid
  16. Muhammad Watad, a “defensive” alliance led by Washington.. Will Israel use the countries of the region to confront Iran?, Al Jazeera, June 21, 2022 (accessed November 13, 2022):  https://kurzelinks.de/e0rq 
  17. Debbie Mohnblatt, Israel Reportedly Deployed Radars to the UAE and Bahrain, Angering Iran, the Medialine, 13.06.2022, https://kurzelinks.de/hsfo 
  18.   i24news, Report: The Negev Summit will discuss the establishment of a security cooperation mechanism to confront air and sea threats, March 27, 2022 (accessed November 13, 2022):  https://kurzelinks.de/tzaf
  19.  Al-Jazeera Channel, To repel Houthi attacks.. Israel agrees to sell an air defense system to the UAE, September 22, 2022, (accessed November 13, 2022):  https://kurzelinks.de/doww
  20. Paul R. Pillar, The Middle East Non-Peace Accords and Non-Cooperation on Russia, The National Interest, 29.03.2022, https://kurzelinks.de/3koy  
  21. Victoria Coates, Ibid.

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SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a bachelor's degree in political science and international relations as well as a Master's degree in international security studies, alongside a passion for web development. During my studies, I gained a strong understanding of key political concepts, theories in international relations, security and strategic studies, as well as the tools and research methods used in these fields.

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