A number of variables have diminished the priority of counter-terrorism efforts in American policy. Notably, these include the withdrawal of Washington from Afghanistan and Iraq and the reduced capabilities of Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Iraq and Syria to carry out attacks. Additionally, U.S. foreign policy priorities have shifted toward focusing on the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Nonetheless, remnants and branches of terrorist organizations continue to exist in the Middle East and Africa, leaving significant parts of these regions unstable and unpredictable. Anti-Western sentiments persist in Afghanistan, Syria, the Sahel, and other areas, making future terrorist attacks unlikely to be ruled out.
In this context, the significance of the 2023 “Terrorism Threat Assessment” report by the Rand Corporation becomes evident. The report highlights that while terrorism has diminished under new circumstances, it still exists, necessitating that Washington remains prepared and engaged in continuous deterrence, especially given the evolving capabilities of terrorist groups. The report outlines a framework for assessing terrorist threats that can complement the effective efforts currently being undertaken by the U.S. counter-terrorism community, particularly as this issue no longer serves as the primary focus of U.S. national security planning.
According to the report, the anticipated sources of terrorist threats can be divided into two categories. The first includes large terrorist groups hostile to the United States, primarily in the Greater Middle East and its surroundings. The second comprises widely dispersed networks of small cells or individual extremists. Currently, the first category of terrorists possesses the most capacity to execute highly destructive attacks, as both centralized and decentralized groups may have access to advanced means for facilitating attacks, such as increasingly affordable and accessible drone systems, data networks, artificial intelligence, and possibly biological agents.
The functions that U.S. counter-terrorism institutions must perform to prevent attacks can be summarized as follows: collecting and analyzing intelligence, directly engaging terrorists, disrupting their command, control, and communications, creating an unfavorable environment for international terrorist travel, denying terrorists safe havens, hindering terrorist recruitment, disrupting terrorist financing, rallying and maintaining international cooperation, recruiting, supporting, and managing local partners and agents, and protecting critical targets.
Assessment Framework:
The assessment framework for terrorist threats proposed by the Rand Corporation considers the capabilities and intentions of known terrorist organizations and compares them with the strategies and means the United States and its partners might employ to combat them, provided there is a suitable strategy and adequate tools. This assessment should align with what U.S. policymakers regard as acceptable limits to the probability and magnitude of threats, particularly the most severe ones. The assessment framework is based on key elements: consequences, threats, objectives, and capabilities, which can be detailed as follows:
Consequences: Although determining expected consequences before a terrorist attack is challenging, they remain the driving force behind decisions related to policies and resources. For instance, the Transportation Security Administration was established to prevent an attack similar to the September 11 events. Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security deploys radiation detection devices at key transportation centers to prevent nuclear or radiological attacks. Such capabilities exist because these types of attacks could have severe consequences, which can be described objectively (for example, losses and economic damage) or individually (for example, American citizens demanding their government protect them, leading to investments that exceed needs).
Threats: The Rand assessment framework takes into account the intent, capability, and accessibility of terrorist groups, enabling policymakers to understand the evolution of these organizations. The report outlines the vision of the terrorist threat in two dimensions: the terrorist groups themselves and terrorism as a form of political expression. For the first, there will be distinct capabilities upon which U.S. capacities can be based for counteraction, and the assessment will resemble traditional evaluation methods used to compare the armies of nation-states. In terms of the second aspect of the terrorist threat, the comparison will be less quantitative but still necessary as it will address considerations not linked to specific terrorist groups, aiding in policy direction, planning, and budgetary decisions.
Objectives: This consists of two main components: the target of the terrorist attack and the executive decision to attempt the attack. The target can be very broad (for example, an attack on a prominent landmark in the United States without specifying which one), while the executive decision is specific, requiring certain capabilities and subject to the ordinary decision-making processes of organizations regarding risks and probabilities of success. The objective also applies to counter-terrorism as a method of political expression; predicting the existence of a threat of specific types of terrorist attacks, even if not linked to specific groups, will provide insight into the capabilities needed to thwart them.
The U.S. government’s understanding of the objectives of a particular terrorist group is based on intelligence—both classified and open-source. Over multiple presidential administrations, the United States has focused on foreign terrorist groups that pose a threat to attack the U.S., American interests abroad, or key U.S. partners and allies. Over the past decade, these terrorist groups have included Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and certain affiliates, along with various organizations receiving direct support from Iran (for example, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite militias, and the Houthis).
Capabilities: The Rand assessment framework considers the ability of a terrorist group to carry out a dangerous attack of any kind against the United States or its domestic or foreign interests. A terrorist group may express its intention to target the U.S., yet lack the personnel, material, financial resources, infrastructure, and training necessary for successful attack planning, preparation, and execution. This expression of intent can motivate others to act.
In this context, there are two categories of capabilities required by a terrorist organization: those that maintain the group’s presence and those that provide the ability to carry out a specific attack. The first category relates to organizational capabilities, including elements such as ideology, leadership, recruitment, and propaganda. The second pertains to operational capabilities, encompassing elements such as command, control, weaponry, operational space, operational security, training, basic intelligence, technical expertise and specialists, sources of external weaponry, funding, and deception skills.
Here, the assessment of counter-terrorism capability shifts towards comparing the means necessary to confront known terrorist threats with the means required for caution and preparedness. Understanding the various capabilities that can be utilized against more than one threat simultaneously indicates the American tools needed to keep the country safe. Importantly, assessments are not solely about quantitative comparisons of capabilities; it is crucial to determine whether terrorists view their capabilities as sufficient to overcome U.S. counter-terrorism methods. In this regard, deterrence is a critical factor influencing the decision-making process of a terrorist organization or group, particularly regarding whether to launch an attack and how to do so, and thus should be part of American planning.
Although the Rand report does not specifically examine the deterrence of terrorist groups, if terrorists perceive U.S. counter-terrorism preparations as strong enough to render an attack perilous, their intentions will likely be positively affected, leading to a decreased threat and reduced risks.
Accessing Targets
In this context, “access” refers to both physical access and the belief held by a terrorist group that it can succeed with manageable risks. For instance, a terrorist organization aiming to attack a commercial aircraft must first navigate airport security and consider the possibility of an air marshal who could thwart the attack on the plane.
While terrorist groups have executed successful attacks against American interests abroad over the past two decades, a significant and coordinated attack against the United States has not occurred since September 11. This is largely due to the collaboration between U.S. intelligence agencies, law enforcement, military counter-terrorism entities, and support from foreign allies and partners.
The likelihood of a terrorist group being able to launch a physical attack that results in significant casualties hinges on three essential factors: (1) the existence of a target with exploitable vulnerabilities, (2) the belief within the terrorist group that the risk of attacking a specific target with such vulnerabilities is acceptable, and (3) the possession of the necessary capabilities, which vary according to U.S. counter-terrorism measures.
The Rand report ultimately warns that in an open society like the United States, there will always be a vast number of targets that are more susceptible to terrorist threats when viewed in isolation from one another. For example, any large gathering of people presents a certain level of vulnerability. However, because U.S. counter-terrorism efforts have been significantly successful, we assess vulnerabilities—or the likelihood of a successful attack—by comparing them to American capabilities, considering how widespread these vulnerabilities are, and how they are perceived by terrorists.
The absence of subsequent foreign attacks within the United States since September 11 indicates that as long as U.S. capabilities are maintained, deployed appropriately, and perceived as such by terrorists, there is a substantial opportunity to deter or prevent major terrorist attacks.
Source: Terrence K. Kelly, David C. Gompert, Karen M. Sudkamp, Terrorism Net Assessment, Research Report, The RAND Corporation, 2023.
