Chadian President Mohamed Idriss Déby visited Hungary on September 8, 2024, at the invitation of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Budapest has expressed a clear interest in enhancing security ties with N’Djamena, raising questions about Hungary’s motives for bolstering these relations at this particular time, especially given the ongoing changes in Africa’s Sahel region and increasing international competition there.
Several Motivations
Several factors are driving Hungary’s interest in strengthening its security ties with Chad, including:
A Distinctive and Independent Approach from Europe
The European military withdrawal from the Sahel region exposed the failure of Europe’s security strategy, and Hungary is looking to capitalize on this under the vision of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who follows a path independent of general European policies. Hungarian-European relations are currently marked by growing tension due to Orbán’s opposition to what he calls the “Brussels elite.” Key points of contention include accusations against Budapest concerning democratic practices, while Orbán views the European Union as a haven for liberals and leftists. Within this context, Budapest’s interest in security relations with Chad underscores its opposition to European policies in the Sahel, showing Hungary’s determination to provide a different security approach from other European nations.
Expanding Security Presence in the Sahel
Hungary is positioning Chad as a security focal point to extend its political and security influence in the Sahel. Chad appears relatively stable compared to Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Budapest also seeks to fill the void left by Europe’s diminished presence, especially after taking over the rotating presidency of the European Union in July 2024. Hungary is working to strengthen its presence in the region and capitalize on Europe’s security failures to draw closer to Sahel countries.
This may explain Hungary’s announcement of plans to deploy 200–400 soldiers to Chad in 2024. In November 2023, the Hungarian parliament approved a proposal by Defense Minister Kristóf Szalay-Bobrovniczky regarding the mission of these forces. This marks Hungary’s first operation in the region, as it did not previously participate in European counter-terrorism efforts there. Analysts suggest that, since NATO’s mission in Afghanistan ended in 2021, the Hungarian army has lacked a challenging operational environment, prompting Hungary to initially seek involvement in “Task Force Takuba” before its collapse in Niger following the July 2023 coup. Hungary then turned its attention to Chad to enhance its military presence.
Supporting Cooperation on Illegal Migration Control
Observers note a rift between Budapest and other EU member states regarding migration. Prime Minister Orbán’s government embraces right-wing, anti-migrant views, accusing the EU of failing to prevent irregular migration at its source.
In this regard, the Hungarian government has approved a complex assistance program, encompassing economic, humanitarian, and social elements, to help Chadian authorities maintain the country’s stability and curb illegal migration. Some experts argue that Hungary is primarily concerned with its own interests, viewing its presence in Chad as a way to reduce the number of refugees it is required to accept under EU quotas. International reports indicate that Chad hosts the world’s largest number of refugees, even though a third of its citizens require humanitarian aid. This compels Hungary to support the current Chadian government and ensure its stability.
Exploiting Chad’s Interest in Diversifying Security Partnerships
During his visit to Budapest on September 8, 2024, President Mohamed Idriss Déby called on Hungary to deploy a military force in Chad. Chad is also keen to strengthen military cooperation with Hungary, particularly in obtaining technical means, weapons, and equipment for the Chadian army, as well as receiving advisory services, operational support, and military oversight. The Hungarian Ministry of Defense confirmed that the mission of Hungary’s military contingent will be based on the Chadian authorities’ request, further solidifying cooperation agreements between the two nations, particularly in diplomatic, humanitarian, and defense matters.
Multiple Implications
Hungary’s security initiatives are likely to have far-reaching consequences for both international interactions and the Sahel region:
Increasing Tension and Division within the European Union
Despite Hungary’s current presidency of the European Union, Hungarian-European relations are increasingly strained. This tension has been fueled by Prime Minister Orbán’s visit to Russia in July 2024 and Budapest’s foreign policy stance, particularly on the Russian-Ukrainian war and the Sahel. Hungary opposed Ukraine’s EU accession talks in June 2024 and previously vetoed the EU’s decision to allocate €1.4 billion from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. Hungary has also used its veto power multiple times to block military aid to Ukraine.
Hungary has diverged from the EU’s consensus on supporting NATO’s efforts for Ukraine, refusing to participate in arms shipments or the training of Ukrainian forces. Thus, Hungary’s decision to deploy troops in Chad without coordination with France, which still maintains a reduced military presence in Chad with around 300 soldiers (compared to 1,000 before), could further exacerbate tensions and competition between France and Hungary in Chad.
Strengthening Hungary-Russia Cooperation in the Sahel
This move has raised concerns in Europe that Hungary may be acting on Russia’s behalf. Hungary has denied representing Moscow or any other foreign interest through its special envoy to the Sahel, László Máté. However, international reports suggest that Hungary is prepared for closer cooperation with Russia. Prime Minister Orbán’s son, Gáspár Orbán, has been heavily involved in strengthening ties with Chad, and there have been reports of his role in creating a new national security advisory group. These developments come amid increased Russian activity in Chad.
Some analysts speculate that Hungary may be working to establish a military intelligence center in Chad, likely serving Russian interests. Orbán is also interested in accessing uranium deposits, potentially linked to Budapest’s nuclear energy project with Russia. Hungary has refused to endorse sanctions on Rosatom, raising the possibility of Hungary aiding Russia in controlling Chad’s uranium reserves while limiting French companies’ access. This aligns with Kremlin efforts to expel France from Africa. Additionally, Gáspár Orbán visited Chad in 2024, as well as Niger, a country also rich in uranium and controlled by a Russian-backed military junta.
Rising Domestic Opposition to Hungary’s Military Role
Hungary’s military mission in Chad faces growing opposition at home, with critics denouncing it as a wasteful and futile military adventure. Military personnel have also raised concerns, and opposition parties have increasingly criticized the involvement of Gáspár Orbán, who was secretly involved in negotiations with N’Djamena and was officially appointed as the “liaison officer for the mission’s preparation.” The mission also faces technical and financial challenges, fueling ongoing domestic criticism.
Hungary’s Potential Involvement in Chad’s Internal Conflicts
Although Hungary’s military mission in Chad is intended to combat terrorism, provide humanitarian aid, and support efforts against illegal migration, political observers point out that internal political conflicts, particularly between President Déby and his rivals within the ruling family, may compel Déby to seek Hungarian assistance against domestic foes. Additionally, the ongoing tensions and lack of a peace agreement between the Chadian government and foreign-based armed groups present significant security challenges that could test Hungary’s military mission.
Reshaping Alliances
In conclusion, Hungary’s military and security involvement in the Sahel is reshaping alliances and political dynamics in the region. Hungary’s increasing role, potentially as a closer ally of Russia and China, is introducing new scenarios, which could lead to greater military involvement by Ukraine in the region. This also reflects growing divisions within the European Union, which may intensify due to differing approaches to the crises in Ukraine and the Sahel.
Hungary is expected to continue expanding its presence in other Sahel countries like Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, particularly since Hungary has shown no objection to Russia’s Wagner forces operating in these countries. However, Hungary’s limited financial capacity to extend its military presence may push it to coordinate its policies more closely with Russia in the region, possibly deploying a small number of troops in specific nations.
