The sharp nature of the Russian-Ukrainian war has brought the military term “high-intensity war” to the forefront. French President Emmanuel Macron referenced this term in January during a speech at the Mont-de-Marsan Air Base, where he announced an increase in France’s military budget from 2024 to 2030 to €413 billion, compared to the current €295 billion budget for 2019 to 2025. This marks a 40% rise in French defense spending, reaching €59 billion annually by 2030, compared to the current plan’s €42 billion, with the aim of ensuring the French armed forces’ ability to “engage in large-scale, high-intensity conflicts.”
In this context, a study by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) by Elie Tenenbaum in July 2023 discusses “high-intensity war” as one of the most significant challenges of future warfare, and the challenges it poses to the French armed forces. The concept of high intensity has become a source of debate and misunderstanding within the French defense community. Questions arise such as: What exactly is high-intensity conflict? On what scale should this term be understood? How is it different from any major combat operation? And what is its relationship with nuclear deterrence?
The author argues that while political strategies may retain some ambiguity, it is up to military strategists to interpret or clarify them. To do so, it is essential to examine the concept theoretically, then place it within its political and strategic context by distinguishing between high political intensity in war and high military capability intensity. This involves reconsidering how the concept relates to deterrence and proposing potential scenarios for French engagement, with the goal of identifying the tactical characteristics of a high-intensity battlefield and determining priorities for developing the French armed forces.
The Nature of the Concept and Its Application Limits
The author suggests that the concept of high intensity is multifaceted, but it can be understood in its most realistic form through physical scale. By transferring the idea of intensity to the battlefield, the intensity of combat (I) can be determined by the relationship between the kinetic energy (EK) of any moving object entering the battlefield over the product of the battlefield’s volume (V) and the duration of combat (T). This simple equation is intuitively appealing because it links intensity with the “density” of military means and a certain type of “focus of effort.”
The ability to generate large amounts of kinetic energy is structurally tied to the complexity and technological advancement of military equipment, and thus to capital intensity. For instance, fighters equipped with hand-thrown weapons (arrows and spears) are less capable than those equipped with anti-tank missiles. Therefore, it makes sense to judge combat intensity as a function of a given technological era. The Roman legions may have been high-intensity in their day, but when faced with 21st-century equipment, they would be a low-threat force.
Additionally, considering the issue from the perspective of capital intensity suggests a revision of the strict, active approach to intensity. Technological advancements in military equipment are partly aimed at increasing kinetic power. Progress in materials and communications, especially in range and accuracy, leads to only marginal increases in kinetic energy on the battlefield, but plays a crucial role in enhancing system effectiveness through increased capital intensity. Lethality is a well-known outcome that has been extensively studied in military history, linking high intensity with bloodier wars. It is important to note the paradox here: the sharp rise in lethal weapons at the start of the 20th century led to increased dispersion of combat forces, mathematically reducing density relative to the battlefield’s size, even as technological intensity continued to advance. Based on this triad of energy, technology, and lethality, a broader concept emerges known as “capability intensity.”
The Duality of High-Intensity Wars:
Highlighting the international conditions leading to severe conflict prompts us to reconsider its relationship with the level of political engagement. High-intensity conflict is often associated with the concept of “major process/war,” viewed as a long-term political and strategic war due to the fundamental/vital interests of one party being at stake. The higher the risks, the greater the political intensity, leading to a full mobilization of the population, economy, and all aspects of national life.
The author emphasizes that tactical fighting will become intense for any individual involved. For French soldiers who engaged in Bosnia in 1995, Afghanistan in 2009, and Mali in 2013, it can be said that each of these engagements was high-intensity at the individual level, especially considering the overall duration and spatial scope of these conflicts, despite them being globally low-intensity due to the disparity of means between the sides in these conflicts.
In an asymmetric conflict, the kinetic energy that the weaker side can apply is extremely limited by its economic, technological, and military resources. This pushes the weaker side to maximize other factors such as mobility, concealment, and reliance on non-material elements (ideology, psychology, and information), among others, to pursue its strategy.
Thus, once we move beyond the tactical level, the intensity of conflict depends on more comprehensive aspects of power balance. The American unipolar moment at the end of the Cold War meant that, at least for Western powers, the prospect of high-capacity wars was unlikely due to their overwhelming superiority in military, economic, and technological domains.
Naturally, this did not signify the end of war but the beginning of a new pattern of conflict characterized by asymmetry, reflected in Western military power. Since the early 2000s, while Western powers were mired in marginal conflicts, a profound shift on the global stage occurred with China emerging as an economic, then technological and military power, alongside India and, to a lesser extent, Brazil, as well as Russia’s strategic rise in its traditional areas of influence, including the Middle East and Africa, and challenges from regional powers like Turkey and Iran.
As a result, the strategic landscape has been disrupted by a mix of growing military means and the attempts of many powerful states to revise the post-Cold War international system. This mix of means and intentions by certain actors in the geopolitical sphere has manifested in what is now known as “strategic competition,” potentially bringing about a return to shocks between major and/or medium powers, either directly through military confrontation or more covertly through challenging one power’s strength in ways that remain below the threshold of war.
In this context, the triad of “competition, conflict, and confrontation” should not be understood as successive stages in the international system but as overlapping domains. Therefore, “high-intensity war” can be understood as one of the military forms of strategic competition, with the other face being hybrid warfare and what is known as gray zone operations. Given that high-intensity war means complete liberation from the constraints imposed on the side that believes, rightly or wrongly, that it can absorb these costs and risks, as is the case with Russia in Ukraine.
The Persistence of Nuclear Deterrence:
The author argues that the distinction between political density and military capability density needs to be reexamined, particularly in France, where the protection of vital interests is guaranteed by nuclear deterrence. The existence of nuclear weapons and their deterrent effect may not guarantee against the risk of a high-intensity war, but it sets an upper limit on the range of possibilities. Nevertheless, there remains a broad range of scenarios that, while remaining below the threshold of vital interests, far exceed the requirements associated with warfare.
The author believes that any act of aggression or even a security crisis could lead to the activation of key elements with high-density capabilities, potentially beyond Paris’s control. It is not difficult to imagine a request in the context of a high-density conflict from a country with which France has defense agreements containing mandatory assistance clauses—such as Greece and Djibouti—or even through one of the “strategic partnerships.” Thus, the problem of so-called “proxies” is a significant factor in engagement scenarios because any direct confrontation between France and another major nuclear power would, at some point in the logical unfolding of the security dilemma, involve activating deterrent forces. For this reason, the hypothesis of a major war is often seen by France as a distant possibility.
Operating in a High-Density Environment:
The author draws from Donald Rumsfeld’s saying: “You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time,” and advises that this sentiment should strongly resonate within French defense circles planning a gradual shift to high-density combat capabilities by 2035. Although this date may seem distant due to daily fluctuations in the global strategic landscape, it should guide the preparation of forces and the development of their capabilities in line with the characteristics of high-density operational environments.
The author argues that the danger of such environments comes from attrition. Regardless of the army’s quality, it must have the minimum capacity to absorb losses, especially in terms of personnel. Having armed forces without a broad base of support means that replenishment becomes impossible, as if they could only be deployed once, severely limiting the political authority’s options and likely influencing its decisions. This is evident in European societies suffering from an aging population structure.
To address attrition, the alternative is to invest more in survivability through self-protection and armor, using electronic warfare systems and an integrated multi-layered air defense system, which can help forces by forming a moving shield around them. The ability to move quickly, remain concealed, and maintain situational awareness are all critical factors in enhancing survivability in the most lethal environments.
Finally, the ability to renew armed forces is crucial not only from a human perspective, with medical support needing to be reviewed in light of expected lethality, but also in terms of equipment, including maintenance, armored recovery vehicles, spare parts, and having adequately trained mechanics, without neglecting training. Even the most efficient army can lose its effectiveness within a few years or months without a proper operational preparation cycle capable of bringing well-trained forces to the front.
In conclusion, high-intensity warfare presents a significant and multifaceted challenge for the French armed forces as it tests the limits of the current force model adopted at the end of the Cold War. The primary role of nuclear weapons pushes the French defense community to be cautious of engagement scenarios that seem to fall within the scope of major war. Nevertheless, the distinction between political density and capability density should enable strategists to anticipate formations that do not reach the level of deterrence mechanisms but exceed the crisis management that has dominated military employment over the past three decades. Especially since the new French military programming law for 2024-2030, which includes an increase in defense spending, commits the French armed forces to the path of high-intensity warfare. Given that high-intensity warfare represents a significant possibility for the French armed forces, a possibility that cannot be dismissed solely based on France’s nuclear deterrent, the emergence of an unstable world characterized by multi-directional strategic competition calls for a reevaluation of traditional French missions.
The ability to engage in a high-intensity battlefield, which may fall below the threshold of vital interests, is not solely the responsibility of the armed forces. It also highlights the nation’s moral steadfastness and its ability to rise to this challenge by accepting the price of being a responsible major power and supportive ally, a status France still aspires to.
Source: Élie Tenenbaum, “High-Intensity Warfare: What Challenges for the French Armed Forces?”, Ifri, July 2023.
