“Latin America remains a region of secondary importance to the United States because no major power competitor exists there, nor is it a theater of active military confrontation or interstate war.” This statement dominated U.S. strategic thinking towards Latin America since the September 11, 2001 attacks, as Washington shifted its focus to the Middle East.
In contrast, over the past two decades, China and Russia have turned their attention to Latin America. Beijing has made significant economic and diplomatic advancements, while Moscow, to a lesser extent, has increased its diplomatic and military presence. This shift has prompted a reassessment of U.S. priorities in a region of growing geopolitical importance to Washington, especially as it competes with China and Russia in an emerging new international order.
The 2023 report by the RAND Corporation, titled “Great Power Competition and Conflict in Latin America,” explores four areas of competition for influence in the region between the United States, China, and Russia: diplomacy, information, military, and economics. However, it excludes Mexico from the scope of its study.
Diverging Perspectives:
The report highlights a range of overlapping geopolitical interests and objectives between the United States, China, and Russia in Latin America. These include balancing the influence of their rivals, projecting power in the region, and pursuing economic interests that vary from one country to another. Additionally, Washington has a vested interest in internal security due to its geographic proximity to Latin America. These interests can be broken down as follows:
The U.S. Perspective: Drug trafficking and illegal immigration have long been Washington’s primary concerns in Latin America, distracting it from the region’s growing geopolitical significance. However, recent U.S. policy documents, such as the Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy, acknowledge the region’s geopolitical importance within the broader strategic competition between the United States, China, and Russia.
This emphasis is echoed in the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, issued in March 2021, which underscores the importance of the Western Hemisphere alongside the Indo-Pacific and Europe. The document asserts that “the vital national interests of the United States require deeper engagement with the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere.”
Chinese Interests: Beijing’s geopolitical objectives in Latin America are twofold. First, it seeks to establish strategic partnerships to support China’s great power ambitions. Second, it aims to persuade countries that recognize Taiwan to revoke their recognition. In its efforts to find regional allies and counterbalance the United States, China has garnered support from several regimes in Latin America, such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, which are more likely than others in the region to adopt an anti-Washington stance and back China’s positions in regional and international forums like the United Nations.
Economically, China’s goal is to expand “trade and investment opportunities to support Chinese economic growth.” Beijing has strengthened its economic ties with the region since joining the World Trade Organization in 2001. In 2009, China participated in the first BRICS summit (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which was established as a group of the world’s five largest emerging economies at the time.
Russian Interests: Russia’s interests in Latin America are primarily geopolitical, focused on balancing U.S. influence and projecting power near its geographic proximity. While Russia does have economic ties to the region, these are not as significant as China’s partnerships. The report notes that Russia’s ability to project power close to the United States should be viewed in light of the Kremlin’s perception that the U.S. and NATO are encroaching on Russia’s sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, particularly in former Soviet states. These relationships also serve domestic political purposes for Moscow, which seeks to restore its image as a global power.
Areas of Competition:
The report identifies four main areas of competition between the United States, China, and Russia in Latin America: diplomacy, information, military, and the economy. It attempts to explain how the potential competition in these areas might affect regional conflict, emphasizing that the level of conflict is not uniform across Latin America. Case studies show that countries with the highest likelihood of competition among these powers are Brazil, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Argentina, and Venezuela, which represent the region’s largest economies and most populous nations. The areas of competition can be detailed as follows:
Diplomacy:
The competition in diplomacy between the U.S., China, and Russia across Latin America shows that the three powers have somewhat divergent regional priorities. The U.S. has focused its diplomatic influence on Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Brazil, with Colombia receiving the largest amount of U.S. foreign aid and the most high-level diplomatic visits. For Russia, the main countries of diplomatic interest are Cuba, Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Argentina, overlapping somewhat with the interests of Washington and Beijing due to their significance as large regional economies. China, on the other hand, has shown the most diplomatic interest in a mix of large economies (Brazil, Chile, Peru, Argentina) that have engaged in the most high-level diplomatic exchanges with China over the past two decades, as well as less developed economies (such as Jamaica and Guyana) and smaller nations (such as Costa Rica and Ecuador), which have also become investment destinations for China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Information:
The potential for information-based competition among the three powers in Latin America is higher—according to the data gathered by researchers—in Argentina, Cuba, Panama, and Uruguay. Mechanisms of competition in this domain focus on media presence and broadcasting partnerships. Russia has signed broadcasting agreements with Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay between 2016 and 2019, highlighting its growing interest in information influence activities in the region. Meanwhile, China’s “CCTV,” “China Radio International,” and “Xinhua News Agency” are present in Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Venezuela. China works to make its programs available to Latin American audiences through co-production deals and agreements with local broadcasters, often offering its content for free. It also provides online news and radio programs of the Chinese Communist Party in Spanish, while “Xinhua” and “China Radio International” offer services in Portuguese. Like Russia, Chinese state-owned media companies have struck deals with private and public broadcasters across Latin America, ensuring their programs reach wide audiences. The U.S., in contrast, relies less on its state-sponsored media platform “Voice of America,” as private outlets such as “CNN en Español” have a broad presence across Latin America.
Military:
Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, and Nicaragua are the countries where military competition between the three powers is most intense, based on the compiled data. Overall, the U.S. maintains the largest military footprint and has greater access across the entire region, including military bases at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Soto Cano, Honduras, as well as military access agreements with nine other countries in the region through airports, cooperative security sites, radar facilities, military offices, and training centers. The report notes that China has deliberately scaled back its military arrangements in Latin America to avoid being perceived as a military challenge to the U.S. in its hemisphere, with China’s military capabilities in the Western Hemisphere considered limited. Unlike China, Russia has made deliberate military incursions in the region in an attempt to project power, but its presence remains relatively limited and does not currently pose a significant challenge to the U.S. Colombia is the most important country in the region for the U.S. militarily, as it serves as Washington’s closest security partner in South America. Neither Russia nor China have military or defense cooperation agreements with Colombia, as the Colombian government has been unwilling to jeopardize its security partnership with the U.S. Meanwhile, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina are China’s top three countries of security interest in Latin America, and Beijing has signed defense cooperation and military-technical agreements with all three.
Economy:
The potential for economic competition is greatest in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Peru, the four largest economies in the region and major exporters of natural resources such as oil, copper, and iron. The report notes that foreign investment data analysis indicates these countries are the preferred destinations for foreign investment in Latin America. The U.S. remains the largest trading partner with Latin America, with total trade volume reaching about $761 billion in 2019, the last year for which data is available. China, the second-largest trading partner, had a total trade volume of about $315 billion by 2019. Russia lags far behind, with total trade of about $14 billion in 2019. Although the U.S. and China are the largest trading partners with Latin America, trade with the region holds more significance for Washington compared to Beijing, as it represents a relatively small percentage of China’s overall global trade (7%). Brazil, Chile, and Colombia are ranked highest by the U.S. in terms of potential for economic influence. China has increased its trade value with key economic actors in the region over the past decade: Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Colombia. This increase has coincided with a rise in Chinese diplomatic visits, beginning in 2010–2011, many aimed at boosting economic engagement. Russia’s trade with Latin America has been volatile and slightly declined over the past decade, and the report suggests it is unlikely that Russia will become a major economic player in the region in the near future.
Flashpoints:
Researchers assessed the likelihood of internal conflict in Latin American countries using two sources: the “Jane’s Conflict Risk Index” and the “Fragile States Index.” The following table lists the top ten countries based on the likelihood of internal conflict in the region.
Colombia ranks first, remaining a stage for Marxist insurgency since the early 1960s, with high levels of internal violence continuing after the 2016 peace agreement with FARC. Haiti follows, having experienced several waves of internal violence over the past two decades, including challenges such as gang violence and the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021. Venezuela and Bolivia also face their own internal conflicts.
Researchers combined the countries with the highest potential for internal conflict and those with the highest likelihood of competition among major powers. Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua emerged as the top four countries where both variables overlap.
Conclusion:
The report suggests that the perception of Latin America’s secondary importance in U.S. policy has begun to fade, driven by the shifting global strategic environment, particularly the increased Chinese presence in the region close to Washington and, to a lesser extent, the Russian presence. This has led to a shift in U.S. strategic focus towards Latin America. The report recommends that Washington maximize its capabilities to compete with China and Russia in the region, emphasizing that any future proxy conflict in the region would primarily be between Washington and Moscow, with China playing a smaller role. However, it does not rule out the possibility of China taking on a larger role in the future, particularly if Beijing decides to expand its activities in the military and security arenas, especially as China continues its rise in the international system.
Source: Irina A. Chindea, Elina Treyger, Raphael S. Cohen, and others, Great-Power Competition and Conflict in Latin America, The RAND Corporation, 2023.
