During the 1980s and 1990s, NATO forces adopted the “Air/Land Battle” strategy, which primarily relied on targeting enemy rear lines with precise tactical strikes using guided munitions to destabilize the enemy. This approach focused on attacking command centers, communication networks, and disrupting the decision-making circle through guided munitions, while maintaining sufficient flexibility for numerous offensive maneuvers to fight deep within enemy forces. This strategy exploited the weaknesses of the Soviet strategy, which were:
Tactical Stagnation: This was evident in the decision-making circle, which prevented any method of modifying military orders or tactical phases due to direct interference from command centers in every detail of the missions. It stifled any kind of innovation or development, helping the adversary predict the performance of the forces operating in the theater.
Inefficient Second-Tier Forces: Missions were determined, and based on them, reserve forces were summoned, leadership formations were set, and training was conducted according to the specified missions. They were then typically deployed on the front lines of defensive or offensive battles, limiting their ability to advance attacks or sustain efforts on defensive lines continuously.
Technical Weakness: Despite developments over two decades, Soviet systems were not at par with their Western counterparts, especially in the quality of artillery munitions, tank systems, and aircraft.
However, since the dawn of the millennium, Eastern adaptation was evident, particularly after observing NATO’s performance in the Yugoslavian and Iraqi conflicts. This led to the development of a new strategy known as “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD), which significantly pressured NATO to rapidly revise its old strategies and adopt a new strategic concept from 2010, culminating in 2013 with the “Air-Sea Battle” (ASB) concept, focusing exclusively on “air and sea” operations. This was further developed in 2015 into a more comprehensive concept, the “Joint Access and Maneuver Concept for the Global Commons” (JAM-GC). These strategies can be outlined as follows:
- A2/AD Concept: “Anti-Access/Area Denial”
- ASB Strategy: “Air-Sea Battle”
- Development of the Joint Access and Maneuver Concept (JAM-GC)
1. The Concept of “Anti-Access/Area Denial”
- Anti-Access (A2): This involves measures to slow down or prevent friendly forces from entering the operational theater or working from long distances.
- Area Denial (AD): This includes measures to impede the maneuver operations of friendly forces within the operational theater.
To fully implement the new Eastern strategy (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, etc.), certain capabilities are essential or desirable, including:
- Means to destroy or disrupt NATO satellites used for navigation, guidance of munitions, or reconnaissance.
- Advanced electronic and cyber warfare systems for jamming, interference, isolation, and eavesdropping on communications or radar systems.
- Various long-range reconnaissance and surveillance systems, both airborne, terrestrial, and naval.
- Thousands of highly accurate guided munitions and missiles of various types with long ranges, launched from multiple land, sea, and air systems.
- Significant focus on submarine warfare, enhancing capabilities to launch cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles.
- A layered air defense network (IADS) with mobile ground-based air defense systems (GBADs) to handle distant and close targets, supported by air defense fighters and air control.
- Development of command and control centers (C2) using fiber optics and data links for coordination among air, ground, and sea formations.
- Enhanced air capabilities for command, control, and reconnaissance to coordinate offensive operations such as air combat and targeting.
- Submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles with conventional or nuclear warheads.
- Securing maritime borders with thousands of mines of various types.
The chances of success for forces employing this strategy increase if they start with offensive operations. This poses a threat to friendly forces on the front lines or allies who would be directly facing the adversary. The primary goal for the adversary would be to disrupt the support forces of the allies or achieve effective results through long-range strikes, alongside gaining suitable combat momentum and succeeding in dispersing NATO’s combat efforts by opening multiple fronts simultaneously.
2. The ASB Strategy and Development of the Joint Access and Maneuver Concept (JAM-GC)
The core idea of the new strategic concept is seen as the optimal response (from NATO’s perspective) to the Eastern strategy. This involves developing interconnectivity and integration between different branches of the military across various dimensions—air, land, sea, and space—to conduct offensive operations deep within the enemy’s territory (NIA). The aim is to achieve the threefold objective of disrupting, destroying, and defeating (D3) the enemy’s defensive capabilities (A2/AD), allowing allied forces to operate freely to attack or enter and maneuver within the operational theater.
This is achieved through two main phases:
Phase One: Initial Military Operations
- Withstanding initial attacks on NATO’s or allied forces’ front or rear lines while minimizing losses using defensive means or maneuvers.
- Executing counterstrikes against pre-identified targets, such as command centers or critical infrastructure that could disrupt operations.
- Targeting the enemy’s offensive missile arsenal, particularly ballistic missiles.
- Initiating combat efforts to regain the initiative in air, land, sea, and space.
Phase Two: “Supplementary Operations”
The purpose is to create better options in negotiations for optimal gains against the adversary, including:
- Expanding combat operations to sustain the initiative in air, land, and sea.
- Conducting sieges either through forces or economic sanctions.
- Maintaining logistical support in parallel with combat operations.
- Increasing military production, especially of guided munitions.
The latest and most comprehensive version, developed in 2015, is the “Joint Access and Maneuver Concept for the Global Commons” (JAM-GC). This concept is an evolution of the ASB, not limited to a specific enemy or operational theater. It resulted from extensive U.S. military maneuvers and simulations of numerous scenarios electronically. It focuses on defeating the enemy’s core plan, not merely denying their A2/AD capabilities, by leveraging both advanced and less advanced technologies in the operational theater, with significant combat effectiveness and cost considerations. The new concept includes essential attributes for NATO forces to succeed on the field:
- The capability to deploy and operate from bases and forward operating points, not just main bases, while retaining the flexibility to provide the necessary combat momentum on demand.
- The ability to quickly recover from setbacks to reorganize, counterattack, or maintain cohesion to minimize losses.
- Flexibility to be integrated into any command structure temporarily or permanently to perform different tasks, gained through training for diverse missions to provide fighters with the necessary experience to work within different formations and equipment.
- Greater capacity to use a wide range of military or civilian (commercial) equipment and integrate them for multiple roles, such as commercial drones.
- Sustained logistical capabilities aligned with the timing of combat operations.
In conclusion, combat adaptation is the central theme of all these strategic concepts. Both camps have learned from previous lessons during the Cold War, rapid military product updates, and mutual surveillance, leading to the development of new concepts to ensure the use of all available means to impose rules of engagement on the adversary and ensure combat effectiveness. Development will certainly continue over time, resulting in more powerful and lethal weapon systems, but usually, the testing of these systems will involve proxy wars between allies rather than direct confrontation between the Eastern and Western blocs. The question remains: will this pattern be broken now?
