A Neo-Classical Realist Account on External Security Behaviors of Weak Power towards Great Power

  In the contemporary US-led unipolar moment, North Korea has effectively and continuously played a strategy of diplomatic brinkmanship vis-｀a-vis the US since the end of the Cold War. How can we explain the North Korean problem that is a Weak Power seeking to maximize its national security by proactively creating crises against the unipolar power? Moreover, why did Sadam Hussein’s Iraq resist the US knowing that its failure to surrender would result in not only the demise of his regime but also his life? On the other hand, despite the strong anti-American sentiment and domestically strong support for the fundamental Islamic movement in Pakistan, why did Musharaf make a 180-degree maneuver in the aftermath of 9.11 and accommodate the US demand to collaborate? In essence, how can we better explain Weak Powers’various and seemingly deviant behaviors in their asymmetric and oftentimes threatening relations with a Great Power? Why do Weak Powers generate different behaviors vis-｀avis a threatening Great Power? What IR theories can be applied to explain these variances in Weak Power’s strategic behaviors vis-｀a-vis threatening Great Powers? What other variables should we bring in to acquire better understanding of these states’ external behaviors?
  One way to answer these questions is through a synthesis of the domestic and international systemic factors which clearly enables researchers to aggregate the units and enhances our understanding of external behaviors of state in international system. The state-centric level of analysis (the second image) produces richer descriptions and causal explanations for the origins of state behaviors, while the systemic / holistic level (the third image) is better at providing broader generalizations about how the nationstates normally behave within international system.¹⁵⁾ Morton Kaplan, for example, makes claims that the international system and certain characteristics of the actor’s internal system can specify the main outlines of state behavior in world politics.¹⁶⁾ Political scientists interested in linking systemic- and domestic-level theorizing persuasively justify combining these two, and make numerous efforts to construct the best ways to do it.¹⁷⁾
  Although the acceptance of domestic variables as explanatory variables has been accepted as a quasi consensus, the ways to get at it have been very murky and less systematic. In Sterling-Folker’s words, little effort has been made for exploring “the theoretical basis upon which such a combination could take place or whether it is possible in anything but the most ad hoc manner.”¹⁸⁾ In this vein, I advocate a neoclassical realist approach that employs a crossover of the levels of analysis in which interactive dynamics within world politics function as the independent variable while the domestic politics as the intervening variable.
  My research puzzles also bring more perspective-diversity in realism by bringing Weak Power’s perspectives. As a result of Great Power-centered international politics, a great deal of the IR literature on Weak Powers (i.e., Third World states and developing countries) has been written from the perspectives of Great Power competition in the strategic regions of their interest. Little has been written in a systematic fashion about Weak Powers’foreign policy by reversing from Great Power perspectives to Weak Power perspectives, which integrates Weak Power’s external security environment with its internal factors.¹⁹⁾
  In this vein, I argue that Weak Power’s internal politics, especially its regime security, may become a critical predictor of its external security strategies due to its less institutionalized nature of domestic politics. Precisely, this research presents a systematic model that explains behaviors of Weak Powers by integrating the systemic factors?⑴ the level of external threat and ⑵ the availability of external alliance – as independent variables, with the domestic variable?⑶ the regime security of a Weak Power? as an intervening variable. By inserting the domestic variable, I want to explore Weak Power’s behaviors such as defying, accommodating and bargaining with Great Powers through a neoclassical realist framework in terms of uncovering its motivations by linking external and internal variables. The main hypothesis is such that if the regime of the Weak Power is stable, then we should expect weak power’s strategies that are consistent with the expectations of neorealism, and on the other hand, if regime security is shaky, that is unstable, we should expect to observe a Weak Power’s strategies that would be considered by neorealism to be either irrational or doomed to fail.²⁰⁾
  This paper consists of two sections?a theoretical section followed by an empirical case study. In the theoretical part, I will present a neoclassical realist model integrating the external security environment with the domestic regime security of Weak Powers after a series of deductive reasoning backed up with detailed literature reviews. In the empirical section, four longitudinal cases of Libya from 1977 to 1992 will be analyzed specially in the domain of the US-Libya relations.

1. Variables: External Threat, Availability of Alliance and Regime Security

  Since the domain of observation is asymmetrical conflicts, I use threat from a Great Power as one of two independent variables. Moreover, I accommodate the balance of threat theory by Stephan Walt where threat is operationalized as the major source of state’s external behavior at system level. Weak Power is existentially sensitive and vulnerable to external threats due to its low defensive capability. An imbalance of threat perceived by a Weak Power is the systemic driver for the Weak State either to balance against or bandwagon with the source of threat. In my model, I operationalize the level of threat imposed by Great Power into two levels- high and low(See Table 1). If a Great Power directly and coercively threatens a Weak Power’s security, theoretically at least according to the balance of power theory, it may have to accommodate the demands of Great Powers unless it decides to fight and, possibly die out.⁴⁸⁾ On the other hand, if the threat is conceived low, then a Weak Power will try to seek other ways to manipulate the situation.
  The second independent variable is the availability of alliance. I use the term – alliance in its broadest sense to refer to a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between a Weak Power and a potential ally other than the threatening Great Power⁴⁹⁾ and look at other Great Powers that may assist the Weak Power. The Weak Power’s external security environment is complicated by availability of external assistance, especially at the time of external security crisis. Therefore, Weak Power’s sensitivity to external threat is diminished by availability of an international ally. Alliance availability provides the Weak Power’s expectation regarding political-military support from its potential allies as well as additional ranges of strategic options between bandwagoning and balancing in confrontation with the Great Power. The existence of the Great Powers’rivalry structure may generate subsequent uncertainty in the security of Great Powers.⁵⁰⁾ Such competition often works in favor of the Weak Power, which,“ if they are free to offer their alliance, can raise their price and ask the great powers for more support.”⁵¹⁾ If outside help were available, then the Weak Power would have more options to maximize its goals, it can defy, negotiate or bandwagon.⁵²⁾
  The conception of political regime is narrowly defined as a group of ruling coalitions whose best political interest is to maintain its continued incumbency as the executive branch of government in the state.⁵³⁾ I operationalize regime security as cohesiveness of the incumbent leadership and its control in domestic politics. The cumulative dynamics of the domestic regime security, internal threat and leadership cohesiveness will function as a conversion mechanism that determines the strategy of a Weak Power.⁵⁴⁾ The incumbent regime of a Weak Power must either reconcile the international systemic influence and the domestic political reaction to it, or overrule the domestic political reaction and pursue rational policy options dictated by the international systemic constraints. Table 1 presents operational definitions of the variables.

2. Weak Power’s Security Strategies

  A Weak Power’s external strategies are of three types?accommodate, bargain and defy. Conceptualization and operationalization of each typology are as following.
  Accommodate
  Weak Power can capitulate the threat or demand of a Great Power. In this case, the level of threat from the Great Power may be directly and coercively targeted to the survival of the Weak Power. Thus, to Weak Power, capitulation is solely a defensive foreign policy decision intended to secure its national security. Accommodation may take place in the forms of diplomatic endorsement, unconditional concession to Great Power’s threat or specific demand or bandwagoning with the source of threat.
  Bargain
  Weak Power may actively bargain with Great Power by setting agendas and terms of negotiations through peaceful means for side payments or payoffs. This may bring a peaceful resolution that does not involve any conflictual behavior from either side. Great Power may induce the Weak Power to bandwagon behavior using engagement. This bargaining strategy may be employed as Weak Power’s desire for side-payment or specific tradeoff for conditional concession to Great Power.
  Defy
  The conflictual behavior of a Weak Power vis-｀a-vis a Great Power is defined as defiance. The Weak Power will not give into threat from the Great Power but will continue to defend its position and resist threats from Great Powers. Defiance will be specifically targeted to the issue areas that Great Power greatly values. In defiance, Weak Power would make threats“ in the hope that the other would negotiate.”⁵⁵⁾ It will venture this policy through“ the deliberate creation of a recognizable risk of war, a risk that one does not completely control.”⁵⁶⁾ Defiance can be observed as blackmailing, skirmishes, small-group resistance, internal balancing, and balancing with external assistance.

3. Specified Hypotheses

  The general hypothesis is that, should the incumbent regime of a Weak Power be threatened internally, we may expect a different outcome of foreign policy choice. I will test whether the regime security of Weak Powers function adequately as an intervening variable affecting the behavioral manifestation by Weak Powers vis-｀a-vis Great Powers, while the availability of alliance and the levels of external threat essentially function as the outer-environment. Therefore, I treat internal security of the regime of a Weak Power as a variable, meaning leaders must consider simultaneously the political survival of his own and national security.
  Hypothesis 1: If the high level of threat and the availability of an ally characterize the external security environment, a Weak Power will balance by joining other Great Power as an ally, therefore conforming to the expectations of neorealism. Thus, external security strategies may be well predicted without the factor of domestic political variables.
  Hypothesis 2: If thereat level is low, and a Weak Power has an ally available for assistance, the level of regime security will play more influential role for the regime to formulate its external security strategies. The low level of threat is not immediately posing direct threat to its national security and the regime has an option of playing other strategies before bringing other external help that is already available. In this vein, the regime will bargain with the source of threat in order to induce profitable payoffs. On the other hand, the shaky regime is likely to confront a Great Power. As the threat level is low and alliance is available, the primary concern of the regime is likely to internalize its low external threat by standing firm against the source of external threat.
  Hypothesis 3: If high external threat and no available ally characterize the most unfavorable external security environment, the level of regime security is likely to play a decisive role for a Weak Power’s security strategies. The solid regime of a Weak Power will formulate its security strategy rationally as induced by the systemic attributes. It will accommodate the high threat of Great Power not only due to its high external threat and unavailable ally, but also its full control of the domestic politics that makes the regime believe resisting would only destabilize its internal politics. On the other hand, the shaky regime of a Weak Power is likely to defy by resisting alone even if no external alliance is available.
  Hypothesis 4: If external threat is low and no external alliance is available, the solid regime of a Weak Power is likely to bargain with a Great Power since there is no immediate external threat and its domestic politics seems under control. On the other hand, the shaky regime of Weak Power may actively seek to defy Great Power, as its act of defiance will divert its domestic instability to exaggerated external threat by the regime. The table 2 summarizes the four hypotheses.

4. Research Methods and Case Selection

  For examining the hypotheses, the case study method examines the diplomatic history of the bilateral relationship between the US and Libya from 1978 to 1992. Historical case studies provide most detailed evidence regarding the cause of Weak Power’s external behavior processed by the interactions of external security environment and internal political dynamics. Although a single dyadic case generates a problem of generalizability, this case study, however, is carefully crafted to produce a focused, structured and controlled comparison by systematically representing the security environment, capturing the internal dynamics in a Weak Power’s security strategy formulation, and linking these two.
  I have chosen the Libyan Qaddafi’s foreign policy vis-｀a-vis the US, because this is a hard case to test the hypotheses. The conventional wisdom is that the Libyan foreign policy has been heavily driven by their nationalistic and anti-US ideologies, which are often described as unpredictable, quixotic or even irrational. If this is the case, then we should not have seen much of variations in the Libyan foreign policy to the US from a die-hard resistance to active attempts to bargain during the periods covered in this study. The US-Libyan case lays out a solid springboard for applicability of our framework to other cases of asymmetric conflictual relations in which a Weak Power’s ideology is based on indigenous nationalism and anti-American ideology (i.e., North Korea).

1. CaseⅠ: 1977 to 1980

  The Qadhafi regime enjoyed stable internal security and favorable external security environment. The USSR assisted Libya in expanding its influence in North Africa. Moreover, although US policy to Libya became increasingly hostile and threatening especially as a result of the weakening of the US position in the Middle East and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US policy to Libya between 1978 and 1980 was less antagonistic compared to the years ahead. The Carter administration employed diplomatic approaches to Libya, although its pressure was escalated towards the end of its administration. The US approached Libya with “the policy of mild, low key punishment of Libya while leaving open the door to possible improvement in relations.”⁶⁰⁾
  Carter in 1977 identified Libya as a major transgressor on human rights and a supporter of international terrorism and took a non-confrontational approach that ensured diplomatic solutions. Carter pressured Qadhafi through diplomatic manners (i.e., diplomatic letters and envoys) in order to warn him to abandon a plot to assassinate the US ambassador to Egypt. In 1978, the US blocked export items to Libya on the grounds of its continuing support for terrorism. But its policy reversal was made later in the year. On Dec 2 1979, the US closed its embassy in Tripoli after it was attacked by a group of demonstrators allegedly supported by Libyan officials, but did not break diplomatic relations with Libya. In May, 1980, the US expelled four of the five Libyan diplomats in Washington D.C., in view of Libya’s continued support for terrorism and aggression towards Tunisia. On the other hand, the Soviet-Libyan relationship became quite friendly; the USSR provided a 440-megawatt nuclear power plant; it also delivered its cutting-edged MiG-25s to Libya in 1978, before delivering to Warsaw Pact states in Eastern Europe. In response to Egypt’s rapprochement with Israel and the US in November 1977, Libya strengthened its relationship with the USSR and did not condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.⁶¹⁾
  The Revolutionary Committee, a loose assembly of young men whose leaders were handpicked by Colonel Qadhafi from his close entourage, strengthened political stability and revolutionary momentum. The Revolutionary Committees exercised rigid control along with the Presidential Guard and a special Deterrent Battalion, which not only protected the leaders of the regime but had the added task of preempting any attempted coup from the military itself. The Revolutionary Committee before 1981 was institutionalized to propagate Qaddafi’s ruling ideology and lacked the actual governing and controlling authority over the state. However its take-over of the Libyan state began on March 2 1979, when the General People’s Congress declared the separation of formal and revolutionary authority. From this point on, the Revolutionary Committee exercised its informal power by taking over virtually all segments of the Libyan government, and enforced radical and oppressive policies domestically and internationally. Essentially, the level of the Qadhafi regime security was strengthened by the Revolutionary Committee to defuse opposition in the Libyan society and maintain the tight control over the Libyan armed forces. That Qadhafi had entrusted the Revolutionary Committees with the vital mission of manning air defense positions underscored the extent to which he has deployed them to counterbalance the power of the armed forces. Qadhafi had learned one vital lesson from the often-turbulent Middle East politics, namely that the military has masterminded most coups. Therefore, military commanders were frequently rotated or forced into early retirement.⁶²⁾
  While the US during this period approached the Qadhafi regime with a series of engagement policies, the stability of the Libyan Qadhafi regime was the driving factor behind proactive conciliatory efforts to persuade the US policy makers that Libya should be taken seriously and was committed to working within the framework of international law.⁶³⁾ Moreover, it was before the Revolutionary Committee took over the regime that the Qadhafi regime showcased a series of conciliatory gestures and bargaining intentions to the US. The Libyan government invited a number of delegations of prominent US citizen, politicians and the president’s brother Billy Carter and mother, Lillian, in order to improve the relations with the US. Libya even created academic endowments to universities in the US in hopes of approaching U.S. academia and civilians.⁶⁴⁾
  The first case illustrates a case of favorable external and internal security environment, although during this period the US-Libyan relationship was deteriorating. Essentially, the Qadhafi regime proactively approached the US with a series of demands for bargaining, while collaborating with the USSR by obtaining military and political assistance.

2. CaseⅡ: 1981 – 1984

  During this period, the bilateral relationship between the US and Libya deteriorated and often led to small-scale military clashes. At the beginning of 1981, the Reagan administration singled out Libya for special attention as a“ base for Soviet subversion,” ruled by “the most dangerous man in the world.”⁶⁵⁾ After shutting down the Libyan embassy in Washington in May 1981, the US cited,“ Libyan provocations and misconduct, including support for international terrorism.”⁶⁶⁾ In July, 1981, the US announced, “we recognize that African nations need assistance against Qaddafi’s diplomacy of subversion and support for international terrorism.”⁶⁷⁾ The Libyan threat was part of the US rationale behind arms sales to Morocco, Sudan, and the sale of 54 M60-A tanks to Tunisia for $92 billion.⁶⁸⁾ In August 1981, two US F-14s shot down two Libyan jets in the Gulf of Sidra where Libya had claimed maritime sovereignty over 200-miles offshore.⁶⁹⁾ In March 1982, the US imposed a boycott on the importation of petroleum products from Libya and established a license requirement for most US exports to that country.⁷⁰⁾ In February 1983, AWAC (Air-borne Warning and Control) surveillance aircrafts were dispatched to Cairo West airfield for a reconnaissance mission in response to an alleged Libyan threat to the Sudanese government. The US began to launch covert operations in the form of disinformation, propaganda dissemination, sabotage, and support for dissident groups. The Reagan administration reportedly advocated the idea of plotting a plan to assassinate Qaddafi, including large-scale operations to overthrow the Qadhafi regime.⁷¹⁾
  When the US threat was increasing, Qadhafi made a second visit to the USSR in April, 1981. The USSR made repeated offers of military and technical assistance to Libya. Libya had collaborative relations with the Soviet Union despite policy differences from Afghanistan to Chad. In 1981, Qadhafi concluded technical and economic cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union. Libya continued to purchase sophisticated Soviet arms. Libya acquired an array of mostly Soviet weapons, but they have flatly denied bases in Libya to the Soviet Union and have opposed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.⁷²⁾ The USSR supported the 1981 treaty of friendship and cooperation between Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen as a means to check US policy in North Africa
  While the external security threat was increasing, domestic unrest in the form of military mutinies and attempted coup increased during the period between 1980 and 1983, as observers estimated that there were “as many attempted coups between 1980 and 1983 as in the previous ten years.”⁷³⁾ A substantial amount of political discontent was known to exist during this period. Discontent and its actual expression rose when the militancy of the Revolutionary Committee intensively increased its oppressive control over virtually every section of the regime. Several coup attempts were made. In August 1980, an air-force unit in Tobruk mounted an unsuccessful coup, and subsequently over 2,000 arrests were made and 800 executions were carried out for political offenses. In 1983, at least eight coup attempts by the military were reported in the international media.⁷⁴⁾ Opposition centered around student groups and self-imposed exiles increased during this time.⁷⁵⁾ In May 1984, a group combined with opposition in the General People’s assembly launched an attack on Qadhafi’s barracks and lost a number of its members in a bloody shoot out with government forces. This coup attempt occurred during the growing competition between official government and military hierarchies and the revolutionary committees.⁷⁶⁾
  As the external threats amounted to increase and the regime security got unstable, its external strategies toward the US became increasingly conflictual (i.e., assassinate key officials of the US and Libyan dissidents). The Revolutionary Committee of the Qadhafi regime began supporting radical organizations that used violence from IRA to Abunibal when its security was highly threatened both externally and internally. It also became increasingly hostile towards the US and Arab states such as Egypt that maintained close links with the US.⁷⁷⁾ The regime successfully diverted the discontent within by criticizing Egypt for bandwagoning with the US and purging military officers and intellectuals by accusing them of being the US collaborators.⁷⁸⁾
  The second case needs a more careful interpretation since my model predicted that the Qadhafi regime would defy by brining the USSR, but it actually confronted alone without bringing in the USSR assistance. That US threat was high and USSR was available as a potential help would predict a balancing behavior. The Qadhafi regime actually defied the US by confronting alone. The increasing level of domestic unrest and unprecedented numbers of leadership challenges resulted in externalizing the internal regime crises by confronting the US directly.

3. Case Ⅲ: 1985 – 1988

  In the aftermath of the December 1985 terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports, the US increased pressure on Libya by terminating all direct economic activities, freezing Libyan assets in the US and rallying the EC governments for imposing economic and political sanctions on Libya.⁷⁹⁾ In February, 1986, the US cut off virtually all the commercial relations with Libya. By early 1986, the US singled out Libya as an example of American resolve to combat terrorism with the toughest possible response. This policy came in implementation in March 1986 to contest Libya’s claim to sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra. Three US carrier groups, including forty-five ships, 200 aircraft and nuclear powered submarines, assembled off the Libyan coast for Operation Prairie Fire. On April 15, 1986, the US Air force and Navy struck six main targets in Tripoli and Benghazi including the Aziziya Barracks, Qadhafi’s residence.⁸⁰⁾ In June 1986, the US implemented the termination of US oil companies’operation in Libya.
  The USSR did not help Libya during this period, although it verbally criticized the US 1986 raid on Tripoli by canceling a scheduled meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. It remained an aloof and reluctant ally when Qadadfi’s deputy, Abdel Salam Jalloud visited Moscow in May, 1986.⁸¹⁾ Qadhafi was far too independent to be a submissive prot´eg´e, despite his dependence on Moscow for military hardware. Many of his beliefs conflicted with Soviet doctrines. In 1985, Qaddafi’s third state visit to Moscow did not generate any meaningful cooperation between the two mainly due to the Soviet’s reluctance, as Moscow did not see any benefits of maintaining a closer relations with a leader in whom it did not have full confidence. The lack of effective Soviet support to Libya during and after the United States raid on Tripoli in April 1986 underlined Moscow’s reluctance to risk a confrontation with Washington by supporting Qadhafi too strongly. In May 1986, the USSR did not extend additional credits for weapon-transfer, rejected a mutual defense treaty and markedly disengaged from Libyan affairs, remaining very aloof and reluctant, thereafter.
  During this period, the military remained the most serious threat to the Qadhafi regime. In the 12 months proceeding May, 1986, six coup attempts were reported in the international media.⁸²⁾ By March, 1987, there were signs of disaffection among military officers. In part, this was the result of mounting casualties and setbacks in Libya’s war with Chad. Qadhafi’s calls for a people’s army that would eventually replace the professional military evidently disturbed the armed forces. This was due to the aggressive take-over by the Revolutionary Committee, which often increased their power at the military’s expense. In response, the military resented the Revolutionary Committees’interference in national security affairs. It was reported, for example, that brief armed clashes between the two groups took place when certain missile positions were unable to respond to the United States air attacks in April 1986 because revolutionary committee members who were supposed to man them could not be found. In 1988, faced with rising public dissatisfaction over the shortages in consumer goods and setbacks in Libya’s war with Chad, Qaddafi, for the first time at the 14th session of the General People’s Congress in March 1988, criticized the abuse of power committed by the Revolutionary Committee and implemented to minimize its political and policy intervention in the state affairs.
  The Qadhafi regime, despite the US’s high threat and actual attack on its soil, continued to defy and be hostile to the US. Obviously, the 1986 US raid on Libya impacted the Qadhafi regime. Its regime security was threatened due to the power struggle between the military and the revolutionary committee. However, the revolutionary committee not only became much more active in crushing dissidents within the leadership and in society but also in seeking to divert attention from the internal security problem by proactively mobilizing anti-American sentiment in the US and advocating and implementing retaliatory polices to the US. In this vein, the Revolutionary Committee launched purges of domestic opponents, “challenging those elements in the Libyan military and elsewhere that the United States had intended to strengthen with the April raid.”⁸³⁾ Its actual defiant policy ranged from verbal denunciations of the US, the execution of two kidnapped Britons and one American in Beirut, to an attack on a US embassy employee in the Sudan as well as a Libyan missile attack in the direction of a US installation on the Italian island of Lampedusa.⁸⁴⁾
  The third case shows that the external security environment of the Qadhafi regime was the least favorable and the regime security was the most unstable among the cases. The unfavorable external security would predict that the Qadhafi regime would bandwagon with the US, but the outcome did actually turn out that it confronted alone. As the regime, from 1981 on, faced a deteriorating level of internal security, it ventured to secure itself by externalizing the domestic political problems; the Revolutionary Committee aggressively pursued radical domestic and international policies to offset the internal problems.

4. Case Ⅳ: 1989 – 1992

  The Bush administration sought to assess and meet the post Cold War threat to the US and developed a strategy of isolating“ rogue states”(i.e., Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya). It continued the Reagan administration’s policy of sanctioning rogue states. However, its military aggressiveness towards Libya was lessened due to a reassessment of the global security environment at the beginning of the post Cold War era and its military mobilization to the Gulf. At the same time, the Bush administration used a multilateral approach towards Libya by taking the matters to the UN. Libya’s failure to produce the Lockerbie suspects for trial drove the US, along with the UK to mobilize UN to impose the UN sanction on 21 January 1992. But no military threat was explicitly made out to Libya. With the dismantling of the Cold War structure, the already dismantled relationship between the USSR and Libya deteriorated further. Clearly, the USSR disengaged from its expansionist policies in the Third World including North Africa and was no longer available as a potential ally for Qadhafi.
  Qadhafi began to take measures to restrain the role and scope of the Revolutionary Committee in 1989. The militancy of the Revolutionary Committee that had caused popular discontent and military dissatisfaction with the regime, waned and, in turn, regime security became more stabilized. Moreover, the domestic liberalization (i.e., release of political prisoners and grant of freedom of foreign travel) was launched to appease popular discontent in limited scope.
  In January 1989, Qadhafi made a conciliatory gesture toward the incoming Bush administration by offering to conduct talks aimed at improving the Libya-US relationship on the issues of disarmament and inspection of weapon factories. In this manner, on January 13 1989, Libya returned the body of a U.S. airman shot down during the American air raids in April 1986. In October 1989, Libya announced its desire to have normal relations with the US. Its relationship with Egypt was normalized by the end of 1990, which was a significant foreign policy decision as it signaled the pursuit of a moderate course vis-｀a-vis the Arab world.
  The fourth case is the opposite situation of the second case. I expected that the solid regime would attempt to bargain, as the secure internal security would provide more political maneuverability to seek more benefits from the threatening Great Power. The external environment would predict that the Qadhafi regime is more likely to accommodate due to the unavailability of external alliance. But the secured Qaddafi regime consistently attempted to bargain with the US while the US did not explicitly impose military threats.