Defending the National Interest?

Lee, Jae-Seung – Korea University – The Korean Journal of International Studies 4-1 (December 2006), 73-94.

Abstract
  This paper explores the causes of French disagreement on the Iraq War by examining the French economic and political interests regarding the war, which had often been neglected in previous studies on transatlantic relations. Based on a broad literature survey, this study contrasts the ideational approach which emphasizes different worldviews in dealing with the international conflict and the interest-based approach which underlines the French effort to guarantee the economic and political interests in the Iraq War. Iraqi oil and trade relation were important economic factors which had affected the French policy considerations. Traditional pro-Arab policy and European concern were also at the center of political considerations. The French opposition became more severe when these interests were combined with the anti-American sentiments. These interests had provided an underlying context of unusually strong consensus among the French policy actors, which in turn amplified the methodological differences with the US. By providing these interest-based explanations, this study explained the reason for different responses to“ the war on terrorism”led by the US and enabled a more balanced understanding of the French policy choice regarding the Iraq War as well as the nature of transatlantic division.
Keywords : France, Iraq, Terrorism, the US, War
Ⅰ. Introduction
  The Iraq War in 2003 brought a transatlantic rift and the division of Europe. The EU’s common voice based on Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy(ESDP) was largely absent during the Iraq War. While the EU was cautious not to break still a fragile consensus on the principle of CFSP and ESDP,1) political will of member countries often surpassed the European supranational norms. The foreign policy choice regarding the Iraq War reflected domestic politics at the national level as well as the alliance with the US and the EU member states.2)
France was one of the most ardent opposition countries in Europe before and during the Iraq War.3) A group of writers tried to find the reason for French objection to the Iraq War from the transatlantic relations and the primacy of multilateralism. It has been a common perception that France had a long-time discrepancy with the US in dealing with world affairs and the French disagreement on the Iraq War was the result of different worldviews prevailed within the two countries. The US negligence of the UN and international consensus was another reason for the French objection.
However, the transatlantic explanation and ideational approach would not be sufficient to address the sophisticated nature of French foreign policy choice. When other international disputes in the post Cold War era?such as the Gulf war, and the Kosovo, and the Afghanistan War?were considered, the French position was not always contrary to that of the US. The shift of the French position from an active participation in Afghanistan to a strong opposition to the Iraq War4) raises a question about the effectiveness of unilateral application of transatlantic factors. Then, what drove France to raise an objection to the Iraq War? Why did France show a different stance from that of the Afghanistan War in less than a year?
This paper examines an alternative perspective that the French opposition to the Iraq War mirrored not only different worldviews and strategies with the US but also an effort to defend its national interests. The French opposition to a military intervention in Iraq reflected the underlying primacy of economic and political interest in this region. This paper focuses on a special relationship?both economic and political?between France and Iraq and contrasts it with previous studies focusing on transatlantic relations. It also considers the French concern for the Arab World and other European countries.
Based on a broad survey of the literatures on the French and European stance toward Iraq as well as the US foreign policy about the Iraq War, this study identified the types of “special relation”between France and Iraq and the French effort to guarantee the economic and political interests. In addition, France also had crucial political concerns in domestic Muslim populations and the relations with other European neighbors. However, the economic and political interests regarding the Iraq War were not strong enough to provide a self-sufficient explanation on the French position. Instead of denying entirely the significance of anti-American attitude of the French leader and the public, this paper argues that these interests had provided an underlying context of unusually strong consensus among the French policy actors, which in turn amplified the methodological differences with the US. Transnational division was in fact a combination of the different perception of worldviews, such as the legitimacy of war, and the differing national interests. While it would be unfeasible to separate the interest-based factors entirely from ideational factors, this paper attempts to build a framework to combine the two categories.
Part Ⅱ of this paper examines the French stance toward the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War?“the War on Terrorism”in the aftermath of the 9?11 terrorist attacks. Part Ⅲ addresses the previous approaches which explain the French policy choice from the perspective of transatlantic relations, different worldviews and the preference for multilateralism. Part Ⅳ contrasts these approaches with interest-based explanation which emphasizes the French economic and political interests regarding the Iraq War. Part Ⅴ concludes the discussion by arguing that the French foreign policy toward the Iraq War was not just a reflection of its relations with the US and the UN but also the result of the effort to defend its national interest5), both political and economic, which was shared among the most French policy actors.
Ⅱ. The French Involvement in the War on Terrorism
1. 9?11 and the Afghanistan War

Before the Iraq War, the position of France toward the U.S.-led war against terrorism was not essentially hostile. After the 9?11 terrorist attacks, France expressed a deep sympathy and solidarity to the US and showed a strong support to ant-terrorism activities. French leaders from diverse political spectrum showed a solidarity with and support for the US. President Chirac rushed to the US and became the first international leader on the scene to express solidarity with the US. Le Monde published the September 13th edition with the headline, “We are all Americans.”6) The American national anthem was played at the Champs Elys´ee as a symbolic act to show the French sympathy. The 9?11 has also brought the French public closer to the US. In spite of a growing transatlantic “cultural gap,”the 9?11 attacks served as a reminder of the values and interests that Americans and Europeans still had in common.7)
Unlike its traditionally reluctant stance to an enhanced NATO’s role, France did not hesitate to support the invocation of NATO’s Article IV which guaranteed mutual defense. France also supported the employment of NATO Airborne Early-Warning (AWACS) platforms over U.S. territory.
As the presidency country of the UN Security Council at the time, France introduced the Resolution 1368 which described a terrorist attack as a“ threat to international peace and security.”It provided the US with international political legitimacy to retaliate against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. France also supported the US proposals in the UN Security Council to confer international authorization to freeze the funds of terrorist organizations by endorsing the Resolution 1373.8)
Over the past few decades, France has frequently been affected by terrorism. As a result, France has a long tradition and experience to deal with the war on terrorism.9) France remained at the forefront of the war on terrorism as the attacks could target the French state and/or French citizens at any time.10) President Chirac and other leaders expressed France’s readiness to take part alongside the US in a possible military retaliation against Bin-Laden, a stance supported by 73% of the French, according to a survey.11)
During the Afghanistan War, France had deployed nearly 5,000 military personnel and French forces have been present at nearly all phases of the operation of Afghanistan.12) The French contribution was comprehensive including major air-strike operations. Intelligence sharing with the US has also increased. French officers were already on the ground before the 9?11 with Northern Alliance forces. The US forces used the French intelligence network to create a partnership with the Northern Alliance that proved critical for overthrowing the Taliban government.13)
However, France has made it clear that its solidarity was not unconditional to grant a blank check for the US. Chirac wanted to be consulted in advance about the modalities of intervention in the war on terrorism, which was made clear after his September 18 meeting with President Bush. The conclusion of the Afghanistan War and the changed focus on the Iraqi issues began to show a discrepancy between the US and France. The French were also disappointed with the impression that their contribution was sidelined as the Afghanistan War moved toward the end.

2. The Iraq War and French Response

In spite of the French support to the war on terrorism, noticeable disparities between France and the US began to grow in dealing with the Iraq war. After the victory of the Afghanistan War, the US broadened the scope of war on terrorism by targeting Iraq as the next agenda. This time, the US began to show a more unilateral stance in applying a new policy paradigm in the Middle East and it brought clashes with a number of countries, most notably France, which claimed their traditional role in this region. French criticism of U.S. anti-terrorism policies has increased markedly since President Bush’s“ axis of evil”speech in January 2002.14) The French position on the Iraq War did evolve over the fall and winter of 2002-03. France opposed categorically to pre-emptive military action in Iraq. France maintained that military intervention in Iraq would be a “material breach”of UN Security Council resolutions and rejected an automatic link between Iraq’s failure to disclose arms and military attack. Chirac pointed out that “war… would be an admission of failure.”15) The use of force in Iraq could be legitimatized only after more comprehensive arms inspections. At the onset of the Iraq War, France became the one of the hardest opponents to the US policy.
Unlike the Afghanistan War, and the mild opposition to the Gulf War in 1991, the French public opinion was not favorable to the US. The US tendency toward unilateral actions has provoked a growing anti-American sentiment among the French public and it was widely shared by the media.16) A poll conducted at the beginning of April showed 78% of the French public disapproved of the “American war”and 74% approved of Chirac’s opposition to Bush. 65% thought the conflict was entirely or primarily caused by the US.17)
Reflecting the attitude of the French public, French leaders have warned against turning a war on terrorism into a war on Islam and emphasized a solution based on diplomacy, law enforcement, and international intelligence cooperation.18) France was also skeptical about the American vision of post-Saddam Iraq19) and expressed a concern that a military intervention would deteriorate a fragile regional balance.20)
There existed a strong anti-war unity among different political actors. Both the incumbent party and the opposition parties supported non-participation to the Iraq War. President Chirac announced on 10 March on French television that“ my position is that regardless of the circumstances, France will vote no because … there are no grounds for waging war in order to achieve the goal we have set ourselves ? to disarm Iraq.”21) In addition to a traditionally strong presidential initiative in foreign policy, domestic political support enabled the French government to uphold an anti-war position.22)

Ⅲ. Ideational Bases of the French Opposition to the Iraq War
1. Transatlantic Relations

A breach in transatlantic relations between France and the US has been discussed as the major factor explaining the French position in the Iraq War. Franco-American relations were central to the transatlantic debate.23) France has insisted a certain degree of autonomy in its international relations and often defied the US leadership since the Cold War era. France had a long record of providing an alternative policy vision to that of the US or Britain.24) The French worldview represented the goal of a strong Europe steered by France, and the desire for a“ multi-polar world.”25) Former foreign minister Dominique de Villepin also emphasized that stability would be achieved not by partnership with Washington but by the development of“ a number of regional poles.”26) In this multipolar world, France could increase its voice vis-`a-vis the US superpower.
From a traditional diplomatic standpoint, the French objection to the Iraq War was not a surprising one.27) Different perceptions and worldviews between the two countries had prevailed before the Iraq War. Stanley Hoffmann points out that current transatlantic discord is different from past conflicts in the West in that the crucial difference was the “philosophy”of the Bush administration regarding how to exercise power and treat disagreements among allies.28) According to Jean-Marie Colombani, editor-in-chief of Le Monde, these differences are even more profound, dating from the very origins of the two republics.29) From the standpoint of power relations, Robert Kagan contrasts a Hobbesian US and a Kantian Europe.30) Europe?including France?was weak in power and had to rely on a multilateral solution. Europe chose a co-existence with the danger while the US was capable of getting rid of the real threat and pursued a unilateral solution. These different worldviews had ultimately led to different policy responses to the Iraq War. French policy regarding the Iraq War was also motivated by a reservoir of resentment at the American superpower, which was shared by both the policy-makers and the public.31)
Leaders’style and perception also contributed to the breach between France and the US. Regarding the Iraq War, Chirac mirrored the deep vein of anti-Americanism while Bush advocated the validity of the holy war and they blamed each other for the mismanagement of the case. In a sense, the two leaders had inaccurately gauged the preferences of the‘ ‘other’’in their subjective interpretations of the political environments. They seemed to systematically overestimate their influence and underestimate that of their rivals. This overconfidence could have led them to confront in the final phase of bargaining.32)
Regarding the method of dealing with the Iraqi case, France and the US showed discrepancies.33) The US found itself vulnerable from terrorism and regarded itself as being in the front line of the war on terrorism. The US demonstrated the view that the terrorist threat was linked to Iraqi governments and military means were appropriate.34) On the contrary, France took a legalistic approach to proliferation problems and it was preventative in essence.35) They believed that UN weapons inspection would be an effective guarantee against the resurgence of an Iraqi WMD program.36)
However, the French and the US positions were not fundamentally drifting apart. Both governments shared a principle that the fight against terrorism should be upheld.37) Regarding proliferation policy, the US and French positions were not fundamentally at odds.38) Post-9?11 management including the cooperation in the Afghanistan War showed that the two parties were still in the same side even with a series of “methodological” differences. Anti-Americanism and the US hostilities toward the French were, therefore, much exaggerated.39)

2. The UN and Multilateralism

The core of French foreign policy has been its emphasis on the multilateral approach in dealing with conflict prevention and crisis management. France believed that the terrorist threat was a global one and must be met by multilateral tools including diplomatic, intelligence, and legal measures.40) The French also stress the need for legitimacy for the Iraq War by relying on the UN.
The Security Council has bestowed France with a veto power that became the only virtual way for France to constrain the US.41) The UN, therefore, has emerged as the most important institutional framework for dealing with the US. France has consistently stressed the overwhelming importance of the UN in legitimizing military action.42) France emphasized the value of the resolution to strengthen the UN inspection regime even though President Bush expressed little faith in the efficacy of inspections after the passage of Resolution 1441. President Chirac staked out his position by emphasizing diplomacy, multilateral behavior, patience, and opposition to any military action not approved by the UN Security Council.43) According to Chirac,

  One sees rising the temptation to legitimize the unilateral and preventive use of force. This development is worrying. It is contrary to France’s vision of collective security, a vision that depends on the cooperation of states, the respect for law and the authority of Security Council. We will reiterate these rules each time that it is necessary and, particularly, in relation to Iraq. If Baghdad persists in refusing to allow the return of inspectors without conditions, it is for the Security Council and the Security Council alone to decide the measures to take.44)

French Foreign Minster Dominique de Villepin also refused to rule out the possibility that France would vote against any military action.45) The French position was supported by Germany which was soon-to-be the chair country of Security Council. The German Foreign Minister asserted that inspectors should have‘ ‘all the time which is needed’’to perform their duties.46)
France certainly had a stake in the UN and showed a strong adherence to its resolution. But in a broader scope, the UN was considered more as an instrument to control the US than as a diplomatic objective per se. Ideas, norms and legitimacy can not exist separated from a more tangible substance. Understanding the French position in the Iraq War, therefore, also needs a careful consideration of the interest-side of the event.

Ⅳ. Defending the National Interests
1. Economic Interests

The French economic tie with Iraq and Saddam Hussein has been maintained since 1975.47) A comprehensive accord on economic cooperation was signed between Baghdad and Paris together with the exchanges of the leaders.48) During the period of ambitious industrialization in the 1970s with increased oil revenue, French companies became key beneficiaries of public projects in Iraq. Iraq committed to granting French oil companies a number of privileges and France repaid the favor by approving the construction of Iraq’s first nuclear-power center, Tammuz, near Baghdad.49) France also sold an estimated $20 billion worth of weapons, including Mirage fighters, to Iraq, and emerged as Iraq’s biggest trading partner.50) After a brief pitfall during the Gulf War, many of the French private enterprises had re-established ties with Iraq by the mid-1990s.51) Economic relation with Iraq also had significances in the relations with the Arab world in commercial and energy domains. Baghdad could serve as the centre of a regional strategy for France.
France has also been active in altering the sanctions against Iraq by proposing the “Oil for Food Program,”which was adopted as the UN Resolution 986. French commercial hopes were pinned largely on securing a significant post-sanctions role, too.52) Bilateral Franco-Iraqi trade rose steadily, from =C685 million in 1997 to =C1.6 billion in 2001.
Oil was at the core of Franco-Iraqi economic relations. Total,53) the French energy giant, had been active in the Iraqi oil industry for a long time and became a primary negotiator of major oil fields such as Majnoon and Bin Umar. By the end of the 1990s, Total had initialed pre-contract agreements for post-sanctions oil development in Iraq along with China’s CNPC and the Russia’s Lukoil. Table 1 shows the contracts regarding major Iraqi oil fields.
Considering these economic ties between Paris and Baghdad especially during the time of Iraq’s hardship under the sanctions, France’s economic presence in Iraq was huge. The Iraq War led by the US, therefore, could seriously threaten the pre-existing French advantage in Iraq. There was a general suspicion that oil interests dictated the French policy toward Iraq and the divergence with the US.54)
However, economic interest alone does not provide a compelling explanation on the French opposition to the Iraq War. Despite the specific interests mentioned above, Iraq was far from being France’s main trading partners. Iraq amounts to only 0.2% of France’s exports and 0.3% of its imports. Furthermore, the Oil for Food program did not bring France at the top of the list in Iraq.55) Given these figures, it is difficult to say that business exerted a determining influence on France’s policy choice. A direct linkage between the French oil interest and the participation in the Iraq War was also dubious. Valerie Marcel pointed out that Total has been careful not to tie its interest too closely to the French government’s, realizing that its independence from the government would be critical for securing its role in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.56) As long as France did not participate in the coalition operations in Iraq, Paris would have little influence over the occupying administration to support Total’s bid.57)
The French economic interest in Iraq was real regarding the Iraq War. However, the direct influence of business was less obvious even though their existence was not in doubt. The French Government formally rejected the accusations that its opposition to the war was due to the business interests from Saddam Hussein’s oil revenues. Instead of reflecting strong sectoral interests, the French economic interests regarding the Iraq War were deeply imbedded also in a political context.

2. Political Interests

⑴ Pro-Arab Policy and Muslim Concern
An important source of French opposition to military action against Iraq came from France’s traditional pro-Arab foreign policy. Opposition to war was linked to deeper concerns about the impact of a conflict on the region and on Arab attitudes. France had already faced a political turmoil when President Francois Mitterrand decided to contribute French forces to the Gulf War in 1991. Jean-Pierre Chev`enement, then Minister of Defense, resigned in protest of the French deployment to the Gulf region.
The French position to the Iraq War reflected its previous bilateral relationship with Iraq. Iraq was a pivotal power that served to the political interest of France in the Middle East. In the 1970s, France was firmly in position as a key supplier of weapon to Iraq. In the formal diplomatic arena, Paris was the most receptive of OECD states towards Iraqi officials during the 1990s and the French anti-sanction lobbies have grown its influence. At the personal level, Chirac also had a long relationship with Hussein and the Iraqi authorities warmly welcomed the election of Jacques Chirac in May 1995.58)
However, the bilateral relation was not always a privileged one. There has been a criticism within France that Iraq had overstepped the red line. Moreover, France’s participation in the Gulf War and Iraq’s inability to pay for its military imports in the 1980s already revealed some cracks in their political relations. The French political interests in the Iraq War would rather be found in a larger scope of pan-Arab policy than in a direct application of the previous bilateral relations with Iraq. In this sense, the relation with the Islam world was considered seriously. The impact of French Muslim was another important concern for the French government.59) France has the largest Muslim population in Europe of nearly five million and their agitation could result in more anti-Semitic attacks involving terrorism. Given the sensitivity of the Muslim population in France, any military action against Iraq could have been interpreted as another move against the Arab world.60)

  ⑵ European concern
France had dual objectives regarding its European policy. First, France has sought to increase European political voice to counterbalance the US and other contending superpowers. At the same time, France has wanted to take the leadership in Europe. Europe was, in that sense, was “the effective multiplier of French power which would serve to the realization of French national glory.”61) However, France has faced an increasingly unfavorable international environment to realize these objectives in the post Cold-War era.62) France’s unique position and freedom of diplomatic maneuver were weakened by the ending of the Cold War, and the reunification and normalization of Germany.63)
The enlargement of Europe was another challenge for France. More diverse interests and stances began to emerge among the member countries, which made the common voice of Europe more difficult. Discrepancies were found not only between France and the US but among the EU member countries. Europe seemed to be divided in terms of the degree of alliance with the US. The US was trusted more in many other European countries than France and the French diplomacy had to meet these diverging European positions.64)
Regarding the Iraq War, France wanted to uphold the voice of Europe which was different from that of the US while maintaining the fragile balance of the CFSP and ESDP in which new member countries began to put their stakes.65) Giving a green light to the US military action could shrink the uniqueness of European voice and would also weaken the visibility of France.
The Iraq War also illustrated the enduring French interest in its relation with Germany. French and German military concepts and doctrines have evolved in a converging manner in recent years and they have agreed more than ever on security and defense.66) However, neither France nor Germany could exercise decisive influence on other European countries. “New European”states refused to accept what they saw as the excessive power of the Franco-German couple.67) If France and Germany could not present a common front, this“ privileged axis”would suffer more credibility loss.68)
In a situation where the CFSP and ESDP were weak to make common European voice and where“ Old Europe”was countered by“ New Europe,”the French room of maneuver was not large. The initial negative stance toward the Iraq War had to be maintained and strengthened to meet the European concern of France.
In sum, France had a broad range of interests in the Iraq War. French politicians, business, and the public concerned about their economic and political interests regarding the Iraq War even though some of these interests were not articulated vociferously. To a large degree, these interests were already embedded in the everyday policy-making in France since they had existed for a long period of time.69) Decisions on the Iraq War were not one-time issues. Such deep-rooted interests regarding the Iraq War were, however, not found in the Afghanistan War. French economic relations with Afghanistan were negligible compared to those with Iraq and the French government was not favorable to the Taliban government or terrorist groups led by Bin-Laden. Compared to Iraq, Afghanistan did not have such an important geopolitical implication for France. The existence and the level of embedded interest could explain different responses of the French government to the war on terrorism. However, each of these interests alone may not be able to represent the consistent cause of French decision. Instead, these embedded interests provided the context in which further foreign policy factors such as transatlantic relations and multilateral institutions could be considered.

Ⅴ. Conclusion
  This paper argued that a simple dichotomy of pro- and anti- American perspective does not provide a comprehensive explanation on the French choice regarding the Iraq War. The French opposition to the Iraq War reflected a far more sophisticated function of domestic politics, economic and political interests, and European concerns in addition to the foreign policy tradition regarding the US and the UN. The contrasting responses to the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War could be explained by incorporating the differing economic and political interests regarding the two cases. While the Afghanistan War did not threat major French interest, Iraqi oil and trade relation were much more sensitive economic factors which affected the policy consideration. Traditional pro-Arab policy and European concern were also at the center of political considerations. The French opposition became more severe when these interests were combined with anti-American sentiment that the US was using the war on terrorism as an opportunity to build a new world order which would guarantee their business and geopolitical interests.70)“The vestiges of Gaullism, traditional pro-Arab policy and the American desire for unilateral decision-making ruled out the possibility that France might take the American side.”71) By providing interest-based explanations, this study explained the reason for different responses of the French government to the US-led war on terrorism and provided a more balanced understanding of the French policy choice regarding the Iraq War.
This paper has a few implications in the study of French politics and European CFSP. First, a dual consideration of idea and interest enables a more case-specific analysis in foreign policy-making by providing in-depth contextual insights. Understanding embedded political and economic interests is essential in that they provide a context in which external factors could be considered. Second, by examining the underlying causes of the French objection to the Iraq War, this paper also contributes to the discussion on the efficacy of CFSP and ESDP as well as the nature of transatlantic relationship. The French case implies that European countries will decide their foreign policy not just in terms of static position vis-`a-vis the US or the UN but also with a careful consideration of their pending interests. The urgency of interest would amplify or diminish the impact of international rules and norms. The European response to similar cases in the future, therefore, does not render a unique path of pro- or anti- transatlantic relations.
Footnotes
1)Stephen Wood, “The Iraq War: Five European Roles,”National Europe Centre Paper No.112 (2003), p.2. For the CFSP and ESDP regarding the Iraq War, see Brian Crowe,“ A common European foreign policy after Iraq?”International Affairs, 79-3 (May, 2003); Christopher Hill,“ EU foreign policy since 11 September 2001,”Journal of Common Market Studies, 42-1 (March, 2004); Romain Yakemtchouk, La politique ´etrang`ere de l’Union europ´eenne (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005).
2)Jolyon Howorth,“ France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis,”Survival, 45-4 (Winter, 2003-04).
3)For the division between Europe and the US, see Thierry de Montbrial, La guerre et la diversit´e du monde: Les ´Etas-Unis contre l’Europe-puissance, (Paris: L’aube, 2004); Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004); Thomas S. Mowle, Allies at Odds? The United States and the European Union (New York:Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Michael Gueldry, Les ´Etats-Unis et l’Europe face `a la guerre d’Irak, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005); Daniel Levy, Max Pensky, and John Torpey, eds., Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War (London: Verso, 2005).
4)The US defined these two wars as“ the war on terrorism.”
5)The national interest, often referred to by the French term raison d’´etat, is a country’s goals and ambitions in economic, military, or cultural arena (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_interest(searched on 2006. 12. 10)). In this paper, “national interest”specifically means the economicinterests to maximize national welfare and the political interests to increase national influence andstatus in international affairs.
6)Le Monde (2001. 9. 13).
7)The two countries had shown disagreements on issues such as the death penalty, abortion, gun control and religion. Philip H. Gordon and Suzan Benedicte, “France, the United States and the ‘War on Terrorism’,”U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (2002).
8)Jeremy Shapiro, “The Role of France in the War on Terrorism,”U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (2002), p.1.
9)For detailed discussions on French anti-terrorism, see Daniel Hermant and Didier Bigo, “Les Politique de Lutte contre le Terrorisme: Enjeux Francais”in Fernando Reinares ed., European Democracies against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 2000); Erik Van de Linde et al.“ Quick Scan of Post 9? 11 National Counter-terrorism Policymaking and Implementation in Selected European Countries,” Research project for the Netherlands Ministry of Justice (May, 2002); Jean-Louis Brugui´ere, “Terrorism after the War in Iraq,”U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (2003), pp.1-2.
10)Gregory Shaun,“ France and the War on Terrorism,”Terrorism and Political Violence, 15-1 (Spring 2003), pp.124-147.
11)Gordon and Benedicte (2002).
12)The French contribution included“ a naval task force led by the aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle which have flown more than 10% of coalition reconnaissance and air defense missions since the carrier arrived. During Operation Anaconda, French Mirage jets based in Kyrgyzstan and Super Etendard fighterbombers from the Charles De Gaulle struck 31 targets, becoming the only nonU.S. jets to have conducted strike operations in Afghanistan.”Shapiro (2002).
13)Shapiro (2002).
14)Former French foreign minister Hubert V´edrine described this stance as demonstrating a “simplistic”understanding of international affairs. Shapiro (2002).
15)Jacquelyn K Davis, Reluctant Allies & Competitive Partners: U.S.-French Relations at the Breaking Point? (Dulles: Brassey’s Inc., 2003), p.163.
16)Hertoghe, however, provides an observation that there had been substantial misinformation about the Iraq War. Alain Hertoghe, La Guerre `a Outrances: Comment la Press nous a d´esinform´es sur l’Irak (Paris: Calmann-L´evy, 2003).
17)Le Monde (2003. 4. 1); Wood (2003), pp.6-7.
18)This emphasis on the non-military measures explains French leaders’initial reluctance to use the word“ war”to describe the anti-terrorism campaign. Gordon and Benedicte (2002).
19)William Shawcross, Allies: Why the West Had to Remove Saddam (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
20)Jacques Beltran, “French Policy Toward Iraq,”U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (2002). For the French stance toward the use of force and legitimacy of military action, see Gilles Andr´eani and Pierre Hassner, eds., Justifier la guerre? De l’humanitaire au contreterrorisme (Paris: Sciences Po Les Presses, 2005); Pierre Hassner, “Raymond Aron on the Use of Force and Legitimacy,”in U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (February, 2005); Stanley Hoffmann, “Force, Legitimacy, and Order,”U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (February, 2005).
21)Jane M. O. Sharp, “Tony Blair, Iraq and the special relationship: poodle or partner?”in International Journal, 59-1 (Winter, 2004), p.66.
22)The French politics has traditionally allowed a huge leverage to President in deciding a foreign policy, which was a reserved domain for political executives. In fact, a real decision regarding Iraq was made among selected few policy actors. Interview with Dr. Dominique David and Etienne de Durand, IFRI (2006. 2. 6).
23)See David Baran, ”La guerre d’Irak: la strat´egie du faible face`a la puissance am´ericaine,”Politique ´Etrang`ere, 68-2 (printemps, 2003); Jean-Marie Colombani and Walter Wells, Dangerous De Liaisons: What’s Really Behind the War Between France and the U.S. (Hoboken: Melville House, 2004); Philip H., Gordon, “France, the United States and the ‘War on Terrorism’,”U.S.-France Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (January, 2002); Thierry Tardy,“ France and the US: the inevitable clash?”International Journal, 59-1 (Winter, 2004).
24)David Styan,“ Jacques Chirac’s‘ non’: France, Iraq and the United Nations, 1991-2003,”Modern &Contemporary France, 12-3 (August, 2004), p.375.
25)Wood (2003), p.6.; Le Debat, 125 May-August 2003.
26)Dominique de Villepin, Toward a New World (Hoboken: Melville House Publishing, 2004); John Gaffney, “Highly Emotional States: French-US Relations and the Iraq War,”European Security, 13-3 (2004), p.248.
27)Emmanuel Godin and Tony Chafer, eds., The French Exception (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005).
28)Stanley Hoffmann, “Force, Legitimacy, and Order,”U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (February, 2005).
29)Jean-Marie Colombani and Walter Wells, Dangerous De-Liaisons: What’s Really Behind the War Between France and the U.S. (Hoboken: Melville House, 2004).
30)Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power (New York: Knopf, 2003). For power relations, see also Michael Brenner and Guillaume Parmentier, Reconcilable Differences: U.S.-French Relations in the New Era (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002); Tod Lindberg, ed., Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America, and the Future of a Troubled Partnership (New York:Routledge, 2004).
31)For discussions on the French anti-Americanism, see Thierry de Montbrial, “Les trois sources du malaise am´ericain,”Le Monde (2002. 12. 29),“ Le monde selon George W. Bush,”Le Monde (2003. 2. 7), “Au-del`a de l’affrontement,”Le Monde (2003. 3. 20); Philippe Roger, L’ennemi am´ericain:G´en´ealogie de l’antiam´ericanisme francais (Paris: Seuil, 2002). Jean-Francois Revel took a more cautious position that much of anti-Americanism in France was exaggerated. Jean-Francois Revel, L’obs´ession anti-am´ericaine: Son fonctionnement, ses causes, ses incons´equences (Paris: Plon, 2002).
32)Gregory Marfleet and Collen Miller, “Failure after 1441: Bush and Chirac in the UN Security Council,”Foreign Policy Analysis (2005), pp.333-360.
33)See Francois Vergniolle de Chantal, “Les d´ebats am´ericains sur la relation transatlantique,” Synth´ese n.128, CFE-IFRI (mars, 2004), p.5; Guillaume Parmentier,“ Force, faiblesse, puissance?,” Commentaire No.100 (hiver, 2002-2003).
34)Stanley Hoffman and Frederic Bozo, Gulliver Unbound: The Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Mason, John G., “Gulliver en process: la guerre en Irak et ses retomb´ees aux Etats-Unis,”Politique ´Etrang`ere (autumne-hiver, 2003-2004).
35)Fouad El Khatib, “Counter-Proliferation Policy and France’s New Government,”U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (2002).
36)Beltran (2002).
37)Ruxandra Popa,“ The UN Disarmament Process: French and American Lessons from Iraq,”U.S.France Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (January, 2004), p.5.
38)Khatib (2002). For a general explanation on the security policy of Chirac’s France, see Etienne de Durand, “French Security Policy under the New Government,”U.S.-France Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (November, 2002).
39)Colombani and Wells (2004).
40)Brugui`ere (2003), p.4.
41)Jean-Claude Casanova, “U.S.-French Crises in Historical Perspective: An Aronian View,”U.S.Europe Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (February, 2005), p.4.
42)France emphasized the role of UN and its Security Council during the 1999 Kosovo war and debate over NATO’s new Strategic Concept. Gordon and Benedicte (2002).
43)Marfleet and Miller (2005), p.336.
44)Jacques Chirac, Speech to the 10th Ambassadors’Conference, August 29, 2002. Beltran (2002), p.6.
45)De Villepin (2004).
46)Marfleet and Miller (2005), p.337.
47)David Styan, France and Iraq: Oil, Arms and French Policy Making in the Middle East (New York:Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
48)Chirac visited Baghdad in November 1974 and January 1976, hosting Saddam Hussein, who was vice president at the time, back in France in September 1975.
49)The project, which subsequently emerged as the core of Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons, was destroyed in an Israeli air raid in September 1980. Amir Taheri, “The Chirac Doctrine,” National Review Online (2002. 11. 4). http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/123 (Searched on2006. 1. 17).
50)For the details of Franco-Iraqi economic relations, see Styan (2004), pp.374-396.; Styan (2006).
51)By the end of the 1990s, Elf, Total and Alcatel-Alsthom had all reopened offices in Baghdad. Styan (2004), p.375.
52)Styan (2004), p.376.
53)Total, Elf and Petrofina merged into TotalFinaElf (TFE) and later changed its name to Total. In this paper, Total and TFE mean the same company.
54)Pierre Noe¨l,“ Irak: Une guerre pour l’or noir?”Le Nouvel Observateur (2002. 10. 3),“ L’Am´erique et le p´etrole irakien,”Policy Brief du CFE, Paris, IFRI (f´evrier, 2003),“ La strat´egie am´ericaine de s´ ecurit´e et le p´etrole du Moyen-Orient,”Document de travail du CFE, Paris, IFRI (octobre, 2003), “A long terme, les Etats-Unis auront peu d’influence sur le p´etrole irakien,”in La Tribune (2003. 5. 23); Michel Chatelus, ”P´etrole: mythe et r´ealit´e de l’h´eg´emonie des Etats-Unis,”Politique ´Etrang`ere, 68-3/4 (automne-hiver, 2003-2004).
55)With the introduction of the oil for food program, Iraq decided to diversify its sources of supply, largely in favor of neighboring Arab countries. As a result, in 2001, France ranked 11th in terms of contracts signed under this program. Valerie Marcel,“ Total in Iraq,”U.S.-France Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (August, 2003).
56)Total relied on its own commercial relations in Iraq and turned to diplomatic support only when it judged such support useful and available. Marcel (2003), pp.5-6.
57)Marcel (2003), p.6. Furthermore, these contracts have not been signed because of UN resolutions, and could not be executed until sanctions were lifted. James S. Robbins, “Coalition of the Unwilling,”National Review Online, http://www.nationalreview.com/robbins/robbins021103.asp(2003. 2. 11). (2006. 1. 21).
58)Styan (2004), p.376.
59)Michel Wieviorka, “The Effects of a War Foretold: The War in Iraq and French Society,”U.S.France Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (January, 2003).
60)Part of the difficulty faced by the French government in its relations with France’s Muslim community stemmed from its refusal to consider individual faith or minority communities in state decisions. France adopted a rigid stance on secularism and discounted any ethnic or religious characteristics in questions of citizenship, which would threaten the foundations of the Republic. Beltran (2002).
61)Parmentier (2002-2003), p.9.
62)Interview with Professor Jean Klein (Paris Ⅰ) at IFRI (2006. 2. 8).
63)Parmentier (2002-2003), p.9. Hubert V´edrine points out that it is too often forgotten that the elements of status, power and prestige which the French inherited from their history, ancient or modern, have been trivialized or relativised. Gr´egory Rayko et Isabelle Lass`erre, Entretien avec Hubert V´edrine, Politique Internationale?La Revue, 06, (Hiver, 2005); Margaret Blunden, “France,”in Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (eds.) The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp.19-20.
64)Davis (2003), p.152.
65)Maxime Lefebvre,“ France and Europe: An Ambivalent Relationship,”U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (September, 2004).
66)Francois Heisbourg, “The French-German Duo and the Search for a New European Security Model,”The International Spectator, 3-2004, pp.62-63.
67)Heisbourg (2004), p.63.
68)Wood (2003), p.7.
69)Phone interview with Alain Barluet of Le Figaro (2006. 1. 28, 2006. 10. 3).
70)Volker Perthes, “Guerre en Irak: vers un nouvel ordre regional?”Politique ´Etrang`ere, 68-3/4 (automne-hiver, 2003-2004).
71)Casanova (2005), p.3.
References
  1. Andr´eani, Gilles, and Pierre Hassner, eds. Justifier la guerre? De l’humanitaire au contre-terrorisme. Paris: Sciences Po Les Presses, 2005.

  2. Baran, David.“ L’adversaire irakien.”Politique E´trang`ere, 68-2 (printemps, 2003).

  3. Baran, David. ”La guerre d’Irak: la strat´egie du faible face `a la puissance am´ericaine.” Politique ´Etrang`ere (printemps, 2003).

  4. Beltrand, Jacques.“ French Policy toward Iraq.”US-France Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (September, 2002).

  5. Blinken, Antony. “The United States, France, and Europe at the Outset of the New Administration.”U.S.-France Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (March, 2002).

  6. Blunden, Margaret. “France.”in Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman, eds., The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000.

  7. Bozo, Fr´ed´eric. La politique ´etrang`ere de la France depuis 1945. La D´ecouverte & Syros, 1997.

  8. Brenner, Michael.“ The CFSP factor: a comparison of United States and French strategies.” Cooperation and Conflict, 38-3 (Sep, 2003).

  9. Brugui`ere, Jean-Louis.“ Terrorism after the War in Iraq.”U.S.-France Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (May, 2003)

  10. Casanova, Jean-Claude.“ U.S.-French Crises in Historical Perspective: An Aronian View.” U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (February, 2005).

  11. Chatelus, Michel. ”P´etrole: mythe et r´ealit´e de l’h´eg´emonie des Etats-Unis.”Politique ´Etrang`ere, 68-3/4 (automne-hiver, 2003-2004).

  12. Colombani, Jean-Marie and Walter Wells. Dangerous De-Liaisons: What’s Really Behind the War Between France and the U.S. Hoboken, Melville House, 2004. Crowe, Brian.“ A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq?”International Affairs, 79-3 (May, 2003).

  13. Cuche, Pascal. “Irak: et si la France s’´etait tromp´ee?”Politique ´Etrang`ere, 2-2003 (printemps, 2003).

  14. Davis, Jacquelyn K. Reluctant Allies & Competitive Partners: U.S.-French Relations at the Breaking Point? Dulles, Brassey’s Inc., 2003.

  15. De Durand, Etienne.“ French Security Policy under the New Government.”U.S.-France Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (November, 2002). 16 De Montbrial, Thierry. La guerre et la diversit? du monde: Les ´Etas-Unis contre l’Europe -puissance, Paris, L’aube, 2004.

  16. De Montbrial, Thierry.“ Les trois sources du malaise am´ericain.”Le Monde (2002. 10. 29).

  17. De Montbrial, Thierry.“ Le monde selon George W. Bush.”Le Monde (2003. 2. 7).

  18. De Montbrial, Thierry.“ Au-del`a de l’affrontement.”Le Monde (2003. 3. 20).

  19. De Villepin, Dominique. Toward a New World, Hoboken, Melville House Publishing, 2004.

  20. Gaffney, John. “Highly Emotional States: French-US Relations and the Iraq War,” European Security, 13-3, 2004.

  21. Godin, Emmanuel, and Tony Chafer, eds. The French Exception. Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2005.

  22. Gordon, Philip H.“ France, the United States and the“ War on Terrorism.”U.S.-France Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (January, 2002).

  23. Gordon, Philip H. “Trading Places: America and Europe in the Middle East.”The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 47-2 (Summer, 2005).

  24. Gordon, Philip H. and Jeremy Shapiro. Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq. New York, McGraw-Hill, 2004.

  25. Gordon, Philip H. and Benedicte Suzan. “France, the United States and the “War on Terrorism.”US-France Analysis, The Brookings Institution (January 2002).

  26. Gregory, Shaun.“ France and the War on Terrorism.”Terrorism and Political Violence, 15-1 (Spring 2003).

  27. Gueldry, Michael. Les ´Etats-Unis et l’Europe face`a la guerre d’Irak. Paris, L’Harmattan, 2005.

  28. Hassner, Pierre. “Raymond Aron on the Use of Force and Legitimacy.”U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (February, 2005).

  29. Haglund, David G.“ Has France Finally Said auf Wiedersehen to Its German‘ Problem?’” Orbis (Summer, 2004).

  30. Heisbourg, Francois. “The French-German Duo and the Search for a New European Security Model.”The International Spectator (3/2004).

  31. Hermant, Daniel and Didier Bigo.“ Les Politique de Lutte contre le Terrorisme: Enjeux Francais,”in Fernando Reinares ed., European Democracies against Terrorism:Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation. Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 2000.

  32. Hertoghe, Alain. La Guerre`a Outrances: Comment la Press nous a d´esinform´es sur l’Irak. Paris, Calmann-L´evy, 2003.

  33. Hill, Christopher. “EU foreign policy since 11 September 2001.”Journal of Common Market Studies, 42-1 (Mar, 2004).

  34. Hoffman, Stanley, and Frederic Bozo. Gulliver Unbound: The Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq. Lahnam, Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.

  35. Hoffmann, Stanley.“ Force, Legitimacy, and Order.”U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (February, 2005).

  36. Howorth, Jolyon.“ France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic crisis.”Survival, 45-4 (Winter, 2003-04).

  37. Kagan, Robert. Of Paradise and Power. New York, Knopf, 2003.

  38. Khatib, Fouad El.“ Counter-Proliferation Policy and France’s new Government.”U.S.France Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (September, 2002).

  39. Le Debat. 125 (May-August 2003).

  40. Lefebvre, Maxime. “France and Europe: An Ambivalent Relationship.”U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (September, 2004).

  41. Le Monde, various days.

  42. Levy, Daniel, Max Pensky and John Torpey, eds. Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe:Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War. London, Verso, 2005.

  43. Lindberg, Tod, ed. Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America, and the Future of a Troubled Partnership. New York, Routledge, 2004.

  44. Marcel, Valerie. “Total in Iraq.”U.S.-France Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (August, 2003).

  45. Marfleet, B. Gregory and Collen Miller.“ Failure after 1441: Bush and Chirac in the UN Security Council.”Foreign Policy Analysis (2005).

  46. Mason, John G. “Gulliver en process: la guerre en Irak et ses retomb´ees aux EtatsUnis.”Politique ´Etrang`ere (autumne-hiver, 2003-2004).

  47. Mowle, Thomas S. Allies at Odds? The United States and the European Union, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

  48. Mueen, Saqueb. “Fallout from the War in Iraq: Domestic Echoes in Foreign Policy?” Rusi Journal (June 2003).

  49. Noel, Pierre.“ Irak: Une guerre pour l’or noir?”Le Nouvel Observateur (2002. 10. 3).

  50. Noel, Pierre. “L’Am´erique et le p´etrole irakien.”Policy Brief du CFE, Paris, IFRI (f´evrier, 2003).

  51. Noel, Pierre. “La strat´egie am´ericaine de s´ecurit´e et le p´etrole du Moyen-Orient.” Document de travail du CFE, Paris, IFRI (octobre, 2003).

  52. Noel, Pierre. “A long terme, les Etats-Unis auront peu d’influence sur le p´etrole irakien.”in La Tribune (23 Mai, 2003).

  53. Parmentier, Guillaume. “Force, faiblesse, puissance?”Commentaire, No.100 (hiver, 2002-2003).

  54. Perthes, Volker.“ Guerre en Irak: vers un nouvel ordre regional?”Politique E´trang`ere, 68-3/4 (automne-hiver, 2003-2004).

  55. Popa, Ruxandra. “The UN Disarmament Process: French and American Lessons from Iraq.”U.S.-France Analysis Series, The Brookings Institution (January, 2004)

  56. Rayko, Gr´egory et Isabelle Lasserre. Entretien avec Hubert V´edrine. Politique Internationale?La Revue, n

SAKHRI Mohamed
SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a bachelor's degree in political science and international relations as well as a Master's degree in international security studies, alongside a passion for web development. During my studies, I gained a strong understanding of key political concepts, theories in international relations, security and strategic studies, as well as the tools and research methods used in these fields.

Articles: 14313

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *