Defending the National Interest?

Before the Iraq War, the position of France toward the U.S.-led war against terrorism was not essentially hostile. After the 9?11 terrorist attacks, France expressed a deep sympathy and solidarity to the US and showed a strong support to ant-terrorism activities. French leaders from diverse political spectrum showed a solidarity with and support for the US. President Chirac rushed to the US and became the first international leader on the scene to express solidarity with the US. Le Monde published the September 13th edition with the headline, “We are all Americans.”⁶⁾ The American national anthem was played at the Champs Elys´ee as a symbolic act to show the French sympathy. The 9?11 has also brought the French public closer to the US. In spite of a growing transatlantic “cultural gap,”the 9?11 attacks served as a reminder of the values and interests that Americans and Europeans still had in common.⁷⁾
Unlike its traditionally reluctant stance to an enhanced NATO’s role, France did not hesitate to support the invocation of NATO’s Article IV which guaranteed mutual defense. France also supported the employment of NATO Airborne Early-Warning (AWACS) platforms over U.S. territory.
As the presidency country of the UN Security Council at the time, France introduced the Resolution 1368 which described a terrorist attack as a“ threat to international peace and security.”It provided the US with international political legitimacy to retaliate against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. France also supported the US proposals in the UN Security Council to confer international authorization to freeze the funds of terrorist organizations by endorsing the Resolution 1373.⁸⁾
Over the past few decades, France has frequently been affected by terrorism. As a result, France has a long tradition and experience to deal with the war on terrorism.⁹⁾ France remained at the forefront of the war on terrorism as the attacks could target the French state and/or French citizens at any time.¹⁰⁾ President Chirac and other leaders expressed France’s readiness to take part alongside the US in a possible military retaliation against Bin-Laden, a stance supported by 73% of the French, according to a survey.¹¹⁾
During the Afghanistan War, France had deployed nearly 5,000 military personnel and French forces have been present at nearly all phases of the operation of Afghanistan.¹²⁾ The French contribution was comprehensive including major air-strike operations. Intelligence sharing with the US has also increased. French officers were already on the ground before the 9?11 with Northern Alliance forces. The US forces used the French intelligence network to create a partnership with the Northern Alliance that proved critical for overthrowing the Taliban government.¹³⁾
However, France has made it clear that its solidarity was not unconditional to grant a blank check for the US. Chirac wanted to be consulted in advance about the modalities of intervention in the war on terrorism, which was made clear after his September 18 meeting with President Bush. The conclusion of the Afghanistan War and the changed focus on the Iraqi issues began to show a discrepancy between the US and France. The French were also disappointed with the impression that their contribution was sidelined as the Afghanistan War moved toward the end.

2. The Iraq War and French Response

In spite of the French support to the war on terrorism, noticeable disparities between France and the US began to grow in dealing with the Iraq war. After the victory of the Afghanistan War, the US broadened the scope of war on terrorism by targeting Iraq as the next agenda. This time, the US began to show a more unilateral stance in applying a new policy paradigm in the Middle East and it brought clashes with a number of countries, most notably France, which claimed their traditional role in this region. French criticism of U.S. anti-terrorism policies has increased markedly since President Bush’s“ axis of evil”speech in January 2002.¹⁴⁾ The French position on the Iraq War did evolve over the fall and winter of 2002-03. France opposed categorically to pre-emptive military action in Iraq. France maintained that military intervention in Iraq would be a “material breach”of UN Security Council resolutions and rejected an automatic link between Iraq’s failure to disclose arms and military attack. Chirac pointed out that “war… would be an admission of failure.”¹⁵⁾ The use of force in Iraq could be legitimatized only after more comprehensive arms inspections. At the onset of the Iraq War, France became the one of the hardest opponents to the US policy.
Unlike the Afghanistan War, and the mild opposition to the Gulf War in 1991, the French public opinion was not favorable to the US. The US tendency toward unilateral actions has provoked a growing anti-American sentiment among the French public and it was widely shared by the media.¹⁶⁾ A poll conducted at the beginning of April showed 78% of the French public disapproved of the “American war”and 74% approved of Chirac’s opposition to Bush. 65% thought the conflict was entirely or primarily caused by the US.¹⁷⁾
Reflecting the attitude of the French public, French leaders have warned against turning a war on terrorism into a war on Islam and emphasized a solution based on diplomacy, law enforcement, and international intelligence cooperation.¹⁸⁾ France was also skeptical about the American vision of post-Saddam Iraq¹⁹⁾ and expressed a concern that a military intervention would deteriorate a fragile regional balance.²⁰⁾
There existed a strong anti-war unity among different political actors. Both the incumbent party and the opposition parties supported non-participation to the Iraq War. President Chirac announced on 10 March on French television that“ my position is that regardless of the circumstances, France will vote no because … there are no grounds for waging war in order to achieve the goal we have set ourselves ? to disarm Iraq.”²¹⁾ In addition to a traditionally strong presidential initiative in foreign policy, domestic political support enabled the French government to uphold an anti-war position.²²⁾

A breach in transatlantic relations between France and the US has been discussed as the major factor explaining the French position in the Iraq War. Franco-American relations were central to the transatlantic debate.²³⁾ France has insisted a certain degree of autonomy in its international relations and often defied the US leadership since the Cold War era. France had a long record of providing an alternative policy vision to that of the US or Britain.²⁴⁾ The French worldview represented the goal of a strong Europe steered by France, and the desire for a“ multi-polar world.”²⁵⁾ Former foreign minister Dominique de Villepin also emphasized that stability would be achieved not by partnership with Washington but by the development of“ a number of regional poles.”²⁶⁾ In this multipolar world, France could increase its voice vis-｀a-vis the US superpower.
From a traditional diplomatic standpoint, the French objection to the Iraq War was not a surprising one.²⁷⁾ Different perceptions and worldviews between the two countries had prevailed before the Iraq War. Stanley Hoffmann points out that current transatlantic discord is different from past conflicts in the West in that the crucial difference was the “philosophy”of the Bush administration regarding how to exercise power and treat disagreements among allies.²⁸⁾ According to Jean-Marie Colombani, editor-in-chief of Le Monde, these differences are even more profound, dating from the very origins of the two republics.²⁹⁾ From the standpoint of power relations, Robert Kagan contrasts a Hobbesian US and a Kantian Europe.³⁰⁾ Europe?including France?was weak in power and had to rely on a multilateral solution. Europe chose a co-existence with the danger while the US was capable of getting rid of the real threat and pursued a unilateral solution. These different worldviews had ultimately led to different policy responses to the Iraq War. French policy regarding the Iraq War was also motivated by a reservoir of resentment at the American superpower, which was shared by both the policy-makers and the public.³¹⁾
Leaders’style and perception also contributed to the breach between France and the US. Regarding the Iraq War, Chirac mirrored the deep vein of anti-Americanism while Bush advocated the validity of the holy war and they blamed each other for the mismanagement of the case. In a sense, the two leaders had inaccurately gauged the preferences of the‘ ‘other’’in their subjective interpretations of the political environments. They seemed to systematically overestimate their influence and underestimate that of their rivals. This overconfidence could have led them to confront in the final phase of bargaining.³²⁾
Regarding the method of dealing with the Iraqi case, France and the US showed discrepancies.³³⁾ The US found itself vulnerable from terrorism and regarded itself as being in the front line of the war on terrorism. The US demonstrated the view that the terrorist threat was linked to Iraqi governments and military means were appropriate.³⁴⁾ On the contrary, France took a legalistic approach to proliferation problems and it was preventative in essence.³⁵⁾ They believed that UN weapons inspection would be an effective guarantee against the resurgence of an Iraqi WMD program.³⁶⁾
However, the French and the US positions were not fundamentally drifting apart. Both governments shared a principle that the fight against terrorism should be upheld.³⁷⁾ Regarding proliferation policy, the US and French positions were not fundamentally at odds.³⁸⁾ Post-9?11 management including the cooperation in the Afghanistan War showed that the two parties were still in the same side even with a series of “methodological” differences. Anti-Americanism and the US hostilities toward the French were, therefore, much exaggerated.³⁹⁾

2. The UN and Multilateralism

The core of French foreign policy has been its emphasis on the multilateral approach in dealing with conflict prevention and crisis management. France believed that the terrorist threat was a global one and must be met by multilateral tools including diplomatic, intelligence, and legal measures.⁴⁰⁾ The French also stress the need for legitimacy for the Iraq War by relying on the UN.
The Security Council has bestowed France with a veto power that became the only virtual way for France to constrain the US.⁴¹⁾ The UN, therefore, has emerged as the most important institutional framework for dealing with the US. France has consistently stressed the overwhelming importance of the UN in legitimizing military action.⁴²⁾ France emphasized the value of the resolution to strengthen the UN inspection regime even though President Bush expressed little faith in the efficacy of inspections after the passage of Resolution 1441. President Chirac staked out his position by emphasizing diplomacy, multilateral behavior, patience, and opposition to any military action not approved by the UN Security Council.⁴³⁾ According to Chirac,

French Foreign Minster Dominique de Villepin also refused to rule out the possibility that France would vote against any military action.⁴⁵⁾ The French position was supported by Germany which was soon-to-be the chair country of Security Council. The German Foreign Minister asserted that inspectors should have‘ ‘all the time which is needed’’to perform their duties.⁴⁶⁾
France certainly had a stake in the UN and showed a strong adherence to its resolution. But in a broader scope, the UN was considered more as an instrument to control the US than as a diplomatic objective per se. Ideas, norms and legitimacy can not exist separated from a more tangible substance. Understanding the French position in the Iraq War, therefore, also needs a careful consideration of the interest-side of the event.

The French economic tie with Iraq and Saddam Hussein has been maintained since 1975.⁴⁷⁾ A comprehensive accord on economic cooperation was signed between Baghdad and Paris together with the exchanges of the leaders.⁴⁸⁾ During the period of ambitious industrialization in the 1970s with increased oil revenue, French companies became key beneficiaries of public projects in Iraq. Iraq committed to granting French oil companies a number of privileges and France repaid the favor by approving the construction of Iraq’s first nuclear-power center, Tammuz, near Baghdad.⁴⁹⁾ France also sold an estimated $20 billion worth of weapons, including Mirage fighters, to Iraq, and emerged as Iraq’s biggest trading partner.⁵⁰⁾ After a brief pitfall during the Gulf War, many of the French private enterprises had re-established ties with Iraq by the mid-1990s.⁵¹⁾ Economic relation with Iraq also had significances in the relations with the Arab world in commercial and energy domains. Baghdad could serve as the centre of a regional strategy for France.
France has also been active in altering the sanctions against Iraq by proposing the “Oil for Food Program,”which was adopted as the UN Resolution 986. French commercial hopes were pinned largely on securing a significant post-sanctions role, too.⁵²⁾ Bilateral Franco-Iraqi trade rose steadily, from =C685 million in 1997 to =C1.6 billion in 2001.
Oil was at the core of Franco-Iraqi economic relations. Total,⁵³⁾ the French energy giant, had been active in the Iraqi oil industry for a long time and became a primary negotiator of major oil fields such as Majnoon and Bin Umar. By the end of the 1990s, Total had initialed pre-contract agreements for post-sanctions oil development in Iraq along with China’s CNPC and the Russia’s Lukoil. Table 1 shows the contracts regarding major Iraqi oil fields.
Considering these economic ties between Paris and Baghdad especially during the time of Iraq’s hardship under the sanctions, France’s economic presence in Iraq was huge. The Iraq War led by the US, therefore, could seriously threaten the pre-existing French advantage in Iraq. There was a general suspicion that oil interests dictated the French policy toward Iraq and the divergence with the US.⁵⁴⁾
However, economic interest alone does not provide a compelling explanation on the French opposition to the Iraq War. Despite the specific interests mentioned above, Iraq was far from being France’s main trading partners. Iraq amounts to only 0.2% of France’s exports and 0.3% of its imports. Furthermore, the Oil for Food program did not bring France at the top of the list in Iraq.⁵⁵⁾ Given these figures, it is difficult to say that business exerted a determining influence on France’s policy choice. A direct linkage between the French oil interest and the participation in the Iraq War was also dubious. Valerie Marcel pointed out that Total has been careful not to tie its interest too closely to the French government’s, realizing that its independence from the government would be critical for securing its role in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.⁵⁶⁾ As long as France did not participate in the coalition operations in Iraq, Paris would have little influence over the occupying administration to support Total’s bid.⁵⁷⁾
The French economic interest in Iraq was real regarding the Iraq War. However, the direct influence of business was less obvious even though their existence was not in doubt. The French Government formally rejected the accusations that its opposition to the war was due to the business interests from Saddam Hussein’s oil revenues. Instead of reflecting strong sectoral interests, the French economic interests regarding the Iraq War were deeply imbedded also in a political context.

2. Political Interests

⑴ Pro-Arab Policy and Muslim Concern
An important source of French opposition to military action against Iraq came from France’s traditional pro-Arab foreign policy. Opposition to war was linked to deeper concerns about the impact of a conflict on the region and on Arab attitudes. France had already faced a political turmoil when President Francois Mitterrand decided to contribute French forces to the Gulf War in 1991. Jean-Pierre Chev｀enement, then Minister of Defense, resigned in protest of the French deployment to the Gulf region.
The French position to the Iraq War reflected its previous bilateral relationship with Iraq. Iraq was a pivotal power that served to the political interest of France in the Middle East. In the 1970s, France was firmly in position as a key supplier of weapon to Iraq. In the formal diplomatic arena, Paris was the most receptive of OECD states towards Iraqi officials during the 1990s and the French anti-sanction lobbies have grown its influence. At the personal level, Chirac also had a long relationship with Hussein and the Iraqi authorities warmly welcomed the election of Jacques Chirac in May 1995.⁵⁸⁾
However, the bilateral relation was not always a privileged one. There has been a criticism within France that Iraq had overstepped the red line. Moreover, France’s participation in the Gulf War and Iraq’s inability to pay for its military imports in the 1980s already revealed some cracks in their political relations. The French political interests in the Iraq War would rather be found in a larger scope of pan-Arab policy than in a direct application of the previous bilateral relations with Iraq. In this sense, the relation with the Islam world was considered seriously. The impact of French Muslim was another important concern for the French government.⁵⁹⁾ France has the largest Muslim population in Europe of nearly five million and their agitation could result in more anti-Semitic attacks involving terrorism. Given the sensitivity of the Muslim population in France, any military action against Iraq could have been interpreted as another move against the Arab world.⁶⁰⁾

  ⑵ European concern
France had dual objectives regarding its European policy. First, France has sought to increase European political voice to counterbalance the US and other contending superpowers. At the same time, France has wanted to take the leadership in Europe. Europe was, in that sense, was “the effective multiplier of French power which would serve to the realization of French national glory.”⁶¹⁾ However, France has faced an increasingly unfavorable international environment to realize these objectives in the post Cold-War era.⁶²⁾ France’s unique position and freedom of diplomatic maneuver were weakened by the ending of the Cold War, and the reunification and normalization of Germany.⁶³⁾
The enlargement of Europe was another challenge for France. More diverse interests and stances began to emerge among the member countries, which made the common voice of Europe more difficult. Discrepancies were found not only between France and the US but among the EU member countries. Europe seemed to be divided in terms of the degree of alliance with the US. The US was trusted more in many other European countries than France and the French diplomacy had to meet these diverging European positions.⁶⁴⁾
Regarding the Iraq War, France wanted to uphold the voice of Europe which was different from that of the US while maintaining the fragile balance of the CFSP and ESDP in which new member countries began to put their stakes.⁶⁵⁾ Giving a green light to the US military action could shrink the uniqueness of European voice and would also weaken the visibility of France.
The Iraq War also illustrated the enduring French interest in its relation with Germany. French and German military concepts and doctrines have evolved in a converging manner in recent years and they have agreed more than ever on security and defense.⁶⁶⁾ However, neither France nor Germany could exercise decisive influence on other European countries. “New European”states refused to accept what they saw as the excessive power of the Franco-German couple.⁶⁷⁾ If France and Germany could not present a common front, this“ privileged axis”would suffer more credibility loss.⁶⁸⁾
In a situation where the CFSP and ESDP were weak to make common European voice and where“ Old Europe”was countered by“ New Europe,”the French room of maneuver was not large. The initial negative stance toward the Iraq War had to be maintained and strengthened to meet the European concern of France.
In sum, France had a broad range of interests in the Iraq War. French politicians, business, and the public concerned about their economic and political interests regarding the Iraq War even though some of these interests were not articulated vociferously. To a large degree, these interests were already embedded in the everyday policy-making in France since they had existed for a long period of time.⁶⁹⁾ Decisions on the Iraq War were not one-time issues. Such deep-rooted interests regarding the Iraq War were, however, not found in the Afghanistan War. French economic relations with Afghanistan were negligible compared to those with Iraq and the French government was not favorable to the Taliban government or terrorist groups led by Bin-Laden. Compared to Iraq, Afghanistan did not have such an important geopolitical implication for France. The existence and the level of embedded interest could explain different responses of the French government to the war on terrorism. However, each of these interests alone may not be able to represent the consistent cause of French decision. Instead, these embedded interests provided the context in which further foreign policy factors such as transatlantic relations and multilateral institutions could be considered.