- The Arab Democratic Center
(Israel) tried to put an active role in it on the African continent, because the region is of strategic importance, so it quickly extended bridges of cooperation with the countries of the region to obtain economic, political and strategic benefits, and based on (Israel) awareness of the importance of the region, its policy has drawn a strategy that depends on more than one means Diplomatic, economic and cultural, as well as military cooperation, and the (Israel) orientations have welcomed and supported the United States; Because there are common interests between them in the same region, so the state of South Sudan has gained great importance in the (Israeli) strategy, due to its proximity to the headwaters of the Nile River which (Israel) is seeking to seize, as Israel has invested a state of dissonance and the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese government and the movement Armed) in the south at the time, in order to deepen the intensity of that conflict by following its strategy known as (tightening and amputating the parties) that was set by some of the most prominent thinkers of the fifties, on the basis of which (Israel) sought to stokeAnd that the seriousness of this matter extends to the threat to Arab national security.
The problem of the study : The study tries to review the development of Israeli relations with the state of South Sudan, its causes, and how Israel makes the most of it to serve its strategic interests, by answering the following questions. What is the development path for Israeli relations and the state of South Sudan? What are the areas of bilateral cooperation between them? And what are its implications for Arab national security?
The study hypothesis: : begins the study of that hypothesis (that the geographic location of the State of South Sudan , which connects the African Muslim north with the southern African Christian, as well as its location on the Nile River , making them gaining importance in the Israeli strategy aimed at achieving Massalha in the acquisition of the Nile Basin water In addition to achieving its goals of splitting Arab countries into disharmonious small countries, by investing and deepening the intensity of conflict and disharmony by following its strategy known as (tightening and amputating the parties) in harmony with the American policy in the region called (the creative chaos strategy) to fragment and weaken the Arab region.
Study methodology : In this, the historical approach was used to give a historical overview of the development of relations between Israel and the armed movement in South Sudan until it reached separation and statehood, and the descriptive and analytical approach through collecting information and facts to give a picture of the Israeli goals and interests in the state of South Sudan.
Based on the foregoing, the study was divided into two topics in addition to the introduction and conclusion. The first topic dealt with: a historical overview of the development of relations between Israel and the state of South Sudan, while the second topic dealt with the implications of Israeli relations with the state of South Sudan on Egyptian national security.
The first topic: the historical track of the development of Israeli relations with the state of South Sudan
The first requirement: Israeli relations with the state of South Sudan before the disengagement
The relations between ‘Israel’ and the state of South Sudan are not new, and its real history dates back to the end of the fifties of the last century, after the outbreak of the rebellion in the city of Torit in southern Sudan in 1958, as Israel was interested in providing humanitarian aid (medicines, foodstuffs and doctors) And to provide services to the southern IDPs across the Sudanese border to Ethiopia who fled the dangers of the war, and at this stage Israeli attempts began to invest the tribal disparity in southern Sudan, as well as to exploit the state of dissonance and the ongoing conflict between North and South Sudan, to deepen that conflict and then Supporting the south’s orientation towards secession, hence the beginning of the (Israeli) contact with elements representing the leadership of the tribes of southern Sudan, such as “Joseph La Qu”, leader of the (Alania) movement, and undertaking these contacts from Ugandan lands, Colonel Baruch Bar Sever and a number of intelligence services Israeli that wasShe works in Uganda, and at this stage a conviction has developed with the Israeli government that deepening the conflict in South Sudan is an effective means of implicating Sudan in problems that do not leave him an opportunity to support or support Egypt in its struggle against Israel.(1) .
Since the beginning of the sixties of the twentieth century, the role of (Israel) in southern Sudan has taken a practical approach, as Israel has taken advantage of some neighboring countries, including (Uganda), which has transformed since 1962 into a base for the delivery of weapons and ammunition to (armed movements) in South Sudan, which It was supervised by elements of the Mossad (Israeli) and the Military Intelligence Wing, and Ethiopia also turned into the largest base for delivering military aid and means of support to (armed movements) in southern Sudan, as well as training elements of the leaders of the armed movement in the arts of war and fighting, and so it has Arms and equipment began flowing to southern movements in Sudan from several basic bases in the African countries surrounding Sudan and under the supervision of a large number of officers and advisers (Israelis), and most of them were light Russian weapons that Israel seized from the Egyptian army during the tripartite aggression against Egypt in 1956, as well On the famous Israeli machine gun (Uzi)(2) .
With (Uri Lubrani) assuming the position of (Israeli) ambassador in Uganda (1965-1966), then the position of ambassador (to Israel) in Ethiopia (1967-1972), Israeli support evolved to southern movements in Sudan to take new perspectives, including the transfer of officers And soldiers from the Israeli special units (the paratroopers) to train (armed movements) in southern Sudan and participate with them in the battles, in addition to (Israel) establishing a school for infantry officers in (Wenge – Kabul) in the Palestinian Galilee to train military cadres to lead the armed movement in southern Sudan, Some sources indicate that more than (2000) members of the armed movement in South Sudan have received their training in (Israel), including Colonel (Joseph Lako) leader of the (Alania) movement, who remained there for a period of (6) months receiving intensive training on Martial arts and leadership, and as a result of this extensive military support, organized, armed and prepared, the (Israeli) departments were able to support the hostile regional and international parties.For Sudan from expanding the war in the south, stabilizing the (armed movements) pillars, and establishing the foundations for their continuity. Israeli military support continued until 1972 when the peace agreement was signed in Addis Ababa between north and south Sudan, and as a result, Israeli support for South Sudan declined, especially after cutting African countries their relationship with Israel after the October 1973 war (3) .
Nevertheless, during the 1980s, Israel managed to restore its activity strongly after the return of the conflict in South Sudan, by providing support to the opposition movements through several means and procedures, including sending experts and officials in Arab and African affairs to take over the process of contacting the leaders of the (armed movements) in South Sudan In addition to sending weapons and military equipment and receiving elements of the “armed movements” to receive training in “Israel” on guerrilla warfare, in 1989 Israel received the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (John Garang), who demanded that it be necessary to intensify its support for the rebel movement through its establishment By training a number of pilots to lead light fighters to launch lightning attacks on Sudanese army centers stationed in the south, (Israel) also provided financial assistance that amounted to (500) million dollars, which was covered by the CIA treasury and under a secret agreement with the intelligence services ( Israeli) in the scope of strategic cooperation withUnited States of America(4).
The (Israeli) support for the SPLM contributed to the transition of the problem of South Sudan from its domestic framework to the regional and international framework, which led to the destabilization of the internal political stability of the Sudan, thus weakening its international positions in general and the direction of (Israel) in particular, especially that ( Israel) has sought to provide more support to the SPLM in southern Sudan by training some of the movement’s leaders to fly with a view to using them against government forces stationed in the south, as well as to provide this movement with anti-aircraft missiles and artillery and advanced weapons, and to continue to provide political support to them, (Israel) with this strategy from its desire to push the Sudanese government towards refraining from opposing the (Israeli) role in the African region, and to limit the export of its Islamic directions to its ally Eritrea, which, due to regional influences, has become a country with a negative impact on Arab security, especially Sudanese security.(5) .
And with the beginning of the nineties, the (Israeli) activity in supporting (armed movements) in southern Sudan was revealed, as (Israel) took advantage of the events that took place in the region, including the American war on Iraq, the fall of the Ethiopian regime, and the entry of American forces into Somaliland under the pretext of humanitarian intervention, and the beginning of independence Eritrea from Ethiopia to accelerate the pace of (Israeli) intervention to support the conflict in South Sudan, especially after the SPLM has maintained close relations with (Israel), and in coordination with Ethiopia and Uganda, as (Israel) is supplying the movement with weapons and military equipment, including missiles and heavy artillery Modern and advanced means of espionage and monitoring, in addition to the role played by experts and advisors in providing military information and training to members of the movement, as there are more than 300 (Israeli) experts in Ethiopia who oversee the training of Ethiopian and SPLM forces in southern Sudan, as well as Repeated visits to the leader of the popular movement(John Garang) to (Tel Aviv), in the year 1990 he states that (John Garang) visited (Tel Aviv) three times and met with the leaders of the (Israeli) army(6) During his meeting with the Israeli ambassador, John Garang requested that he be provided with rocket and mortar shells, machine guns, military trucks and soldiers, and millions of dollars in grants, and this was aimed at recovering some southern cities and bases that fell to the Sudanese army, and in order to enhance his negotiating position. Before the resumption of the Sudanese peace talks sponsored by Nigeria, and there (Israel) established an air bridge to the areas of armed movements and provided them with military weapons, and I also dispatched military experts to train them in the field, as some sources indicate that (1995) Israel trained more than seventeen One thousand members of the (armed movements) in South Sudan (7) .
After 2001, Israel decided to develop the level of military support for the opposition movement in southern Sudan by placing a group of officers in the (Israeli) army at the disposal of the leadership of the opposition movement, led by (John Garang), to train and arm the SPLA, coinciding with the movement’s demands. The separatist media to mobilize the support of world opinion under the title (a human group suffering persecution and repression by a puritanical Islamic authority, while the (Israeli) lobby in the United States of America adopted the issue of southern Sudan, which resulted in Sudan being included in the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, and the application of economic bans, also contributed Jewish communities in other countries such as (Britain, France, Canada) in promoting the cause of the south as a problem (liberation and emancipation) (8).
In fact, there are many reasons that prompted the armed movement in southern Sudan to receive support from the Israeli side, including: First, the need for a strategic ally that provides the movement with the necessary weapons and money. In order to achieve its goals, which include seeking separation and the establishment of a new state in southern Sudan. Second, the south’s sense of oppression and oppression is the result of the unbalanced pattern of development between the North and the South, and the focus of development in what is known as the Nile Triangle without the South. Third, Israel presents itself as a strategic ally of the rebellion in the south, especially with the movement’s lure of financial, political and military support from the Israeli side. Fourth, through the Comprehensive Peace Agreements in Sudan of 2005, Israel contributed to moving the separation lawsuit by the rebel movement.(9) .
The second requirement: the development of Israeli relations with the state of South Sudan after the disengagement.
After the declaration of independence for the state of South Sudan on July 9, 2011, relations between (Israel) and the state of South Sudan developed and formalized after the wave of secrecy that surrounded it, as (Israel) announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with the nascent state on July 28 of 2011, and by that It became the fourth country in terms of diplomatic representation in South Sudan after (Sudan, Egypt, the United States of America), followed by an exchange of visits at the official level between the two countries, as the first official visit was headed by (Danny Danube) Deputy Speaker of the Knesset to Juba on August 29 2011, and the most prominent result of that visit was the announcement of the opening of an embassy in South Sudan in (Tel Aviv), and President (Silva Kiir Mayardit) visited (Tel Aviv) on September 20, 2011, which the (Israeli) side described as a historical visit It gave a qualitative pause in the development of relations between the two countries, during which Silva Kerr met with Israeli Prime Minister (Benjamin Netanyahu), Israeli President (Shimon Peres), Minister of Foreign Affairs (Avigdor Lieberman) and Defense Minister (Ehud Barak), and this visit reinforced convictions regarding the strategic dimensions involved in relations between (Juba) and (Tel Aviv), and was expressed by (Silva Care) By saying, “You stood by our side along the way, and without this support we would not have a list.” This came as a comment on the Israeli president’s statement. SudanThe Israeli President, he talked about the historical relations of Israel with the leaders of the southern rebellion, which represented a disclosure of the veil of secret relations between Israel and the rebel movements in southern Sudan.The Israeli President, he talked about the historical relations of Israel with the leaders of the southern rebellion, which represented a disclosure of the veil of secret relations between Israel and the rebel movements in southern Sudan.(10) , as the (Avigdor Lieberman) Israeli Foreign Minister paid a visit to Juba in the month of September of 2012 , within a tour of five African countries, and it can be said that the aim of this visit is to encircle Egypt ‘s efforts to improve its relations with African countries after the revolution of January 25, 2011 And exploiting the Nile file, as (Lieberman) shows special interest in this file, and believes that Egypt can be pressed hard through it, so (Israel) was quick to provide a package of aid to the Nile Basin countries, especially the State of South Sudan in exchange for economic benefits. And investment (11) .
Hence, it can be said that the relationship between Juba and (Tel Aviv) has taken another direction by opening official frameworks for various cooperation between the two countries, and after Silva Care’s visit to Israel, Tel Aviv tended to push relations with Juba and make it more fluid, so it established Appointing one of the largest Israeli experts in Sudanese affairs, in addition to his mastery of the Arabic language and several Sudanese dialects, who is Ambassador Haim Koren as its first ambassador to the State of South Sudan on December 10, 2012, and this Ambassador also worked as a teacher for three years in the College of Security QNB, which is affiliated with the Israeli foreign intelligence service, and his choice raised many question marks and suspicions together (12) .
The third requirement: areas of cooperation in Israeli relations with the state of South Sudan
The cooperation frameworks between the two countries can be restricted to:
First – Strategic Cooperation: The President of South Sudan, Silva Kiir Mayardit, expressed his desire for his country to establish strategic friendship with (Israel), which amounts to a strategic alliance with different contents (military, security, and political), in a way that helps the nascent state In the face of the dangers that could threaten it, and such trends have raised the concerns of some neighboring countries, which led the country of South Sudan to send reassurances, the essence of which was that relations with (Israel) will not be at the expense of neighboring countries, especially Egypt and Sudan, and on the other side (Tel Aviv) did not fear its strong support, and rather its desire to formulate a strategic alliance with South Sudan within the framework of its new strategy in Africa. Its broad lines were to establish an African grouping under the Israeli leadership that includes all of (Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Sudan) (13 ) )Moreover, this alliance aims to establish a belt against the Arab countries that witness the rise of Islamic currents in their regimes after the outbreak of the so-called Arab change movements, and this is in harmony with the American project (the great Horn of Africa) (14) .
Thus, the strategic alliance with the State of South Sudan will allow Israel to possess a base and a technical focal point for Israeli combat aircraft in order not to be compelled to undertake missions far from Israel, as Israel wishes to enhance its defense and national security above all, since the weapons that reach the movement ( Hamas) in the Gaza Strip passes through Sudan, or tunnels and corridors in the Egyptian (Sinai) region, and it will be easy for the Israeli Air Force to destroy these targets and convoys from southern Sudan, as it did before in November and December of 2011, when The missiles, weapons, and ammunition that went to Hamas destroyed those weapons, whether they were Iranian-made, or Russian and Chinese (15) .
Second – security and military cooperation : security and military cooperation is necessary for southern Sudan, in view of its desire to build a strong regular army whose pillar will be the army of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, and since (Israel) has enough experience in this area, it has been agreed to start In the construction process, providing the necessary training for this army, developing its defense policy and enhancing its armament capacity, and from here it was assigned (Israel) to carry out some tasks such as building barracks and military hospitals, establishing a mine research center in the city of Juba, erecting border control towers, and establishing an air base in an area ( Falaj, in the south, with the aim of training southern warplanes, and within the framework of armament operations, Israel provided a shipment of weapons to the south, which included artillery and thermal monitoring and sensing devices (16).And that the security and military cooperation between Juba and (Tel Aviv) will greatly benefit (Israel), because it will enable it to obtain accurate security information about the situation in the region, and then prepare to face the risks and potential threats directed against it from inside or outside the African continent. And it has already managed to launch four raids during the past years on Sudanese military convoys loaded with weapons and fighters, in addition to that it has established several military bases against the Arab countries, including: a naval base in the port of (Massawa) at the entrance to the Red Sea, as well as air bases in Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Chad, and three modern airports in (Chad) are: Lake (Aero) Airport, (Zakumah) Airport, and (Macor) Airport in order to monitor the Libyan-Sudanese border (17)And, this matter will be more dangerous to the Egyptian national security, as (Israel) was able, with the help of the United States of America, to have a military presence in South Sudan (18) .
Third – Economic Cooperation: South Sudan abounds in many oil and mining resources, and from here, Israel has rushed to build broad economic relations with Juba, as a number of (Israeli) businessmen visited Juba after the separation, and that visit was followed by the start of (Israeli) companies In practicing its work already in the south in the fields of infrastructure, such as the (Soleil Bonnet) Company for Industrial Contracting, paving roads in several areas of the capital, (Israeli) companies also pledged to establish a water purification plant between the Blue Nile and the Ethiopian state, and the fields of cooperation included agricultural and technological fields And the mining and electricity sector, an agreement was signed between the two countries in Tel Aviv to supply (Israel) southern oil, as it was agreed to transfer southern oil to (Israel) in order to refine it in exchange for transporting water to (Tel Aviv) (19) .
The secession of South Sudan and the establishment of an independent state in it is a dream that has been haunting the leaders of the Zionist entity for decades, especially since they dream of the existence of small entities that are closer to them and stand at the same distance with them from hostility and disagreement with the Arabs and Muslims, and Israel was of course the first to recognize this state; Because it hopes to closely link with it, and there is no doubt that this new state and its expected relations with the Zionist entity carries with it strategic dimensions and connotations that are a real threat to Arab national security, especially Egypt and Sudan (20) .
Hence, the establishment of strong relations with South Sudan would bring many benefits to Israel politically, economically, and security, which South Sudan had previously used in the past, and Israel aims from this to be a political and economic striking force in the region, in addition to building relations with Headwaters of the Nile Basin to solve the water problem for them (21) .
On the other hand, the State of South Sudan seeks to achieve many interests and goals through its orientation towards strengthening relations with Israel, on the one hand, it can be estimated that this nascent country is concerned with establishing an international alliance, with strategic, military, security and political implications, with some strong regional powers in a way that helps it in facing The dangers that could threaten it, especially as it borders African countries with which it does not have friendly relations, and conflicts may arise with it in the future.It seems that Israel is the preferred country in South Sudan for this purpose to be an ally country, especially because of its “international weight”, represented by its close relations with the United States and Europe, and secondly thanks to its expertise and modern weapons, and on the other hand the state aims to benefit from the experiences Israel in the fields of agriculture and scientific research in order to enhance its economic growth opportunities, especially as it is one of the poorest countries in the world, and needs the support and assistance of all countries of the world to consolidate the pillars of the nascent state.
It can be said that the visit of the President of the State of South Sudan to Israel and its results indicate that the future of relations between the two sides will be more cooperative, and the State of South Sudan may soon become an active regional power and an important ally of Israel and the West. Despite the reservations that this might raise, it indicates the necessity of taking positive steps by Arab countries to embrace the nascent state and strengthen relations with it to be a supportive force for the Arabs and their issues and not an additional source of threat.
The second topic: the repercussions of the Israeli relations with the state of South Sudan on Arab national security
The Israeli penetration into the African continent in general, and Sudan in particular, has serious strategic repercussions on Arab national security , and at the heart of it is the Egyptian national security. The Israeli move in the African countries surrounding Egypt is carried out through what is known as the strategy of limiting the parties, which aims mainly to destabilize the security system The Egyptian national in his Nile circle and depriving Egypt of any influence within the African continent, as well as Israel is always trying to exploit and deepen Arab differences with some African countries, and threatening the security of the Arab countries dependent on the Nile by trying to increase its influence in the countries controlling the waters of the Nile from its sources, with focus On establishing agricultural projects that depend on withdrawing water from Lake Victoria, and from this topic, the most important elements of the Israeli threat to Arab national security will be addressed through the following demands:
The first requirement: penetration of the security and regional systems of the Horn of Africa:The Horn of Africa region was important in the (Israeli) foreign policy, because this region is of the utmost importance in preserving the national security system (Israeli) and its strategic interests, given the close connection of the Horn of Africa region with the close Arab (Israeli) conflict, and the (Israeli) interest in the region is due The Horn of Africa as the most important strategic security location since the establishment of (Israel) in the heart of the Arab region, as the region enters into what is called the vital strategic field (for Israel), according to what was determined by former (Israeli) Prime Minister (Ariel Sharon) before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee ( Israeli) on January 12, 1982, when he was Minister of Defense, when he said (In order to establish our major state with pure Jewish identity as a regional power in the region we must secure the circle of its vital field, which is the region that includes (Israel) strategic interests, and includes all areas Arab worldAdjacent, as well as Iran, Turkey and Northeast Africa(22) Therefore, Israeli (decision-makers) adopted special policies to deal with that region according to plans and tight targets for penetration within it, as the region is an important strategic location for its supervision on the shores of the Red Sea on the one hand and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab and the Gulf of Aden on the other, which paves them to automatically link In the national security system (Israeli) (23) , therefore, Israel has endeavored with all its strength to find a foothold in the countries of the Horn of Africa so that it can achieve its political, economic and security goals, and to guarantee its right to navigation on the Red Sea dependent on its military strength , as it is considered Trying to control the Red Sea is one of the most important strategic goals (of Israel) in the African continent that started since 1949 after the establishment of the (Israeli) entity in the Gulf of Aqaba, and with the aim of communicating with the outside world through the Red Sea. To achieve this goal, (Israel) began establishing a presence for it. On the Red Sea in order to use it to achieve its political, economic and military goals (24) , (Israel) seeks to internationalize the Red Sea and prevent it from becoming an Arab lake, but (Israel) has begun linking its concept of Israeli security to the geostrategic extension in the south of the sea (25) , as (Israel) is the Red Sea, its vital outlet towards Asia and Africa, as its economic security moves pass through it and therefore it does not allow other regional powers to threaten its economic and security movement (26) .
The Red Sea has gained increasing importance in the (Israeli) security strategy after two important events, the June 1967 war, as (Israel) obtained combat military aid from American bases in Ethiopia and was transferred to (Israel) via the Red Sea, and the October 1973 war, As Israel has suffered from imposing a ban on it by the Egyptian navy after it closed the Bab al-Mandab strait in the face of its interests after the (Israeli) traffic in these waters has become a strategic issue for them, which made it adopt a marine policy for this port, as it worked on Deploying naval forces capable of facing any new threats, and establishing full naval cooperation with the Fifth American Fleet in the Persian Gulf and European Western fleets deployed in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, and this was helped by its presence in the countries of the Horn of Africa (Eritrea) in particular in provisions Control over strategic areas and islands at seaRed through the deployment of its naval forces along the Eritrean beaches and the provisions of its control over the Bab al-Mandab strait through the deployment of the joint naval forces and the launch of maritime watchtowers and eavesdropping devices in the Massawa Eritrean port(27) .
Therefore, the firm and strong presence (of Israel) in this region enables it to have the most important advantages: access to the countries of the Horn of Africa, which is the strategic back of some Arab countries, and secondly, complete control of the Red Sea and then control of security in the region, and this is what Aba Abyan made clear. The former Israeli saying, “In order to undermine Israel from the imposed regional blockade, it can turn into a transit bridge for all continents across the eastern and western oceans with a narrow strip of land, and then liberate the peoples of Asia and Europe by relying on the Suez Canal, meaning that Israel’s security is directly linked to its permanent control over Free lanes towards the Red Sea ” (28).
Israel is the Red Sea at the present time as a vital nerve according to its strategy for accessing African countries in general for political and economic considerations. As for politics, its importance focuses on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the impact that African countries can have regarding the voting power in the United Nations and on Economic considerations, the Red Sea has an advanced position with (Israel), as 20% of the total (Israeli) trade volume passes through it, as the direct contact process is done by way of the riparian countries, especially Eritrea, which places its airspace in the service of (Israeli) flights heading to the Middle East countries (29) .
(Israel) seeks to achieve several strategic goals in the Red Sea, which is to expand and consolidate its military presence, and to secure its interests by allowing it to directly attack the Arabs in Bab al-Mandab, and to find a strategic depth in the Red Sea, allowing it to monitor any Arab military activity in the region. And to break any Arab blockade that might happen in the future against the Israeli forces between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea to Asia and Africa, as it aims to maintain a maritime, land and air force in the face of the Arab countries and prevent the success of its efforts to make the Red Sea an Arab lake, and continue to strengthen the port (Eilat) as a war port, as well as a commercial port to ensure the existence of the port that it has created for itself since 1949 (30) .
The second requirement: – igniting the dispute between the upstream and downstream countries of the Nile Basin: The Israeli orientation towards the African continent and South Sudan in particular is not without many Israeli ambitions, in order to encircle the Egyptian national security in all its different directions, but the water issue remains the spearhead from which Israel in that region, asIt is no secret to anyone that Israel has old dreams of obtaining a share of the waters of the Nile River, as water for Israel is not only an economic issue but also a political, military and demographic issue, as Israel’s view of the waters of the Nile formed part of the Israeli approach to the shared waters between it and the Arab countries Water has been present in Israeli thought since the Herzl project in 1903 to irrigate the Negev desert, which he submitted to the British government, which was based on the settlement of Jews in the Sinai as a region to occupy Palestine and the exploitation of the groundwater therein, and this idea continued to reach the project “ Elisha Eli Kali, introduced by the Israeli engineer (Elisha Eli Kali) in 1974, which was to expand the “Peace Channel” by designing a canal to draw water from the bottom of the Suez Canal and deliver it to Israel.The Israeli expert (Arlozorov) also presented the “Shaul” project in 1977, which included the construction of six water channels under the Suez Canal, as these projects can supply the Negev desert with half a billion cubic meters, but they were met by the Egyptian refusal on the official and popular levels, because of the water policy constants The Egyptian firmly rooted in the minds and minds of the hydro-political decision makers in Egypt, is the refusal to divert water out of the natural course of the Nile River basin, and therefore these projects did not find their way of implementation because they were always aimed at achieving Israel’s water interests only(31) .
Therefore, Israel has developed a special strategy for controlling the headwaters of the Nile River, as it is a pressure on Egypt and Sudan because water resources are one of the most important issues facing economic, social and military policies of Israel due to the limited water resources in it, and it is a source of concern for Israel because land and water are among the most important Israeli strategies, and this This was reflected in its settlement policy against the Arabs, especially since Israel suffers from a lack of water (32) .
Israel is seeking to obtain a share of the Nile water as a result of the scarcity of available water resources which, with a total water resources has (1.8 billion m 3 ) This amount of water is not sufficient for the needs of Israel despite the exploitation of every drop of that amount and the rationalization of consumption and the use of drip irrigation of Cultivation, reuse of wastewater and other means, and despite that, Israeli studies indicate that Israel will face a future water shortage and the solution to this problem is only by importing water from external sources (33).
The water deficit in Israel is due to the interaction of a group of variables, such as an increase in the natural population, an influx of immigrants from the Jews, agricultural expansion, increased rates of industrial development and environmental pollution, so Israel seeks to obtain a fixed share of the Nile water that comes to Egypt (34) .
Israel is trying to get the Nile water by about (1%) or even (0.5%) through Egypt; Because it was of the view that Egypt has a surplus of 10 billion m 3 if the channel (Jonglei) also completed it believes that the Egyptian water lost in the Mediterranean Sea in the winter and used to generate electricity should be utilized to create a project proposal for the transfer of water to Israel extends from the Salam Canal to Negev Desert and in cooperation with (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Congo and Rwanda) In order to achieve this, Egypt must be pressed (35) .
Therefore, the state of South Sudan has gained great importance in the Israeli strategy, because it is located at the top of the headwaters of the Nile River, and because it represents the Israeli access to the headwaters of the Nile, so that it can use this issue as a pressure card on Egypt and Sudan, which seeks to sell water along the lines ofWhat Turkey is doing, or at least moving forward with the project of delivering the Nile water to it, so Israel is keen to sign the South Sudan state (Entebbe) agreement that refuses to recognize the historical Sudanese rights to water, and the close relations between Israel and the state of South Sudan represent a grave danger The Arab national security, especially in its Egyptian-Sudanese extension, is represented by the strategy of the (Ocean Belt Pact), that is, establishing alliances with countries and ethnic and religious groups hostile to this Arabs on the one hand, and on the other hand, taking advantage of their presence in the region to wave the water card in the face of Egyptian policy, As well as paving the way for American influence to enter this pivotal area for Egypt and Sudan (36)As Israel relies on the implementation of its policy on the American role, especially there is an urgent effort to establish areas of influence in the source countries of the Nile and Central Africa, by choosing leaders to implement this plan and most of the new leaders it sponsors represent the leaders of the Nile Basin, as well as several European and Western countries to buy large areas of Ethiopian territory, Uganda and Kenya in order to cultivate the Nile water to supply its food grains and this has an impact on the water resources of the economic and political terms . (37) .
In this context, the visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister (Avigdor Lieberman) came to Africa, and three of the five countries he visited were from the Israeli Nile Basin countries towards these Arab countries, which aim to block them from the Nile Basin side and promote water internationalization projects, and then encourage the African countries to detain more The waters of this river, by building dams that encourage (Israel) to build and help finance in preparation for the sale of water to other countries such as (Israel) itself, and that efforts to build dams and water projects are pushing towards demanding the source in the future to amend agreements to distribute water quotas, in an effort to reduce Egypt’s share It regards it as a historical right and is concerned that its country’s share of (55,5 billion) m3 is sometimes shrunk to (51,5) billion m3, because Ethiopia and some Nile Basin countries have built dams on the river that have seized large quantities of water and that building more of them will reduce the country’s shares The course and estuary are Egypt and Sudan(38) Therefore, Israel is always trying to exploit and deepen Arab differences with some African countries, and threaten the security of the Arab countries dependent on the Nile River by trying to increase its influence in the countries controlling the waters of the Nile from its sources, with a focus on establishing agricultural projects that depend on drawing water from a lake Victoria, perhaps the crisis that erupted between the upstream countries and both Egypt and Sudan at the Alexandria meeting in July 2009, and prevented the signing of the framework agreement for the waters of the Nile is largely due to the hidden Israeli hands. Israel uses its diplomatic tools and soft power to increase its influence in the Nile Basin, enabling it to besiege the national security of Egypt and Sudan in the region (39) .
The third requirement: hitting Arab interests in the Arab depth: It is no secret to anyone that there are influential Arab communities in some African countries, especially in the West, and they come mostly from the Levant. Despite the economic empowerment of these communities, they do not play an active political role, and this may be due to hidden attempts to provoke national and racist tendencies. Perhaps the presence of many Israeli advisors in many West African countries and the intensity of Israeli interests in the region lead to the question about the reality of Israeli hands in fighting the Arab presence in Africa, and therefore it can be said on the whole that the Israeli strategy in East Africa generally affects the foundations and pillars of national security The Arab is in its overall formulations, and it also puts to the test the vital role and interests of some Arab staff in Africa, such as Egypt, Sudan and Algeria (40) .
Fourth requirement: attempt to blow up parts of the parties to the Arab regional system in Africa and to create hotbeds of tension and conflict in the Arab and African regions to seek : asThe Israeli interest in the fragmentation of the Arab states is due to small rival states among themselves, to plans approved and adopted by Israel since the beginning of the sixties of the last century, since Israel has been trying since then to find a foothold in that strategic spot, where the natural resources and the distinct geographical location, as a region that allows them to besiege Neighboring Arab states, Israeli policy – according to the principle of limiting parties – has sought to bomb some countries from the inside, such as Sudan and Mauritania. On the other hand, it has worked to create the seeds of enmity between Arab and African peoples, according to religious, ethnic and cultural foundations and claims.(41) So, the Sudanese national security that was struck in its joint is a strong and painful blow to Arab national security, especially since Israel has a prominent role in this separation and has significant gains due to this division that has occurred in Sudan, and to prevent the achievement of Sudanese national security, Israel has created new approaches in Post-secession Sudan, to prevent Sudan from entering as a strong player with the Arabs against it, through the new starting point which is the Republic of South Sudan, as the northern borders of the State of South Sudan represent the longest border and extend over a distance (2010) km, thus becoming the longest border in the African continent (42) This will help Israel to nurture and support the conflicts and tensions in northern Sudan, especially in the areas of (Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan), as the state of South Sudan has become a haven and shelter for many leaders of the rebel movement, which will make it easier for Israel to contact them, as well. On stirring attempts to separate my state:Blue Nile and South Kordofan, Israel has granted about five hundred refugees from Darfur the political asylum, this means that it has close relations with the Sudan Liberation Movement – the wing of Abdel Wahid Nur – which opened a liaison office in Israel, and the eastern theater may be activated in the next stage to complete Dividing Sudan into a number of weak and fragile entities, and turning it into another Somalia to complement its strategy known as (tightening and then amputating the parties). Israel has a security presence in eastern Sudan that is not visible by spies and agents. Sudan to the Gaza Strip in Palestine via Egypt, without the ability of the Sudanese Air Force to pursue them(43) Moreover, the Israeli role has created allies from the countries surrounding Sudan, which enables Israel to form a new alliance against the Arabs in any upcoming conflict or the creation of a new Arab-African conflict (44)
Therefore, we find that many of the motives behind Israel’s move towards southern Sudan in particular and Sudan in general are political ones; In order to achieve more political gains, by removing one of the largest countries in the Arab world from interest in the basic issue of the Arabs, which is the conflict with Israel, as well as the political influence on Egypt in weakening and encircling it from the south, depending on the principle of tightening the parties and creating new dilemmas facing Egyptian national security, especially water security, and security motives; Represented by further Israeli navigation insurance in the Red Sea, and its vital interests in it, and water motives; Represented by influencing Egypt and Sudan’s water share in the waters of the Nile River, and the clear Israeli desire that part of that share be directed to Israel itself, and economic motives; On the basis that Sudan is abundant with many oil and natural resources that are tempting all countries and which any country in the world seeks to control.
1- Yasser Abu Hassan, Israeli intervention and support for the south until the stage of separation, Al-Muntada Magazine, Al-Rased Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Sudan, Issue Twenty-eight, September 2014, p. 56
2- Mona Hussein Obaid, Israeli policy towards East African countries (Ethiopia – Sudan) as a model, Journal of Palestinian Studies, Center for Palestinian Studies, University of Baghdad, No. 11, June 2010, p. 109.
3- Amani Al-Taweel, Israel and Sudan’s Fragmentation Strategies, “The Separation of South Sudan, Risks and Opportunities” from “Researchers Group”, The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Beirut, 2012, p. 236.
4- Daham Muhammad Al-Azzawi, Zionist Intervention in the Problem of Southern Sudan, International Issues, Center for International Studies, University of Baghdad, No. 32, October 1999, p. 31.
5- Mona Hussein Obaid, Sudan and its Regional Surround, previously mentioned source, p. 128
6- Mona Hussein Obaid, Israeli Policy Toward East African Countries (Ethiopia-Sudan) as a Model, aforementioned source, p. 110.
7- Yasser Abu Hassan, previously mentioned source, p. 60
8- Sherif Shaban Mabrouk, The Israeli Policy in South Sudan and its Repercussions on Arab National Security, Arab Affairs Magazine, League of Arab States, Cairo, Egypt, No. 151, April 2012, p. 204.
9- Ibrahim Minshawi, a permanent strategic alliance: the implications of the Israeli relations in South Sudan on the Egyptian national security, Institute of African Research and Studies, Cairo University, 2014, p. 7.
10- Abd al-Latif Farooq Ahmad, The Secession of South Sudan and Its Effects on Egyptian National Security, Arab Knowledge Bureau, Cairo, 2016, p. 193.
11- Muhammad Al-Hassan Abdel-Rahman Fadel, The Impact of Israel’s Relations with South Sudan on the Arabs, Al-Rased Magazine, Khartoum, No. 364, 2012, p. 97.
12-25- Abd al-Latif Faruq Ahmed, The Secession of South Sudan and Its Effects on Egyptian National Security, Arab Knowledge Bureau, Cairo, 2016, p. 113.
13- The same source, p. 194.
14- Abd al-Hamid al-Musawi, The Strategic Relationship between Israel and the State of South Sudan and its Implications for Egypt and Sudan, Journal of the Mustansiriya Center for Arab and International Studies, The University of Mustansiriya, No. 44, 2013, p. 10.
15- The same source, p. 7
16- Ibrahim Al-Minshawi, previously mentioned source, p. 5.
17- Abdul Hamid Al-Musawi, previously mentioned source, p. 12
18- Abdel Moneim Muhammad Salih Abdullah, Israeli Strategic Interests in the State of South Sudan, Hammurabi Journal of Studies, Hammurabi Center for Research and Strategic Studies, Issue 11, November 2014, p. 110.
19- Ibrahim Al-Minshawi, previously mentioned source, p. 5
20- Muhammad Al-Hassan Abdul-Rahman Al-Fadil, Implications and Dimensions of Southern Sudan and Israel Relations, Al-Rased Magazine, Issue 368, Khartoum, 2012, p. 2.
21- Reem Mohamed Moussa,, The Necessities of Economic Cooperation between Sudan and South Sudan and the Possibility of Achieving Integration, The African Research and Studies Institute, Cairo University, 2012., p. 6.
22- Sanad Walid Saeed, The Policy of Israeli Penetration in the Horn of Africa, Political and International Journal, Al-Mustansiriya University, No. 30, 2016, p. 264.
23- Ahmed Tohamy Abdel-Hay, The Israeli Strategy in the Red Sea and the Fountains of the Nile, Constants and Novelties, The Arab Organization for Education, Culture and Science, Institute of Arab Research and Studies, Cairo, 2003, p. 38.
24- Amer Abd, The Horn of Africa: Between the Repercussions of the Past and Future Prospects, Al-Liwaa International Newspaper on http://alewaanewspaper.com/
25- Hamdi Abdel Rahman Hassan, The Regional Balance in the Great Lakes and Egyptian Water Security, International Politics Magazine, Al-Ahram Foundation, Cairo, Egypt, No. 135, January 1999, p. 33.
26- Abdul-Salam Al-Baghdadi, The Contemporary Zionist Movement in Africa, African Studies Series No. (24), Institute of Asian and African Studies, Baghdad, Al-Mustansiriya University, Mosul University Press, 1986,, p. 23.
27- Sanad Walid Saeed, previously mentioned source, p. 265
28- Jassem Younis Muhammad, Israeli Foreign Policy Toward Africa After the Cold War ended, Case Study of Ethiopia, Political Science, Baghdad No. (35) College of Political Science, University of Baghdad, 2007 AD, p. 150.
29- Amani Al-Taweel, Piracy in the Red Sea, Red Sea Security, Reality and Challenges, International Politics, Cairo, Al-Ahram Foundation, No. 176 April 2009, p. 217
30- Zakaria Muhammad Abdullah, Red Sea Security and Arab National Security, Arab Affairs, General Secretariat of the League of Arab States, No. 88, Cairo, 1996, p. 156.
31- Ibrahim Minshawi, previously mentioned source, p. 5
32- Muhammad Al-Hassan Abdel-Rahim, the Israeli plan in the headwaters of the Nile and its impact on Egypt and Sudan, from the Internet http://www.arrasid.com/index.php/main/index/conte
33- Ahmed Badr Sharaf Al-Din, Economic Cooperation between the Nile Basin Countries, International Politics Magazine, Al-Ahram Foundation, Cairo, Egypt, No. 181, 2012, p. 133.
34- Muthanna Muhammad Turki, The Water Crisis in the Nile Basin Countries, Master Thesis (unpublished), College of Political Science, University of Baghdad, 2012. p. 141
35- The same source, p. 145.
36- Mohamed Hassan Abdel Rahman Fadel, The Importance of the State of South Sudan to Israel, Al-Rased Magazine, Issue No. 388, 2012, p. 20.
37- Mustafa Shafiq, The Israeli Penetration into the Nile Basin in Bringing the Parties to Amputation, Center for Humanitarian Studies, 2010. http://www.arab-center.org/index/php?option.com
38- Manasik Abdel Wahab Hekmat, The Israeli Strategy Towards New Platforms, Unpublished Master Thesis, College of Political Science, Al-Nahrain University, 2013, p. 224.
39- Sharif Shaaban Mabrouk, The Israeli Policy in South Sudan and its Implications for Arab National Security, Arab Affairs Magazine, General Secretariat of the League of Arab States, Egypt, No. 151, p. 206
40- Sharif Shaban Mabrouk, previously mentioned source, p. 207
41- The same source, p. 189
42- Noura Osama, Accounts of the Emerging State, South Sudan’s External Relations, International Politics Journal, Al-Ahram Foundation, Cairo, Egypt, No. 185, 2010, p. 121.
43- Hani Raslan, Salva Kiir’s Visit to Israel and Egyptian National Security Issues, Al-Ahram Newspaper, December 30, 2011, p. 3
44- Ibrahim Youssef Hamada, The Israeli Role in the Secession of South Sudan and its Repercussions on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Unpublished Master Thesis, College of Graduate Studies, An-Najah National University, Palestine, 2014, p. 116