Lavrov’s tour to Africa: its international dimensions and geopolitical calculations

This paper deals with the dimensions of the objectives of Sergey Lavrov’s visit to a number of African countries, in addition to monitoring Moscow’s survival in its African incubators, its future influence in shaping the policies of African countries, and anticipating the future of its presence on the continent.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made a historic tour of four African countries at the end of last July, in the midst of a Russian-Ukrainian war that has entered its sixth month, and triggered global humanitarian and economic crises, whose negative effects are still spreading from one African country to another, as a result of its severe effects on the global food crisis caused by the suspension of wheat exports from Ukraine; This prompted Moscow to reassure its allies in Africa and in response to Western propaganda that Russia is behind the exacerbation of the global food crisis. However, Lavrov’s historic visit to African capitals, which is the first of its kind in decades in some capitals, comes within the framework of strengthening the Kremlin’s presence in Africa as a competing continent It has unparalleled adults, between the Eastern bloc (China and Russia) and Western countries, especially France and America, which are trying to repel the infiltration of the Russian bear from behind them to the capitals of the continent, one after the other.

In this paper, we discuss the dimensions of the visit of the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, to Egypt, Congo, Uganda and Ethiopia, in addition to monitoring the locations of Moscow’s survival in its African incubators, and the future of its influence in shaping the policies of African countries, and exploring the future of its presence in the continent, which is witnessing an international conflict that is almost precipitating a war. A new cold between the West on the one hand and Russia and China on the other hand.

Russian-African Relations: From the Fringe to the Front

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early nineties of the last century, Russian-African relations remained for decades governed by Western hegemony and the influence of the United States of America, which affects most of the decisions of African countries towards re-normalizing their relations with Russia and China. What made Africa’s ties with Russia remain fragile due to the repercussions of the Cold War in the eighties of the last century, in addition to the persistence of unipolarity in the global system and its effects on shaping international politics, within new blocs in Africa on the one hand, and the West and America on the other.

In the period following the fall of the Soviet Union, the area of ​​Western hegemony expanded in Africa, including gradually expanding towards countries that had a close strategic relationship with the Soviets, and military coups were the typical means for the West to bring down the rest of the fortresses of the Soviet allies in the brown continent. What made the African countries revolve in the orbit of the West, and legitimized absolute dependence on the West, especially America and France, which makes the current Russian position in Africa and even globally facing multiple difficulties in that Russia’s influence does not stem from huge investments in Africa, but rather from being confined to the areas of food security (grains) and arms trade (Kalashnikovs). Moreover, the volume of Moscow’s trade on the continent does not annually exceed the threshold of 20 billion US dollars, equivalent to about one-tenth of the volume of Chinese investments in the African continent (1) (250 billion dollars in 2021, compared to 64.33 billion dollars between the states). United States and Africa) (2).

Despite the media attack from the West and the promotion of rhetoric of incitement against Moscow, especially from France and the United States of America, an attack that was reinforced with Russia’s launching a military attack on Ukraine last February, a crisis that reflected a sharp contrast between the West and Russia, about the future of Russia’s existence. Unipolarity in the international arena, and the emergence of Beijing and Moscow as two superpowers that form a strategic alliance to confront the West in a changing world full of new challenges, and the West’s attempt to besiege Russia in Africa after 18 African countries abstained from voting in favor of a resolution condemning Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, is a Western realization that Russia has a growing influence in the capitals of several countries in Africa.

Since 2010, Russia has been trying to position itself differently in the international arena and restore its geopolitical and military influence and influence in the world. This hypothesis has already been proven after its invasion of Crimea in 2014, and its annexation for Moscow represented a turning point in moving a step forward in its foreign policy towards establishing its presence as one of the main players On the international scene, followed by its military intervention in Syria, 2015, which radically changed the course of the war in the country and highlighted Russia’s power in the Middle East.Its invasion of Ukraine reinforces the hypothesis that Russia is no longer a spectator of the international game to besiege and target it, but rather seeks to appear as a global power on its way to dispel the unipolarity that regulates international politics (3), which prompted Moscow to search for new allies in Africa after imposing strict economic sanctions on it. By the West and America in order to isolate it financially and internationally, and as a result of avoiding these sanctions, Russia is expanding its strategic depth towards Africa, similar to China and Turkey, and the Russian influence is currently concentrated in Central Africa, Sudan, Comoros and South Sudan, and its eyes are directed towards deepening its relations with Egypt, Uganda and Ethiopia, and this is the purpose President Sergey Lavrov’s visit to four African countries with political weight in international and African forums, a visit that coincides with the global food crisis facing African countries in particular. What are the objectives of the Russian Foreign Minister’s visit, and its geopolitical dimensions?And South Sudan, and its eyes are directed towards deepening its relations with Egypt, Uganda and Ethiopia, and this is the main purpose of Sergey Lavrov’s visit to four African countries with political weight in international and African forums, a visit that coincides with the global food crisis facing African countries in particular. The Russian Foreign Ministry, and what are its geopolitical dimensions?And South Sudan, and its eyes are directed towards deepening its relations with Egypt, Uganda and Ethiopia, and this is the main purpose of Sergey Lavrov’s visit to four African countries with political weight in international and African forums, a visit that coincides with the global food crisis facing African countries in particular. The Russian Foreign Ministry, and what are its geopolitical dimensions?

Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Africa: stations and goals

In order to face Western pressures against African countries in order to reverse their stances towards Russia’s war on Ukraine and get it out of the diplomacy of “neutrality” and aligning behind the West in the face of the Russian opponent, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, began a visit to Africa for the first time after the Russian war on Ukraine. Multiple goals and dimensions, perhaps the most prominent of which is to reassure African leaders regarding the global grain crisis, and to create a more credible, vital and mutually beneficial partnership with African countries. What is the importance of the African countries that Lavrov visited for Moscow?

First: Egypt

Choosing Egypt was not an initial stop for the Russian Foreign Minister’s tour, but rather came for several considerations, the first of which is that the Russian-Egyptian relations are old, and are characterized by strategic partnership since Russia’s support for Cairo since the fifties of the last century, and the events of 1967 and 1976, and relations between the two countries have witnessed a development Notable in recent years in the field of economic and military cooperation, and the process of bilateral cooperation between the two sides has been strengthened, represented by Russian projects in Egypt within the framework of Egyptian-Russian relations, foremost of which is the establishment of the Dabaa nuclear power plant (at an estimated cost of 25 billion US dollars) and the Russian industrial zone in the axis of the Canal Suez and other investment and economic projects between the two countries in all sectors (4).

Lavrov’s meetings with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi dealt with several economic, security and military files, but the assertion that Egypt plays the tune of neutrality regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war and adherence to its neutral position was the main purpose of the Russian Foreign Minister’s visit. President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, that Cairo believes that dialogue between Russia and Ukraine is the only way to silence the guns and curb the barrel of tanks, without getting involved in the struggle of giants between East and West, a position that Moscow praises, but attempts to pressure from Western powers to dissuade Cairo from its position do not It is still being cooked in the corridors of Western policies against Russian expansion towards Africa (5).

The existence of different positions in the Arab countries towards the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the absence of an Arab consensus to condemn the Russian invasion of Kiev within or outside the Arab umbrella, also paved the way for Moscow to reformulate its external orientation towards the Arab region, and set its sights on Egypt as a gateway to co-opt Arab positions. In its favour, in addition to intensifying its cooperation with African countries, and mobilizing support for its policies through international forums, the Russian-Ukrainian war was present in the files and discussions of the Egyptian and Russian sides, as it is currently the only way for Western countries to provoke positions that reject Moscow and create counter-African tendencies against the rising Russian influence. globally in recent years.

Second: Congo

Brazzaville was the second destination for the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, and he held talks with the President of the Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean-Claude Jakosso. The meeting highlighted the mutual interest of the two countries through the development of cooperation in the military and technical field. Lavrov said during a press conference with his Congolese counterpart: “We have great prospects for economic cooperation, and there are several Russian companies operating in the Republic of the Congo now, and we also agreed to develop cooperation in the medical field and to combat the spread of dangerous infectious diseases” (6). Lavrov affirmed Russia’s support for the Congo in combating manifestations of discrimination within the framework of the United Nations, welcoming the role of the Republic of the Congo in settling crises on the African continent, and convening a conference that brings together all parties to the Libyan conflict.

 For his part, the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs stressed that Sergei Lavrov’s visit to the Republic of the Congo is a major and historic event, noting that his country’s position has not changed due to the crisis in relations between Russia and Ukraine, pointing out that the Republic of the Congo wanted to convey to both parties the need for mutual respect. And resolve this issue on the basis of joint negotiations.

Lavrov’s visit also comes to emphasize the Russian-Congolese relations; This strengthens Moscow’s position in the Congo and the Central African Republic, in order to meet its mining needs for basic raw materials that are used in the manufacture of many diverse Russian products; Russian companies are expanding their activities in mining resources such as coltan, cobalt, gold and diamonds in Central Africa (7).

Third: Uganda

Sergey Lavrov landed in Kampala for the first time since his appointment as Russia’s foreign minister in 2004. He is the first high-ranking Russian official to visit Uganda since 1960, and this visit comes after Kampala abstained from voting in favor of a resolution condemning Russia after its invasion of Ukraine last February. In addition to 17 African countries that did not share the Western system’s decision to condemn the Russian military intervention in Kyiv (8).

Lavrov held a meeting with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, who has ruled the country for 36 years. For the West or pro-East,” Museveni’s speech indicates how close the Ugandan president is to the Russian camp, considering that she and China are countries that do not interfere in the internal affairs of African countries, and do not seek to determine their own destiny, but rather focus only on trade and economic exchanges and respect for the sovereignty of countries in a way that guarantees the interests of countries with Global Emerging Powers (9).

Museveni stressed that the Russian-Uganda relations are historical, and that the air forces of his country were trained by the Czechoslovak military elite, which was within the eastern camp and the Warsaw Pact, which is the security cooperation between Kampala and the Soviets to enhance the capabilities of the Ugandan forces, praising the role the Soviets played in the African struggle against Western colonialism. In the fifties and sixties of the last century.

Fourth: Ethiopia

With the accession of Abi Ahmed to the presidency of the government in Ethiopia in February 2018, and the reduced level of participation of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in the political system in Addis Ababa, Western Ethiopian relations took a new turn, with the status of the Tigrayan class declining within the political component, and the American- Ethiopia has a dramatic dimension governed by tensions with the eruption of Ethiopia’s internal crises, including the Tigray war in 2020 and the tripartite conflict between Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia over the Renaissance Dam, crises that prompted Addis Ababa to review its relations with Washington, which did not see the Abi Ahmed regime as a closer strategic option and alliance than The front whose nose was stuck in the dirt due to the revolutions of the hungry that turned the regime upside down in Ethiopia, which erupted in 2016, and gradually continued until it overthrew the TPLF regime in 2018 (10).

Sergey Lavrov’s visit came in light of escalating Ethiopian-American tension, as Moscow embodies its presence in the Horn of Africa by taking advantage of Ethiopia’s position and influence in the Horn of Africa, and Moscow wants to implement a renewable nuclear energy project in Ethiopia, similar to Egypt and Nigeria, projects that will contribute to the development Ethiopia, which ranks ninth in the world in terms of population with more than 115 million people, and the delinquency of Addis Ababa to China comes in the midst of an external Ethiopian tendency to move away from the West gradually and towards a rising eastern bloc in the global system.

What is remarkable about the visit of the Russian Foreign Minister to Ethiopia was his speech at his country’s embassy in Addis Ababa in the presence of a group of ambassadors of the African Union countries. The global food crisis resulted from the Russian war against Ukraine, indicating that the reason was due to Western sanctions that hindered the availability of food in the markets, and which prohibited the entry of Russian and foreign ships to the Mediterranean ports.

There is no doubt that Lavrov’s visit to Addis Ababa has different dimensions. From the point of view of Ethiopian researchers, Addis Ababa is no longer a country under absolute American dependence, on the grounds that it is the policeman of the region for Washington, and that the beautiful time that linked it to the “Tigray” front is over forever. On the other hand, it is moving more towards China and Russia, but the extent of Addis Ababa’s ability to balance the emerging powers that want to win their favor raises big question marks in the short and long term (11).

Objectives of Lavrov’s visit to Africa

The objectives of Sergey Lavrov’s visit to four African countries are summarized in the following axes:

  • Show that Russia is not isolated internationally by its military attack on Ukraine, which is a message of reassurance directed first to the Russian interior, that Moscow is practicing its foreign policies in accordance with its interests in Africa and the Middle East, and reassure its allies in its strategic depth that the food crisis facing African countries is a result of a shortage Russian and Ukrainian wheat supplies are just a passing summer cloud.
  • Highlighting Russia’s position in the international arena and that it is no longer a country suffering from the weight of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
  • Show that Russia is a friend and strategic partner with African countries and that their relationship is mutually beneficial and not stemming from a colonial legacy by drawing painful calamities.
  • Russia’s support for the proposal to grant a permanent seat to African countries in the United Nations (Security Council), which would give them greater influence in the United Nations.

As for African countries, Lavrov’s visit is of paramount importance and can be summarized in the following points:

  • Take advantage of Russian investments towards African countries and not stay in the arms of the West and America for the coming period, which is full of global geopolitical fluctuations.
  • Emphasizing not to fall into the trap of conflicts between the great powers, east and west, and to remain in the zone of neutrality (the independent path), according to Lavrov’s statements after the end of his meetings with the leaders of African countries.
  • A sense among the leaders of many African countries that the time of imperialism that ruled and dominated the course of the situation in Africa has come to end, and from this point of view it is necessary to search for strategic allies and international partners in the global equation that have more capacity to respond to Africa’s requirements than to attract huge investments, and without interfering In their internal affairs, whether through the practice of military interventions to overthrow African regimes, especially those that have been in power for decades and have not yet responded to the conditions of Western democracy, or through pressure on the interior and creating confusion that ends with the overthrow of the regime from within, with revolutions of hungry and resentful African dictators.

Russian and Western approaches to Africa

Russia’s liberal outlook and foreign policy toward Africa differs from that adopted by Western countries toward the continent, as it is a natural extension of Western countries such as France and Britain by virtue of the traditional colonial legacy, and not from a strategic perspective and in a changing world determined by new vicissitudes.

There is no doubt that the Russian regime, which rose with Putin’s accession to power in 1999, sees that Moscow has become a new superpower in Africa, and that Western Arctic no longer has economic weight on the continent to the extent that liberal Russia plays, and that the world is living in the wake of shock waves And its military repercussions caused by Western unipolarity in the international arena. President Putin described the current international system as unipolar and does not reflect the true balance of power in the world, and that unilateral action is no longer acceptable, and that the excessive use of force is uncontrollable. Thus, the United States has exceeded its national borders, and Minister Lavrov published an article, in 2016, in which he addressed the attempt of the United States and the Western alliance to maintain global hegemony in all available ways, which are the imposition of economic sanctions, direct military intervention, launching cyber and information war, and unconstitutional change for governments (12).

In this context, the Russian approach towards African countries is that they do not carry a colonial legacy. Therefore, the policy of disassociation from the internal affairs of African countries is one of the most important pillars of foreign policy towards Africa, to ensure its multiple economic, security, diplomatic and cultural interests (13).

As for the Western approach to Africa, it is completely different due to the historical relations with the leaders of African countries, given that Russia does not have large economic tools to invest in Africa, and its investment in Africa represents one percent compared to Western investments, and the joint agreements with African countries (14); Its economy is on par with that of Spain, does not provide significant investment or trade to the continent (other than grain and arms), and is increasingly disconnected from the international financial system(15) as a result of financial sanctions and its exclusion from the global SWIFT system into which it was incorporated in 1989, as a financial weapon to punish it. By imposing financial isolation on it, its daily transactions constitute 1.5 percent of the total transactions in this system (16).

The other Western approach lies in its relentless pursuit to change African regimes with authoritarian inclination to democratic regimes that guarantee the protection of human rights standards guaranteed by international conventions, which necessitates it to intervene diplomatically or even militarily to achieve the conditions for democracy by curbing authoritarian African leaders and putting pressure on them to respond to the demands of their peoples. . While in the Russian approach to the brown continent, it tweets the opposite, by approaching and partnering with the ruling elite that enjoys special privileges, and that Russia is interested in its interests only through African leaders trampling on the rights of their peoples with Russian support; This means that the limits of its partnership begin and end with the ruling elite, which alone accounts for influence and gains, without the African societies inheriting anything from the wealth of their countries, whether repression, killing, and intended liquidations of all kinds (17).

But Russia’s approach is primarily geopolitical and then economic; It is keen to weave relations with African powers that are at odds with the West. For example, Russia has approached Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe at a time when Zimbabwe is under economic sanctions from the West after allegations that the Mugabe regime is responsible for violence and torture of its opponents. Russia, along with China, stood with Zimbabwe, and vetoed a Security Council resolution on an arms embargo in 2008, criticizing Western sanctions against Zimbabwe. Later, relations developed into economic ones; Russia has resumed the export of a number of materials and finished goods to the country, from lumber and fertilizers to printed materials, railway cars and electronics. Russia imports coffee and tobacco from Zimbabwe. The Russians also crowded out British companies – the former colonial country – in diamond and gold mining projects in the country; The Russian companies of Zimbabwe are sharing a joint venture called Darwendale to mine and smelt one of the world’s largest deposits of platinum minerals (18).

And between the ups and downs, African countries remain under the influence of Western pressures and their potential threats to fuel military and political coups that are accompanied by popular chaos causing violent shocks of living in African countries that decode dependency with the West on the one hand, and the growing influence of Russia, China and Turkey in the African origin, especially the countries that It enjoys a unique strategic location or is characterized by the possession of huge wealth in its interior, such as minerals and oil on the other hand. As long as Western and Russian approaches to Africa remain different, many African leaders have limited options between disengaging from emerging powers that guarantee them more vitality and independence, or breaking away from under the mantle of hegemonic power such as France and America, which have enjoyed greater military and political influence in Africa for decades.

The future of African-Russian relations in light of international changes

Russian President Vladimir Putin says, “Strengthening relations with African countries is one of the priorities of Russian foreign policy”(19), and this came in his speech at the Russian summit held in Sochi in 2019, in the presence of a number of leaders and representatives of African countries, which is the first African summit – Russia highlighted Moscow’s interest in the continent after a long period during which it was absent from the African theater, but with the Kremlin slowly returning to the heart of Africa, it is noticeable that a new cold war will reveal its teeth in the international arena, especially in Africa, which represented an arena for the Cold War between the Soviet Union and NATO ( NATO).

The future of Russia’s positioning in Africa and the Kremlin’s influence tools in the African arena is determined by strengthening its relations with the countries of the continent, despite the prominent Chinese competition in metropolitan Africa. The determinants and mechanisms of Moscow’s influence in the future on the continent can be limited to the following aspects:

First: the arms trade

If the Chinese dragon entered the worlds of Africa through its cheap commercial goods and huge investments in Africa, the arms trade for the Kremlin is the magic through which it attracts African countries. The Russian arms trade has become more popular on the continent than the dominant powers; Russia has managed to become the largest arms exporter to Africa, accounting for about 49 percent of its total exports to the continent, and its share of about 37.6 percent of the African arms market, followed by the United States 16 percent, France 14 percent, and China 9 This is in addition to the constantly growing defense relations between Africa and Russia (20). Since 2014, Moscow has signed military cooperation agreements with about 19 African countries, and Russia has concluded agreements with Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso and Equatorial Guinea during 2017 and 2018. .

The reasons for the demand for Russian weapons by the countries of the continent are summarized in the following items:

  1. The advantage of Russian weapons is that they fit the budgets of African countries, and do not cost them much.
  2. Moscow does not obligate the African countries, with which it has security agreements and feed on their weapons, to protect human rights, and does not interfere in their internal affairs to achieve the conditions for a democratic transition on the continent. For example, in 2014, government soldiers in Nigeria were accused of committing human rights abuses against suspects in the country’s fight against Boko Haram. Subsequently, the United States canceled a shipment of attack helicopters, even though the deal had already been signed. But in the same year, Nigeria submitted an order to Russia and received six Mi-35M combat helicopters from it. A similar scenario also occurred in Egypt after the military coup in 2013; The United States began cutting off military aid and arms supplies to the country. This left Russia with France (another major arms exporter) an opportunity; This prompted it to rapidly intensify the transfer of arms to Egypt. Russia’s exports accounted for 31% of Egypt’s arms imports between 2009 and 2018 (22).
  3. The Russian weaponry currently available is identical to the weapons that the Soviet Union was supplying to the countries of the continent, so fixing their defects is easy and does not require high-cost techniques.

Second: Mercenary Diplomacy (Wagner)

The Wagner Group, which is deployed in several African countries, is one of the tools of Moscow’s influence in its incubators on the continent. The group’s tasks are multiple, represented in the military and security field related to participation in combat, training forces and protecting officials, and its presence is concentrated in about ten African countries, namely: Sudan, Central Africa, Libya, Zimbabwe and Angola. Madagascar, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (23).

But the spread of Wagner appeared on the African map to the public in the war that Libya witnessed between Major General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan army, where Russian interests were forcing them to intervene militarily to resolve the battle in favor of their allies or to practice alternative diplomatic tools to bring positions closer, in order to protect their interests; Russian investments in Libya during the era of Muammar Gaddafi exceeded the $15 billion ceiling, and sought to complete the $4 billion arms deal in light of the embargo imposed on Libya by the United Nations. However, its efforts failed after the defeat of Khalifa Haftar in the bloody battles in Tripoli, in 2020 (24). The Wagner Group is remarkably spread in both the Central African Republic and Sudan, with the aim of smuggling gold and prospecting for minerals, to win a specific percentage of the revenues earned by those countries.

Third: Energy and mining projects

The interest in energy in Africa came in two historical moments. The first was after the October 1973 war between the Arab countries and Israel, when six Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries announced a ban on exports to countries supporting Israel, especially the United States. At that time, the price of oil quadrupled to $11.65 a barrel; The second was in March 2014, shortly after the Russian Federation annexed Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula. In the second current, Western countries realized the danger of the European continent’s dependence on Russian gas, and eight years ago they began searching for alternatives, the pace of which was accelerated by the recent Russian war on Ukraine (25).

Since the beginning of the second millennium, Russian companies in the field of energy and mining have begun to enter fierce competition with their European, Chinese and American counterparts in Africa, and the bulk of the work of these Russian companies is concentrated in North and West Africa, in search of commercial deals, and Gazprom invests about $500 million in its projects. Energy sources in Africa, including gas production in Namibia, and Lukoil implement oil production projects in West African countries, especially in Nigeria, Cameroon and the Gulf of Guinea countries. The total volume of its investments is estimated at more than one billion dollars (26).

In the field of nuclear energy, many Russian state-owned companies such as Gazprom, Lukoil, Rosteg and Rosatom are spread in African countries, and most of the energy projects of these companies are concentrated in Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Nigeria and Uganda (27). For example, Rosatom has signed memoranda and agreements for the development of nuclear energy with 18 African countries, including Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Rwanda, Nigeria and Ethiopia, and this company has also agreed to build four 1,200 MW VVER nuclear reactors in Egypt, with a construction and maintenance value of 60 One billion dollars with a Russian loan amounting to 25 billion dollars, and an annual interest of 3 percent of the volume of revenues (28).

In the field of mining, Russian companies are active in mineral exploration, due to their urgent need to obtain some basic minerals in the development of their industries, especially manganese, bauxite and chromium. To invest the “Dian Diane” reservoir. Its investment projects amounted to more than $300 million, and Renova extracts minerals in South Africa, Gabon and Mozambique, with a total investment of more than $1 billion. Nigeria, and Nordgold extracts gold in Burkina Faso and Guinea (29).

Despite the Russian expansion in Africa, this prominent presence does not pass without many challenges. The continent, and the effects of its invasion of Ukraine will impose more economic restrictions on it and restrict its freedom of movement and investment in Africa, as well as negatively affect the possibility of the Wagner Group staying for a longer period on the continent if the raging Russian battle with the West in Ukraine is not resolved quickly, the economic and military bleeding of the cost of the war with Kyiv Which has entered its sixth month, will be expensive for the Kremlin, in addition to other challenges facing the Putin administration from Western countries, which have historical influence and influence in Africa, as well as huge Chinese investments, which represent the real concern of the West more than the Russian presence represented by Wagner mercenaries and investmentsRussia does not exceed only one percent compared to the size of the West’s investments.

a summary

In the end, the visit of the Russian Foreign Minister to several African countries with geopolitical and strategic weight on the continent reflected a new Russian orientation towards Africa, and carried great importance to Africans that can be translated that the Russian bear has more credibility in honoring his promises with African countries, but Moscow’s strength remains And the future of its presence on the continent depends on how serious Putin’s ambitions are in Africa, and whether Russia is ready to make the large financial investments that it has promised to implement in multiple sectors.But Moscow’s future and its rising presence in Africa remains dependent on diversifying its relations with Africans without focusing on the arms trade, and automatically switching from the machines of destruction that it distributes at the lowest prices to others with great influence under the framework of developing a new strategy, to deepen its economic partnership, including energy and the marketing of its grain, medicine and other fields. Digitization, technology and the implementation of development and cultural projects, and this is what can root its future in the brown continent and guarantee it African acceptance, provided that Moscow improves its options for its existence and its factors of survival that fit the needs of the toiling African peoples.

About the author

Shafi'i start

Shafi’i start

Somali researcher interested in issues of the Horn of AfricaREFERENCE

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(13) Ibid.
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(28) Ibid.
(29) The most prominent Russian economic projects in Africa, Russia Today, previous reference.

SAKHRI Mohamed
SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a bachelor's degree in political science and international relations as well as a Master's degree in international security studies, alongside a passion for web development. During my studies, I gained a strong understanding of key political concepts, theories in international relations, security and strategic studies, as well as the tools and research methods used in these fields.

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