Political studies

Moroccan Islamists: From the Reform Bet to the “Organizational Crisis” A Reading of the Experience of the Moroccan Justice and Development Party (1997-2017)

  • The Arab Democratic Center

Addressing the path of the Justice and Development Party within the framework of Islamic movements as social and political movements with multiple deposits and backgrounds, benefits methodologically from avoiding the pitfalls of generalization and prejudices, and the ambiguities that characterized various studies issued by Western and Arab parties, where they reflected a piecemeal view of Islam and those movements and raised meanings Different to the one concept, and it focused on a set of concepts with negative connotations, especially the link between Islam, extremism and violence [1] , and between parties or Islamic movements and the crisis of democratization in the Arab countries.

The relatively limited openness of Arab regimes, and their recognition of the lack of realization of their liberalization and development projects, and the endorsement of the most prominent Islamic movements with a series of intellectual and political revisions, were a starting point for the shift to building a foundational stage based on adopting a strategy of gradual reform from within the political system and embracing the thesis of political progress in change by invoking the dimension of legitimacy Legitimacy and moving forward within the framework of the integration series [2] . The positions of the ruling regimes were determined by the emergence of these movements in the non-opposition to their existence as long as they serve their goals and intersect with their projects, by strengthening the religious dimension within society and educated elites and reducing the influence of the left forces within society, the labor community and universities, Besides achieving a kind of ideological and cultural balance that is in the interest of the system [3] .

The problem of the spread of Islamic movements in the Arab world in general, and the Maghreb in particular, is related to the phenomenon of return to religion [4] , this social phenomenon that has become permeated in many social circles, as an attempt, among others, in the search of the Arab character for psychological, cultural balances against cultural looting and multiple conflicts About inheritance and identity.

By virtue of the historical, social and political contexts to which these movements have been subjected, I have known several transformations and changes in the level of their perceptions, programs and discourse, which lacked clarity and theoretical rigor in the face of contemporary challenges, as a natural consequence of their immersion in heritage books in search of answers to the questions of the present and their inclusion in the arms of the glories of the predecessors .

In connection with a set of contemporary transformations, especially after its transition to the helm of governance, it has become relatively formulated its reform program in modern ways and with a pragmatic multi-level trend, including political, social and economic, and avoids the threat of traditional speeches, such as the application of Islamic law and the call to establish borders and prevent taboos such as alcohol, gambling and usury, as opposed to Its production is a set of contradictory speeches and behaviors that contradict its references, and it continues to make concessions to the ruling authority under several Islamic rationales and justifications, such as the call to avoid “strife” [5] .

In this context, the Moroccan Justice and Development Party is among the few Islamic parties in the Arab world that have adopted in their approach the principle of gradual reform from within, as this party has known throughout the course of its integration into political life for two decades (1997-2017) The transformations, especially at the level of dealing with the contradictions and constraints associated with the transition, “the position of the opposition” to “the helm of management,” which requires engaging in a political space fenced by strict rules and controls.

Therefore, the choice of this topic related to the path and experience of this Islamic party in the political process for twenty years, i.e. from the legislation of 2007 to the end of the legislation of 2017, as a problem for research, study and analysis, is related to several reasons, including what is objective related to trying to study and understand the phenomenon of the growing rise of Islamists in the Moroccan political scene and the implications The negative consequence of this is their relationship with the political authority and the rest of the other political parties, on the horizon of setting scientific conclusions aimed at consulting the reactions and reactions of these events on this Islamic organization and on its unity and future within the political and social context, in view of the outcomes of the negotiations related to the formation of the government after the seventh of October in the first stage (Benkirane) or the stage The second (Ottoman).

Including what is scientific is mainly represented in trying to address this issue within the framework of a holistic approach that adopts modern approaches and trends in the study of these Islamic organizations [6] and understanding the normative and behavioral shifts that are under way, which are based on linking the theoretical and cognitive vision to an understanding of practical contexts and expressions That are done within it, in addition to the effect of some subjective reasons that it is difficult for every researcher to break free from them on the grounds of impartiality and objectivity.

In connection with the subject of the study, and upon reviewing the course of the war of justice and development, it is clear that it has been subjected and still since its inception to many requests that ranged between successes and failures, whether at the organizational level or the level of its relationship with the rest of the spectrums and popular components as well as the existing system. Over nearly two decades, this party evolved remarkably after the last leg related to the legislative elections that took place on October 07, 2016 produced a set of appearances and transformations at the level of the Moroccan party system as a whole, as the interactions and interactions that accompanied the formation of the government were reflected either before Benkirane was removed from the premiership or during Saad al-Din al-Othmani was in the internal house of the Islamist Justice and Development Party, which is heading towards rift and dissent.

By monitoring a set of transformations that this Islamic party is experiencing, and the constant and intensive follow-up of the events related to the phenomenon of political Islam or “Islamism” [7] , since more than a decade ago [8] , a set of phenomena and problems that are related to the intellectual container have been recorded and observed. The cultural, and ideological, of this party in general, or that falls within the circle of what is termed a “kinetic actuality” which relates to all of its practices, actions, programs and perceptions.

In order to crystallize this problem in order to dismantle, analyze and address it, this requires raising a set of the following sub-research questions:

  • What are the contexts and conditions that constitute the Justice and Development Party?
  • What are the conditions and backgrounds that allowed Islamists to integrate into the political process?
  • What are the determinants of the growth and spread of these movements despite the crisis of thought and practice that ruled its course and development? What is the nature of the transformations that the popular movement brought about during the course of the year 2010 on the path of the reformist Islamists in Morocco? And why did the intellectual framework of the Islamic movement succeed, during the revolutions, in mobilizing voters at the expense of the secular civil trend?
  • What are the implications of the rise of Moroccan Islamists through the electoral mechanism on the democratic transformation, on the one hand? And on the social and political lines?
  • What are the causes and repercussions of the crisis experienced by the Islamic Party after the “exemption” Benkirane? What are the challenges before the Islamic Prime Minister to absorb internal tension and restore the relationship with the political system?
  • What is the future of the thesis “Democratic Struggle”, which is considered the entrance to the party to achieve a democratic transition in Morocco and social justice?

In the context of trying to find and formulate answers to the questions related to the problem of research and study the current internal crisis experienced by this Islamic party as a result of the severe congestion that exists due to the rift and exchange of accusations of treason and the disposal of difference and conflict outside the structures of the party organization, whether between the leaders of the first row or between the leaders of the second row, this study will be divided into two chapters .

First, it will be devoted to the contexts of political participation of the Moroccan Islamists and their first trends, by evoking the path, development and transformations that this party has known since its participation in political work from within institutions, and exposure as well to the most important milestones that he lived. As for the second chapter, it will be devoted to the outcomes of negotiations on forming a government after the elections of the seventh of October, whether during the era of Benkirane or during the era of the Ottoman Empire, and exposure in detail to how the party managed this stage and the ability of the current leaders to overcome the “shock reality” left by the decision to exempt Benkirane to his supporters within the party And the ensuing transformation at several levels, whether on the method of the party’s management and its changing thesis, or the level of its political plan and struggle project.

Within the framework of the study, we found some difficulties that mainly relate to the accelerating transformations experienced by the party in the current stage. Therefore, the rhetoric of the issue insofar as it opens up the appetite for research, it also prevents the availability of solid scientific references and writings that address the reality of the internal crisis of the Islamic Party.

Chapter 1: Justice and Development Islamists from the Search for Legitimacy to the Political Facade

The Moroccan political field witnessed the incorporation of the reformist Islamist movement [9] (the Tawhid and Reformist Movement) through the Justice and Development Party, in the first political experiment for moderate Islamists with institutional political action from the beginning of the legislative elections November 14, 1997. This participation has been proposed since the nineties of the last century until today. Problems and questions about the nature of political participation of Islamists and their position as new actors within the Moroccan political system [10] . Especially with the transformation that took place during the Arab Spring in late 2010 after the Islamists moved from the helm of the opposition to the position of responsibility and government management.

Therefore, the research approach to the problem of the integration of Moroccan Islamists into the political process in its early stages [11] , made researchers and specialists focus in their work on the nature of this participation and its prospects within the political field from a dynamic approach that mixes the theoretical and field side, and deals with the ideological production of Islamists in its relationship with the sociological political Within a vision that addresses speeches and attitudes in its relationship with political reality [12] , the Justice and Development Party has known difficult labor before birth, which has interfered with several factors, some of which are related to the party’s reference due to the specificity and sensitivity of the referral to the Islamic religion and others related to the nature of the Moroccan political system that is based on “the Emirate The Believers [13] .

The religious field from which the king derives his religious legitimacy through the “Emirate of the Believers” has repercussions and extensions that penetrate other fields, both political and arbitration, this association makes the king, like previous constitutions, interfere in all fields without restrictions and moves in the political field as a major player controlling the rules of the game Political [14] .

The first topic, the circumstances of birth and the formation of the party

The decision to participate in the leadership of the Reform and Unification Movement by merging with the Democratic Constitutional People’s Movement party came after several initiatives to establish a party, all of which were crowned with failure and rejection by the authority, as the “Reform and Renewal Group” had previously submitted a draft basic law for the National Renewal Party “Four years before its merger with the League, the Association also submitted a project to create a” Unity and Development “party and rejected its request as well. After that, the leadership of the movement realized that the issue of establishing a party of an Islamic nature is not desirable within the political system, and the decision to join and control the The Khatib Party, then adopted in May 1996, and it was the king himself who gave the green light for the possibility of allowing moderate Islamists to officially enter the political field under the tutelage of Khatib, after he had been alert to the positives of their inclusion in parliamentary institutions [15] .

The popular movement (the party embracing part of the Islamic movement) has witnessed a change in its path following the difference between Al-Khatib and Ahran who announced the support of the king’s decision to dissolve Parliament, and his support for the declaration of the state of exception, while Al-Khatib denounced this, which led Ahradan to take the decision to expel the right of the preacher who He founded the “People’s Democratic Constitutional Movement” in February 1967, where it supported the government and took the form of an Islamic character, and the party’s activities remained frozen for nearly three decades, and it represents, according to Waterbury, “a new pawn on the king’s chessboard” [16] .

The Khatib Party stipulated that the Islamic elements enter as individuals rather than as a group, after those elements had made several contacts with many parties, especially in the beginning, the “Independence Party” [17] , and they were unsuccessful, and the bonds of interaction and cooperation between the party and the unification and reform movement appeared at the beginning as a result of their adoption For the same positions related to international Islamic issues, [18] , agreement was reached on a set of points, working under the emirate of believers, rejecting extremism and violence, and recognizing Islam as a state religion. Then the party’s extraordinary conference was held on June 2, 1996, and it was known that members of the movement entered the secretariat Party general, and after a series of negotiations, the party’s name will be changed from the People’s Democratic Constitutional Movement to the name “Justice and Development Party”.

Despite the novelty of engaging in partisan work and the limited experience in electoral processes for those enrolled in the party, the party fought the legislative elections experience on 14 November 1997 in a remarkable effective and dynamic manner, in which it revealed adaptation and interaction with the requirements of electoral processes, where it presented an electoral program in which it raised the slogan “for the renaissance Comprehensive: Originality – Justice – Development ” [19] .

In this regard, the party won the ninth rank despite not covering half of the electoral districts, and the total number of votes obtained by 264324 votes, or 4.14%, and nine of its members won, as well as the group of votes obtained by 70.292 votes, and the parliamentary work of the Justice and Development Party was launched By announcing the birth of the party’s parliamentary group and the General Secretariat’s approval of Mustafa Al-Ramid as its coordinator, and in the October 1999 session he announced the establishment of the party’s parliamentary team after completing the necessary quorum after the joining of two members of the Council (Hussein Karroumi – Abdullah Ibn Shuaib) [20] and before them Representative Abdelilah Benkirane has joined after he won the partial elections in Salé.

Thus, the true birth of the party started precisely when some of its members entered the legislative institution, because entry to this institution is a real test for measuring the party’s extensions within the mass circles, and thus to reduce positions and embody the political line, and this experience also helps to formulate more realistic programs, positions and choices.

The second topic, the Islamists’ stakes: from normalization with the regime to the forefront of the electoral scene

The Moroccan regime’s strategy towards the Islamic movement was based from the start on trying to contain and fence its movement and control its bets and aspirations, in return. The Islamists, in turn, wagered on the option of participation to obtain recognition and legal legitimacy. Where the political authority believes that inclusion and allowing the Islamists to participate may help them to strengthen the foundations of legitimacy [21] and to control, contain and control them, while Islamists consider that participation allows them to obtain legitimacy [22] and legitimacy and work in accordance with the law.

But with the practice and transformations that took place during the past twenty years, and after the authority’s objectives intersected with the stakes of the Islamic movement, those stakes became far apart and contrary to what is underlined, which negatively affected the relationship of the two parties, which has become more inclined to tension and collision. In this context, the path of the Islamic Justice and Development Party can be divided into two main stations.

The first station, the stage of searching for legitimacy and normalization with the system (1997-2009)

The regime allowing Islamists to join the democratic popular movement means its implicit recognition of the Islamic movement [23] , and allowing this movement to operate politically enables it to control the framework in which it will operate, by placing it under the responsibility of a person known to be loyal to the palace and ownership [24] .

The incorporation of this Islamic faction [25] falls within the framework of consolidating the pillars of the political system, and glorifies its political legitimacy, which passes through the incorporation and containment of all political actors and actors, accompanying them, and even their anticipation [26] . Peaceful and Civilian in the face of currents of atonement that embrace violence as a method of change. The presence of Islamists defending the Emirate of the Faithful [27] serves ideological balances in the face of the secular trend that demands the separation of religion from the state and the harmonization of Moroccan laws with international conventions [28] .

The experience of political and electoral participation by the Islamic Justice and Development Party has contributed greatly to the demarcation of their political presence, as their activities and political performance have become recognized realistically and have become part of the existing political scene, and then relatively dispelling that frightening image that some foreign or local parties are trying to draw. for them. The electoral results they obtained also gave them popular and democratic legitimacy through the ballot box, which is an important political gain despite the media campaign launched against them from time to time [29] .

During its first participation during the legislative elections on November 14, 1997, the party was subjected to restrictions and abuses and suffered discrimination against the authorities, such as reducing the use of public audiovisual media quotas and removing the quotas allocated to it, and the delay in enabling it to support material despite the launch of the election campaign, and it was also excluded From the membership of the National Elections Tracking Committee, despite this, the party ranked ninth, knowing that it did not cover half of the electoral districts [30] .

The party has also followed the normalization approach with the constraints of institutional political participation, at the municipal level, as it participated in the municipal elections of September 2003, but with the approaching date of depositing the nominations approaching, the party was forced to reduce this percentage again and noticeably if it announced its intention to run in 19% of The competing constituencies yielded to the dictates of power, and the same scenario was repeated in the 2007 and municipal elections in 2009, and the party submitted limited nominations in agreement with the Ministry of Interior.

In sum, the relationship of the authority with the amalgamated Islamic current during this stage went according to what the parties had planned, considering that on the part of the authority, the exclusion of Islamists touches in depth the essence of the political game, so the adopted tactic is to contain them and involve them in institutions, while specifying a ceiling and scope Their movement and precautions prevent this participation, and perhaps these sudden state strategies towards the Islamists are politically justifiable, as the state became aware after a while that it is of interest to involve the Islamists in the running of the municipal affairs, especially the highly sensitive urban points such as Casablanca and Meknes, for example [31] .

The second stop, a bet topping the political scene and sweeping the elections (2011-2017)

As a result of the popular movement that the Arab region witnessed during the end of the year 2010, the ceiling of the Islamists’ ambitions rose, and he moved from the search for legitimacy to an attempt to take the political scene and reach the stage of management, as Morocco experienced a kind of transformation in this context, which was the culmination of accumulated social and political protests, His banner raised the February 20 movement, which took to the streets demanding change, freedom and dignity, bypassing institutions and organizations.

The movement formed a basis of youth tired of the language of politicians and the prevailing elites, and came out with the support of political bodies, Islamic groups and human rights associations, to demand demands of a political, social and economic nature. This movement went through stations that extended between the confrontation with the party of power and the attempt to coordinate it from within, before the most important component of it, the Youth of Justice and Charity, withdrew from it, while the other components continued to go out in their weekly marches [32] .

The context of the rise of Islamists in Morocco [33] , specifically that the Justice and Development Party won the legislative elections, is mainly related to the determinant of the interaction and response of the political system to the popular movement embodied in the February 20 movement. On the other hand, the Justice and Development Party’s dealings with the popular movement, in which Abdelilah Benkirane played a fundamental role as the party’s leader, specifically in his failure to participate in the popular protests called for by the February 20 movement [34] . While the positions of the Reform and Unification Movement, as the party’s advocacy wing, remained vague and polite towards the February 20 movement [35] .

Benkirane’s success in converting his opposition to the “February 20” movement into political gains may find his full interpretation on its path. Since he was elected Secretary-General of the Al-Misbah Party to succeed Saad al-Din al-Othmani, Benkirane has been keen, on every occasion and media outlet, to recall his role in the reviews carried out by his comrades, and their transition from seeking revolution to the king to believing in its importance and role in stabilizing the country and protecting its religious authority [36] ] .

The “Arab Spring”, according to a number of followers, was an opportunity to “return the favor” after the Palace prevented the Justice and Development Party from dissolving after the May 16 terrorist bombings. His party, in the glory of the winds that overthrew the president of Tunisia and then Egypt and Libya, lived the stage in his own way, “and from the first day he has been involved in calling for the necessary and democratic reforms as a basis for these reforms.

Benkirane opened his party’s campaign, which ended in a landslide victory, with more courtship, where he told his followers that the king has two different sides, symbol and politics. “As for the symbol, we do not touch it. As for politics, we must say we saw it before the ship sank and we are all in it.” Then he called on Moroccans to preserve this property “when it was in the past that preserved them [37] .”

While the February 20 youth march on Sunday November 27, 2011 was roaming the streets, then-Interior Minister Tayeb al-Sharqawi was sitting in front of media representatives to announce that the Justice and Development Party won a total of 107 seats, or 27 percent of the general results of the new constitution’s legislation [38] .

After this party assumed the presidency of the government, Benkirane remained whenever he sensed the “danger” or felt that the positions that the party occupies at the level of management and leadership of the government experiment, is warning about most of its public output and waving the possibility of the return of the movement and the specter of revolutions that struck the Arab region, after he was the first to Respond to the February 20 movement [39] .

During the entire period of Benkirane’s presidency in the first term, the Justice and Development Party pursued policies and adopted approaches, which the political authority had wagered upon to stunt it and return it to its predetermined natural condition and to restore the spaces that this party acquired due to the wave of the “Arab Spring” and its organizational strength, but the surprise was loud after the announcement On the results of the collective elections held 04 September 2015, where the Justice and Development Party was able to lead the regional results, after ranking the largest number of advisers and won 174 national seats, followed by originality and contemporaryity 132 then independence, and in such a way that this organization was able to double its seats by three times compared to the elections The previous group stage, where the results ranked third by obtaining 5,021 group seats (15.94% of the total number of competing seats) [40] .

This sweep that the Justice and Development Party won in the elections comes in accordance with three basic determinants, firstly 3469 seats divided between the previous and last elections, secondly: that this organization swept the urban area, especially the major cities, and it now heads a number of important groups such as Fez, Tangier, Quneitra, Marrakech, Agadir, without forgetting the privacy of the major cities that it has run, such as the administrative capital (Rabat), the economic capital (Casablanca), the scientific capital (Fez) and the tourist capital of Morocco (Marrakech).

The series of tension between the Authority and the Islamists will intensify and flare up after a year of municipal elections, and exactly after the legislative elections for the seventh of October 2016, where these electoral benefits have resulted in a new reality that the Authority considered a kind of disruption after the Islamists took the political scene again with a big difference. The Justice and Development Party won 98 seats in the local constituencies and 27 seats in the national electoral constituency, for a total of 125 seats.

After announcing these results, the authority realized that dealing with the Islamists according to the new conditions and the current changes requires changing the strategies and tactics adopted, especially as the international and internal conditions were heading in the opposite direction to the rise of these currents. Despite the limited options available, the system worked to strictly employ the legal / constitutional course and contradictions related to partisan geography that frame the political field, with the aim of curbing and fencing the endless rise in the popularity of this Islamic party, which is moving towards sweeping the electoral issue.

Chapter two: Islamists between the internal crisis and the obsession with losing popularity

Throughout the course of the Justice and Development Party, which extends for more than two decades as a self-standing party institution with a presence within representative institutions, this organization has not witnessed a severe crisis at the level of its internal organizational structure and political thesis, so that it has become a harbinger of the possibility of a tremor that might undermine its unity and the coherence of its organizational structure.

Today’s crisis, according to a set of indicators, is only an extension of previous accumulations in which a group of factors, policies and attitudes adopted by the party since its entry into the government in its first version contributed to it, so that these factors can be extended to three levels:

first , the deviation of the party about its goals and slogans appeared harbingers initially with the government of Ben Kieran in the first version, as a result Kiemahbthalvat partisan hybrid and fragile and approach pragmatic non – framed controls rendered the party ‘s tendency ideological conservative, in addition to the tendency of the prime minister in his quest to win the king confidence to Acting in the 1996 constitution instead of the 2011 constitution, reproducing the same slogans and sayings and adopting economic policies that the party previously criticized when it was in the opposition.

Of the second , the collision of the party on several occasions with some of the parties in Alsulthalta seeking to adjust the political map and guide and framing the rhythm of the party practice. After the Islamists of this party acquiesced to the dictates of these parties previously through several precedents (agreement on the percentage of circles coverage, changing the team leader in case of objection to power …), they changed this approach as a result of the secretions of the popular movement that the Arab region witnessed in late 2010 and are now more inclined To independence from power, which the latter considered as a challenge and a soft reversal of this Islamic trend on the “ruler terms and rules”, which created a state of apprehension and mistrust of the political system from this faction.

Third, the way the party arranges the negotiation stage to form the government after the recent legislative elections, whether in the era of Benkirane or in the era of the Ottoman Empire, and the interactions and interactions that have reached the point of exchanging accusations between the party’s supporters, whether those who reject the method of removing Benkirane or those who are against the Ottoman style and the concessions he made in order to form the government .

The first topic, the Pancreatic era: the end of a man in the eyes of power and yesterday’s comrades

Benkirane’s relationship with the Moroccan political system has been subject to continuous ebb and flow for years, but it will witness a qualitative boom and was characterized by extreme convergence during the end of 2010 due to a set of factors that can be reduced in two basic conditions, the general condition associated with the wave of popular movement that has afflicted some Arab ruling regimes, and the special condition Related to the role that Benkirane played as a leader of the Justice and Development Party in avoiding the party’s involvement in the movement expressed by the February 20 movement, and played an important role in absorbing public anger, softening and controlling the pace of demands at the street level by defending the 2011 constitutional document and participating in elections The loyal legislative that produced his victory in first place.

The general and special conditions that ruled to a large extent and exceptionally “harmony and harmony between the Islamists and the royal establishment” and determined the nature of the relationship between them will disappear after a year’s passage by the absence of the political and ideological role of the Islamic movement, and trying to remove these currents from positions of responsibility after being able to overcome the circumstance associated with the movement, and the fall Some of the examples that this trend represented in Egypt and Tunisia, not to mention the positions of some Western and Arab powers that were pushing toward a return to before the wave of popular movement through the marginalization and containment of political Islam movements and controlling the ceiling of their movement.

The first requirement, the Benkirane stage: from personalization and confrontation to leadership

The personality of the leader of the Justice and Development Party, Abdellah Benkirane, since he assumed the presidency of the government, has sparked a lot of controversy and debate, especially in the media and popular circles, especially since his outputs and statements have been receiving intense attention and add a degree of excitement and suspense to the debates and political debates both inside and outside Parliament. Outputs regardless of their content and the extent of their sincerity had a dual impact, so that they arouse the admiration and interest of large groups of public opinion and at the same time bring to this leader the discontent and anger of some power and opposition circles, especially when he plays the role of the opposition and makes statements through which he asserts that he is not responsible for what It falls from many things.

One of the attributes that adhere to Benkirane’s speeches [41] in many of his outputs is populism which his opponents accuse of relying on to camouflage the recipient on the truth of things and gain their sympathy, and employ many vocabulary and hadith in a certain way that makes him appear closer to the culture of the vast majority of Moroccan citizens. On the level of his struggle with the opposition, Bankirane is well aware of his political wits that the history of the opposition’s components is full of loopholes, which he knows well how to use to shoot at its components. [42]He also knows that his monthly stances in front of Parliament will become a renewal of the balance of popular sympathy with him and his party, so he will be keen to attend regularly for these sessions, especially in front of an opposition characterized by weak speech and legitimacy in front of the Moroccan people, who know very well that many opposition parties and political figures even if they show Fierce in its opposition to the government and its president, this cannot restore some credibility to the people [43] .

The other context of Benkirane’s political discourse is directed at the general Moroccan community, especially the popular groups. What is more attached to Benkirane is the language of the discourse that seems easy to all societal groups, and tries as much as possible to employ the popular vernacular dictionary [44] in order to address the least individual in society in terms of cultural formation And he is far from using some of the terms that Moroccans have written. Benkirane also has the art of escaping from difficult situations in a way that satisfies this category by referring difficult issues to the divine will [45] , this referral, which may resent the followers who are waiting for a logical, systematic answer, but it receives In response from all Moroccans who wrote to refer their affairs to the divine will, it is therefore not surprising that they respond to such a letter from Benkirane [46] .

Benkirane’s success and supremacy over the opposition on the level of rhetoric and raising the pace of mobilization and conflict from his governmental position through the ability to professionally manage the verbal and rhetorical debate has made his political opponents and competitors unable to keep pace with this rhythm [47] , which led the prime minister to override the speech and ceiling of the opposition parties, through His description of internal conditions in a manner that does not take into account his position and governmental responsibility, especially when the weekend turns into exhibitions or by expressing his relationship with the royal institution and its surroundings without adhering to the established traditions and customs.

This behavior, adopted by Benkirane, will lead to discontent and anger at the king on several occasions, where in this context and in a precedent in contemporary Moroccan history, the royal speech on the occasion of the 17th anniversary of the Throne carried several messages, one of which was addressed directly to the Prime Minister, and in a tone confirming what was reported by some media King about the lack of satisfaction and rejection of the statements that came on the tongue Benkirane when he referred to in one of the communities , “the existence of two states in Morocco, one headed by the king and the other does not know where it comes Ptainatha and decisions” [48] .

This royal rejection of this statement came in an exclamation and surprising form, indicating that there is a great misunderstanding between the king and the prime minister, especially since this statement came in a turbulent international and regional context, Morocco is trying hard to give and export a picture that is different from the situation prevailing in some neighboring countries [49] ; As the Moroccan king stated in this context that “it is surprising that some people carry out practices that are inconsistent with the principles and ethics of political action, and make statements and concepts that harm the reputation of the country and affect the sanctity and credibility of institutions, in an attempt to win the votes and sympathy of the voters.”

On the other hand, there is another trend that sees that the royal anger of Benkirane is not only related to incalculable outputs and statements, insofar as it is related to the nature of the Moroccan political system, which does not accept the presence of a personality competing with the king at the level of popularity and presence in the public space, so that the royal establishment in Morocco With strong constitutional authority, where the king is constitutionally defined as: “the head of state and its supreme representative, the symbol of the nation’s unity, the guarantor of the permanence and continuity of the state, and the supreme rule among its institutions, which ensures that the constitution is respected, and the proper functioning of the constitutional institutions,” and before that “the Commander of the Faithful, protector of religion and religion” »As recognized in Article 41 and 42 of the Moroccan Constitution of 2011.

Although the chanting of the Prime Minister, Abdel-Ilah Benkirane, that “he is merely an employee of the King’s government, doing what he orders,” it is a complete recognition of the authority of the Royal Institution, but this method that Abdel-Ilah Benkirane is dealing with with minors is not that. «naive» or «appeasement» as it seems, as it appears, as little Foreign Affairs in  the report of  her [50] , the unwillingness Benkirane play the role of the scapegoat, to bear alone the political failure, and shows that the first charge is the palace, and displays the property indirectly For public accountability, about what is happening in the country, in front of public opinion, the thing that broke the barrier that separates the king from the people, being the actual ruler of the country, but his rule is always from above or from the shadow [51] .

Consequently, Benkirane’s outputs and his communicative method, which contributed to the high level of the popularity of the Islamic Justice and Development Party in various circles, in addition to his statements that put him in a dual and ambiguous position and make him analyze his governmental responsibility when he bounces the opponent’s hat over the platforms, all these factors and indicators made this character undesirable Those in power circles, and thus difficult to return to head the government in its second copy.

The first paragraph, Benkirane and the government formation negotiations: between mismanagement and “blockage”

After the announcement of the results of the legislative elections for the seventh of October 2016 and in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 47 of the Constitution, King Abdelilah Benkirane appointed the Secretary-General of the Justice and Development Party as head of the Moroccan government and instructed him to form it, during his reception, at the Royal Palace in Casablanca on October 10. [52]

Before the start of the consultations to form the government, Benkirane believed that after this royal appointment, the road would be clear for a second term to head the government, but with the passage of time it seemed more complicated, especially after the removal of Salahuddin Mezouar from the presidency of the National Rally of Independents Party and the recruitment of Akhnoush, a businessman close to the king. .

Subsequently, several accelerated shifts occurred at the level of alliances, which made Benkirane aware that the formation of the government would not be that easy, especially when four parties, namely, the Constitutional Union, the Popular Movement, and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, fell under the banner of the new leader of the National Rally of Independents.

The emergence of this new alliance and the requirement of Akhenoush not to involve the Istiqlal Party in the government have made Benkirane in his management of the negotiations path fall into several administrative, communicative and negotiating mistakes, whether through the outbreak of the war of communications, or through the lack of a clear strategy for managing the constraints related to the difficulty of finding a majority in the Moroccan political field.

The situation of stumbling in the path of negotiation has worsened a lot, with a kind of belief for the various parties entrenched that the heads of other parties that the Liberal leader speaks on their behalf do not have the power of decision and those who lack independence for Benkirane and implement a hidden agenda aimed at obstructing the formation of the government, employing the term “pokage” to characterize this belief [53] While other parties believe that Benkirane does not act as the president in charge of forming the government, but rather acts as a general secretary of the “El Baijidi” party and does not possess the ingredients for a prime minister because of his statements that do not observe the obligation to reserve and keep secret of the negotiations.

Benkirane faltered in forming the government over time, which would lead to a state of acute polarization and polarization between the various party components, which led to the division of the Moroccan political field between two teams, the first, represented by the Islamic Justice and Development Party and its allies, the Progress, Socialism and Independence Parties [54] , and the second that includes parties The four that the Liberal leader was negotiating in its name.

According to this divergence, the first party became of the opinion that the requirements of the other parties are nothing but mines and obstacles aimed at thwarting Benkirane in his mission to form the government, especially since the previous indications and great misunderstanding with the Royal Institution were aimed at supporting and strengthening this belief. As for the second party, it is believed that the designated Prime Minister, Andak, is making a set of mistakes in his management of the negotiations track [55] .

The stumbling block registered at the level of government formation is related to three basic levels. The first relates to the method of managing the course of negotiations by the designated Prime Minister, so that Benkirane entered into consultations with the parties without any clear negotiating strategy, and it was remarkable that the euphoria of winning the first rank made the Justice and Development Party The Islamic deals with the contradictions and complications associated with the reality of the partisan with a kind of disregard that indicates that the results of the poll were not read objectively, and therefore this party bets on “numerical logic” to complete the governmental majority in addition to announcing from the beginning about the preference for an alliance with some parties, but not others, may have contributed to weakening the site The negotiation of Benkirane and negatively affected the course of the consultations.

As for the second level, it is related to the nature of the party elites that currently exist, so that these elites are still governed by the culture of dependency and conspiracy theory and its tendency to wait for signals and instructions, although the 2011 constitutional document expanded from the circle and margin of the movement of party elites both at the level of the political and management field to work to develop public policies In various sectors, it is still acting according to the operative cap of the 1996 constitution.

Concerning the third level, it relates to the nature and content of the legal arsenal framed for the electoral process that prevents the screening of a harmonious majority after each electoral entitlement, as the electoral boycott and the current voting pattern contributed in their role to Balkanization of the political map, which makes the bet of forming the government in Morocco conditional on the alliance of the largest number of parties from different References and backgrounds.

Over a period of nearly five months, consultations to form the government entered a “dead end tunnel”, after the National Rally  and Popular Movement parties clung to  the  participation of the Socialist Union (leftist), which Benkirane rejected, as Benkirane insisted that it be limited to the four parties that were the outgoing government, They are justice and development (125 seats out of 395), the National Rally of Independents (37 seats), the popular movement (27 seats), progress and socialism (12 seats).

In the face of this situation, and immediately after the return of the king from his visits to some African countries, the sudden end of the Justice and Development Party supporters came after he announced the removal of Benkirane from forming the government, this transformation reflected negatively on the party’s internal house, especially with the advent of the Ottoman, who adopted a different approach and method in negotiation and management of the party .

The second paragraph, the Ottoman period: between the internal crisis and the challenge of preserving the party’s popularity

On the eve of March 15, King Mohammed VI decided, on the basis of his constitutional powers, to remove the Secretary-General of the Justice and Development Party, Abdul Ilah Benkirane, from the head of the government, and compensate him with a surrogate, from the Justice and Development Party as well. “consultations carried out by the prime minister – designate, for more than five months, did not yield to some extent today announced the formation of a majority government, in addition to the lack of indicators suggest the imminent formation” [56] .

This royal intervention according to this form did not present any discussion or objection on the part of the party from a legal point of view, as much as the discussion about the repercussions and repercussions of this variable has affected the party’s popularity and future. On the legal level, the 2011 constitutional document that this Islamic party voted on proves political practice. It is full of some linens that sometimes need clarification or interpretation.

To understand the constitutional foundations that allow the king to exempt Benkirane and appoint a new personality from the Justice and Development Party, three key keys can be conjured up. The first is based on Chapter 42 of the constitution, which regards the king as the guarantor of the functioning of institutions. And “This position gives the king the right to intervene in various fields, to secure the work of all constitutional institutions and to find solutions and exits to political and economic problems and crises that may occur.”
The second key, is that the resort of the king to another figure from the same party that is leading the election results, respects the requirements of Chapter 47 of the Constitution, which has been raised around the period of faltering many discussions and interpretations.

As for the third key, it is represented in “the king’s reliance on Chapter 42 of the Constitution, to end the stalemate that has prolonged, without prejudice to the new constitutional engineering, of which Chapter 47 is one of its most important pillars, indicating that political practice in Morocco establishes new norms that may develop and may retreat According to the nature of partisan elites and the interactions of the entire political field [57] .

On the other hand, on the political side, the main Justice and Development Party structures decided to interact positively with the Royal Court’s unanimous communication [58] , through the General Secretariat meeting on the day following the removal of Benkirane, as well as the party’s parliament that was held on March 18, but before the latter’s meeting On the day a new variable took place, which was the issuance of a report from the Royal Court, so that King Mohammed VI did not wait for the National Council of the Justice and Development Party to be held, to which attention was turned to find out the name of Khalifa Abdelilah Benkirane; Rather, he appointed Saad al-Din al-Othmani as head of the new government.

Therefore, resorting to the constitution, resorting to its texts, and adopting strictness in dealing with its formalities and operative terms, as far as it reflects the political maturity and democratic development witnessed by Morocco, it also reflects, according to current contexts, a crisis of confidence or major misunderstanding between the Royal Institution and the Justice and Development Party. [59] ] .

Although the king respected the operative part of the constitution in removing Bin Kiran from the premiership and appointing him as another party member, in addition to the positive interaction of the Islamists of this party with this transformation, the Ottoman success in forming the government in view of its components and the method and speed of its formation, the party entered into major mazes difficult to predict its results On its unity and coherence of its organizational structure.

The second requirement, the Ottoman government and the repercussions of the internal crisis

After their appointment by the King, and within a short time, not exceeding 19 days, the Ottoman managed to form a government coalition consisting of six parties and comprising 39 ministers, which sparked a wave of discontent and discontent within the party’s circles. Congestion, its manifestations appeared on social media and on the pages of some newspapers, rather than being discharged into party institutions.

The differences between some leaders exceeded the ceiling of divergent opinions, positions, and estimates to exchange and exchange accusations, and amounted to treason, insult and beating under the belt. This situation insofar as it indicates that there is a real crisis that the party is experiencing, insofar as it raises several unanswered questions about the reasons, causes and backgrounds of this congestion, especially since the party chose, from the beginning, according to its sectarian paper and its political program, the option of reform from the inside, and the consequent consequence of this in presenting concessions To operate under the auspices of the Royal Institution for a Democratic Transition.

To understand the tension and crisis prevailing in the ranks of the Islamists of the Justice and Development Party since the formation of the Ottoman government, it is possible to use some keys and indicators to read this transformation experienced by this organization, which was an exception in the Moroccan political field regarding internal democracy and the discipline of its supporters in resorting to the regulatory bodies to manage differences and disagreement. This is done through three basic levels:

The first level relates to the two characters ’heterogeneity and differences, as Benkirane achieved as an unprecedented breakthrough in terms of popularity in addition to his stubborn, temperamental, and confrontational personality, in addition to his rhetorical and communicative ability, which helped him establish his hegemony over the party’s organizational machine and created broad bases of supporters within the infrastructure And the parallel, especially the parliament of the party (the National Assembly, and the youth of the party). As for the Ottoman, his personality tends more to truce, flexibility and balance, and also tends more towards harmony rather than collision. He is known as a flexible and less charismatic figure, compared to Ben Kiran [60] .

Throughout his leadership of the party and his presidency of the government, the latter was able to create for himself an aura of respect and appreciation in the ranks of the party. Therefore, the imagination of the Ansar is governed by the logic of comparing the two personalities, which makes Benkirane’s leadership symbolically remain present in the conscience and sympathy of the majority of the party’s Islamists, while the Ottoman needs time to rearrange the internal house and market his personality inside and outside the party.

As for the second level , it is linked to the anger of the Ottoman, as a result of his concessions, which were without limits, according to his critics, whether by agreeing to accept the Socialist Union in the government, and by agreeing to also being asked to find people known for their hostility to the Islamists [61] , and flooding the government with a large number of technocrats.

There are those who consider that the outcome of the negotiation process confirmed that the Ottoman completely abandoned the method of Benkirane that was approved by the General Secretariat in the previous communications, and even reached the point of accusing the Ottoman of singling out the decision to form the government, despite what was issued by the National Council of the “Misbah Party” of the necessity to keep pace The General Secretariat for its consultations with the other parties [62] .

The formation of the government contributed to the emergence of the type of tension and internal tension, as it is manifested by the exchange of accusations between some prominent leaders, and the use of most of the affiliates and supporters in their various locations within the party to social networking sites [63] or newspapers and websites [64]   to drain their positions and express their anger, in light of Disrupting the stalemate of all party institutions [65] , especially since the angry people tried to collect a quorum to hold the party’s parliament (the National Assembly) and were unable to do so.

The situation will get worse after leaking and publishing a set of “current data or accusations” at the level of all branches of the party, where those “accusations” were the subject of articles and newspaper investigations whose owners relied on the narration of some leaders within the party. It includes some scenes and crypts related to recent events and developments, and it is directed towards the presence of a knitted plot to download the scenario of exempting Benkirane and compensate him with the Ottoman, this “conspiracy” or “treason” against the leader of the Islamic Organization, according to what was stated in some investigations was with the complicity and participation of leaders of the first and second ranks [66] .

  As for the third level , it relates to the “deep gulf” between the thinking style of the leaders of the Justice and Development Party and the aspirations and ideas of associates and sympathizers affected by Benkirane’s speech. To check more, the ceiling is different and deranged for both parties [67] ; So that the first party represented by the leadership, the situation formed by members of the Secretariat, their ambition ceiling is low, sometimes not to try to normalize with the state and obtain legal legitimacy, and at other times try to engage in the reform process from within the institutions and under the auspices of the king (this is the essence of the party’s thesis, according to thinker Jebron). This approach laid the foundations of the bloc parties after the struggle that the Socialist Party waged against the regime throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

As for the second party, that is, the supporters and sympathizers of this Islamic party. And because they did not coexist with constraints of beginnings and bets of upbringing, and due to their cultural and social backgrounds and their ambitions related to change and reform, in addition to being subjected to a stream of excessive injections of freight and mobilization by Benkirane, they had a tendency to change and move according to a ceiling that does not take into account the conditions and limitations announced in the party literature and exceeds the ceiling of aspirations Expressed by the leaders and contracted with the regime according to which the state allowed the Islamists to work in the political field.

Conclusions and conclusions:

With the departure of Ben Kiran from the premiership, the appointment of the Ottoman and the formation of the government in this way and how, many questions have imposed themselves on the future of the Justice and Development Party within the Moroccan political system, its relationship with the state in light of the current transformations that are at the international and national levels, and the extent of the ability of the new prime minister to win the preservation bet The popularity of this party and its impact on the street, but also about its ability to maintain its cohesion and unity by absorbing tension and tension in the ranks of the Islamists of this party.

The circumstance in which the Justice and Development Party is passing, according to the mentioned indicators, can be considered as a test in front of Saad al-Din al-Othmani. Success in containing the internal crisis and managing the challenges presented may help him to put his hand on the party’s keys, and thus obtain his leadership during the next conference. As for things getting loose and aggravating, it indicates On failure and closing the arc of the experiment he leads prematurely. Therefore, Al-Othmani faces a set of major challenges and challenges, which can be summed up in three main challenges:

  • The challenge of preserving the party’s unity: Since Benkirane was removed from the presidency of the government and the formation of the government of Saad al-Din al-Othmani, the party lives on the rhythm of a suffocating internal crisis, which has become deeper over time, especially in light of the divergence of opinions and positions and the absence of any initiative to contain the situation, as this crisis took many forms and manifestations Unprecedented within this Islamic organization, which was previously characterized by organizational rigor and the discipline of associates and supporters.

Therefore, the new prime minister needs a great effort to restore his image within the party, and to absorb the congestion that exists before going to the next conference, in order to avoid a split that has started to appear in light of the current atmosphere and conditions, and that reflects negatively on the popularity of this party [68] .

  • The challenge of re-restoring the relationship with the regime: The relationship of the reformist Islamists to the Moroccan political system is going through its worst stages as a result of a set of internal and external factors. By extrapolating a set of indicators and data, it becomes clear that the political authority in Morocco is moving towards closing the arc of the Islamists ’participation in power, and trying to return this experience to its beginnings The first [69] , by fencing their participation and adjusting it according to a ceiling that does not exceed their presence in limited numbers within the parliament dome.

This approach intersects and is also consistent with the transformations that have dominated US policies and strategies toward Islamic movements, especially with Trump’s arrival in the White House administration. It should be noted in this regard, that before Trump’s victory, during the Obama era, there was a tactical shift or a new perception in the framework of the crystallization at the level of the American strategy regarding the file of Islamists involved in the political process, through two indicators: supporting the coup in Egypt and collusion with the attempt The coup in Turkey in June 2016 [70] .

This shift is certainly not intended to close the arc of supporting the Islamists ’experience as much as there is a review of this old perception after it became clear that political Islam movements are difficult to tame and control according to the mechanisms and previous controls.

Consequently, America, through reviewing previous policies, seeks to support the involvement of Islamists in a limited and controlled manner without the risk of allowing them to seize power or exercise power at least at the current stage.

  • The thesis of the “democratic struggle” thesis adopted by the party, by referring to the document “democratic building” produced by the previous conference of the Justice and Development Party, which emphasized the need to develop the party’s approach to the political situation and its thesis [71] ٬ The document stressed that insofar as it provides stability A condition for sustainable reform is the continuation of the reformist dynamic, the actual and democratic downloading of the requirements of the constitution, and touching its effects at the level of institutions and policies, and at the level of “final cutting with control an approach to governance and rent approach to the economy.” The document indicates that the thesis of democratic construction does not take its real content only through Political democracy, the democracy of institutions and elections, must lead to economic development and the pursuit of justice between groups and fields, and then it must be sought to pair between achieving a democratic transition and strengthening democratic construction and achieving social and economic development.

The thesis of democratic construction in the shadow of the recent crisis that the electoral station produced for the seventh of October, and the tense relationship with the political system, made some youth leaders both within the General Secretariat and the National Council. It questions the efficacy of this thesis [72] and calls for opening an internal collective dialogue to provide answers about the current situation in the party.

It is worth noting that the demand to review the party’s thesis, reformulate and crystallize it is not emerging today and is not related to the internal crisis the party is experiencing at the current stage, as Moroccan researcher, Mohamed Jabroun, has previously expressed it in several writings that have centered in their entirety on the need to abandon the democratic transition thesis , Where he sees that “building a modern political system in Morocco, the final exit from the predicament of dual control / democracy, and a final break with the history of the political conflict in the country .. does not need, and will not be achieved by summoning the saying of democratic transition, and resurrecting it, but rather a creative composition between Tradition and political modernity so as to preserve ownership of its actual presence, and allow citizens to participate in power, through their representatives. [73]

Finally, the Islamic Justice and Development Party, through its political experience of its successes and failures, formed a true test for this faction to learn about the complications associated with management and governance, as this experience enabled them to achieve a kind of positive accumulation in their outlook and their treatment of a set of problems and challenges. Moving from theorizing, drafting speeches and slogans with an Islamic rarity to the measure, its daily constraints and difficulties, and trying to answer the expectations of citizens, should be followed by reviews that include reconsidering the project of this Islamic party, its political plan, its orientations, choices, and relations with the regime and political parties.

Approved references:

References in Arabic

Books or literature:

Nabil Abdel-Fattah, Jean-Marc et al., “Islamists and Democrats, Problems of Building an Islamic Democratic Stream” Editor: Amr Al-Shobaki, Center for Political and Strategic Studies – Al-Ahram – Cairo 2004.

 Fayez Sarah, “The Islamic Movement in the Arab Maghreb, its origins, development, programs,” Center for Strategic Studies, Research and Documentation, Beirut, first edition 1995.

– Rashid Muqtadir, “The Political Integration of Islamic Forces in Morocco”, Arab Science House Publishers, Beirut, first edition 2010

Muqtedar Rasheed, “Political Participation of Moroccan Reformist Islamists”, as a contribution to the study and evaluation of the political path of Islamists in Morocco. The Arab Future, forgetting (April) 4/2005 No. 314, year 27, issued by the Center for Arab Unity Studies.

– Mohamed Touzi, “Monarchy and Political Islam in Morocco”, the new Najah press. Casablanca, March 2001.

– Ahmed Boujadd, “Ownership and rotation, a comparison of the strategy of modernizing the state and reproducing the political system in Morocco,” An-Najah Press, Casablanca, first edition 2000.

– Abdel-Ali Hami El-Din, “The Moroccan Constitution and the Bet of Power Balances”, Monarchy, Parties, Islamists, Point of View Books, First Edition, Year 2005.

– Collective author, “Morocco in the year 2011”, supervised by Omar Harchan, curated by Shakria, Al-Maaref Al-Jadida Press, Rabat, first edition 2012.

Ibrahim Al-Madhoun, Tawfiq Shoman, George Qurm, and others, “Concerned Revolutions, Socio-Strategic Approaches to the Arab Movement,” prepared and presented by: Mahmoud Haider, Civilization Center for the Development of Islamic Thought, Beirut, first edition 2012.

Bilal al-Talidi, “Islamists and the Arab Spring, Ascension, Challenges, Governance” (Tunis, Egypt, Morocco, Yemen), Namaa Center for Research and Studies, Beirut, first edition 2012.

– John Arberradley, “After the Arab Spring, How I Hijacked Islamists and the Middle East Revolutions”, translation: Shaymaa Abdul-Hakima, Arabic for Translation and Publishing, First Edition 2013.

– Zakaria Sahnoun, “The Political Discourse of Abdul-Ilah Bin Kiran… A Reading of the Intellectual and Methodological Foundations.”

Theses and theses:

– Mohamed Al-Zahrawi, “The Islamic Movement in the Arab Maghreb, a study on the problems of participation, extremism, violence,” research for a doctorate, the academic year, 2014-2015.

 Written by Gea, “The Problem of Religion and Politics in Islamic Discourse, The Speech of the Justice and Development Party as a Model”, a study to obtain a diploma in higher studies in depth in public law, University of Muhammad V, Akdal Rabat, the academic year 2007-2008.

Fouad Al-Atrash, “The Basic Intellectuals of the Partisan Elite in Morocco – The Justice, Development and Independence Party Model,” research for a deep diploma in graduate studies. Agdal. Rabat 2003-2004.

– Bounaaj Merbeh, “Political behavior of Islamic movements in Morocco, the model of the Tawhid and Islah movement,” a thesis for a deep diploma in higher studies, University of Mohamed V Agdal – Rabat, the academic year 2007-2008.

– Mohamed Al-Zahrawi, “Political Islam and Power in Morocco” research for an in-depth postgraduate diploma, 2005-2006 academic year

Magazines and newspapers:

First: magazines:

– Mohamed Al-Zahrawi, “Reading in Chapters (41) and (42): Between approving religious functions, arbitration for the king, and reproducing Chapter (19) of the Constitution (96). .

Second: Newspapers

– “Al-Tuzi, Ramadan and Kibeel put Islamic movements under the microscope” Akhbar Al-Youm newspaper, issue No. 740, 04-28 / 04/2012.

– A statement by Muhammad Al-Zahrawi to the London-based Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed newspaper about the legal expulsion of Benkirane, more detail on the following link: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics

– Parliamentary Justice and Development Party’s dialogue with the Al-Sabah newspaper, Issue 5304, Wednesday, May 10, 2017, p. 09

– Mohamed Al-Zahrawi, “President Trump’s Policy Toward Islamic Movements: Foresight Radios,” Al-Watan Newspaper, Issue: 681

  • Official documents and reports

– 2011 order

Justice and Development Team in the House of Representatives, Five-Year Results, Commitment and Giving: Legislative Mandate (1997-2002), First Edition, Jumada al-Thani 1423 AH / August 2002.

The Doctrinal Paper of the Fifth National Conference of the Justice and Development Party.

The “democratic building” document produced by the last conference of the “Justice and Development Party”

The Carnegie Institute has many papers and research that justify the integration of Islamists into the political process, including the paper “Morocco: From Hierarchical Reform to Democratic Transition” and the paper “Islamic Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World”.

– October 10, 2016, by the Ministry of Royal Palaces, Ceremonies, and Decorations, regarding the appointment of Abdel-Ilah Ibn Kiran, Secretary-General of the Justice and Development Party, as Prime Minister, and assigned him to form it.

Notifications of the General Secretariat of the Justice and Development Party regarding government formation negotiations:

– Communication on Thursday, January 4, 2017

– The second communication was issued on Saturday January 6, 2017, known as “The speech has ended.”

– The Royal Court notification regarding the removal of Benkirane from the premiership.

Web sites

– “Akhbar Al-Youm” newspaper, issue No. 1295, dated 16/15/2014, p. 12

Rashid Muqtadir’s interview with “Akhbar Al-Youm” newspaper, issue 1295 dated 16/15 February 2014.

– The results of the collective elections of 04 September 2015 at the following link:

http://www.elections.ma/elections/communales/resultats.aspx

– Muhammad Jabron “ On the need to abandon the thesis of democratic transition” at the following link:

http://www.alyaoum24.com/682453.html

– Abd al-Ali Hamid al-Din replied under the title “A discussion with Muhammad Jabron” published on Al-Youm 24 website, at the following link: http://www.alyaoum24.com/685213.html

– Muhammad Yateem, “Notes on Jabron’s article: On the need to abandon the democratic transition thesis.” Article published on the party’s website: http://www.pjd.ma

– Videos on YouTube related to some of Benkirane’s responses to opposition questions in Parliament on the following links.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eaYRaqCT_8s

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aLwivcVHU8o

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrM0nNWOXsI

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-NaotkoTIdw

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zqb_0HYpXIg

  • Saeed Al-Hajji, “The political speech of Benkirane between populism and political savvy”, at the following link: http://www.maghress.com/ksar24/693

– A group of videos of Benkirane speaking on the popular dictionary (pheasant) on the following links:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XR3SFltFo7M

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AY_QfsTuDsc

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l3nLc6_LHGQ

– Antics, slips of the tongue, and Qafqat Benkirane during his government in Morocco, at the following link:

– Benkirane’s talk during a meeting with his party’s youth before the legislative elections about the existence of two states, and for more and listening to this speech on the following link for you 2:

http://www.lakome2.com/permalink/15767.html

– Muhammad Al-Zahrawi, “These are the most prominent letters of the speech of the throne” on the Hespress website at the following link:

http://www.hespress.com/orbites/316125.html

– Review the report at the following link:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/morocco/2014-10-23/rabats-undoing

– “Benkirane and the King … Is it the end of friendliness between the palace and the Islamists in Morocco? On the politician’s website, at the following link:

https://www.sasapost.com/the_moroccan_king_and_benkirane

– Muhammad al-Zahrawi’s statement to the Haspres electronic newspaper, in an article entitled “These are three letters surrounding the appointment of al-Othmani as the head of the new government”

At the following link:   http://www.hespress.com/orbites/343180.html

– Refer to the news investigation prepared by journalist Ali Anouzla under the title “Thread” of the internal coup against Benkirane “on the website” For You 2 “at the following link: http://lakome2.com/%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%86 % D8% A7% D8% B3-% D9% 83% D8% A8% D8% B1% D9% 89 /% D8% AA% D8% AD% D9% 82% D9% 8A% D9% 82 / 26176.html

– Muhammad Al-Zahrawi, “Why did he get angry at the Justice and Development Party after the announcement of the government? .. An attempt to understand it on the website https://elkelaa24.com

Foreign references

-Ben salama, “in the name of Islam, investigation into instrumentalized religion”, Pierre Astier Literary Agency, Paris 2009, P: 09

-EmilDurkheim, “elementary forms of religious life”, Alcan, Paris 1912-

 François burgat; “Islamism in the Maghreb, the voice of the south”, karthala editions, Paris 1988.

-Dominique shnapper: ”what is Integration? “Gallimard edition ، 2007

– Jean Barrea: “External political integration“, Global concept and sociological analysis.

-John Waterbury; “The legitimization of power in the Maghreb” Tradition, protest and repression, In Political Development in the Maghreb, CNRS 1979.

-leca et madeleine Grawitz ، Traite de science politique, volume1 ، Press universitaire de France, 1 edition, June 1985

[1] – Not a day will pass without a terrorist act carried out in the name of Islam to take place across the world, especially in the Arab and Islamic countries, which led to the emergence of confusion between Islam and terrorism, without forgetting that the first victims of violence are the Muslims themselves.

about:

== Ben Salama, “in the name of Islam, investigation into instrumentalized religion”, Pierre Astier Literary Agency, Paris 2009, P: 09

[2] – Rashid Muqtadir, “The Political Integration of Islamic Forces in Morocco,” Arab Science House Publishers, Beirut, first edition 2010, p. 14.

[3] – Ibid, p. 14

[4] – Religion as “an institution that separates the sacred and the profane” – according to Emeldorckheim – occupies a central region “not only in the belief system but also in the coherence of the social structure as a whole” where he says in this regard that all known religious beliefs, simple were Or complex, it represents one common property: it assumes a classification of the real or idealistic things of individuals, through two levels or two corresponding types, generally referred to with two distinct terms: profane and sacred.

about:

EmilDurkheim, “elementary forms of religious life”, Alcan, Paris 1912, P 50: –

[5] – “Fitna” is a loose and uncontrolled concept, but it practically involves a political load centered around the idea of ​​providing security and stability to freedom and justice.

[6] – Like every research that belongs to the field of social sciences, where relativity is the rule in analyzing data, drawing conclusions and extrapolating judgments, we believe that it is necessary to exclude the logic of assertion and reliability in dealing with such a problem and check its elements, as we proceed from the existence of more than one difficulty, it is imperative to adopt Patience when analyzing and diagnosing the elements of research and the geographical and historical space represented by the Arab Maghreb.

[7] The designation associated with these trends raises a set of problems related to concepts and terms, as they were addressed in this research, by controlling and specifying those terms scientifically to avoid loose terms (idiomatic inflation), Islamism, fundamentalism, Khomeinism, the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamism In addition to the diversity and the difference of these currents, it contributed to the complexity of this phenomenon and the difficulty of studying it by observers, especially Westerners.

See these terms in detail:

François burgat; “Islamism in the Maghreb, the voice of the south”, karthala editions, Paris 1988, PP: 05.

[8] Especially since the research obtained by obtaining a diploma in deep studies obtained in 2006 was about this phenomenon, entitled “Political Islam and Power in Morocco”, and the Ph.D. obtained in 2015 was on the topic of “The Islamic Movement in the Arab Maghreb: A Study on Problems Participation, extremism and violence. ”In addition to the dialogues and discussions that took place with scholars and those interested in this social phenomenon,

[9] – The concept of “inclusion” is used in the political field to denote the introduction of a political, social or cultural component to a political system and push it to harmony with its values, thesis and policies. It means the integration of individuals, their behavior conforms to the prevailing standards, and also means their active participation in social life. Political and inclusion are of two types: internal political integration and external political inclusion.

Merger also means “action merged in the sense of grouping the parts in a way that enables the formation of each organic”

For a detailed description of the concept of “inclusion”, see:

  • Dominique shnapper: ”what is integration? “Gallimard edition ، 2007 pp: 45
  • Jean Barrea: “External political integration“, Global concept and sociological analysis ، pp: 64.

[10] – To learn more about the origins and development of the Islamic movement in the Arab Maghreb, see: Fayez Sarah, “The Islamic Movement in the Arab Maghreb, Its Origin, Evolution, and Programs”, Center for Strategic Studies, Research and Documentation, Beirut First Edition 1995, p: 18

[11] – For a detailed explanation of the course of the integration of the Islamic Justice and Development Party in the political field, see: Rashid Muqtadir, “The Political Integration of Islamic Forces in Morocco”, The Arab House of Sciences Publishers, Beirut, First Edition 2010, p. 14.

[12] – Muqtedar Rasheed, “Political participation of Moroccan reformist Islamists” as a contribution to studying and evaluating the political course of Islamists in Morocco. The Arab Future, forgetting (April) 4/2005 No. 314, year 27, issued by the Center for Arab Unity Studies.

[13] – The Justice and Development Party believes that the “Commander of the Faithful” is the supervisor of the management of the religious matter in Morocco, considering the constitutional character of the king as a protector of religion and religion, and the party also stresses the importance of the “Emirate of the Faithful” and its historical role in preserving religion, and calls for Working to support and strengthen all the effective institutions in the religious field by keeping the mosques away from the partisan conflict, see in this context, skip it in fear, “The problem of religion and politics in Islamic discourse, the speech of the Justice and Development Party as a model” research to obtain a diploma in higher studies in depth in public law , University of Mohamed V Akdal Rabat, the academic year 2007-2008, p .: 3

[14] – Muhammad Al-Zahrawi, “Reading in Chapters (41) and (42): Between approving religious positions, arbitration for the king, and reproducing the chapter (19) of the Constitution (96)”, Nuzhat’s Magazine, Issue 58, Fall 2013, The New Knowledge of Success. Casablanca, p. 48

[15] – Mohamed El Touzi “Monarchy and Political Islam in Morocco”, the new Najah press. Casablanca, March 2001, p. 243.

[16] – Rashid Muqtadir, “Political Participation by Islamists …”, previous reference, p. 58.

[17] – When the Islamists looked for a partner through which to enter and participate in political work, the positions of the parties were ritual and fluctuating between rejection and acceptance for several reasons, the most important of which are:

Fear of the Islamists sweeping parties from within, and the political scene as well.

– Ideological refusal in advance of the Islamic movement

– Fear of the wrath of the authority, given that embracing this trend constitutes a challenge to authority, which may expose the party to the consequences it does not need.

[18] – Fouad Al-Atrash, “The Basic Intellectuals of the Party Elite in Morocco – The Model of the Justice, Development and Independence Parties”
Research for an advanced postgraduate diploma. Agdal. Rabat 2003-2004. P. 17.

[19] – The Justice and Development Team in the House of Representatives, “The Five-Year Result, Commitment and Giving: Legislative Mandate (1997-2002)”, First Edition, Jumada al-Thani 1423 AH / August 2002. p. 4.

[20] – The Justice and Development Team for the House of Representatives, “Outcome of the Five Years… Previous reference, p. 5.

[21] – John Waterbury believes that there is another form of legitimacy defined in the mass action and that is the popular explosions that express the context of illegitimacy, and thus the masses represent somehow enmity towards the system and symbols of legitimacy. For more see:

John Waterbury; “The legitimization of power in the MaghrebTradition, protest and repression, In Political Development in the Maghreb, CNRS 1979.pp: 420-421

[22] – Legitimacy is defined as “a set of procedures that make compulsive authority a desirable authority, so that others may realize it as a social imperative,” for more see:

Jacques lagroye ”la légitimation” in jean leca and madeleine Grawitz ، Traite de science politique, volume1 ، Press universitaire de France, 1 edition, June 1985, pp: 395-396

[23] – The period between 1992 and 1997 was the stage of testing the movement’s pulse and testing the nature of its intentions, and the extent of its ability to integrate into political action according to the conditions of the system, so it was difficult to allow the movement to enter the electoral battlefield without giving the green light, especially The effects of the Algerian and Tunisian experience were overshadowing Morocco, resulting in a psycho-political space characterized by anticipation, apprehension and mistrust. See: Rashid Muqtedar, “Political Participation with Islamists,” previous reference, p. 57

[24] – Mohamed Touzi, “Monarchy and Political Islam in Morocco,” previous reference, p. 237

[25] – The Carnegie Institute has published many papers and research that justify the inclusion of Islamists in the political process, including the paper “Morocco: From Hierarchical Reform to Democratic Transition” and the paper “Islamic Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World”.

[26] – Ahmed Boujdad, “Ownership and rotation, a comparison of the strategy of modernizing the state and reproducing the political system in Morocco,” An-Najah Press, Casablanca, first edition 2000, p. 154.

[27] – Although the Justice and Development Party defends the Emirate of the Believers, some of its leaders are demanding parliamentary ownership, or at least the establishment of this goal, in the context of observing the fragility of the country’s democratic system, weak political institutions, and the absence of established traditions in the rotation of power, The king, according to Al-Ramid’s thesis, “should keep in his hands the means of preserving sovereignty, the constitution and the rights, foremost of which are the army and security, in addition to giving him all the constitutional tools to practice that.” For more details, see: Abdelali Hami El-Din, “The Moroccan Constitution and the Bet of Power Balances”, The Monarchy, Parties, Islamists, Point of View Books, First Edition, Year 2005. pp. 192-193.

[28] – Bounaaj Merbeh, “The Political Behavior of Islamic Movements in Morocco, The Model of the Unification and Reform Movement,” Message for a Postgraduate Diploma in-depth studies, Muhammad V University Agdal – Rabat, Academic Year 2007-2008, p .: 160

[29] – Ibid.

  • – Mohamed Al-Zahrawi, “Political Islam and Power in Morocco,” previous reference, p .: 89 [30].

[31] – Ibid, p. 130

[32] – Collective author, “Morocco in the year 2011”, supervised by Omar Harchan, curated by Shakria Al-Maaref Al-Jadida Press, Rabat, first edition 2012, p. 04.

[33] – There are some references that dealt with the Islamic rise in some Arab countries during the popular movement that the Arab region knew in late 2011, among them: – Ibrahim Al-Madhoun, Tawfiq Shoman, George Qurm, and others, “Concerned revolutions, socio-strategic approaches to the Arab movement” Prepared and presented by: Mahmoud Haider, Civilization Center for the Development of Islamic Thought, Beirut, first edition 2012.

Bilal al-Talidi, “Islamists and the Arab Spring, Ascension, Challenges, Governance” (Tunis, Egypt, Morocco, Yemen), Namaa Center for Research and Studies, Beirut, first edition 2012.

John Arradradley, “After the Arab Spring, How Hijacked Islamists and the Middle East Revolutions”, translation: Shaimaa Abd Al-Hakima, Arabic, for translation and publishing, first edition 2013.

[34] – The first decision that Benkirane made against “February 20” was that he forced the “Justice and Development” youth to back down from the decision to participate in the marches on February 20, 2011, which she had taken. On the eve of the date for the first exit of the youth movement, a statement issued by the former youth general writer, Mustafa Baba, said that he “reached a series of the Secretary-General on Thursday, February 17th, in which the youth are required to retract the position issued by the National Office in which it had previously announced participation in the February 20 2011 protests. And commitment to the General Secretariat’s decision confirming that the party is not interested in participating in these protests, and based on that correspondence, Mustafa Baba announced a “comment” of youth participation on this protest day, see: “Akhbar Al-Youm” newspaper issue 1295, 16/16/2014. , P. 12

[35] – With regard to the reform and unification movement, which is considered the advocacy wing of the Justice and Development Party, the leadership positions for this movement differed immediately after the announcement of the February 20 movement, between those calling for an exit to protest and those who opposed it, and the official position was not issued until after February 20, where A statement of the movement praised the “level of awareness and responsibility of the protesters” and called for “accelerating real, bold and qualitative political, constitutional, economic and social reforms … within the framework of the constants.”

As for the Salafi movement, a demand was noted. The release of the 16 May detainees in the February 20 movement rallies. Public opinion recorded the rebellion carried out by some of those affiliated with this movement in various prisons, especially Salé Prison. In contrast to these developments, some of the Salafi sheikhs had important roles in the process of voting yes to the 2011 constitution and participating in the legislative elections, where Al-Fezazi affirmed in a letter distributed to the media and published in his personal website entitled “My opinion on the draft constitution”: “I say frankly that an attempt Abolishing the position of the Emirate of the Believers is an attempt to overthrow Islam itself. “He also called for adopting the option of participating in elections rather than boycotting.” See “Morocco in 2011, previous reference, pp. 16-17-18.

[36] – Muhammad Al-Zahrawi, “The Islamic Movement in the Arab Maghreb, a study on the problems: participation, extremism, violence,” research for a doctorate, the academic year, 2014-2015, p. 177.

[37] – Ibid, p. 18.

[38] – The political support of the Justice and Development Party to the Royal Institution was evident, by refusing to engage in the protest movement developed by the February 20 Movement despite opposition from a group of political parties to this trend, a strategy in which the party sought as an organized opposition force to choose the system between The street, which is repeatedly waving at the level of the discourse by resorting to it, with the challenges and surprises that could be expected that cannot be expected, and between giving way to an electoral political game that the party holds its real position within the political field, which enabled it to reach the first position with 107 seats, and its formation of the government In its first and second versions. Refer to: Rashid Muqtadar’s interview with “Akhbar Al-Youm” newspaper, No. 1295 dated 16/15 February 2014, p. 12.

[39] – “Morocco in the year 2011 ″”, previous reference, p. 18

[40] – To see the results of the collective elections of 04 September 2015 in detail, please see the following link:

http://www.elections.ma/elections/communales/resultats.aspx

[41] – For more details about the communicative style of Benkirane, see: – Zakaria Sahnoun, “The Political Discourse of Abdel-Ilah Bin Kiran… A Reading of the Intellectual and Methodological Basis”.

[42] – Some of Benkirane’s responses to opposition questions in Parliament on the following links.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eaYRaqCT_8s

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aLwivcVHU8o

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrM0nNWOXsI

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-NaotkoTIdw

[43] – Saeed Al-Hajji, “The political speech of Benkirane between populism and political savvy”, at the following link: http://www.maghress.com/ksar24/693

[44] – Refer to a group of videos of Benkirane speaking on the popular dictionary (pheasant) on the following links:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XR3SFltFo7M

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AY_QfsTuDsc

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l3nLc6_LHGQ

[45] – Said Al-Hajji, “The Political Discourse of Benkirane,” op.

[46] – Ibid

[47] – Watch all the jokes and slips of the tongue and pops of Benkirane during his government term in Morocco, at the following link:

[48] – This hadith came during a meeting with Benkirane with his party’s youth before the legislative elections, and for more and listening to this speech on the following link for you 2:

http://www.lakome2.com/permalink/15767.html

[49] – Muhammad al-Zahrawi, “These are the most prominent letters of the speech of the throne” on the Haspres website, at the following link:

http://www.hespress.com/orbites/316125.html

[50] – Review the report at the following link:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/morocco/2014-10-23/rabats-undoing

[51] – “Benkirane and the King … Is it the end of friendliness between the palace and the Islamists in Morocco? On the politician’s website, at the following link:

https://www.sasapost.com/the_moroccan_king_and_benkirane/

[52] – Notification of the Ministry of Royal Palaces, Ceremonies and Decorations. “The Ministry of Royal Palaces, Ceremonies and Decorations announces that His Majesty King Mohammed VI, may God bless him and support him, received the disappearance of his day, Monday Muharram 8, 1438 AH corresponding to October 10, 2016, in the royal royal palace in Casablanca, Mr. Abdel-Elah Ibn Kiran, Secretary-General of the Justice and Development Party, and appointed by His Majesty under the Constitution as Prime Minister and instructed by His Majesty to form the new government.

[53] – In this context, the term “blockage” has emerged, which is a French word circulating in the Moroccan popular dictionary meaning “obstruction” as it was used by Benkirane to suggest that the failure to form a government is intended and knitted by other parties.

[54] – Benkirane was insisting that the Istiqlal party be brought into the government before it ceded it due to the crisis with Mauritania as a result of its leader’s February statements. Benkirane’s insistence, despite previous disputes with February, was mainly related to what was argued that the Independence Party and its leader Hamid February revealed a “coup” plot, which he refused to engage in when he was called to an urgent meeting on October 8, 2016 (the day the election results were announced) between Partisan leaderships to form an “artificial majority”, outside the polls ’output, to block the Islamists’ return to government leadership.

[55] – Benkirane and the General Secretariat for Communications Technology resorted to the extent that it contributed to establishing new norms in dealing and communication that were not in effect informing the public opinion of all developments in the formation of the government, this behavior negatively affected and contributed to the stumbling of the course of negotiations, so that these communications exceed their news nature. It carries with it some decisions and messages in an escalating language that made the other parties reciprocate, which brought the negotiations to the impasse, but sometimes led to the suspension of the negotiation process that lasted for more than two months. The following communications are rare in this context:

– A notification on Thursday, January 4, signed as the Secretary-General of the Justice and Development Party and as the head in charge of forming the government, this communication in which Benkirane announced the formation of his government from the parties of the previous majority: Justice and Development – the National Rally of the Liberals – the Popular Movement – progress and socialism, before waiting for Aknoush and the element to respond to His presentation, prompting Akhnoush to issue a communiqué on expanding consultations with the Constitutional Union and Socialist Union parties.

– The issuance of the second communication on Saturday January 6, known as “The Speech Has Ended,” in which he responded to the decision of Aknouch so that this communication was in strict language, and in a tone that is not without challenge and suggests that forming a government is impossible according to the existing conditions.

[56] – See the text of the royal court’s communication regarding the removal of Benkirane from the premiership.

[57] – A statement I made to the London-based Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed newspaper about the legal expulsion of Benkirane, more detail on the following link: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics

[58] – The party leaders avoided offering the option of resorting to the opposition and find its justifications in trying to avoid entering into a conflict with the king, and in this context the leadership said the safety of the eyes was “I said previously that the post-exemption measure was marked by confusion, the opposition’s choice did not go to the council Al-Watani because the message was clear, it cannot be understood from the political behavior of the party that it chooses at any moment in its history to enter into a confrontation with the king on the grounds that the partnership with the royal establishment imposes the completion of democratic building workshops. The title of the party’s political thesis was extracted from its dialogue with a newspaper Morning, Issue 5304, Wednesday 10 May 2017, p. 09.

[59] – A statement I made to the Haspres electronic newspaper in an article titled “These are three letters surrounding the appointment of al-Othmani as the head of the new government.”

At the following link: http://www.hespress.com/orbites/343180.html

[60] – Muhammad Al-Zahrawi, in an interview with Al-Masaa newspaper, No. 3288, dated 13 and 14_2017, p. 12

[61] – Lifting was appointed Minister of the Interior after his long struggle with the Salami of this party while he was governor of the administrative capital.

[62] – In this regard, the leader Abd al-Ali Hamid al-Din, the deputy chairman of the National Council and a member of the party’s general secretariat, rose up when he revealed that “Saad al-Din al-Othmani does not involve the general secretariat or the general secretary in managing what is related to the government,” registered on his Facebook page. “The government is not the result of political alliances between free political parties.”

[63] – This stage witnessed great momentum on the level of social networking sites, especially Facebook and Twitter, given the many blogs of this party’s Islamists, which are full of mutual accusations and expressing anger and discontent towards the recent events in which the party occurred. Where the matter has reached the point where the sons of Benkirane, the party’s general security, have resorted to these sites to criticize what is going on and to announce in a direct way that this organization deviated from its path and employed a group of nets and sharp descriptions.

[64] – Abd Al-Ali Hamiz al-Din, a prominent leadership member of the Islamic Party, answers a question about the post-Bin Kiran expulsion stage, saying, “The project of political transformation in Morocco has taken a big blow and the next stage will be more difficult.” In an article published by the Moroccan newspaper “Al-Youm 24”, Hamid al-Din explains his opinion about the future role of the party by saying: “Certainly, the Justice and Development Party cannot allow the successive concessions to continue, and to forget the goal that came for it, which is reform.”

[65] [65] – The General Secretariat after it met once a week, but since the formation of the government and the emergence of this crisis and the travel of Benkirane to perform Umrah, it is in a precedent of its kind that has not taken place for more than three weeks, which reflects the degree of congestion and tension.

[66] – Refer to the news investigation prepared by journalist Ali Anouzla, under the title “Threads” of the internal coup against Benkirane, on the website “Lokm2” at the following link: http://lakome2.com/%D8%A3%D8%AC% D9% 86% D8% A7% D8% B3-% D9% 83% D8% A8% D8% B1% D9% 89 /% D8% AA% D8% AD% D9% 82% D9% 8A% D9% 82 / 26176.html

[67] -Muhammad Al-Zahrawi, “Why did he get angry at the AKP after announcing the government? .. An attempt to understand it on the website https://elkelaa24.com

[68] – Partial elections were held on May 04, 2017 in the city of El Jadida, and among its results, the failure of the Justice and Development Party candidate failed to win a seat, and this was considered by some to be the result of the internal situation in which the party is living, as its rival, the Constitutional Union candidate, got 27 thousand votes, Most of them are in the villages, while the Al-Bujaidi candidate, Abdul Majeed Abu Shabaka, received 7,000 votes, losing 17,000 votes, compared to the October 7 elections in which he received 24,000 votes.

[69] – During the recent legislative elections, the tension between the authority and the Islamists reached unprecedented levels, both through the “unknown march” that was organized against this party before the elections in Casablanca, and the announcement by the Islamic Minister of Justice through a blog post on social media that he did not participate In observing the elections, but it came to the night of the announcement of the results, he refused to come to the Ministry of Interior and preferred to be present at the party’s headquarters.

[70] – Muhammad Al-Zahrawi, “President Arab President’s Policy Toward Islamic Movements: Prospective Radios,” Al-Watan Newspaper, Issue: 681, p. 9.

[71] – During the fifth conference, the party adopted the slogan “progressive reform,” whereby the party adopted this approach as an introduction to political reform and the rest of the reforms, especially since party leaders believed to you that effective reform is subject to a long-standing rule of accumulation. Refer to the doctrinal paper of the Fifth National Conference of the Justice and Development Party. Pp. 18-19.

[72] – Bilal Talidi, one of the contributors to the “Democratic Construction” thesis and member of the National Council for a party in his statement to you 2 site, said that “Justice and Development” stated that “When Abdelilah Benkirane states that his stage is over, the bets on the democratic building thesis are being raised. She has many questions, because there is a new policy that indicates that institutions no longer make the political map, and that elections no longer make the electoral map. ”

Al-Talidi added, “The Justice and Development Party entered a new stage that requires new answers about the current situation, and a political answer, provided that it is collective through which the party can answer the current circumstance and exceed its conditions and provide real answers to what is required to continue the course of reform in a way that enhances internal cohesion.” . See the declaration on your website 2 at the following link: http://www.lakome2.com/permalink/25123.html

[73] – This researcher also called on the Justice and Development Party to “reconsider the argument of the democratic transition, which has framed the political struggle of the Moroccan national movement, since independence until today, and to desist from a discourse of control in order to contribute to ensuring stability through an authentic and exceptional political system He also added that “the sweeping attack launched by a number of national parties on control, especially the Justice and Development Party, confirms that Morocco is gradually approaching the moment when the Democratic Arch is closed.” See the article on Al-Youm 24 website at the following link: http://www.alyaoum24.com/682453.html

This opinion has sparked a set of reactions that came in the form of articles for some leaders of the Justice and Development Party, the most prominent of which are:

– Abd al-Ali Hamid al-Din replied under the title “A discussion with Muhammad Jabron” published on Al-Youm 24 website, at the following link: http://www.alyaoum24.com/685213.html

– Muhammad Yateem, “Notes on Jabron’s article: The need to abandon the democratic transition thesis.” Article published on the party’s website: http://www.pjd.ma

SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a bachelor's degree in political science and international relations as well as a Master's degree in international security studies, alongside a passion for web development. During my studies, I gained a strong understanding of key political concepts, theories in international relations, security and strategic studies, as well as the tools and research methods used in these fields.

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