The Russo-Ukrainian War and the future of the international system
The study aims to research the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war 2022, politically, economically and strategically, in light of the multiplicity of parties involved in the conflict and the complexity of the international scene. It attempts to determine the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the structure of the international system, especially in terms of patterns of international interactions after the war, and the balances of the existing international system and its future paths.
The origins of the contemporary Ukrainian issue go back to 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Ukraine gaining its independence in the same year. In 1994, the “Budapest Memorandum” was signed in which the Russian Federation pledged to respect Ukraine’s borders in exchange for Kyiv giving up its nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union in favor of Russia. But geopolitical calculus soon imposed itself on Eastern Europe, with NATO expanding eastward. The Czech Republics, Hungary and Poland joined the alliance in 1999, and between 2004 and 2009, 9 countries from Eastern Europe joined, some of them from the former Soviet republics (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia), and then joined them. After that, Montenegro and North Macedonia. The total number of countries that joined the alliance between 1999 and 2020, about 14 countries, making up about half of the member states of the alliance that was founded in 1949.
Only Belarus and Ukraine are left of the buffer states between Russia and NATO. Russia considers that the accession of these two countries to NATO means besieging them within its borders, and its concerns escalated with the outcomes of the NATO summit held in the Romanian capital, Bucharest, in 2008, when the alliance welcomed the aspiration of Ukraine and Georgia to obtain His membership, which was, from the Russian point of view, a declaration of a protracted war between Russia and the West. Russia began a series of military confrontations to prevent these two republics from joining the alliance, the beginning of which was the Russian-Georgian war, in 2008, and Russia’s annexation of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, then the Russian-Ukrainian war, in 2014, then Russia’s announcement of the annexation of the Ukrainian Crimea.
In response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the rates of military and security cooperation between the United States and Ukraine accelerated, and some estimates indicate that Ukraine received, from 2014 to 2021, about $ 5.6 billion from the United States, including weapons and training equipment for the military, support for combating cyber threats, In addition to intelligence support to counter Russian threats through the “Ukrainian Security Assistance Initiative” (1) . NATO also approved a comprehensive package of assistance to strengthen the defense and security strategy in Ukraine (2) .
Opinion polls during the years 2015-2021, conducted inside Ukraine, showed the growing trends in favor of joining the European Union and NATO. On December 17, 2021, a poll revealed that 58% of Ukrainians supported joining the European Union, and 54% supported joining the European Union. to NATO, while only 21% supported joining the Eurasian Customs Union led by Russia (3) .
On February 20, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized the independence of two republics that seceded from Ukraine, “Lugansk” and “Donetsk”. On the twenty-fourth of the same month, the Russian armed forces launched a comprehensive military invasion of the Ukrainian lands, claiming that this came at the invitation of these two separatist republics of the Russian regime to defend them, in the face of what the Russian regime called: “the war of extermination waged by the neo-Nazis in Ukraine” against Minorities of Russian descent in the two republics.
In contrast to Russian policies, international and regional reactions – political, economic, media and even military – to the so-called “Russian invasion of Ukraine”, or “Russian aggression against Ukraine”, especially with the extent of the destruction that the Ukrainian lands witnessed in a short period of time after the start of the war. directly. With the intertwining of the parties and the complexity of the international scene in the face of the repercussions of the crisis, it seems important to research the extent of the impact of the Ukrainian crisis, 2022, on the structure of the international system.
1. Methodological and theoretical considerations
A- The problem of the study
In the context of the interference of international forces in the Ukrainian crisis, the study seeks to answer the following problematic question: To what extent can the Ukrainian crisis affect the structure of the international system, especially in terms of patterns of international interactions after the war, the balances of the existing international system and its future paths, and the possibilities of restructuring The circles and areas of influence of international units, and the formulation of regional and international security arrangements, especially in Europe and the Middle East?
B- Study Methodology
The researcher relied on the approach of the “international system” in international relations, which is one of the sub-approaches, to the systems analysis approach, and is based on the fact that the system consists of a group of elements that are linked to each other by a certain pattern of relationships, and it is in a state of constant contact with its environment through a mechanism To pump inputs into it, and push outputs from it. This approach allows to identify precisely the political dynamic, and then try to understand the laws that govern or control its movement.
The approach also allows tracing the course of interactions between the existing system and its basic units and its internal and external environment, and identifying the changes that may occur to the elements of this system and that environment due to these interactions. This approach stems from deconstruction, comparison, and realizing the nature of relationships and patterns of variables, and then helps to reconstruct them again in a way that allows for a more logical understanding of how the system under study works.
If we proceed from the premise that international relations constitute a “system”, then this requires that we distinguish between the system and its environment, and this assumes that the environment of the system has been identified and its components have been identified and its components, structure, institutional and interactions, with an explanation of the patterns of relations between these components on the one hand, and between them and environment on the other hand (4) .
C- Theoretical framework of the study
In analyzing the phenomenon under study, the researcher starts from the realist perspective, which has proven intellectual solidity during the past century, especially with the multiplicity of schools of thought and formative, analytical and interpretive theories that have emerged within the framework of this perspective.
After the end of World War I (1914-1918) and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919, the idealistic perspective dominated the study and analysis of international relations. The idealists tended to affirm the status of international values, norms, and institutions as tools to prevent wars and conflicts, and called for the loyalty of human beings to comprehensive collective interests . The principles of American President Thomas Woodrow Wilson were one of the most important pillars on which the theorists of the idealistic perspective relied (6) , and many opinions inspired by the teachings of the heavenly religions and the cultural and moral heritage of general human philosophies emerged within the perspective (7) .
But the ideals’ hopes collapsed with the outbreak of World War II (1939-1945), and the emergence of contradictory theories that began the new foundation of the realist doctrine. The emergence of the book “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace” (8) , by Hans Morgenthau , marked the solid beginning for the establishment of new theories that dominated the study of international relations, and had their impact on the institutions of foreign policy-making in all Western countries ( 9) . The realistic perspective – with its multiple theories (traditional, defensive, offensive, constructivist) as well as its various stages of development – dominated the trends and strategies of international relations in thought and movement.
In the framework of the foundational premises of the realist perspective in international relations, the researcher agrees with what Stephen Walt , one of the most important founders of the neoclassical realism trend, concluded that what is happening in Ukraine supports and confirms the explanatory power of the realist perspective in international relations, based on To a number of basic arguments:
1 Realists agree that in the world there is no body or institution that can protect states from one another; What makes states worried about the possibility of being subjected to a serious attack that might threaten them at some time in the future, and this situation forces states, especially great powers, to worry about their security and competition for power. These fears sometimes lead states to do horrific things. For realists, the Russian invasion of Ukraine (and the US invasion of Iraq, 2003) confirm that great powers sometimes act in “awful and foolish” ways when they think their core security interests are at stake. Moral condemnation alone will not prevent these practices.
2. The war in Ukraine also illustrates another classic realist concept which is the idea of the “security dilemma,” which arises because steps taken by a state to increase and enhance its security often make others less safe. When country A feels that it is insecure and seeks to create alliances or increase its armament, this leads to the annoyance and sensitivity of country B of this step, which it considers a threat to it, which causes it to act in the same way; Which leads to deepening suspicion, and ends up in the lack of security for both countries. From this standpoint, a logical explanation can be provided for the desire of Eastern European countries to join NATO, given their long-term concerns about Russia, and then it is understandable why Russian leaders consider this development a worrying matter .
3. Seeing the events in Ukraine from the perspective of realism does not mean supporting Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Realism does not call for war as the only or desirable option. Rather, it sees resorting to it as a necessary evil by virtue of the objective law of conflict that governs and controls the behavior of countries. This means objectively recognizing what is happening in Ukraine as a recurring behavior in international affairs despite its negative repercussions. If the realists have condemned the tragic nature of world politics, they warn that the dangers that the realistic perspective highlights, including the dangers that arise when they threaten what another country considers a vital interest, cannot be overlooked .
4. Liberalism, as a perspective of international relations, has failed to provide explanations for what is happening in Ukraine; International law and international institutions have proven to be a weak and impotent barrier to the practices and ambitions of great powers. Nor did economic interdependence and a philosophy of interdependence prevent Moscow from launching its invasion of Ukraine, despite the huge costs it would incur as a result. Soft power could not stop the Russian tanks, and the votes of the United Nations General Assembly condemning the invasion (141 to 5, with 35 abstentions) did not have a significant impact on the course of the conflict, and the assertions of realism based on force as a basis for international relations were confirmed.
5. While realists underestimate the role of legal norms and rules as strong constraints on the behavior of great powers, their presence played an important role in explaining the global response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and was a pillar on which states, companies and individuals in most parts of the world relied in adjudication and imposition of sanctions against Russia Considering its behavior a clear violation of international standards, and a threat to international peace and security (10) .
The study comes to test those hypotheses that Stephen Walt concluded, in terms of clarifying the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the future of the contemporary international system.
2. The Russo-Ukrainian War: Dimensions and Repercussions
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the start of a military operation against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and called on its army to lay down arms and take control of the government. There have been many contexts and interpretations of this military operation, as well as the political, economic and strategic repercussions that it entailed, which can be addressed in these themes.
First: contexts and justifications
The Russian-Ukrainian war is related to many contexts and dimensions that had importance in the developments and repercussions of the war, including:
1. Political transformations in Eastern Europe after 1991
The Russian-Western confrontation after the Russian invasion of Ukraine is just one chapter of a protracted confrontation, and the beginnings of this chapter were with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 1991, and most of the republics independent of the Soviet Union or those that belonged to the Eastern bloc during the Cold War turned to the Western camp, whether By joining NATO, or joining the European Union. The year 2004 was a defining moment in the history of the Federation; As ten countries joined it at once, most of them were from the Eastern Bloc countries, and during the period from 1999 to 2020, 14 countries from the Soviet republics and Eastern European countries joined NATO.
On the other hand, with President Vladimir Putin coming to power in 1999, then winning the 2000 and 2004 elections, he sought to impose his complete control over all the capabilities of the Soviet state, political, economic, military and security, and turned to preserve what he called the borders of the “Russian Federation”, even if By force if necessary. During his two terms: the first and the second, “color revolutions” erupted in a number of former Soviet republics (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan), and were followed by elections that produced a new political and intellectual elite closer to Western liberal thought. This is what Putin considered an “American plot” to gain access to Russian spheres of influence, and he treated it as a serious threat not only to the Russian state from a strategic point of view, but equally to him personally and his regime, which established its legitimacy through its ability to impose order internally and an attempt to restore respect for Russia externally. and re-establishing its role as a major global power.(11) .
These transformations are mostly related to Putin’s military doctrine. Where the Russian President stressed that he will not allow NATO “NATO” to exist on its borders and threaten Moscow directly. Therefore, in the “security document”, he requested the signing of two separate agreements between Moscow, Washington and NATO to establish a system of security guarantees in order to reduce security tensions in Europe, and the alliance to abandon any military activity in Georgia and Ukraine, and not to join the alliance, and to stop the deployment of offensive weapons systems in countries bordering Russia, But Washington refused. The decision to resort to military action, because it represented – according to his military doctrine – the “ideal moment” to put pressure on “NATO” and the European Union to restructure the European security architecture, commensurate with Russia’s position now, which differs from it in 1991.
Therefore, starting in the middle of 2021, Russia began to mobilize its military forces on its western borders in conjunction with a US-European military build-up in Ukraine; Washington has provided Kiev with $2.5 billion in military aid since 2014, including $450 million in 2021. Kyiv has also participated in American maneuvers, allowed the deployment of American missiles on its soil, and received thousands of American soldiers. This prompted Putin to demand several times that the US military buildup in Ukraine should be reduced because there is no justification for it. Kyiv has also announced several times its desire to join NATO; Which Putin described as a “red line” that he will not allow to cross.
At the end of 2021, Russia submitted the “security guarantees” document, which was rejected by Washington, so Russia began to threaten to use the military tool by carrying out military exercises supervised by Putin personally, on February 19, 2022, then Putin announced the official recognition of the republics of “Lugansk” and Donetsk – known as the separatist “Donbas region”, on February 22, 2022. He also announced his intervention to help the separatists in that region, so the “limited” Russian military operation, as described by Putin, was announced on February 24, 2022, as Defense of Donbass” (12) .
2. Major shifts in Russia’s national security strategy
During the period from 2008 to 2021, Putin adopted what he called “the strategy of regaining influence and prestige”, which is based on waging a hybrid comprehensive war on all fronts, and this strategy was based on several levels, in which it emerged:
A- A large-scale offensive cyber war, where Russia formed an Internet army and electronic battalions to broadcast messages and content consistent with Russian trends through social media, and launched secret and intense electronic campaigns against some Western countries. This required work to develop Russian capabilities in the fields of work, eavesdropping technology, censorship, interception, electronic penetration, and other related sectors.
B- Direct or indirect Russian military interventions, as in Georgia 2008, Ukraine 2014, and Syria 2015, whether using Russian military forces or elements from Chechnya, or elements of the Russian “Wagner” company.
c- Strengthening alliances, both through the activation of the Collective Security Treaty; Where Russian forces intervened to quell popular protests against the President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Gomert Tokayev, in January 2022, or conclude strategic understandings with major powers of US opponents, such as China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These alliances are also being strengthened by linking to strong mutual interests with US allies in the Western alliance, such as Germany and France, exchanging military technology and field understandings in Syria with Israel, sharing influence with Turkey in a number of joint dialogue files, and supporting Iran in its regional and nuclear files. And the penetration into new strategic spaces in Africa through Wagner’s forces, and the pursuit of armament diplomacy with Egypt and some Arab Gulf states.
D- The accelerated development of weapons and digital technologies, by working to integrate new technologies to double the force in their old armament systems, and announcing a set of programs for weapons with major nuclear capabilities to ensure their ability to penetrate American missile defense systems, and developing a set of systems that can attack satellites or disable its operations. The development also includes strengthening Russian capabilities in the areas of artificial intelligence technology, disrupting and destroying the adversary’s command and control systems and communication capabilities, and adopting a massive bitcoin mining strategy in Kazakhstan, to limit the dominance of the US dollar in the global economy (13) .
3. US Redeployment Policies
The Biden administration has rethought the plans of the American military deployment in the world, especially in the areas through which Russia and China can be contained, as follows:
A – Redeployment to Europe and the Mediterranean: On March 8, 2021, a group of American ships entered the Mediterranean through the Strait of Gibraltar, belonging to the US Sixth Fleet of Operations. At the end of February 2021, America landed units of the First Division, Infantry, within the Combat Aviation Division, in the port of Alexandrepolis, northern Greece, to participate in the work of the American Air Force directed to support Europe and Africa, and is responsible for the assets associated with American aviation in the region, in implementation of the American decision / The joint European Union regarding the Russian presence in Ukraine, which is called the ” Atlantic Resolve operation “. The landing includes 30 helicopters participating in exercises for Romania in March 2021.
Washington also deployed dozens of military helicopters, and decided to expand four military bases in Greece, and allocated naval bases to American forces as part of defense agreements between the two countries, and used 145 helicopters and hundreds of military vehicles in the “Defender of Europe 2021” maneuvers, in addition to the arrangements associated with what was done Joint exercises with Greece in Western Thrace. In the same context, the United States began to open a path to presence in the Black Sea; Where it conducted joint exercises with Turkey in the Black Sea and Greece in the Aegean Sea, in the context of preparations to secure the Balkan and Black Sea regions (14) , in addition to developing the American vision for the region after the tripartite meeting that included Poland, Romania and Turkey to develop Romania’s combat capabilities through combat helicopters, which previously Landed at Alexandrepolis.
Washington participated with Greece and a number of “NATO” members in the Crete exercises, during January 2021 (15) ; And the “East Thrace” exercises, on February 22, 2021, the “Aegean” exercises, on March 13, 2021, and the “Inicos” exercises, on April 2021 (16) . It also conducted exercises with Turkey in the Black Sea, in February 10, 2021, and in the Eastern Mediterranean, on March 17, 2021 (17) .
B – Redeployment in the Pacific and Indian Oceans: The decision to join the USS Rafael Peralta to the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan and the command ship of the US Seventh Fleet USS Blue Ridge in the Japanese port of Yokosuka, an indication that the United States is paying close attention to the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans; Where the United States faces China in a struggle for influence over the region. Europe is moving to increase its presence in the Pacific region as well by sending the United Kingdom its aircraft carrier, “Queen Elizabeth”.
C – Redeployment in the Arabian Gulf: Joe Biden ordered the withdrawal of some American forces from the Gulf region, and the reorganization of the concentration of American forces in other regions, and the most important pieces that were withdrawn were 3 batteries of Patriot missiles with their crews from the Gulf region, which were redeployed in the Caucasus. . The Pentagon announced that this redeployment aims to contribute to the efforts to contain both Russia and China without the United States having to divert forces from areas more vital to American interests. While it kept the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) air defense systems to ensure the defense of Saudi Arabia against “ballistic missiles.” The US administration also announced its plans to withdraw more than a third of its forces in Iraq, while maintaining forces to provide advice and assistance to the Iraqi security forces (19) .
4. NATO expansion and expansion in Eastern Europe
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and then the announcement of the founding of the European Union in November 1993, the way was paved for the establishment of a new European security system, and after a number of Warsaw Pact countries exited from Soviet hegemony, these countries joined the NATO. In 1999, the countries of the Visegrad Group (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic) joined NATO. In 2004, the countries of the Vilnius Group (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) joined the alliance. In 2009, NATO agreed to the accession of Albania and Croatia, and its membership reached 30 members, with the accession of Montenegro, in 2017, and North Macedonia, in 2020. Three countries were also included: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine under the category of countries aspiring to join the alliance.
With the transformation of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis since 2004, Ukraine’s desire to join NATO was renewed, and in 2008, during the NATO summit hosted by the Romanian capital, Bucharest, the alliance officially welcomed the aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia to join it. But the plans for the two countries’ accession have not been practically implemented, at a time when Russia considers that Ukraine’s accession to NATO is a red line that cannot be crossed (20) .
Second: The consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war
Within the context of the repercussions of the crisis, we can distinguish between several main axes:
1. Russian and Ukrainian losses
Russia suffered various losses as a result of its military intervention in Ukraine, and these losses varied between human (in combat operations, with the long period of war, the inability to resolve and the solidity of the Ukrainian resistance, supported by Western forces, weapons and expertise), and economic (due to the intensity of Western sanctions, which extended Many Russian economic sectors, including the oil and gas sector, freeze assets, collapse of commercial banks and supply chains, and compel many US allies to implement sanctions and stop doing business with Russia), political (with Russia isolated from the international community, as Russia’s connections to the outside world have been damaged) ).Russia has become more isolated than it was even during the Cold War, and trade, cultural and political exchange was cut off, the airspace was closed to Russian aviation in many European countries, and Russian athletes, artists and politicians were prevented from participating in many events, as well as the movement of Russian ships was prohibited from entering ports many countries of the world(21) .
Conversely, as the Russo-Ukrainian war continued, the losses of the Ukrainian economy swelled; Most of the economic activities in the country have stopped, and the basic infrastructure of roads, bridges and ports has been severely damaged. The Russian war was aimed not only at destroying Ukrainian military sites, but also civilian targets, as was the targeting of communications infrastructure in Ukraine. Most of Ukraine’s ports and airports were closed as a result of the damage, and many roads and bridges were either damaged or destroyed.
The closure of the Ukrainian ports overlooking the Black Sea has hampered maritime traffic, and the Ukrainian government has tried to replace the transportation of agricultural goods by rail to European neighboring countries, before banning the export of many agricultural commodities. Although it is currently difficult to definitively account for physical damage in Ukraine, initial estimates indicate that at least $100 billion in infrastructure, buildings, and other physical assets have been destroyed.
Before the Russian war, Ukraine’s cash reserves amounted to $31 billion in 2021, but the war caused widespread destruction of Ukraine’s productive capacity, deteriorated its foreign trade, diminished the government’s ability to collect taxes, further deteriorated financial conditions, and raised inflationary pressures in Ukraine with The rise in energy, food and mineral prices, and the economic contraction by 25-35%, according to the International Monetary Fund, as well as the escalation of the external financing gap to about $5 billion (22) .
2. European economic losses
The European countries faced many damages and challenges due to the repercussions of the war, including during the period under study (February 24, 2022 – April 15, 2022):
Slowing economic growth: Barclays Bank lowered its forecast for the European continent’s GDP growth rate to 3.5% after the crisis, compared to 4.1% before it, and JPMorgan expected a growth rate of 3.2%, only.
The volume of trade exchange: the European Union is Russia’s largest trading partner, and Moscow is the fifth largest trading partner of the European Union, and Western sanctions imposed on Russia will severely affect trade relations between Moscow and the European Union, especially with the decision of the seven major industrialized countries to abolish the “first country” status sponsored” granted to Russia under WTO rules.
The threat of European investments and assets in Russia and their exposure to the risk of confiscation or nationalization due to the war and Western sanctions, as the balance of European Union countries’ investments in the Russian market amounted to about 311.4 billion euros (equivalent to 340 billion dollars) until 2020. Russian investments in the European Union countries amounted to about 136 billion euros in 2020. Also, there are about 60 billion dollars owed to EU banks on Russian entities that can be frozen, and holders of Ukrainian sovereign bonds from Europe (about 23 billion dollars) may also be exposed to the risk of default.
The threat to European energy security: Russia is the largest supplier of energy to the European Union, as about 40% of the Union’s imports of natural gas, and about 33% of its imports of oil, come from Russia.
Threat to food security: Russia is the world’s largest wheat exporter, and together, Russia and Ukraine provide more than a third of global grain exports. In light of the developments of the crisis, the prices of basic materials, including agricultural commodities, especially wheat and corn, increased by rates that varied between 40% and 60%. Projections indicate that global supplies of major agricultural products (wheat, barley, maize, sunflower oil) will decrease by between 10% and 50%.
Ukrainian refugee crisis: About 4 million people have left Ukraine since the start of the war in Ukraine, according to United Nations estimates. These figures are likely to increase the longer the war continues, and it is estimated that relief efforts for Ukrainian refugees require about 30 billion euros ($32.7 billion) during the first year alone.
– The aviation and tourism sector was affected with the ban on flights between Russia and European countries. Russia is also the third largest source of tourism in Europe, as well as many manufacturing, banking and financial services sectors were affected (23) .
3. Implications of the war on European defense policies
After the outbreak of the Ukraine 2022 crisis, the Dutch reconsidered the plan to get rid of heavy tanks, and the Germans announced raising their military budget to 100 billion euros, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated before the German Parliament: “We have entered a new stage after the invasion of Ukraine.” He summed up the new challenge: “Should we allow Putin to turn back the clock or must we muster enough force to set the limits for warlords like Putin?” (24) .
On the ground, Germany abandoned the approach of “patience in enhancing its military capabilities” in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and despite the ban imposed by Germany on the export of lethal weapons to conflict areas, the German government announced, on February 27, 2022, that it was in the process of delivering Ukraine 1,000 missiles Anti-tank missiles and 500 “Stinger” missiles from the German army’s inventory. And headed to strengthen its forces deployed to the east within the framework of NATO, especially in Slovakia. This strategic shift is not only about Germany’s view of itself, but also about Europeans’ view of German power. In 2011, Radoslaw Sikorski, Poland’s former Minister of Defense and Foreign Affairs, said: “I fear Germany’s strength much less than I fear Germany will remain idle. But Putin’s invasion of Ukraine represents the historical moment in which Europe became comfortable with German military power (25) .
The European security dilemma lies in the fact that the reverse repercussions resulting from the imposition of sanctions on Russia are large, compared to their repercussions on Washington, due to the geographical, demographic, economic and security links. Hence, if the Ukrainian crisis may achieve for Washington many strategic goals, such as worsening relations between Moscow and the European Union countries, re-evaluating Russian-European relations, and putting an end to the ambitions of Russian President Vladimir Putin in external expansion and domination of Europe through the strategy of gas diplomacy. This crisis could constitute a watershed for European security and lead to a fundamental change in European security strategies. The longer the crisis continues and the flow of Ukrainian refugees to the European Union continues, the more resources and capabilities of the European Union will continue to be drained, especially since Europe is not prepared for the repercussions of the continuation of the war in the fields of energy and economy, as well as refugees (26)..
4. The Russo-Ukrainian War and the Middle East Predicament
The Russian-Ukrainian war represents in one of its dimensions an expression of competition between two empires, the first disintegrated (the Soviet Union) and its heir (the Russian Federation) fears the continuation of the disintegration, and the second is retreating (the United States) (27) , and both of them seek to employ geostrategic regions in their favor: Russia, To prevent the continuation of the disintegration at home, and in the United States, to prevent an acceleration of decline and to strengthen the presence in Europe.
But on the other hand, a feeling is growing among the political systems in the Middle East region of the decline of American policy, as was evident in the strategic plan of the Joe Biden administration, 2021 (28) , and the continuation of the Ukrainian crisis will deepen this decline, which will affect the relations of units within the region, as well as on The degree of response of some of these units to the American demands regarding the Ukrainian crisis (29) .
And if this is about the challenge facing the United States in the region, then Russian policy faces a challenge of a different kind, which is the extent to which it is able to reconcile the contradictions of the regional parties in the Middle East, including “the contradiction between Russian interests and Iranian and Israeli interests,” and “contradictions Gulf-Iranian, “Israeli security requirements, Syrian security requirements,” and “Russian commitments toward Palestine and Israel.”
This is in addition to the contradiction in the map of Russian-Arab relations. In terms of these relations, the Arab countries are divided into two groups: the first is those countries that are the most importers of Russian civil goods (which are in order: Egypt, Morocco, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Jordan, and Qatar), The second is the most importing of Russian military goods (Syria tops the list of countries importing Russian weapons with 95% of its weapons, followed by Algeria with 81%, Iraq at 44%, Egypt with 41%, and the United Arab Emirates with 3%). The volume of Russian arms sales to Arab countries between 2017-2021 is about 21% of its total sales (30) , and if the economic sanctions on Russia will include more civilian goods than military goods, then Russia’s need for Arab countries importing civilian goods will be greater than its need for importing countries for military goods, which may affect some of its future trends in the region(31) .
3. The future paths of the international system after the Russo-Ukrainian war
Within the framework of these paths, a distinction can be made between a set of basic levels, based on the four pillars on which the international system is based (international units, international structure, international institutionalization, international operations):
First: the Russian-Ukrainian war and the future of international units
The Russian-Ukrainian war came to put Russia’s future in front of many possibilities, despite the extensive losses it incurred due to President Putin’s decision to intervene in Ukraine, the possibility of the fall of the Russian regime, although it exists, may be difficult in the short term to rule out the overthrow of Putin in a coup in The palace, and the difficulties of removing the current elite through mass protests, in light of the repressive policies that Putin adopted internally and externally in support of his allies in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Syria (32) .
On the other hand, about Russia, the state and not the system, John Mearsheimer sees) that Russia is a great power, and although it is now aligned with China, it is likely to shift sides with time and ally with the United States, because China’s growing power, is considered the greatest threat to Russia due to their geographical proximity. And if Moscow and Washington forge close relations out of their mutual fear of China, Russia will be easily integrated into the limited US-led system. If, on the other hand, Moscow continues to maintain friendly relations with China because it fears the United States more than it fears China, Russia will be easily integrated into the limited Chinese-led system. However, another possibility remains that Russia will not align itself with one of the parties and remain on the sidelines, and is working to take advantage of their rivalry together to gain points that enhance their competitive and negotiating capabilities with them together, in an effort to complete its polar structure (33) .
Here, it will be important to consider a world order scenario in which Russia effectively controls much of Eastern Europe, and China controls much of East Asia and the Western Pacific. The Americans and their allies in Europe and Asia will have to decide, once again, whether this world is acceptable, because this means the end of the current world order and “the beginning of an era of global chaos and conflict, as every region of the world adjusts precariously to the new configuration of power.” (34) .
With regard to future paths for the Russian role, the issue of Russia’s position in the Security Council arises, after the West threatened to strip it of its permanent membership in the Security Council. And if Russia’s expulsion or freezing of its membership in the Security Council or its right to vote face real difficulties, there are alternative paths that do not necessarily mean freezing its membership, including the possibility of asking Russia to abstain from voting on a Security Council resolution, because it is related to its aggression (35) .
Ukraine indicated that the constituent republics of the USSR declared in 1991 that the Soviet Union no longer existed, and that any of these entities, including Russia, should have had the legal right to the seat, not just Russia. No resolution was presented to the General Assembly to allow Russia to be a member of the Security Council. The Charter of the United Nations was never amended after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The memorandum still refers to the Soviet Union, not Russia, as one of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (36) .
As for Ukraine, as the most important international unit associated with this crisis, one of the future paths presented to it is partition, and this path is based on the continuation of the military operation and the escalation of attacks, negotiating the division of Ukraine or changing the system of government to a “federal rule”, and carving out strategic cities for its annexation of Donbass , such as the cities of Mariupol in the far south on the Sea of Azov, and the city of Odessa on the Black Sea, because they are – according to the Russian conviction – part of the administrative division of the Donbass region (37) .
As for the future of Europe, Mearsheimer sees it as likely that most countries in Europe, especially the major powers, will become part of the limited system led by the United States, although it is unlikely that they will play a serious military role in containing China. It does not have the ability to export substantial military power toward East Asia, and China does not pose a direct threat to Europe, and because it makes more sense for Europe to transfer responsibility to the United States and its Asian allies, American policymakers will want the Europeans within their limited system for economic and security reasons. strategy; The United States is keen to prevent European countries from selling dual-use technologies to China and helping to impose economic pressure on them when needed. In return, US military forces in Europe will remain, keeping NATO alive and continuing to act as the peacemaker in the region.(38) .
Second: The Russo-Ukrainian War and the future of the international system
The Ukrainian crisis, 2022, came in the midst of a multi-front conflict across many regions, in which Russia sought to declare a challenge to the West and confront NATO’s strategy in Eastern Europe, and to try to impose this by military force, to enhance its position in light of an American strategic repositioning and American military withdrawals from several regions, In return for the expansion of China, which has become the center of strategic attention for the United States and its Western allies, in view of its relentless pursuit during the last decade towards fortifying its international position, strengthening its alliances, and laying the foundations for a new international order in which it would have a greater contribution to managing the international scene, especially with the central role of China in Russian moves against the West. (39) .
Mearsheimer argued that there are likely to be three different realistic regimes in the foreseeable future: a weak international system and two strong limited systems, one led by China and the other by the United States. The lean international system will be primarily concerned with overseeing arms control agreements and making the global economy function effectively, and will give serious attention to problems related to climate change, and the institutions that make up the international system will focus on facilitating inter-state cooperation.
And there will be two essential features of the new multipolar world that will profoundly shape the emerging regimes:
First featureAssuming that China continues its rise, it will engage in an intense security competition with the United States, which will be the central feature of international politics throughout the twenty-first century, and this competition will lead to the creation of limited regimes dominated by China and the United States. Military alliances will be the central component of these two systems, which are now forming and will resemble the two systems led by the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War era. But China and the United States will at times have reasons to cooperate on certain military matters, an endeavor that will fall within the purview of the international system, as before during the Cold War; The focus will be primarily on arms control agreements, and Russia will engage in this endeavour, as will China and the United States. Existing treaties and agreements dealing with nuclear proliferation are likely to remain in place, given that all three great powers want to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. But the three sides will have to negotiate new treaties that limit their military arsenals, as the two superpowers did during the Cold War.
The second feature : There is a huge amount of economic contact between China and the United States, and between China and the United States’ allies in East Asia, and China and the United States also trade and invest throughout the world. It is not likely that security competition between the two limited regimes will reduce these economic flows. The gains from continued trade are important and required, even if the United States tries to limit its trade with China, the latter can compensate for this through its trade with other partners.
Therefore, Mearsheimer went on to say, it is likely that the future will resemble the situation in Europe before the First World War; There was intense security rivalry between the Triple Alliance (Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy) and the Triple Entente (Great Britain, France, and Russia), but there was an enormous amount of economic interaction between these countries in general.
The end result is that the competition between the two limited regimes led by China and the United States, will entangle both in a full-fledged economic and military competition, as was the case with the two limited regimes that Moscow and Washington dominated during the Cold War. The big difference here is that the international system will be deeply involved in managing the competitive aspects of the global economy, which was not present during the Cold War (40) .
Third: The Russo-Ukrainian War and the Future of International Institutions
The Russian invasion of Ukraine revealed many weaknesses in the existing international order, especially in the United Nations Security Council and its role in overseeing the existing international order; The Ukraine crisis has shown that the veto of the five permanent members of the Security Council is a major obstacle to peace, and from the start has been a major obstacle to the body’s completion of its mission. This is because the five countries are often divided into competing geopolitical blocs, with a member of one bloc wielding vetoes over many critical decisions. In the context of the current conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s veto in the Security Council means that the United States and its allies can impose sanctions only through a “coalition of the willing.” It is true that the large number of countries and the extraterritorial spread of the dollar-based payments system in America gives US sanctions enormous leverage.
On the other hand, if the Security Council is at the heart of the multilateral system today, it faces real challenges, given the increasing scope of threats to peace and security. These threats are not limited to the traditional hostilities of the type the world is witnessing in Ukraine, which could escalate into nuclear exchanges, but also include other security threats posed by new technologies. Therefore, among the proposals to change the modus operandi of the Security Council, the proposal for the possibility of restoring the veto to a permanent member by adding a clause to Article 27 that would allow a large majority, representing two thirds of the member countries, exceeds the veto (41) .
Fourth: The Russo-Ukrainian War and the Future of International Operations
Based on the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war, several future paths for international operations patterns emerge, including:
1- Strengthening unity between the two sides of the Atlantic
The West made use of the Russian military intervention in Ukraine, and benefited from it collectively on several levels. Among them :
A- Reminding the two sides of the Atlantic of their common goals: The Russian operation in Ukraine helped remind the United States and Europe of their common global goals, and to crystallize these goals again in the context of upholding democratic values, which the Russian intervention represented a challenge to, which was an incentive for several manifestations of solidarity between the powers Western and International. These included Germany’s agreement to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP, Japan’s pledge to accept Ukrainian refugees, and Britain’s move to bring the fortunes of expatriates from the Russian oligarchy to serious scrutiny. The United States and the European Union worked hand in hand to impose escalating sanctions on Russia .
B – Stimulating the West to protect the rules of the international system: The intervention was also a reason to motivate the West, and effectively, to defend the rules, values, and institutions of the World War II regime, which Putin defined himself as opposed to; The Russian intervention represented a challenge to the United Nations system whose charter is based on respect for sovereignty, a challenge to Europe, whose borders Putin seeks to redraw, and a threat to the rule of law .
C- The tendency of “NATO” towards strengthening its eastern flank: Russia’s intervention in Ukraine pushed the alliance towards strengthening its eastern flank; Given that Putin’s intervention in an independent, sovereign state was not previously expected; With the future center of the crisis likely to shift from Ukraine to the Baltic states, as well as to Poland and other countries that will form the new frontier of the West against Russia, this will act as an incentive for the United States and its NATO allies to send more troops and military equipment to those countries on the front line. .
D- Solidarity to Document Possible “War Crimes”: The Joe Biden administration launched a new campaign to document possible “war crimes” committed by the Russian forces that entered Ukraine, and succeeded in achieving consensus among 45 of the 57 member states of the “Organization of Security.” and Cooperation in Europe” (OSCE) against Russia and its ally Belarus, when plans were approved on 3 March 2022 to send a team of OSCE experts to document possible war crimes. This large number represents an unprecedented agreement; The number of countries that supported the establishment of this mechanism after the horrific violations of human rights in Belarus, in August 2020, was 17, and that was the largest consensus at the time, so the transition from 17 to 45 shows how isolated Russia and Belarus are on the international stage (42) .
2. Building the European security system
The war in Ukraine shows that a greater responsibility for Europe’s security is not only desirable but also possible. The war was a wake-up call for Europeans who believed that a major war on their continent was made impossible by rules against invasion, international institutions, economic interdependence, and American security guarantees. Russia’s actions serve as a reminder that indomitable power remains crucial, and that Europe’s self-proclaimed role as a “civilian power” is not enough, but European governments responding forcefully to defend their security belies predictions that strategic dissonance within Europe may prevent the continent from responding. effectively to the common threat.
Europe can handle the future Russian threat on its own, and European NATO members have potential power that far outweighs the threat facing their east, and have nearly four times Russia’s population and more than 10 times its GDP. Even before the war, European members of NATO were spending three to four times as much as Russia on defense each year. As Russia’s true capabilities are revealed, confidence in Europe’s ability to defend itself must increase dramatically .The war in Ukraine is therefore an ideal moment to move toward a new division of labor between the United States and its European allies, and a moment in which the United States devotes its attention to Asia while European partners bear the primary responsibility for their own defense. So the United States must abandon its long-standing opposition to European independence, help its partners modernize their forces, and the next NATO commander-in-chief should be a European general, and U.S. leaders must view their role in NATO not as first responders, but as the last line of defense. .
With responsibility for Europe’s security gradually handing over to Europeans, and in the longer term, the United States, NATO, and the European Union will also seek to build a European security system – which may not exclude Russia – to promote stability in Europe and to distance Moscow from its growing dependence on China. This development awaits the presence of a new leadership in Moscow (43) .
3. The priority of the US focus on China
Russia’s war in Ukraine will change geopolitical perceptions much more than it changes geopolitical reality, and while Russia under President Vladimir Putin poses a short-term challenge, China will remain a major threat in the medium and long term. The threat from China is radical, because China is working to narrow the power gap with the United States, and China will try to act as a more responsible country even as it gets closer to Russia, and China may assert that it is not an outlaw, like Russia, while redoubling its efforts in creating a sphere of influence through nonmilitary coercion, as it does in practice.
While the United States should give priority to confronting China, it should also be concerned with the European front in the face of Russia’s attempt to re-establish its sphere of influence through the use of force, and the United States has no choice but to confront it with force. Even Europe, which in recent years has tried to distance itself from the United States, has rediscovered the fact that American power is indispensable.
If the United States does not currently have the operational capabilities of a full, long-term commitment to two major issues vis-à-vis Russia and China, geopolitical realities dictate it, and its allies and partners on the European, Indo-Pacific fronts will have no choice but to commit themselves more actively in managing these issues, especially With China and Russia joint support for redrawing regional maps and rewriting the rules of the international system rather than working to gain influence from within existing institutions.
If Washington now faces Chinese and Russian challenges, it must necessarily empower its allies and renew burden-sharing arrangements in Asia and Europe. The Biden administration’s grand strategy helps do both with its special focus on building the networking of resilient partnerships, institutions, alliances, and groups of countries; Where the United States developed formations (five-four-three-two) in Asia, it began with the strengthening of the intelligence alliance “Five Eyes” ( FVEY ) to the dissemination of the quadripartite security dialogue, the signing of the tripartite security agreement ” AUKUS ” and then the strengthening of bilateral military alliances in order to promote work Networking of the Biden administration in Asia.
And if the Asian and European parties cannot balance facing China and Russia alone in the foreseeable future, they help strengthen domestic political support for the United States for the continued military commitment in the two regions. By promoting a greater role for its allies and increasing their political stance, Washington can build lasting regional balances of power in Asia and Europe, backed by US military power. This may force Beijing and Moscow to adopt a more reasonable approach with their neighbors (44) .
Conclusion
Within the framework of the axes addressed in the study, and in light of the developments, data and contexts of the Ukrainian crisis 2022, a number of basic conclusions can be drawn:
First: With regard to international units, the Ukrainian crisis revealed the limits and nature of the role that the main parties can play in the current system, such as the Russian Federation, which moved events and was the initiator in many of its transformations, both in the pre-war and during the war. On the other hand, the role of the United States of America and its allies has emerged. Where it found in the war a great threat to many of its values, principles and civilized model, and even at a stage of the war, it found a real threat to the presence of many countries and parties in the Western camp, especially the Eastern European countries, whether they joined the European Union or NATO after the disintegration The collapse of the Soviet Union, 1991.
Within the framework of international units in the post-Ukrainian crisis, it can be said that there are strong possibilities for the emergence of new countries, and countries with their borders that existed before the crisis may disappear, and we may witness a trend towards building new alliances, some of which may reach the point of integration, especially between some Eastern European countries (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) that activated Article 4 of the NATO Charter among themselves, in the face of the existential threats they found to their security and stability.
Second: With regard to the international structure, the repercussions of the crisis may lead to a radical change in the structure of the current international system, but from the researcher’s point of view, towards a more hegemonic and unilateral Western system, in light of the great damage that Russia and its allies will suffer in the current confrontation if the war in Ukraine prolongs. . The economic sanctions imposed on Russia can bring it back to what it was in 1999, and the significant rise in oil and gas prices, the most important sources of its national income, in light of the sanctions imposed on it, will not help it from countries, giant companies, and huge financial and economic institutions. The researcher does not believe that China could be involved in providing direct military support to Russia, if the war spreads outside the European theater, because it is more keen to preserve its capabilities and secure its model, at least temporarily, until it contains the direct repercussions of the Ukrainian crisis.
Third: With regard to institutionalization, whether organizational, legal and normative, and in line with the foregoing observation, it can be said that the world after the Ukrainian crisis will move towards more dominance of Western institutions, and this was evident in the crisis; Where most of the political, economic, security, military, health, sports, technical and media institutions – with a large degree of coordination in their orientations, practices and procedures – moved against Russia, its policies and its allies. The vast majority of the bodies, institutions and companies affiliated with the Western system were mobilized in the face of Russian policies, and at the forefront of these institutions were the United Nations system, NATO, the European Union, the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and international financial institutions, and even sent text messages and official letters to most of the political regimes in The world, by defining its positions on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
رابعًا: فيما يتعلق بالعمليات الدولية في مرحلة الأزمة الأوكرانية وما بعدها، فإنها تقوم على الجمع بين أقصى أشكال التعاون داخل المنظومة الغربية (وحدات ومؤسسات)، وأقصى أشكال الصراع بين المنظومة الغربية ومن يدور في فلكها من ناحية، وروسيا الاتحادية ومن يدور في فلكها من ناحية ثانية. وستستمر هذه الثنائية (التعاون+الصراع) عدة سنوات حتى تعود بنية النسق الدولي إلى حالة من الاستقرار المؤقت قبل أن تبدأ موجة صراعية جديدة مع بقايا روسيا الاتحادية أو مع الصين التي تنتظر الفرصة للقفز على قمة النظام الدولي.
Fifth: Emphasizing that the transformations and developments that occur in the structure of the international system are reflected, negatively and positively, on all the sub-regional systems on which this system is based, including the regional system of the Middle East. This is, of course, related to the degree of liquidity and the great overlap between international and regional, and even international and local in many regional crises, as well as the patterns of interactions that link local, regional and international parties, the nature and strength of these alliances, and the frameworks and controls governing them. This means that some regional parties may be subjected to political, economic and security pressures and sanctions if they try or think of bypassing the job roles that have been pre-established for them by the United States, which have been established for decades in reality.
This study was published in the fourteenth issue of Labab magazine, to view the full issue ( click here )
About the author
Essam Abdel Shafi
Issam Abdel-Shafi, a former researcher at the Al Jazeera Center for StudiesREFERENCE
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