Turkish orientation to regional hegemony and international advancement

This study seeks to provide an analytical and evaluative vision of the Turkish role in the region, considering Turkey as a model of the rising, middle power that seeks to obtain a major international position in light of changing international events. Achieving its goals and ambitions in a challenging regional environment. In this context, the study attempted to investigate the mechanisms of the Turkish approach to regional hegemony and the international rise, its tools and strategies, through the development of a structural system called the “Turkish Rise and Return System”, which constituted the cornerstone of the Turkish policy towards the region and explained many of the Turkish moves towards its countries in recent times. The study attempted to answer the main research question:

Author
Dalia Arafat 
Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Cairo
Journal of Politics and Economics, Article 10 , Volume 16, Issue 15, July 2022, Page 288-344

an introduction:

Turkey has always been considered one of the most important regional powers in the Middle East, and its position remained stable for many decades, and its relations with the countries of this region fluctuated between convergence at times and divergence at others, until Turkey entered a new historical turning point with the arrival of the Justice and Development Party to power in 2002 to clearly announce the restoration of Defining its position on the regional and international arenas and adopting a new vision for the state based on transforming it into a centralized state with a new strategic depth that allows it regional hegemony and a successful international rise.

In this context, the talk about the Turkish approach to regional hegemony and the international rise seemed to be one of the earliest explanatory approaches to the Turkish behavior in the region, especially after the events of the Arab Spring, which coincided with shifts in Turkish policies towards some of its countries, which made it important to link the Turkish approach to rise and hegemony and the regional role it seeks. to do.

From this standpoint, this study comes to investigate the mechanisms of the Turkish approach to regional hegemony and international rise, its tools and strategies, by setting up a structural system for this approach, which the study called the “Turkish Rise and Return System”, which formed the cornerstone of the Turkish policy towards the entire region and explained many of the Turkish moves towards its countries recently, with an attempt to evaluate the performance of this system and its success in achieving the Turkish strategic goals.

The study attempted to answer the main research question: What are the most important dimensions of the Turkish system of revival and return, and to what extent was Turkey able to achieve its goals from this system? It also sought to answer some subsidiary questions such as: What is the intellectual basis on which Turkey built its system? The most important tools that you used to put it into practice? Are there motivating factors that helped Turkey implement it? Did this system continue with the same strategies and tools or did it change with the change of events? What are the most important indicators of the failure of this system, and the most prominent challenges it faced?

In order to answer these questions, the study was divided into two axes, one analytical and the other evaluative, as follows:

The first axis: the structural system of the Turkish approach to regional hegemony and international ascent (the system of the Turkish rise and return):

This system includes three main pillars with three levels: the first is related to the intellectual level in terms of visions, perceptions and ideas about the Turkish role, while the second deals with the movement level, in terms of mechanisms, policies and implementation tools, while the third and last deals with the motivational level in terms of the supportive environment and the driving factors, and the following is a presentation Its in detail:

First: the intellectual level: the coherent intellectual structure of the Turkish role in the region:

There is no doubt that the arrival of the Justice and Development Party to power in Turkey in 2002 represented a new stage in Turkish history, as it was able to present a different vision of Turkey’s position not only at the regional level, but also globally (), and Turkey transformed in its thought from a mere bridge, barrier, or hamza It connected East and West to a major central state that enjoys capabilities that allow it to produce independent international policies.It goes without saying that transforming the state’s perceptions in this pivotal way requires a new intellectual structure that establishes effective strategies and active policies, the most important elements of which are:

(1) The rising comprehensive perception of the Turkish role: Turkey as a model for the “Middle Rising Power”:

In 2001, the economist Jim O’Neill coined the concept of “rising countries”, as he saw that there is a group of medium-power countries that are expected to occupy a major position in the global economy within a few years, and although this concept was born in the world of economics, it quickly moved To the political environment, specifically the fields of international relations and geopolitics. With the end of the Cold War, a new generation of forces emerged that worked to prove itself and tried hard to find a foothold in the nascent regime. “Would be Great Powers” ​​(), and others described it as “intermediate states” between the minor powers and the great powers (), regardless of the problems of this concept and its overlap with other similar concepts such as the traditional middle power and others, but it differs from it in timing and how these forces reached the status of middle states; While we find countries like Canada and France, for example For example, it reached the center of the middle powers as a result of the restructuring of the global system in the aftermath of World War II. The rising middle powers are a product of the transformations that accompanied the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar system. In addition, these forces often come from outside the Western periphery, specifically from The countries of the south – unlike the traditional powers that belong to the western world or the countries of the north -, which is reflected in the vision and perceptions of these powers of the world, which are often different from those of the traditional powers belonging to the western world or the countries of the north. As some distinguish between them by the criterion of seeking membership in the institutions of the main powers, especially the UN Security Council; While the traditional middle states include a group of states that have significant capabilities, they accept the status quo and do not seek direct participation in the formation of the international system, unlike the emerging states that are looking for a place in the international system (). As some distinguish between them by the criterion of seeking membership in the institutions of the main powers, especially the UN Security Council; While the traditional middle states include a group of states that have significant capabilities, they accept the status quo and do not seek direct participation in the formation of the international system, unlike the emerging states that are looking for a place in the international system (). As some distinguish between them by the criterion of seeking membership in the institutions of the main powers, especially the UN Security Council; While the traditional middle states include a group of states that have significant capabilities, they accept the status quo and do not seek direct participation in the formation of the international system, unlike the emerging states that are looking for a place in the international system ().

This concept also overlaps with the concept of regional powers, and although most studies distinguished between these two concepts, given that the rising powers often go beyond their regional region and enjoy a trans-regional presence and influence, this did not prevent controversy among researchers about whether the rising power It should first be a regional power; While some saw that the regional space has become an element of great importance in international politics and in the approaches to power transformation, and therefore it is not possible for a state to turn into an actor in the international system without playing a role in its regional region, others saw that this is not a necessary condition, as some emerging powers Today, they are not regional powers like India, for example, as the rising power may not turn into a regional power, especially when it competes over it with the dominant power or other rising powers ().

The majority of specialized studies indicate that there is no common definition of what a “rising or rising power” is, as some saw that it expresses a country that finds itself on a path of transformation from an international position to a higher one. From small to medium power, or from medium to large, or from major to global (), and others focus on the fact that the rising power is usually a medium power that has the ability and desire to continue its path towards the position of the major power… In other words, the rising powers are more than The “intermediate countries” or “regional powers”, they have the latent desire to reshape the international system in the future, and they allude to their desire to do so in different ways (), while Christopher Alden considers that the rising powers are “the countries that have a mixture of economic courage and acumen Diplomacy and military force are harnessed to transform the status of a developing country towards challenging the dominance of traditional Western powers” ​​( ).

The literature on politics and international relations abounds with different perceptions of what the idea of ​​revival could include. The traditional view corresponds to the growth and increase – in a relative or absolute sense – of the state’s capabilities. However, there are other, more developed approaches, such as the historical approach that considers the state in a state of ascendancy if it is stronger than it was in the past, and the clarity approach that views the state as emerging if it appears to be rising. It is more involved and integrated in the world than it was in the past, and there is the influence approach, which indicates that escalation is a necessary characteristic of the power to influence others, and we do not forget in this context the approach of the threat of the dominant power, which considers that a state is in a state of ascendance if it poses an increasing threat to the supremacy of the status of the dominant power in the existing international system; Finally, the approach to future expectations, which means that the state rises if other countries believe that it is playing, or will play in the future, a broader role in the world than it did in the past ().

As for the characteristics of these forces, they can be summarized in: (1) the increasing economic weight and the quest for integration into the global economy ( ), which must be the result of a successful development experience and that these emerging forces prove their worth in entering the midst of development and dealing with its challenges, whether they follow the model of liberalism economy, or created its own development model. (2) Elicit recognition of status by other states, especially the dominant power and other major powers in the existing system, as well as recognition of it as a regional leader with weight in the regional system (). (3) The use of soft powers in order to obtain recognition as a rising power, and the pillar of each country differs. from a source at the same time ( ). (4) Relative political and institutional stability, which means the existence of a sufficient degree of internal stability within the state that helps it to shape and enhance its external role. (5) Seeking membership in major international institutions, or what is called the main power institutions, foremost of which is the UN Security Council, or the Nuclear Forces Club (). (6) Opposing “American” unilateral hegemony and not emanating from the traditional pattern of the international system based on the West, because this hegemony prevents it from emerging or emerging as a potential force. These rising powers usually do not fully integrate into the post-World War II system and do not traditionally belong to the West or the North countries, but at the same time they possess several strategies – offensive, containment, and cooperative – that enable them to continue their rise and deal optimally with the dominant power (). (5) Seeking membership in major international institutions, or what is called the main power institutions, foremost of which is the UN Security Council, or the Nuclear Forces Club (). (6) Opposing “American” unilateral hegemony and not emanating from the traditional pattern of the international system based on the West, because this hegemony prevents it from emerging or emerging as a potential force. These rising powers usually do not fully integrate into the post-World War II system and do not traditionally belong to the West or the North countries, but at the same time they possess several strategies – offensive, containment, and cooperative – that enable them to continue their rise and deal optimally with the dominant power (). (5) Seeking membership in major international institutions, or what is called the main power institutions, foremost of which is the UN Security Council, or the Nuclear Forces Club (). (6) Opposing “American” unilateral hegemony and not emanating from the traditional pattern of the international system based on the West, because this hegemony prevents it from emerging or emerging as a potential force. These rising powers usually do not fully integrate into the post-World War II system and do not traditionally belong to the West or the North countries, but at the same time they possess several strategies – offensive, containment, and cooperative – that enable them to continue their rise and deal optimally with the dominant power ().

In the same context, Jana Jabbour, in her book on the diplomacy of the rising powers, identified the most important features that distinguish these powers, the first of which is the pursuit of status and recognition as a power on a regional scale, finding a role for it at the global level, and the continuous demand for equal relations with the great powers, as well as benefiting from The dispersion of power, authority, and the state of ambiguity that prevails in the international system in the wake of major events and changes, and the focus on diplomatic activities to achieve its aspirations, not to mention the export of a positive self-image that is often greater than it is capable of in reality ().

The theoretical talk about the concept of a rising power, or what is known to some as a rising power, prompts us to try to explain Turkish behavior through it, as Turkey has set a main goal in mind, which is to transform from a “traditional regional middle power” to a “rising trans-regional middle power”, and to achieve this goal Turkey has developed ambitious perceptions of its role at the regional and international levels, and it seemed as a country that desperately desires empowerment and self-affirmation on the international arena, and has already begun to take measures to achieve what it wanted. On the economic level, it was able to rank seventeenth in the ranking of global economies, and on the geopolitical level, Turkey began to prove itself more and more as a rising force that challenges the status quo in the international system and aspires to lead active, proactive diplomacy. The process of Turkish renaissance has gone through three stages:

(2) Heading east, “Resetting the compass to the East”: Turkey as a model for “Returning Power”:

The term “returning power” is usually applied to countries that previously represented major or major powers in the international system, i.e. experienced the experience of ascent until it reached its peak and then began to descend as a result of a change in the balance of internal or external power to lose its position and global influence, to begin the return journey to restore This place again. This model applies relatively to Turkey, which considered itself the successor to the Ottoman Empire, which enjoyed power and influence for decades, but quickly collapsed, leaving behind quite a few countries, led by Turkey, which presents itself as its heir powers (), and if Turkey seeks to export the image of the emerging country As the West possesses signs of a transition from a traditional middle country to a rising one, it considers itself not only a country returning to its former position, but also returning to its regional environment represented in the East. Here, the question arises about the reasons for Turkey’s return to the East after it was absent from it for quite a while.

A- The East is the field of implementation of the global Islamic project:

 Turkey’s involvement in the region is a reflection of a policy aimed at implementing a holistic Islamic project. The ruling Justice and Development Party emanates from the stream of political Islam and develops an international religious feeling based on the idea of ​​a united Islamic group. It is natural that this thought leads to sympathy automatically with the countries from which the Islamic nation was formed. Foreign policy is based first and foremost on material interests, and that the tendency of religion that surrounds the policies of some countries is only a cover for achieving goals on the ground, and the focus on religion in the Turkish political discourse may have an instrumental function that helps legitimize Turkey’s return to the region after decades From the estrangement, and the evidence for this is that the Turkish diplomacy under the rule of the Justice and Development Party does not move in the Islamic regions only, but in all directions.

B- The East is the vital field for testing the new Ottoman:

Turkey’s involvement in the region is a reflection of a buried desire to revive the Ottoman Empire on a symbolic level. An analysis of Turkish behavior shows an imperial tendency that reflects the difficulty of getting out of the mentality associated with it. Turkey still views the Arab-Islamic world as a region that was in its custody and was taken from it by force, and today it enjoys the right to take care of it, and some call this imperial ambition the “neo-Ottomanism” ().

C- The East is the paved way to the West:

In the book The Strategic Depth of Davutoğlu, he talked about a phrase that illustrates the intellectual vision from which Turkey stems, which is the “metaphor of shooting with a bow.” He stressed that Turkey’s regional policy must be understood through shooting with a bow. ). This means that the East in the Turkish vision is a way to reach a broader world embodied in the West. The greater Turkey’s strength at the regional level, the more it succeeds in possessing strengths that help it to head west, and perhaps Turkey aspires to turn eastward orientation into a card of pressure and attraction at the same time for the European Union countries that strive to join it despite the difficulties it faces ().

D- The East is the gateway to transformation for the desired revival force:

Some believe that Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East is not only linked to the idea of ​​neo-Ottomanism or the Islamic orientation, but rather to a new variable that emerged in the first decade of the current century, which is the Turkish renaissance, whose features began to take shape through the Turkish policy that strived to raise the status of the state and prove its presence on the scene. International, with the full realization that it will not be able to achieve this except by its strong return to its regional surroundings so that it becomes a pole of attraction in it, and this means that Turkey’s return to the East can be explained through the dynamics of the phenomenon of ascension, as it turned into a field to prove Turkey’s ability to position itself internationally, and to engage Effective in global affairs (). Here, the Turkish strategy appears clearly, which is to build a regional sphere of influence to be used as a starting point towards reaching the rank of the global central state.And if the spaces surrounding Turkey are of great importance, then the Middle East enjoys greater importance, as Davutoglu considers it the backbone on which the Turkish renaissance must be based (), and it is the back garden for Turkey, and it is the key to economic, political and strategic balances, as it is the preferred region for expansion. Turkey has not succeeded in being a regional center of polarization in the Middle East, and sooner or later it will be cut off not only from the Asian and Mediterranean space, but also from the global one.Thus, if Turkey does not succeed in being a regional center of polarization in the Middle East, it will sooner or later be cut off not only from the Asian and Mediterranean space, but also from the global one. ).Thus, if Turkey does not succeed in being a regional center of polarization in the Middle East, it will sooner or later be cut off not only from the Asian and Mediterranean space, but also from the global one. ).

Second: The motor level: strategic and tactical tools and policies:

It includes the tools and policies that Turkey has followed to put perceptions and intellectual visions into practice, foremost of which are:

(1) Strategic Tools: The Trilogy of Revival Diplomacy:

It is called the rising diplomacy trilogy because it includes three major strategic tools that Turkey has pursued in its foreign policies, and these tools embodied new concepts that some considered innovative in the world of politics. Although Oglu belongs to the academic and intellectual stream before he was a statesman, this book was considered as a road map for Turkish foreign policy during his reign. This trilogy is represented in:

(a) Activating the Strategic Depth Doctrine: which Davutoğlu spoke about when he called for re-engineering Turkish foreign policy, with the aim of transforming it into a central state and a global power (), likening the international arena to a chessboard that contains a group of players and stressing the need for The state is one of the influential players and not marginalized pawns, and he stressed in this context that the state’s position on the international chessboard depends – in addition to the self-perception of its elite – on its strategic depth, that is, on its ability to radiate beyond its borders. This will only happen by achieving a balance between freedom and security as a first step to drawing features of an external role. The state must strive to achieve freedom for its citizens, and at the same time achieve security at the largest level of society and the nation, provided that the endeavor to achieve security does not overwhelm the goal of freedom, and vice versa.

It will also not come about except by combining two elements that cannot be overlooked, namely: a positive self-vision supported by high self-confidence and strong political will; The state must view itself as capable and strong, and take the initiative to act even if it involves risks and risks. The state’s leaders must assume their responsibilities and possess the courage that enables them to act independently.

By analyzing the theory of strategic depth from Davutoğlu’s point of view, we will find that it has two parts. The first is the historical and identifiable depth that necessitates it to play a regional and global role, especially in light of its history full of victories and glories as an Ottoman legacy, and its complex identity that provides it with room for movement in several regions and areas of influence. In its immediate surroundings, as for the second part, it is the geographical depth that is based on its location as a meeting point for several regions and its presence in the heart of major geopolitical spaces, as it enjoys a unique location at the intersection of the continents of Europe and Asia, not to mention its proximity at the same time to Eastern Europe, the Near and Middle East, and Africa. This opens the door wide for it to move towards new horizons and play an influential role in the international system ().

Accordingly, this theory represents a strategic tool and an intellectual framework at the same time that enables Turkey to increase its role and strengthen its position in the international system, not as a bridge between the West and the East, but as a major actor enjoying effectiveness and independence. The ruling elite adopted this approach in the document titled “Goal 2023” and published Officially on the website of the Justice and Development Party, which confirmed that it reinterpreted the history and geography of Turkey through the perspective of strategic depth.

(b) Creating a safe regional environment: by resolving the outstanding problems between Turkey and its neighbors, or the so-called “zero problem policy”, and then removing Turkey from the image of the country surrounded by problems, and entering into the image of the country that has good relations with everyone. And this, if achieved, gives foreign policy an exceptional ability to be present and to maneuver effectively. In addition to the increasing influence in the neighboring spaces through the policy of “concentric circles”, which means the need for Turkey to focus on the geographically closest groups before the distant countries, so that it is active in three geographical groups from the nearest to the farthest: the near land ocean consisting of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, The nearby marine basin consisting of the Black Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea, as well as the Nile, Tigris, and Euphrates rivers, and the nearby continental ocean located at the junction of Europe, North Africa, and Central and East Asia ().

Globalization and the intellectual revolutions it carried helped perpetuate this transformation. Before globalization, the major powers reached their position through geographical expansion and the annexation of new lands, whether by outright conquest (the Ottoman and Caesarean empires) or by the annexation of new territories through intermarriage (the Austro-Hungarian Empire). ), or later within the framework of the colonial phenomenon (France, Britain) (), and Turkey realized this shift early and made sure that entering the circle of seniors is no longer possible through traditional geographical expansion, but rather through “functional expansion”, which is more difficult and complicated. Although globalization narrowed the geographical distances, it expanded the functional distances. Where the capabilities of countries were revealed when they converged and began to compare them, and showed that some of them can perform their functions and compete better than others, and from here, their ability to rise and their success in that is not determined by the amount of geographical areas they control, but rather by the amount they enjoy. Functional energies, and policies

(2) Diplomatic and soft tools: expanding the area of ​​Turkish presence and activating smart diplomacy:

Turkey is used as an emerging, innovative diplomatic middle power that is characterized by an active regional movement, and has a great ability to mediate by virtue of its position between the north and the south, as well as a great deal of flexibility that enables it to weave relations with opposing actors in the international system.Through it, it seeks to push the other parties in the international system to recognize their status and strength and to gain them an advanced position in it. The importance of recognition stems from the realistic point of view, from the difficulty of any country acquiring a great position without the recognition of this status by other countries. It is indispensable to achieve the status and prestige that the state seeks to achieve, and this status plays a utilitarian and functional role and provides privileges to those who obtain it, as it secures the legitimacy of the state through which it exercises the role of leadership in various aspects of international life, and pushes other countries to search for aid and assistance, and on the other hand stimulates them This prestige is to formulate a policy on a global scale, bypassing its own borders and its closest regional surroundings, in addition to that obtaining a prestige that guarantees it internal stability by tickling feelings of pride and pride among the local population, which prompts them to renew their confidence in the ruling political elite ().

Turkey has pursued a kind of diplomacy, through which it aimed to expand the area of ​​Turkish presence in quantity and quality. We can call it “smart diplomacy” because of its features, foremost of which are: (a) Comprehensiveness and pluralism “comprehensive and multiple diplomacy”: by pursuing a foreign policy multi-dimensional – linked to Turkey’s position among the vital powers and regions of the world -, and active participation in all the issues of the region to which Turkey belongs (), (b) harmony “harmonious-rhythmic diplomacy”: the development of a new diplomatic method in foreign policy, adopting a moving and proactive stance It allows it to be influential in several spaces, and this requires it to abandon the steadfastness in the positions that have always characterized it during the Cold War, in order to adopt a dynamic, active, interactive and harmonious position in line with the new Turkish orientations, (c) flexibility and effectiveness of “flexible diplomacy”:Where the transition from rigid politics and stillness, to permanent movement and communication with all the countries of the world important to Turkey, (d) the distribution of “distributed diplomacy”, which means the distribution of Turkish efforts among international parties with multi-directional positioning.

The most important types of diplomacy pursued by Turkey are of four types:

Public and humanitarian diplomacy:

Turkey has paid wide attention to human diplomacy that focuses on the human being as the main axis of the universe, so it has emerged as a donor and contributor to official development aid in recent times (), and it ranked fourth in the list of the largest donors of humanitarian aid in 2013, after the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union, and it has doubled The aid granted by Turkey four times between 2003 and 2013, and it took on an institutional character, especially after the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency “TIKA” was established and representative offices were opened in a number of countries in the Middle East.Through Turkey’s involvement in this aid, it tried to prove that it enjoys a kind of Moral authority and that its foreign policy has a humane orientation and that it deserves a greater role in its regional environment, especially after its image has improved in countries benefiting from aid ().

Official development assistance is divided into two categories. The first is humanitarian assistance such as infrastructure projects and others. This aid has a great impact on the countries and peoples receiving it, for two reasons identified by Jana Jabbour in: The first is that this aid comes in the context of South-South cooperation, and it usually takes place in a personal way, that is, it is announced by the able Turks directly when visiting the concerned country, which gives an impression on The local population believes that Turkey is a country close to them and feels their needs. The second reason is that it provides its assistance in a humane manner, far from the western image of aid that is based on superiority, humiliation, and a condescending view of the donor, and is usually accompanied by unfair conditions in the eyes of the state, unlike Turkey, which asserts its identity as a state. Developing, it does not give lessons or sermons to the countries of the south and does not present conditions for the grant and considers it a moral duty for the sake of God, which makes it welcome in these countries.

As for the second category of aid, it serves the idea of ​​reviving the symbolic empire, as it revolves around the rehabilitation of Islamic antiquities in the Arab world, as it has restored a large number of antiquities in Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine and other countries, and Turkey has achieved two goals: The light is on the common history with the Arab countries, which gives them the right to regional positioning, and the second is to prove the civilizational glory and the greatness of the past that qualifies them to obtain a greater position ().

In addition to human diplomacy, Turkey has also paid attention to what is known as public or popular diplomacy, which aims to influence public opinion in other countries and relies on engaging in strategic communication with the public of a foreign country in order to provide information, deliver messages, spread ideas, or paint a bright image of the state and legitimize it. Turkey has realized the great importance of public diplomacy, so it has established an office for public diplomacy attached to the Prime Minister’s departments, and a public diplomacy department attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been established, and the aim of this institutionalization is to create a tool for political communication and spread a positive image of Turkey. In order to achieve this, it made a remarkable effort with the countries of its regional surroundings. As it was keen on direct communication and the active presence of ambassadors and diplomats in Arab countries, it also used the Anadolu Agency as a media platform that provides information in more than one language, and offices were opened in most Arab countries ().

• Diplomacy of Seduction and Soft Penetration: Political Attraction and Exporting the Image of Turkey as the “Model”:

Turkey has realized early on the importance of the role played by soft power – alongside hard power – in achieving its policies (), and has developed a set of mechanisms and tools that enable it to achieve its long-term goals, which do not exceed three: (1) Penetration into the depth of neighboring societies to give popular legitimacy to its policies and obtaining popular recognition of the Turkish regional role, bypassing the political and legal channels for official recognition of the desired status, (2) drawing the image of Turkey as the “model” that deserves the privileged position in its regional environment (), (3) achieving a kind of global political attractiveness that makes its international reputation an intercessor In the adult club.

In order to achieve these goals, Turkey has developed a number of tools such as: (a) cultural tools and audio-visual attraction, as Turkey proceeded to export Turkish series to the surrounding region, specifically to the Arab world, which received these television materials with a great welcome, and these series did not deviate from the three contents of politics, history and romance , which are attractive elements to Arab societies, in light of these series’ demonstration of the values ​​of preservation, development, and respect for Islamic religious traditions. Through these series, Turkey painted a positive image of it as a modern and democratic country with attractive scenery, a modern lifestyle and moral values ​​that made it at the forefront of the countries that Arabs want to visit for tourism. The romantic series “Nour” comes at the forefront of the series that embodied an ideal model for marriage in the Arab mind. Then comes the role of the historical series, which were a revival of the Ottoman spirit, and the confirmation of the status that Turkey enjoyed in the past as part of the Ottoman Empire and its entitlement to a similar position in the future. At the forefront of these series comes the series “The Sultan’s Harem”, which broke the viewing figures in the Arab world because it embodies a historical period saturated with a glorious past, a Turkish Islamic identity, and the greatness of a previous Ottoman civilization. And the movie “Conquest 1453”, which tells the story of the conquest of Constantinople by Sultan Mehmed II, and this film promotes a positive image of the Ottoman golden age in a way that touches the feelings of Muslims, whether they are Turks or Arabs. As for the political series, it is no less influential than its predecessors, and there is no evidence of that from what the series “Valley of the Wolves” produced of psychological impact, as it exposed the issue of the American invasion of Iraq and created the image of a Muslim hero who defends the Iraqis, which is the feeling that the Arab Muslim lacks, who feels his low status and value in The Western world, so that Turkey comes as a model for the moral Muslim state that defends the rights of the weakest in front of the strongest, and paints a picture of what the Arab wants to be. The unprecedented success of this series led to the production of a film with the same idea, “Valley of the Wolves, Iraq,” to emphasize the unity of destiny that unites Arabs and Turks in their struggle against common enemies such as the United States. Then came the movie “Valley of the Wolves Palestine”, turning Turkey from a defender of Iraq to a supporter of the Palestinian cause, which tickled the feelings of the Arabs who see a failure in their governments to defend Palestine, and established a positive image of Turkey, which has set itself up as a supporter of justice and the spread of goodness. Turkey was not satisfied with the impact of its cultural production, as it supported it with political discourses of a moral nature to appear in the form of a defender of freedom and equality, so we find Erdogan denouncing global inequality, saying, “It is tragic and unacceptable to notice the existence of societies suffering from hunger and thirst, living below the poverty line and being deprived One of the primary needs that may lead to death, while on the other side of the world there is an excessive consumerism that reaches the point of waste.” Erdogan also criticizes the cultural hegemony of the West, denounces the marginalization of peripheral cultures, and presents himself as a defender of a more inclusive cultural system.

Erdogan focuses on the idea of ​​justice and equality, saying, “We must establish a political system that represents all people fairly, without contempt, contempt, or exclusion of anyone. We believe in the need for every person in the world to find his seat at the world table without distinction between black and white, or poor and rich, or Christian and Muslim, or western and eastern” (). Here, the moral mantle worn by Turkey appears, as it presents itself as a virtuous force based on moral principles and is at the service of defending human dignity, and affirms that it is ready to watch over all humanity and to extend a helping hand to anyone who is in pain or feels oppressed.

(B) Media tools and media and information attraction: through the launch of Arabic-language television channels such as the “TRT” channel, which opened in 2010, and was considered by Turkish leaders as a new communication bridge between Arabs and Turks. On the Turkish political situation, such as “The Seven Colors”, “A Mosque and a City” and others, and despite the expected effect of this channel similar to that of the Turkish series, this did not happen on the ground, as it faced many difficulties that limited its role and influence in the Arab world, and was characterized as lacking For independence and impartiality, which made the Arabs feel that it is a tool in the hands of Turkish foreign policy, so they refrained from following it ().

(D) Educational tools and the preparation of an Arab elite loyal to Turkey: Turkey has paid great attention to education as an easy tool that can influence the Arab peoples, and realizing the importance of student exchange, the Justice and Development Party established in 2007 the Turkish Scholarship Program, which aims to establish close ties between foreign students and Turkey in a way that meets the country’s regional and global aspirations. It goes without saying that these student exchanges indirectly contribute to building the Turkish regional power, as students usually return to their countries and within them with a positive view of Turkey as a role model, especially in light of its unique combination of Western and Islamic civilization. These students usually maintain their association with Turkey from Through institutional networks as friendship associations between Turkey and their home country.

In addition to student scholarships, Turkey also seeks to influence through the Turkish cultural centers that are full of educational and linguistic activities aimed at attracting a larger audience to the Turkish civilization. To enhance the teaching of the Turkish language and facilitate cultural exchanges between Turkey and its neighbors, which confirms that the primary goal of these centers is not only cultural but also political, to promote the Turkish regional advancement and serve its geopolitical ambitions ().

All these tools serve a main goal for Turkey, which is to turn into a role model in the Arab world, which enjoys political attractiveness and receives sufficient respect in the whole world, and the model is the one that, by virtue of its characteristics and advantages, can serve as a reference that is imitated or reproduced, and it has tried to create A difficult equation that combines civilization, modernity, history, Islam, morals and Western values. Three pillars have been laid for this model:The first is political and diplomatic attraction, as it is a model of successful democracy that introduced Islam into the political equation, which made it enjoy a special attraction for the Arab peoples who have long suffered from oppression, tyranny and colonialism, to represent a living embodiment of an experience that occurred in the near field regardless of the extent of the fragility of their democratic experience (), in addition to This is its active foreign policy that tends to boldness and independence away from Western tutelage. The second is economic attractiveness, as Turkey enjoyed economic prosperity and succeeded in moving from an economy oriented to the interior to a dynamic economy oriented to export. The third is cultural attractiveness, as it represented a model for a modern and developed Islamic state. It has a history and imperial glory and has the ability to combine the elements of eastern Islamic culture with the components of developed western culture ().

Regardless of the extent to which Turkey succeeded in exporting its own model, it should be noted that the attraction exercised by the Turkish model does not lie in what this model represents on the ground as much as the message it conveys to the Arab world, which is similar to it in many cultural, political and economic components. The strength of this model stems from expanding the idea of ​​the “possible” in front of the Arab peoples, as it proves to them that they are capable of development and modernization, and that development and renaissance are not a requirement that they be born from the womb of a Western environment. It also inspires these peoples that Islam and modernity do not contradict each other and that any Muslim country can Walk the path of evolution.

In sum, the Turkish model is like a mirror for the Arab about himself, as it addresses aspects of the Arab spirit that sometimes carry in its depths a negative image of the self based on “inability or effectiveness” to paint a picture of him based on the possibility of realizing the dream with more effort and perseverance ().

• Peaceful-pluralistic diplomacy: flexible mediation and interaction with opposing opponents:

In line with the principle of zeroing out problems with neighbors, and activating the Turkish strategic action, Turkey saw the need to follow a peaceful mediation diplomacy, through which it aims to mediate between the opposing parties in order to find a foothold in international politics, and this diplomacy is consistent with the principle of rhythmic multilateral diplomacy that we referred to previously. Especially since pluralism is a means followed by medium countries to achieve their goals, unlike the major countries that tend to unilateralism in decision-making and international behavior. From this standpoint, the Turkish presence in all international multilateral forums such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other organizations that It gives it greater influence and prestige on the international level.

In application of this principle, Turkey sought to join many international bodies, including the Security Council, in which it was elected for the first time since 1961 as a non-permanent member between 2009-2010. It also launched new initiatives in the United Nations such as the “Alliance of Civilizations” and participated in peacekeeping forces teams. It also remained an active member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Group of Twenty (G20), and still aspires to gain membership in the European Union (). As for the south, it chaired the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 2005, and it enjoyed observer status in the League of Arab States and the African Union. It also obtained the status of a member of the Dialogue in the Shanghai Group in 2013.

The active Turkish move led to an increase in its regional strength, as it emerged as a leading figure, improved its image in many countries, and was able to reach a degree of balance in its policy towards the East and the West. In addition to this pluralistic or harmonious diplomacy, Turkey has taken another path, which is mediation diplomacy, which means playing an effective role in mediating regional and international disputes and helping the conflicting parties reconcile each other through dialogue and formulating a common vision for their future and working together to achieve this vision. This was expressed by Davutoglu, saying, “Turkey’s unique ability to access the countries of the North and the South makes it the appropriate mediator in a wide geographical area” (). With this logic, Turkey becomes an effective mediator characterized by the credibility and legitimacy of the conflicting parties, especially since it is located in a location that makes it close to most conflicts on the international arena, and it is also characterized by a moral ability to mediate in terms of feeling sympathy for others and the wisdom resulting from history. In addition, Turkey uses its capabilities to communicate with many parties and build good relations with opposing actors in the international system, through the system of complex alliances, and maintain balanced relations between contradictory parties, just as it establishes relations with the United States, Europe, Israel, the Arab world and Iran. This is not evidenced by its ability to combine a close relationship with Israel at a time when it establishes itself as a defender of the Palestinian cause (), as it follows a smart policy towards Israel, as it deliberately raises its tone towards the Hebrew state and criticizes Israel publicly and through the media in order to get closer to it. Arabs. This is at the same time that it maintains its practical relationship with Israel (), and with the same logic it weaves relations with the United States at the same time as it maintains its relationship with its enemies such as Iran. This confirms the pragmatism of Turkish politics away from religious and ideological slogans. This is not evidenced by its ability to combine a close relationship with Israel at a time when it establishes itself as a defender of the Palestinian cause (), as it follows a smart policy towards Israel, as it deliberately raises its tone towards the Hebrew state and criticizes Israel publicly and through the media in order to get closer to it. Arabs. This is at the same time that it maintains its practical relationship with Israel (), and with the same logic it weaves relations with the United States at the same time as it maintains its relationship with its enemies such as Iran. This confirms the pragmatism of Turkish politics away from religious and ideological slogans. This is not evidenced by its ability to combine a close relationship with Israel at a time when it establishes itself as a defender of the Palestinian cause (), as it follows a smart policy towards Israel, as it deliberately raises its tone towards the Hebrew state and criticizes Israel publicly and through the media in order to get closer to it. Arabs. This is at the same time that it maintains its practical relationship with Israel (), and with the same logic it weaves relations with the United States at the same time as it maintains its relationship with its enemies such as Iran. This confirms the pragmatism of Turkish politics away from religious and ideological slogans.

Turkey has played a mediating role, whether at the regional or sub-regional level within a single state. We find that it mediated between Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights starting in 2005 until the mediation was canceled at the end of 2008 (), and although its efforts were not crowned with success, it was able to position itself in The image of the effective regional mediator at a time when the major powers could not move a finger. Turkey also played a role in Iraq when it intervened to reconcile the Shiite and Sunni factions, as well as in Lebanon and Palestine, which is considered the main arena for Turkish mediation, especially after the involvement of Hamas in the political game (). And after Turkey strengthened its experience in regional mediation and expanded its activities to participate in sensitive international files such as the Iranian nuclear file, which was monopolized by the superpowers, and was able to conclude a tripartite agreement between it and Iran and Brazil in May 2010, which some considered as a diplomatic coup because it confirmed that the Iranian nuclear issue You can make progress through negotiation rather than sanctions. The response of the superpowers to reject the agreement was expected, as the great powers do not allow those outside them to enter the political game, and despite this refusal, Turkey won a battle in the way of proving itself and increasing its international standing, as it considered that its participation in achieving international peace and security is tantamount to a kind of burden-sharing. which calls for the sharing of power and profits and gives it the right to claim a more privileged position in the international system ().

• Economic Diplomacy: The Back Gate to Regional Engagement:

 Economic diplomacy is considered a translation of the economic and commercial dimensions of the traditional diplomacy of the state, and it is intended to use the state of its economic capabilities to influence other countries and direct its political behavior in the direction that serves the national interest of this state. In practice, it is an exploitation of all that traditional diplomacy offers in terms of channels of communication and frameworks for cooperation with foreign countries to serve the country’s economy, in terms of searching for new markets for national products and attracting businessmen and foreign institutions to invest in the country, as well as promoting the tourist destination of all kinds and its branches.

The city of Gaziantep, which benefited from the Syrian-Turkish rapprochement. In this context, we should not forget the main motive for Turkey from this region, which is to obtain energy and diversify its sources.

(3) Military Tools: Military Presence Under Legal Cover and Illegal Military Intervention:

The military tools were not significant in the Turkish system of revival and return in its initial form, but since 2015 they have occupied a greater position among the tools for implementing this system. Turkey has declared its right to use these tools in what it deems to affect its national security in a broad sense, and its military intervention in its regional environment has become common in recent years. So that it launched several military incursions into Syria, sent supplies and fighters to Libya, and deployed its naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean to confirm its claims about its rights in the region despite the great powers’ condemnation of its endeavors, and expanded its military operations against the PKK militants in northern Iraq, and sent military reinforcements to another The strongholds of the Syrian opposition in Idlib, and finally, provided military aid and Syrian mercenary elements to support Azerbaijan in its war against Armenia in order to restore the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

 The Turkish military presence at the present time is the largest since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which confirms that the military tool has become at the forefront of the Turkish tools used to maximize its influence in the region, and its efforts to increase military bases are still increasing and sending forces to more than one region at one time is repeated. This reflects a kind of shift in the Turkish strategic doctrine, which used to see that soft powers and peaceful tools, although slower in reaching the desired goals, are safer. Now, hard power and military tools are the fastest in achieving goals, and they are the real fuel for maximizing Turkish influence in Turkey. Region( ).

Turkey has helped militarize its international interactions, the relative preoccupation of the United States and the European Union with facing the consequences of successive economic crises, leading to the current Corona pandemic, so that their participation in international affairs has become more focused on issues of interest to internal public opinion, and this represented an irreplaceable opportunity for countries that occupy the second rank in the ranks. The global power, such as Turkey, in order to advance and obtain an advanced position in the structure of the current world order, and the successive positions of President Erdogan reveal a greater desire to engage directly in regional conflicts with the aim of gaining importance and influence, by pursuing a proactive foreign policy based on the use of preventive military force outside the borders Turkey, and filling the strategic void in the region, is among several steps that fall within what the Turkish president sees as a legitimate endeavor for his country in order to obtain “the place it deserves in the global system.”

In this context, we do not forget the role played by the failed coup in 2016 in the militarization of Turkish foreign policy, which paved the way for Erdogan to further centralize power within Turkey, especially with the transformation of the political system from a parliamentary one to a presidential one, and the launch of purge campaigns against army leaders who had previously refused to respond. For his calls to launch military operations in neighboring countries (). The country’s defense spending has jumped by 17% since the beginning of 2020 to reach $7 billion, which is equivalent to about 5% of total spending in the annual Turkish budget. It is noted that Turkey’s military budget has increased by nearly 90% over the last ten years, which indicates that foreign military campaigns have become a priority in the Turkish doctrine.

(4) Tactical tools: the elusive expansion of identity boundaries and the systematic oscillation between East and West “a strategy of multiple alternatives”:

When some look at the Turkish discourses towards the Arab and Islamic worlds, they will mistakenly think that Turkey has decided to replace the West with the East, especially after its almost failed attempts to join the European Union. However, the reality of the matter indicates otherwise. Turkey sometimes follows an evasive discourse based on the false suggestion of Western and Arab substitution Which is not right, because the West in Turkish thought is the permanent strategic goal, while the East is the interim tactical goal. This was expressed by Erdogan, saying, “The process of joining the European Union is a top priority and a strategic goal for Turkey… There is no alternative for us to membership in the European Union” (). Based on this vision, the observer of Turkish affairs will reach the conclusion that Turkey follows a strategy of multiple alternatives, as it issues a smart political discourse based on combining East and West without replacing them, and deliberately oscillates between each without having any intention of losing one party at the expense of the other. We find it expanding the borders of its identity to focus on two dimensions, a Middle Eastern Islamic identity and a Western identity, and issuing two different discourses for the East and the West. In front of an Arab and Middle Eastern audience, the focus is on Turkey’s affiliation with the Islamic civilization, and on the strong relationship that binds it to the Arab civilization, whether at the historical level or even blood relations between the Arabs and the Turks. The Turkish leaders expressed this meaning when they emphasized that the saying that the Turk cannot live from Without the Arab is an unreasonable saying because the Turk is the right eye of the Arab, rather his right hand (). Turkey aimed by exporting such discourses to suggest the idea of ​​a common destiny with the Arab and Islamic world, which would give it the opportunity to present itself as a legitimate leader in the region, and would facilitate the building of its desired regional power. Not only that, but it developed a hypothetical vision of the Middle East that is not bounded by the traditional borders of states, and perhaps that is what prompted it to direct criticism of the Sykes-Picot agreement that was imposed on the region to create undesirable borders between nation-states, and therefore it supports the removal of economic barriers and the liberalization of the movement of goods and people. Davutoglu explained this idea, saying, “We respect the territorial integrity of neighboring countries, but we want a Middle East whose borders are open to neighbors. We want the free movement of ideas, capital and people.” Not only that, but it developed a hypothetical vision of the Middle East that is not bounded by the traditional borders of states, and perhaps that is what prompted it to direct criticism of the Sykes-Picot agreement that was imposed on the region to create undesirable borders between nation-states, and therefore it supports the removal of economic barriers and the liberalization of the movement of goods and people. Davutoglu explained this idea, saying, “We respect the territorial integrity of neighboring countries, but we want a Middle East whose borders are open to neighbors. We want the free movement of ideas, capital and people.” Not only that, but it developed a hypothetical vision of the Middle East that is not bounded by the traditional borders of states, and perhaps that is what prompted it to direct criticism of the Sykes-Picot agreement that was imposed on the region to create undesirable borders between nation-states, and therefore it supports the removal of economic barriers and the liberalization of the movement of goods and people. Davutoglu explained this idea, saying, “We respect the territorial integrity of neighboring countries, but we want a Middle East whose borders are open to neighbors. We want the free movement of ideas, capital and people.”

In other words, Turkey is issuing a discourse that promises political liberation, calm and economic development in the Middle East, presenting itself in the image of a leader who will bring his subordinates to safety, and believes that it is able to link the Middle East with global dynamics and contribute to calming the region and its openness to the world, and for this it is forced Sometimes to attack the West and put it in the category of “they” so that the countries of the Middle East make sure that Turkey belongs to their world, and here Turkey begins to paint the image of the greatest leader in the region who will help its countries overcome internal tensions and divisions by forming a kind of Middle Eastern commonwealth around Turkey . This commonwealth rests on the promise of empowering the Middle East and its people, who have long felt stigmatized, dependent, rejected and excluded, to return to the table of international influence.

In addition to this discourse directed towards the East, we find it directing a different discourse towards the West, as it focuses on its belonging to a global civilization that intersects with Western civilization in several aspects that enable it to contribute to world peace through its own civilizational experience in which it combines the West and the East and pushes it to manage dialogue between cultures and civilizations. In addition, it presented itself as a model for the civilizational alliance, as it combines an Islamic civilization with secular values, which it considers a sufficient reason to join the European Union and a motive for its countries to agree to its accession, and Erdogan expressed this, saying, “In view of Turkey’s rich civilizational experience, the values ​​that it shares with Europe In addition to its identity as a secular country with a Muslim majority….it will give the European Union, if it joins it, exceptional importance because this will prove that it is possible to establish an alliance of civilizations” ().In addition to that proposition, we find that it sheds light on the historical relations with the West in exchange for the Turkish Islamic affiliation, and in that Erdogan stated, “Turkey is a country that resembles Europe because in half a century we have adopted and absorbed the standards, principles and values ​​of the European Union” (), and here the division between we and they turns into equality Between them, where the focus was on equality between Islamic civilization and Western Christian civilization in a way that confirms that there is an equal and non-class relationship between them based on mutual recognition between the two parties.

It goes without saying that Turkey will not give up the goal of joining the European Union, as this accession fulfills its desire and fulfills its dream of belonging to the West (), and at the same time gives it attractiveness to the peoples of the Middle East, because this proves that a country with a Muslim majority can achieve This level of development that allows it to be eligible for a place in one of the most advanced clubs in terms of political and economic in the world (.) This is at the same time that if it succeeds in forming a rising regional power, it will gain attractiveness to Europe as a leader in the region. It is considered vital to it, and Davutoglu expressed this, “The more we help in the Middle East, the wider the extent we reach in Europe” ().

 In short, Turkey is issuing a claim to having a multiple identity – Muslim, Ottoman, Turkish, European and Eurasian – and this elusive expansion of identity borders is one of the tools to achieve the Turkish goal of building a global-oriented regional power because it expands its maneuvering space and horizons of action and justifies its diplomatic activity in several spaces.

Despite the great importance of this tactical tool, as it can contribute to putting perceptions and intellectual visions into practice, it carries with it intellectual and practical duality, as we find the rising state striving to join the world of adults while this world does not allow it to penetrate it. As it is filled with other calculations that may push them to build an impenetrable fortress that stands in front of those who try to penetrate it, so that these rising forces fall between the two sides of a millstone, so the refusal of the adults generates a feeling of humiliation and frustration for them, as they stand in the middle of the road. They cannot join the world of adults, but at the same time they refuse to join the list of adults. Smaller countries and this feeling pushes them to follow a contradictory dual policy at the level of thought and movement, so we find them opposing the West and following a hostile tone towards it, at the same time striving to join it.

(5) Civilizational Tools: Reviving the Symbolic Empire and the Political Employment of Identity and History:

There is no doubt that Turkey considers itself the heir to the Ottoman Empire a long time ago, but this historical self-image has crystallized clearly in the form of policies recently, as Turkey has evoked history in a remarkable way, and used the civilized discourse in order to legitimize its regional and international ambitions and justify entitlement to the status of the central state (). In this context, Davutoğlu wrote, “The tension created by the difference between a high sense of self-confidence given that this country was the political center of a large empire, and the current position it occupies in the hierarchy of states has created an amazing psychological impact that no other society has witnessed, and this is what drives it today to claim that be in an international situation befitting its history” ().

In addition to that, Turkey named the names of the Sultans of Bani Othman on giant projects, just as the Turkish government built a bridge on the Bosphorus, calling it the name of Sultan Selim I, and other practices that confirm that Turkey has planned a comprehensive process to restore the greatness of the empire through what has become known at the political level. referred to as “neo-Ottomanism,” but this Ottomanism does not only aim to achieve ideological goals, but rather pragmatic ones in the first place (). This means that singing about the Ottoman past and imperial glory is one of the tools to achieve the Turkish vision of revival, and a means to build a regional power in the Middle East and a way to legitimize the return to the East. In this context, Davutoglu believes that the Ottoman legacy should be invested in two directions:

We cannot overlook an important element in understanding the overall picture of the revival of imperial glory, as this approach represents a kind of Turkish self-healing, as Turkey still feels a kind of shame and humiliation, and sometimes assumes the role of the victim after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and Turkey has been playing the role of a follower for decades. Hence, returning to the memory of an empire that was described as the sick man of Europe before it was stripped of its possessions and power constituted the main engine for building a resurgent Turkish diplomacy based on psychological revenge and evoking civilizational greatness, given that Turkey is distinguished by a civilization that differs from all other civilizations, especially as it believes that it has a self-perception based on Accepting the other and dealing with it with the logic of exchange and interaction instead of the area of ​​domination and supremacy on which Western civilization is based, and this self-awareness produces a benevolent civilization that is open to the other. Many Turkish leaders have expressed their sense of civilizational greatness, such as Erdogan, who said: “For centuries, we have been carriers of a very unique civilization, history and legacy, which is the product of a wonderful mixture of different cultures and civilizations that interacted with our own culture” (). Which means that evoking the greatness of civilization has moved from the intellectual level to the political level. In addition, Turkey focuses on the greatness of the Islamic civilization, as a country to which it belongs, and which is based on equality between people and upholding the values ​​of tolerance and coexistence, in contrast to the self-sufficient Christian Western civilization, which is based in its essence on discrimination and inequality between peoples. It is expected that this implicit comparison will tickle the feelings of the Muslim population in the Middle East, which revolves around Islam and suffers from its exclusion and marginalization by the international system (). In addition, Turkey focuses on the greatness of the Islamic civilization, as a country to which it belongs, and which is based on equality between people and upholding the values ​​of tolerance and coexistence, in contrast to the self-sufficient Christian Western civilization, which is based in its essence on discrimination and inequality between peoples. It is expected that this implicit comparison will tickle the feelings of the Muslim population in the Middle East, which revolves around Islam and suffers from its exclusion and marginalization by the international system (). In addition, Turkey focuses on the greatness of the Islamic civilization, as a country to which it belongs, and which is based on equality between people and upholding the values ​​of tolerance and coexistence, in contrast to the self-sufficient Christian Western civilization, which is based in its essence on discrimination and inequality between peoples. It is expected that this implicit comparison will tickle the feelings of the Muslim population in the Middle East, which revolves around Islam and suffers from its exclusion and marginalization by the international system ().

Third: the motivational level: the supportive environment and the driving factors:

It includes three elements:

(1) Self-empowerment and internal strength management:

It is not possible for any country to achieve progress at the regional and international levels without building internal capabilities for strength. Proving itself externally must stem from proving it internally. Turkey has realized the importance of this principle and has worked to bring about an internal renaissance since the eighties of the last century, where it focused mainly on Developing the Turkish economy, increasing the rates of trade and economic exchange with multiple countries, and making huge investments in the tourism field after it was able to present a picturesque picture of Turkish tourism, in addition to opening new economic markets that enabled it to export its goods to many regional countries (), to become the period from 2002 to 2012 is the brightest era of the Justice and Development Party, which adopted an ambitious economic policy based on liberalization of the economy, heavy reliance on foreign direct investment, privatization of public institutions, and decentralization ().All this led to great economic progress, which some described as an economic miracle or the ten glorious years, as the Turkish economy ranked seventeenth in the world, and Turkey recorded one of the highest rates of GDP growth in the world after China and India. Per capita GDP doubled, and trade exchanges jumped. An amazing leap, which turned it into a significant trading and economic power that enabled it to play a greater role at the regional and international levels ().

This comes at a time when Turkey was able to achieve a degree of internal political stability under the rule of the Justice and Development Party, which had a political vision of what Turkey could be internally and externally. This does not mean that Turkey did not suffer from political and economic problems, but it does mean that it has been relatively successful in transforming its internal capabilities into strengths rather than weaknesses. This is at the same time that it tried to successfully manage the dilemma of minorities within it, which is the most serious problem in the Turkish interior, as it realized that social cohesion and internal stability are preconditions for any desired external radiation, and in order for it to follow the paths of advancement seeking to influence outside its borders, it must be a nation reconciled with itself and to enjoy a stable internal environment in order to issue the image of a cohesive state (). Accordingly, a solution to the Kurdish problem has become necessary to enable Ankara to build a regional base in the Middle East, and Turkey has pursued two ways to achieve this goal: The first is a safe openness to the Kurds as an internal extension of the policy of zero problems with neighbors, and an attempt to support their belonging to the Turkish nation by reviving the Ottoman experience, which was based on the millet system that guaranteed peaceful coexistence between different ethnic and religious groups, and the use of the Islamic umbrella to melt the different ethnic groups under the banner of Islam. . For this, Turkey adopted three approaches: the cultural approach: in which Turkey granted limited cultural rights to the Kurds, allowing them to open television channels in the Kurdish language, teaching the Kurdish language in private institutes, and facilitated the broadcasting of programs in the Kurdish language in the official television channels (). The political orientation: Turkey engaged in secret negotiations with the PKK in 2010 under the name of the “Oslo process” and then the “Imrali process” for the first time, to express a change in the Turkish official approach towards the issue. Economic orientation:

As for the second way to achieve this goal, it is rapprochement with the Kurdistan Regional Government, which has transformed in Turkish thought from a threat factor into a new field of action for Turkish diplomacy. Shams – which did not bear the desired fruits, so it began to pursue a different policy based on rapprochement with the Kurdistan Government of Iraq through many official visits and bilateral meetings, until the relationship between them reached a form of pragmatic alliance that benefited both parties (), as good relations allowed With Erbil, the consolidation of Turkey’s regional power by increasing its influence with the Iraqi central government, so that Erbil has become Turkey’s gateway to Baghdad, and Turkey is Erbil’s gateway to the European Union and the world. In addition, this openness has contributed to the strengthening of the Turkish economy, as Turkey is the largest investor and the largest trading partner of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

It should be noted that these relentless efforts to contain the ethnic dilemma have borne some fruit, but they did not lead to a radical solution to the Kurdish problem, as there was a kind of temporary calm that Turkey benefited from in launching abroad, but that does not mean that the Kurdish dilemma has turned overnight into a A historical opportunity, and the evidence for that is that it exploded again with the development of the situation in Syria.

(2) Charismatic leadership and a dynamic intellectual-political mindset:

One of the most important factors that helped Turkey formulate an effective role for it at the regional and international levels is the human factor, by which we mean the human leadership capabilities that were able to develop a comprehensive vision of the Turkish role and turn it into a practical road map at the political level, and in this context two political leaderships stand out that the project did not have The Turk can only rise with them. The first is the head of state, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who represented a charismatic model capable of embodying the solid political will and spirit of determination that characterizes Turkey as a rising power. Charismatic authority usually stems from two factors, the first is the human and personal factor that comes from the exceptional qualities of the leader such as his personality, values ​​and ideas, and the second is a circumstantial factor such as the desire and will of the people for change, and their real willingness to receive the messages of the charismatic leader. This means that the two factors must be available simultaneously and in parallel, as the charismatic leader and the appropriate historical moment will inevitably lead to real societal change.

Looking at Erdogan’s biography, we will find that it embodies the march of a self-made man who achieved the success he deserves and faced many difficulties that he was able to overcome, which arouses respect and admiration among the popular and marginalized classes, which turned into his first electoral base, especially after his success in the position of mayor of Istanbul, through which he was able to build a broad popular base. And charismatic legitimacy pushed him towards holding vital positions that brought him to power. In addition to that, he evoked the Turkish spirit, as he worked to revive the Turkish self, and was able to transform the feeling of humiliation and humiliation as a result of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and its consequences into a sense of pride and pride in the Turkish identity, so he appeared as if he was the new man of Turkey ().

In short, Erdogan has presented himself as the voice of the people and that he is a black Turk capable of change, and that he is one of the common people, so he is not a military man like Ataturk, he did not graduate from prestigious universities like Ozal or Erbakan, he does not come from a family of big landowners like Menderes, and he does not speak foreign languages. Like them. Rather, he is an ordinary person attached to the people who feel them and desire change. Erdogan has benefited from his charismatic qualities that he enjoyed. With his stature, his loud voice, and his populist rhetoric, he was able to attract the masses, and by exporting the image of a bold strongman capable of standing up to the world’s leaders without fear or submission, the masses turned around him, and with his humanitarian and benevolent gestures, he captured the hearts of the Turks, and his attachment to traditions and religious and moral values. Which he was able to employ politically and united the Turks under an Islamic identity and nurtured their patriotism in the way that made them draw a personal image consisting of four parts: strength, religion, model, and humanity.

In addition to the charismatic leadership embodied by Erdogan, another leader of a different type comes, Ahmet Davutoglu, who represents a real statesman who was able to draw a complete vision of what Turkey will be. The importance of this man stems from the fact that he is one of the few people who were able to link between science and thought on the one hand and reality on the other hand. His academic and intellectual background made him able to understand and analyze what is happening in the international arena in terms of variables and determine Turkey’s position among them. He is one of the few academics who left their ivory tower to get involved in the scenes of power (), and one of the limited theorists in international relations who had the opportunity to put their theories into practice after “Henry Kissinger” and “Zbigniew Brzezinski” and “Alvaro García Linera” (). Thus, he was the only Turk who possessed a deep intellectual vision and had the opportunity to put it into practice, as his book put the strategic depth before he assumed high political positions in the state that made him able to apply his intellectual vision and turn it into a systematic strategy and a long-term work program. Thus, some considered that the crystallization of the Turkish role was the creation of this man, who theorized Turkish foreign policy and diplomacy through many books, from which he was able to proceed from it towards establishing various Turkish diplomatic foundations with unprecedented capabilities and energies. Foreign Policy magazine described him as the mastermind behind Turkey’s renaissance in the world, and some described him as the Kissinger of the Middle East or Kissinger of Turkey. Thus, some considered that the crystallization of the Turkish role was the creation of this man, who theorized Turkish foreign policy and diplomacy through many books, from which he was able to proceed from it towards establishing various Turkish diplomatic foundations with unprecedented capabilities and energies. Foreign Policy magazine described him as the mastermind behind Turkey’s renaissance in the world, and some described him as the Kissinger of the Middle East or Kissinger of Turkey. Thus, some considered that the crystallization of the Turkish role was the creation of this man, who theorized Turkish foreign policy and diplomacy through many books, from which he was able to proceed from it towards establishing various Turkish diplomatic foundations with unprecedented capabilities and energies. Foreign Policy magazine described him as the mastermind behind Turkey’s renaissance in the world, and some described him as the Kissinger of the Middle East or Kissinger of Turkey.

(3) A regional and international environment seems conducive to the “strategy of turning threats into opportunities”:

On this basis, it seemed that Turkey tried to take advantage of the historical circumstance to achieve its own interests in Central Asia and to extend its influence in this region of the world. This does not mean that it did not face difficulties such as colliding with American unilateralism, but it tried to overcome them at times by confrontation and at other times by evasion.

In a similar way, Turkey tried to benefit from the changes that affected its regional environment, which has always fluctuated between cautious stability and relative turmoil, and was affected by major international events that made it a target from the Western world, such as the events of September 2001, which painted a negative image of the region as a stronghold of extremist Islamic thought, and put the countries of this region in a dilemma after it It found itself compelled to follow the lead of the United States, and to defend itself against the systematic strategy against it (), and the policy of the countries of this region continued to range between steadfastness at times and submission at other times, and adaptation and keeping up with the knees at a third time, and this continued until the decade of this region began to break through with the American invasion. to Iraq in 2003, which represented the first turning point in the regional balance of power, and Turkey reached an important axiom, which is, “It is not in Turkey’s interest to risk its relations with the Arab and Islamic worlds without reaping the fruits.”It became necessary for it to establish a delicate balance between the various American, Israeli, European, and then Arab directions (), by establishing good relations with all its regional neighbors, so that Turkey becomes a pivotal country at the same distance from everyone and is able to play a distinct regional role in rearranging the region’s arrangements, so it found Its goal is in Iraq, which is considered the second largest producer of crude oil in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and is also a center of attraction regionally and internationally because it has many geographical, political, economic, cultural and civilizational elements.These elements led to the intertwining of regional and international interests. There is no doubt that the geographical proximity and historical competition between two large countries the size of Turkey and Iraq produced a wide space for competition and cooperation at the same time. surrounding it as a source of threat to its national security, or as a field for regional movement and influence, or to establish economic relations.

In fact, Turkey has pursued a strategy of turning risks into opportunities. The stability of Iraq is an indisputable matter for Turkey, like Syria and other countries in the regional periphery bordering on it. With this region exposed to various bouts of instability stemming from various reasons such as the invasion of Iraq, the Arab revolutions, And others expected a negative impact on Turkey, which is undeniable. The stability of the regional environment of any country is indispensable as it affects the internal stability of the state, and the matter becomes more difficult in the case of an ethnic problem such as the Kurds distributed among several countries, including Turkey. However, these risks and threats Turkey was able to turn them into opportunities for itself, as happened in Iraq, in which it was able to directly interfere in its affairs in a way that would not have happened without this event.And it followed a different policy towards the Kurds of Iraq, after it deepened its relationship with the Kurdistan region and made it economically dependent on it in a large way, which reduces the possibility of unexpected and undesirable surprises occurring in the Kurdish issue ().

The same strategy was adopted by Turkey again when the Arab Spring revolutions broke out, which surprised the whole world, not just Turkey. The revolutions and an indication of the rearrangement of the balance of power in it, but it was able to turn it into an opportunity that can be exploited to consolidate its regional position in light of a great leadership vacuum in the region, especially after Egypt turned on itself and signs of Gulf crises appeared. Regardless of Turkey’s reactions, which were characterized by a degree of duplicity in dealing with these revolutions, it followed a policy of deliberation that enabled it to initially absorb the event and work to exploit it before turning to direct intervention to change the balances in the region in its favor ().

The second axis: an evaluation vision of the Turkish system of revival and return: indicators of failure and the challenges of continuity:

Many analyzes have tried to evaluate the Turkish experience as a realistic embodiment of the rise of a rising country in its regional setting, and they have varied in their vision of the extent of Turkey’s success during this experience. While some saw that it had achieved unprecedented success and became a major regional power, other analyzes saw that it had failed to the extent that it transformed its regional environment from zero enemies to zero friends ().

 The fact of the matter is that the Turkish experience carries with it strengths and weaknesses – as do many international experiences – as Turkey was able to provide a model for a rising regional power that seeks to maximize its international standing and find a foothold in international politics. Its objectives until the region was ravaged by the Arab Spring revolutions that upset the balance of power in it and produced a series of challenges and obstacles that slowed down the Turkish project and even forced it in many cases to change course, rearrange its priorities, and gain more flexibility to maximize gains and limit losses.

The Turkish system of revival and return went through four stages, which reflected a measure of tactical transformations within it, as follows:

The first stage: the stage of systematic launch and gradual penetration: It lasted from 2002-2010, during which Turkey tried to create a safe environment in the regional neighborhood through a policy of zeroing out problems. At this stage, it entered into open confrontations with its regional environment, and it relied heavily on economic reform, with a focus on using soft power tools to open up to the African continent and the Middle East (), this is at the same time that it was seeking to join the European Union in an attempt to get out of the mantle of Subordination to a stage of cooperation and common interests. On the internal level, the government of the Justice and Development Party, during this stage, gradually began to re-engineer the internal social situation and tighten its control over the Turkish political system.

The second stage: the stage of cautious engagement and the lost balance: This stage began with the outbreak of the Arab revolutions at the end of 2010 and continued until 2015, with the Turkish confusion in dealing with its parties and a state of relative stability in its relations with the countries of the revolutions, with the exception of Egypt, which entered into An open clash with it with the fall of the regime of former President Mohamed Morsi, and these revolutions represented a great challenge to Turkey and an opportunity at the same time, as two challenges emerged before it:The first lies in how to reconcile its economic interests and its good political relationship with the regimes in the region and the duty to support these revolutions, especially since it has been marketing itself as an Islamic, democratic and economic model that can be generalized in the Arab countries. As for the second challenge, it is related to the regional balance of power, where fears emerged. It is evident from the repercussions of these revolutions and the potential new regional powers that could produce to compete with them (), which made them adopt pragmatic reactions towards the countries of the revolutions to support some and reject others, so that the Turkish reaction appears vacillating and double in dealing with the same event, and Turkey resorts to adopting a policy Cautious engagement based on observing the situation first and then acting accordingly again, and it is forced to deliberate in implementing its project in an effort to restore the lost balance.

The third stage: the stage of military escalation and offensive engagement: This stage lasted from 2016-2020, when Ankara’s policy changed towards more intervention and involvement in regional crises and began to adopt an offensive pattern in its relations with actors at the international level, in particular Russia, the European Union and the United States of America. and a confrontational pattern with regard to its role in its regional security positions. And the Turkish tendency towards achieving regional influence began to become more clear, especially in Asia, by pursuing a proactive foreign policy based on the use of preventive military force outside Turkey’s borders, and filling the strategic void in the region. This stage witnessed the beginning of the foreign military operations of the Turkish army, which included countries such as Iraq, Syria and Libya, in addition to the permanent military stationing in a number of countries in what has become known as the militarization of regional politics. ships for exploration and research and threatened to respond if any of its ships were exposed to the slightest harassment and referred to the blue homeland as a governing framework for Turkey’s maritime policy, which is clear evidence of the Turkish expansionist policy in the seas (). It was only natural that this offensive approach negatively affected its relationship with the main actors in the region and made it feel a state of isolation at the regional and international levels.

The fourth stage: the stage of relative calm and tactical retreat: which began at the end of 2020, when Ankara began to follow the policy of calm instead of the escalation that it pursued in the previous stage, especially after it felt real losses at the regional and international levels and with its exposure to a severe economic crisis that was accompanied by semi-international isolation. It decided to calm the tensions surrounding it, and to curb the Turkish expansionist and escalatory tendencies in the fields of its regional and international engagement, even if temporarily, especially with regard to its relations with the European Union, the countries of the eastern Mediterranean, the United States of America and some active countries in the region such as Egypt, which has changed its tone in dealing with it towards more cooperation. And she expressed her desire to hold direct talks between the two sides, as she also sought to hold talks on the eastern Mediterranean with Greece, and expressed her willingness to improve relations with the Arab Gulf, Israel and the European Union ().

In addition, there has been a change in the motivational level, as Erdogan is now facing popular objections more than before as a result of his repressive policies and his monopoly on power, just as the international and regional environment is no longer conducive and the elements of self-power that enabled Turkey for many years to play a greater role on the international and regional arenas are no longer what they are. were; The Turkish economy is suffering, internal sectarian problems are exacerbating, and the internal political situation and its cohesion are full of cracks.

Accordingly, the Turkish system has been accused of ineffectiveness and perhaps failure due to what the rising Turkish power has achieved at the regional and international levels. Therefore, some indicators of failure had to be monitored and the challenges and obstacles of the Turkish system indicated as follows:

(1) Indicators of the failure of the Turkish system of recovery and return:

A number of indicators have appeared indicating that the Turkish system for the advancement and return has not achieved its full goals, including:

A- Turning Turkey into a center for regional and international crises:

Turkey’s abandonment of the policy of non-interference and its military involvement in the region’s conflicts transformed it from a country that supports stability into a country that creates crises, and this was helped by the gradual concentration of power in the hands of President Erdogan, who led the country to engage in numerous conflicts and clashes with its neighbors and main international partners, thus becoming Turkey’s excessive expansion The region is a source of crises in more than one regional arena. Starting with the Syrian arena, in which Turkey was involved in more than one military operation such as the Euphrates Shield 2016, the occupation of the Afrin region in 2018, Operation Peace Spring 2019 and other operations that called for an emergency meeting of the Security Council in October 2019 to discuss the Turkish attack on northern Syria. Not to mention the Libyan arena, in which Turkey intervened in favor of one party at the expense of another, thus igniting the internal conflict in it, in addition to the escalation caused by this crisis on the Egyptian side, which declared that Al-Jufra was a red line, and the possibilities of military confrontation between them increased than before.

In this context, we do not forget the prolonged crisis of the Kurds, which constitutes the backbone of its relationship with Iraq and Syria, which escalated as a result of the silent Turkish behavior of what some Kurdish groups were subjected to, in addition to what was caused by the Turkish policies towards terrorist groups, such as the spread of the phenomenon of terrorism in the region, especially ISIS, which tried to use it as a card. winning to achieve its goals, but it soon discovered that this card is capable of plunging the region into civil wars and endless conflicts. As for the Eastern Mediterranean crisis and its insistence on gas exploration in it, despite the loud voices rejecting Turkish behavior in this part of the world, it still has a lot to be resolved, especially in light of the multiplicity of parties participating in it. All this confirms that Turkey has a hand in every crisis that occurs in the Middle East region, as if it has turned from a center of regional stability into a center of regional crises ().

B- Limited gains and disappointing results:

In view of the ambitious role played by Turkey, especially with regard to its military interventions in regional issues, some analysts indicated that the results that accrued to Turkey were not as much as they were invested in. For example, Turkey has not achieved much in Syria since the beginning of its direct military intervention and occupation of Syrian lands within the framework of Operation Euphrates Shield from 2016 until this year, that is, after about 5 years, and it is still forced to spend on the safe areas that it imposed by force of arms, and it must provide continuous funding to manage the refugee crisis, which is the card that it is trying to use in negotiating with European countries without a meaningful return. In Libya, the situation has not changed much, as the changes are still taking place in a direction far from Turkey’s grip, despite the agreements with the Fayez al-Sarraj government, especially with regard to military bases and security and economic arrangements. Region. In the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey began maneuvering at times and retreating at other times under the pressure of the change in the US position and the explicit European threat to impose sanctions on it, which confirms that the Turkish expansion strategy has not succeeded so far in achieving the fundamental geopolitical gains that it aspired to. This is at the same time that it failed to achieve tangible economic returns that could be quickly invested in the areas of intervention, despite its seizure of vital resources there. And in the event that Ankara continues to be unable to collect current gains for its interventions, this will make it unable to finance tens of thousands of mercenaries, which may threaten to get them out of control and turn them into combat groups on demand, which may personally become one of their targets for revenge in the future. This is at the same time that it failed to achieve tangible economic returns that could be quickly invested in the areas of intervention, despite its seizure of vital resources there. And in the event that Ankara continues to be unable to collect current gains for its interventions, this will make it unable to finance tens of thousands of mercenaries, which may threaten to get them out of control and turn them into combat groups on demand, which may personally become one of their targets for revenge in the future. This is at the same time that it failed to achieve tangible economic returns that could be quickly invested in the areas of intervention, despite its seizure of vital resources there. And in the event that Ankara continues to be unable to collect current gains for its interventions, this will make it unable to finance tens of thousands of mercenaries, which may threaten to get them out of control and turn them into combat groups on demand, which may personally become one of their targets for revenge in the future.

C- The deterioration of relations with the countries of the region and the loss of traditional international allies:

The Turkish behavior led to the deterioration of Ankara’s relationship with many countries in the region, especially Egypt and Syria, whose relations reached the point of complete diplomatic rupture (). In Egypt, Turkey dealt with the 2013 revolution as a military coup and criticized it publicly. It also threatened Egyptian national security with its support for terrorism and its blatant interference in Libya, which brought relations between them to the brink of collapse, especially with the intensification of their rivalry in the eastern Mediterranean region. As for Syria, it turned it into one of the most complex file in the region after it changed its view of Assad from a strategic ally. This is the case in Iraq, which has become a regional center that emits chaos and terrorism, not to mention Libya, which considered it an opportunity to establish its foothold on the North African coast, and the result was the collapse of the state and the establishment of chaos.All of this confirms that Turkey is pursuing policies that lead, sooner or later, to a deterioration in relations between it and countries that were considered among its traditional allies.

Although its relations with some other countries in the region have improved, such as Qatar and Israel (from within), this, on the other hand, has led to the ire of other countries, led by the Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the matter has become more complicated after these relations took military paths in Following the signing of a military agreement by Turkey and Qatar in 2014 to establish a military base in Qatar, which was repeated in Somalia in 2017, which witnessed the opening of a Turkish base southwest of Mogadishu, and the Suakin base in Sudan to be established remains one of the most important contentious issues between them and Egypt. Add to this the impact of its relationship with Israel on its relations with the Arab countries, despite its constant declaration of its condemnation of the Israeli behavior and its public criticism of the Israeli brutal practices in Palestine, we find that it is always developing its security, intelligence and economic cooperation with it, which raises doubts about the credibility of these criticisms ().

The deterioration of relations was not limited to the countries of the region only, but also to the major countries involved in their interests in the same region, led by the United States, which was a traditional ally of it, as the dispute between them became public to the point that Washington signed economic sanctions on some individual and institutional parties in Turkey after its military intervention In Syria, the relations between them are still tense, especially after Turkey acquired the Russian missile system, amid the objection of the United States to that, and its objection to Turkish behavior in the eastern Mediterranean.

As for Turkey’s relationship with the European Union, it is still not satisfactory, as its countries declared their condemnation of Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria and froze European arms exports to it, as well as its adherence to rejecting Turkish behavior in gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean. Even the Union threatened Turkey with economic sanctions and pressured it by deducting 145.8 percent. One million dollars from amounts belonging to European funds that were supposed to be granted to Turkey during the year 2020, in response to the Turkish exploration operations in the Cypriot waters, and the issues of the internal situation, democracy and human rights in Turkey are still at the top of the agenda between them ().

This is not to mention the tense relationship that reached the point of direct confrontation between Turkey and Russia, especially after Turkey shot down the Russian plane, which was followed by a strong response from Russia, which led to a Turkish retreat for fear of the situation deteriorating and entering into a direct confrontation with Russia, in which it would be the biggest loser. However, its decline did not prevent its loss on two levels: the first is the military and strategic level in front of Russia, as it lost the ability to fly over Syria and was forced to retreat to avoid a violent Russian reaction, and the second is political in front of Washington and NATO through its return to identification with their positions and its loss of the relative margin of independence in its foreign policy. away from them.

D – Holes in the Turkish model and the decline of the positive Turkish image:

Although some Turkish and Qatari opinion polls indicate that Erdogan is the most popular president in the region and that Turkey still enjoys great Arab acceptance, the reality of the matter is that the Turkish image in some countries of the Arab world is no longer what it was before (), for example The results of one of the opinion polls conducted in 2009 on seven Arab countries showed that 63% of the respondents considered the Turkish political system a successful model that combines Islam and democracy, while 61% of them saw that Turkey represents a model for the Arab world, and 77% expressed their welcome for Turkey to play a greater role. In the region (), and in 2010 the percentage of those who see Turkey as a model increased from 61% to 66%, and in 2011 the percentage of those who see Turkey as a successful model that combines Islam and democracy increased from 63% to 67%, while the percentage of They see Turkey as a model again to 61% ( ), while in 2012 the percentage of those who see Turkey positively decreased from 78% to 69%, and those who see it as a model from 61% to53%, which confirms that the image of Turkey changes with the change of events and the Turkish reactions to it (). In one of the recent Qatari opinion polls, it is not possible to ignore the percentage of those in Egypt who see Turkey as a threat to them in one of the results of the Arab index, which indicated that the Egyptians see that Israel is the country that most threatens Egypt with a score of 25 points, which is logical in light of the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, it is strange that Turkey ranked next with 18 points and is superior to the United States, which scored only 10 points, which raises questions about the credibility of Turkey’s positive image in the Arab world. Egypt and other Arab countries not included in the index, such as Syria and Libya, are countries that are expected to carry a negative image of Turkey due to its military interventions in it ().In one of the recent Qatari opinion polls, it is not possible to ignore the percentage of those in Egypt who see Turkey as a threat to them in one of the results of the Arab index, which indicated that Egyptians believe that Israel is the country that threatens Egypt most by 25 points, which is logical in light of the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. What is strange is that Turkey ranked next with 18 points and is superior to the United States, which scored only 10 points, which raises questions about the credibility of the positive image of Turkey in Egypt and other Arab countries that were not included in the index, such as Syria and Libya, which are countries that are expected to carry a negative image of Turkey. Turkey due to its military interventions.In one of the recent Qatari opinion polls, it is not possible to ignore the percentage of those in Egypt who see Turkey as a threat to them in one of the results of the Arab index, which indicated that Egyptians believe that Israel is the country that threatens Egypt most by 25 points, which is logical in light of the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. What is strange is that Turkey ranked next with 18 points and is superior to the United States, which scored only 10 points, which raises questions about the credibility of the positive image of Turkey in Egypt and other Arab countries that were not included in the index, such as Syria and Libya, which are countries that are expected to carry a negative image of Turkey. Turkey due to its military interventions.

Not only that, the Turkish presence, despite promoting its importance, still raises the fears of the peoples of the region about the return of its control under the mantle of the new Ottoman Empire. Negative effects of the Ottoman rule are still stuck in the collective memory that are difficult to erase. This is evidenced by what happened in Lebanon during Erdogan’s official visit in 2013, when demonstrators gathered in Martyrs’ Square in downtown Beirut and raised slogans rejecting the Ottoman presence, and some Christian sects refused to show the movie “Conquest 1453.” Which was distinguished by its huge production and exposure to the story of the conquest of Constantinople, as it was trying to obliterate the mistreatment that the Christian communities were subjected to there. And the matter was repeated again with another sect, the Armenians, who showed extreme sensitivity towards showing the movie “The Last Message,” to the extent that one of the parties moved to prevent its showing.

All this at the same time that the Turkish model faces holes and weakness from the inside, despite its attractiveness and uniqueness ( ); Turkey today ranks 110th out of 167 countries in the Democracy Index, while it occupies a value of -1.34 in the rate of political stability according to the Kaufman scale (which gives +2.5 for the most stable countries, and -2.5 for the least stable). It ranks 175 out of 195 countries in this index, while in the index of fairness of income distribution, Turkey occupies a position between acceptable and poor at a rate of 41, 9, All this means that Turkish democracy, which was the subject of admiration and praise from the peoples of the region, is threatened by lack of credibility in light of the erosion of power in Turkey and the strictness in its practice, especially with the purge campaign that was launched in the face of everyone suspected of belonging to the Fethullah Gulen movement, and the reaction of the regime Violence against what was known as the Gezi Park Uprising or the Taksim Uprising, for Turkey to lose a large part of its attractiveness in the region and its current regional expansion becomes a burden on its internal structure (). Some voices rise, declaring the rejection of the Turkish model, not only because of its fragility, but also because of the difficulty of reproducing it in the Arab world, as it is not suitable for application in it, especially since secularism in Turkey does not enjoy the same acceptance in the Arab region, and the democracy that developed in Turkey has reached what it is after years of merging parties. Islam in the system of government, which is a political environment that differs from the political environments in Arab countries.

C- The shift from the strategy of maximizing gains to minimizing losses, and from double gains (East and West together) to double losses (neither East nor West):

When Davutoğlu coined the phrase “shooting with a bow,” he set his sights on the larger strategic goal of Turkey, which is to combine the East and the West, as each leads to the other. However, the reality of the matter is that the steps that Turkey is taking in the direction of the east distance it from the way to the west in one way or another. Reality has become a saying opposite to the metaphor of bow shooting. The more Turkey pulls the string in the Middle East, the more it moves away from the West, especially since Turkey uses Islam as a tool in its policy with the East and spreads the image of the Islamic democratic model, and to the extent that this model achieved for it access to the Arab peoples who owe Islam in the beginning. However, it aroused the ire of other groups of people who believe in secularism or follow other religions, such as Christianity.

h- Compulsory rearrangement of papers and adoption of a policy of less severity and escalation:

After Turkey made sure of the failure of the “zero problems” strategy and its transformation into “zero calm” and the weight of the loss that it began to pay for successively, it has recently begun to re-evaluate its foreign policy and change its compass direction due to several factors, including: (1) the deterioration of the Turkish economy: where The inflation rate continues to rise, recording 15.6% in February 2021, and the Turkish lira continues to decline against the dollar, recording 7.8 against the dollar in March 2021, while the GDP recorded weak growth in 2020 by 1.8%, and the unemployment rate reached 13. 2%, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute. The deterioration of Ankara’s relations with the countries of the region exacerbated the suffering of the Turkish economy, as the volume of trade exchange between Turkey and the countries of the region decreased in 2020 to $51.6 billion, compared to $63. $8 billion in 2012, and the “popular campaign to boycott Turkey” was launched in Saudi Arabia in September 2020, in response to Ankara’s hostility to the Kingdom. The deterioration of the Turkish economy has led to a decline in Ankara’s ability to finance its involvement in the region’s conflicts in Syria, Libya and the South Caucasus (Karabakh region). In addition to the decline in the popularity of the Justice and Development Party at home and the growing voices opposing the government’s foreign policy, which cost the country a lot, especially since many Turkish businessmen held the Turkish government responsible for their inability to export their products to the Arab market, (2) forming fronts to confront the rising Turkish influence: In the eastern Mediterranean region, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum was established by 6 countries (Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Cyprus, Israel and Greece), excluding Turkey. On March 9, 2021, France was approved to join the Forum as a member, and the United States as an observer. The European Union also imposed a package of sanctions on Turkey for continuing its illegal oil and gas exploration activities in the eastern Mediterranean, the latest of which was in December 2020. In addition to the above, France, Greece, the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are coordinating among themselves to confront Ankara’s hostile policies in the region. In Libya, for example, France, the Emirates, and Egypt support the Libyan National Army to combat terrorism and confront extremist militias backed by Turkey in the Libyan West, and France provides military support to Greece in the face of the Turkish escalation, and on March 17, 2021, the “Eye of the Hawk” maneuvers were launched between the air forces Saudi Arabia and its Greek counterpart, in the skies of the Mediterranean, from the Greek “Souda” base. Turkey expressed its dissatisfaction with these maneuvers. (3) The change in the position of the United States from appeasement to limitation: As the United States tended to curtail Turkey’s exaggerated expansion, and since the Trump administration began to adopt a set of policies aimed at curtailing Turkey’s policies in the region, including, for example, making official visits to the NATO naval base in Souda Bay on the Greek island of Crete, and thinking of transferring Washington and its military means from the Turkish “Incirlik” base to the Greek island of Crete, to punish “Erdogan” for his behavior. In December 2020, Washington imposed sanctions on the Turkish Defense Industries Corporation and its president for Ankara’s possession of the Russian “S-400” system, and its refusal to give it up (). Joe Biden also called for increasing pressure on Turkey due to its escalation of tension in the eastern Mediterranean, and announced his rejection of Ankara’s policy against The Kurds in northeastern Syria (4) The Turkish Islamic project faltered in the region:

These contexts collectively led to setbacks and changes in Turkish foreign policy, which gradually appeared in several forms, including allowing the United States and the international coalition to use the Incirlik military base after many months of reluctance, and actual involvement in the international coalition to combat the state organization after months of hesitation, and the subdued voice of Ankara. In the face of the Sisi regime and the pace of its criticism of it, and the relatively soft tone regarding the Russian military intervention on its southern borders in Syria and the tacit acceptance of Assad remaining in power during the transitional period of the political solution agreed upon between the US and Russian foreign ministers, Kerry and Lavrov, in the Vienna Agreement.

Perhaps among the most important measures taken by Turkey in pursuit of appeasement: (1) Repairing relations with the Arab neighbourhood, foremost of which is Egypt, where the Turkish dialect has changed in its dealings with Egypt. Intelligence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stressing “the start of contacts at the diplomatic level.” Ankara also tried to take steps that would ease tensions with Cairo, when the Turkish authority asked the channels affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which broadcast from Istanbul, to adjust its discourse in line with media codes of honor and reduce abuses. It also tried to improve relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE through direct presidential contacts that pour in this direction, (2) reduce tension with European powers, as President Erdogan expressed, in January 2021, during a meeting with the ambassadors of the European Union in Ankara, his country’s readiness to improve Its relations with the European Union, especially France, which expressed its happiness to discuss with Macron again after a long break. Erdogan also held several discussions with the leaders of the European Union to settle the differences, especially the eastern Mediterranean, the settlement of the conflict in Cyprus and the developments in Libya. Turkey also resumed exploratory talks with Greece to discuss the differences in the Aegean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. (3) Addressing contentious files with the United States, on top of which comes the American support for Kurdish fighters in northern Syria and Ankara’s purchase of the “S-400” defense system from Russia in an attempt to activate common interests with the United States and reduce contentious issues between them ().

(2) Challenges and obstacles facing the Turkish system of recovery and return:

Despite the strength this system enjoyed at the intellectual and motor levels, it faced several challenges that prevented it from being activated at the optimal level, including:

A- The challenge of regional chaos and instability:

The Turkish system built its foundations on a largely stable regional environment. Any regional project cannot be successful in light of a regional environment rife with chaos and instability. The ideal environment on which the Turkish visions and perceptions were based turned into an environment of resistance to the Turkish role, as the Arab Spring revolutions broke out that destabilized the existing regional situation and undermined the strategic balances on which its foreign policy was based prior to the outbreak of these revolutions.

Turkey has tried to enjoy a great deal of flexibility that would enable it to adapt to the changes that affected the region, given that its unique model is able to adapt to all circumstances, but this did not avoid it falling between a two-way molar between supporting the rebels, who seemed to be on their way to obtain their demands, which would cost it The loss of its regional partners and the siding with the regimes demanding their overthrow, which may result in distorting the image of Turkey that it has drawn over the past years. It chose to support some of these revolutions, but in a cautious context and separate paths. Turkey was not satisfied with that, but saw that its ability allowed it to play a greater role than mere adaptation or support, so that it tended to push for this change in some Arab countries such as Syria and Libya, which became a disaster for it after the region turned into a complete chaos in which it is difficult to achieve strategic goals. Turkey ( ).

It is worth noting that the nature of the region with its sectarian divisions represented an additional constraint on the effectiveness of the Turkish role. Any Turkish siding with one party at the expense of the other would put it in a dilemma and harm its image, which it had always tried to export by overcoming sectarian divisions, as happened with its rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which showed it as loyal to the Sunni camp as opposed to the camp. Shiite.Perhaps this degree of intertwining and complexity is due to the nature of the Middle Eastern system, which is characterized by a high degree of interdependence between the countries from which it is formed. Therefore, any conflict of Turkey with a country may affect its relationship with neighboring countries, and Turkey has already suffered from this interdependence, so Ankara stands against the Syrian regime, for example. The example led to the deterioration of its relations with other neighbors in the region, such as the central government in Baghdad, and with groups such as the Shiite sect in Lebanon associated with the Syrian regime for strategic and sectarian reasons. The relationship between Turkey and Iran also deteriorated, and it seemed as if they entered into an open conflict, each of them trying to dominate the Middle East.

B- Challenging the compatibility between the stability of the Turkish interior and paying the price of regional prestige:

In the midst of Turkey’s preoccupation with proving its strength and influence in the regional neighborhood, the regional conflict has gradually expanded into the Turkish interior. The Syrian crisis has had not easy consequences for the internal situation in Turkey, as the Turkish regime has become more tyrannical and clinging to power, and its behavior and dealings with its citizens are in this direction. The Turkish government has restored the security logic in dealing with the interior and exterior, and it is no longer surprising that it uses hard power after decades of abandoning it (). Also, the conflict, which took a sectarian turn in Syria, began to be reflected in the Turkish society, in which voices were raised with religious and ethnic affiliations, and the problem of the Syrian refugees remains at the forefront of the problems that Turkey faces in the aftermath of the Syrian crisis, as more than three million refugees flocked to Turkish lands, although the Turkish government I tried to legalize this problem by setting up camps for them on the borders, but this did not prevent the influxes that occurred in the Turkish major cities, which formed a source of tension with the indigenous population. In addition, the economic results resulting from the deterioration of commercial exchanges with the Syrian neighbor after the suspension of the free trade agreement between them and the suspension of some economic projects such as the project to expand the gas pipeline to Turkey, not to mention the cost of maintaining the Syrian camps and absorbing the labor force, as well as its impact on the movement of Turkish exports to the Gulf countries that It was carried out through Syrian territory.

However, the biggest problem that faced the Turkish interior as a result of the Syrian crisis remains, which is the fear of an exacerbation of the Kurdish problem, especially with the Kobani crisis, in which the Syrian Kurds were attacked by ISIS forces, which embarrassed Turkey, as it stood unable to help the Kurds for fear of the growing sense of independence among the Kurds of Turkey. At the same time, it risked distorting its image as tacit approval of what is happening to the Kurds in it, which affected the internal democratic situation, especially after the Kurds declared their dissatisfaction with the policy of their state and its government, which they considered negative in dealing with this issue.

At the same time that the ruling party dismantled the castles of Turkish secularism one after the other, and extended its control over them, starting with the media, passing through the judiciary and educational institutions, and ending with the military institution, which received a heavy blow in the wake of the military coup that took place in Turkey in 2016 and the Turkish army paid for it in an incident that led to To consolidate the pillars of the party, to reduce the role of the military institution, and to Erdogan’s complete domination of power. This caused the explosion of a wave of criticism directed at Erdogan, especially with his policy of liquidating opponents, which became clear with his reaction to the military coup, so he needed external successes to legitimize his power again ().

This coincided with the fading of the star of the Turkish economic miracle, as growth rates declined and the national currency was negatively affected, which lost about a third of its value since 2018, in addition to the growing trade deficit, which reached $4,631 billion in August 2020. Turkey is currently one of the six most indebted countries in the world, as its external debt reached about $431 billion at the end of March 2020. More importantly, the estimated national income volume of about $800 billion is declining, so that its value has become nearly half according to the value of the Turkish currency, which is a path A danger that may lead to Turkey’s exit from the Group of Twenty, and the hope of moving from the club of debtor countries to the club of donor countries is no longer a dream that seeks justice and development, which finds itself forced to return to the tables of the International Monetary Fund. remote.

C – Challenging the limits of self-power, the “dilemma of power deficit” and the difficulty of safe exit:

The Turkish engagement with the Middle East region revealed a dilemma that some called the “dilemma of power deficit”, which refers to a gap between the state’s power and ambitions and the limited capabilities and resources that prevent the realization of these ambitions. Some countries draw a picture of them based on the fact that they have become among the major or regional countries with influence and influence, but the reality of the matter is that these countries do not have the capabilities or resources that enable them to play the roles that they announced, and thus these countries fall into the trap of overstepping their own capabilities ( ) .

This analysis applies, to one degree or another, to Turkey, which many events have shown to fall into the trap of the gap between the estimated status of the state and the actual capabilities it possesses, which prompted some experts to suggest the possibility of its exposure to the danger of “attrition” according to the theory of the British historian Paul Kennedy about “excessive expansion.” , which he presented in his famous book “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” ​​(published in 1987), as happened previously with many major powers, including the Ottoman Empire itself, which Erdogan is trying to revive once again, as it turned into a The “sick man of Europe” before its final fall in 1922.

There are many indications of this trend, so we find, for example, that it is unable to solve the Syrian crisis on its own, despite its close relationship with the Syrian regime, and it has begun to call for international intervention in Syria, either by establishing a no-fly zone or by conducting a ground military operation, which confirms that there are limits to Turkey’s regional power that prompted it to resort to To its traditional allies and to work under the umbrella of NATO, and that it is unable to provide regional solutions to all the problems of the Middle East countries as it used to claim, which requires greater international intervention to complicate the Middle East issues and accelerate their events ().

The crisis of the Lebanese hostages in Azaz, which took place in 2012, sheds light on the inability of Turkish diplomacy to solve the Middle East crises on its own, as it was very late in resolving this crisis, as it succeeded, after nearly a year and a half (17 months) of negotiations with the Free Syrian Army, in the release of hostages in exchange for a large ransom. The difficulty of the situation prompted her to share this achievement with Qatar, which showed Qatar the image of a capable regional player despite the limited real role.

Then comes the fall of the Islamists in most of the countries where the revolutions broke out to confirm that the Turkish influence on this region of the world is not strong enough to make it the dominant force. Rhetoric, rhetoric, and symbolism may be greater than their actual capabilities. In order to implement the Turkish model, billions of dollars must be spent to assist these countries in development and in building democratic national systems, which is difficult for Turkish capabilities to fulfill.

In addition, the multiple fronts open to Turkey in the Middle East region represent a major constraint and challenge for Turkey. The direct involvement in Syria, Libya and Iraq and the unfriendly relations with Egypt and the Gulf states – except for Qatar – and others confirm that Turkey has fallen into what some have called the “Middle Eastern quagmire.” “Turkey’s exit from this quagmire is not an easy matter, as it requires building an alternative strategy for a safe exit with the least possible losses, which is difficult to achieve in the short term in light of the escalation of crises resulting from the Turkish intervention in the region, foremost of which are the Syrian and Libyan crises in particular, because each of them represents an exposure Great for Turkish power, and to the extent that Turkey thought itself in a position of strength and that it was able to control what it considered its backyard, it began to get stuck little by little in the Syrian trap that pushed it to slip into the stagnant waters in the Middle East. Things soon turned aroundIn June 2014, he detained 49 Turkish citizens working in the Turkish consulate in Mosul, and in February 2015 a group of ISIS besieged The tomb of Suleiman Shah, the grandfather of Othman I, the founder of the Ottoman Empire, which is located in Syria, 30 kilometers from the Turkish border.With the increase in terrorist attacks that occurred in various places and claimed the lives of hundreds of Turks, Turkey realized that ISIS has gotten out of control and is threatening Turkish national security. ).

All of this confirms that the Syrian file had an impact on Turkey’s regional and global ambitions. Turkey’s handling of the situation in Syria harmed its reputation abroad, especially after it was slow to participate effectively in the international coalition against ISIS in Syria, which prompted the United States and the European Union to accuse it of being a supporter of the jihadists. Add to that the tarnishing of Turkey’s image caused by the refugee agreement signed between Ankara and Brussels in 2016, after it became clear to the world that the moral and humanitarian principles advocated by Turkey are easy to abandon in front of the private interest (), which embarrassed it at the international level and made its safe exit from Syria is something that is difficult to achieve in light of the exorbitant cost that has been paid, which is not only economic and military, but also political and humanitarian.

What applies to Syria applies, in one way or another, to Libya, in which Turkey has become involved in a way that makes it difficult to imagine its defeat from it in light of internal pressures and external hostilities, which may push it to further indulge in an effort to find a way out that saves its face internationally. Although it is logical that the higher the cost, the greater the possibility of retreating from the adopted engagement policy, but sometimes the high cost leads to more engagement due to the difficulty of coming up with a negative image in which the main color becomes the color of failure or failure.

D- The illusion of formal independence from international influences:

Turkey’s inability to achieve its vision in the Middle East cannot be explained away from the structure of the international system through which it moves, as Turkey relied on a pluralistic vision of the international system after it envisioned the end of the unipolar era irrevocably, which prompted Erdogan to employ the Russian-American (Atlantic) competition. ) on Ankara, which raised the value of the various cards he possesses, and made him able to dodge and maneuver between the Kremlin and the White House. Add to that the Turkish-Russian rapprochement, which provided an advantage to both parties, and despite the deterioration that caused in relations between Turkey and the United States, these relations continued to escalate, especially with both parties following the strategy of separating files. This is in addition to the emergence of the Eurasian East as a potential competitor to the West capable of attracting international powers towards it, including Turkey, which expects a new shift in its major external orientations towards the Eurasian East, led by China and Russia ().

All this made Turkey optimistic about the international system, which is witnessing a decline in American power, and fueled great hopes for its ability to act relatively independently and perhaps influence the international game. However, the international reality has proven that the shadows of unipolarity are still hanging over the international reality, as the great powers are still dominant. This is evidenced by the limitation of the role played by Turkey, jointly with Brazil, in signing an agreement with Tehran regarding the nuclear issue, which is considered a diplomatic success in addition to Turkey’s credit and its role as a regional actor, despite this, the group of five major countries limited what they reached by refusing to recognize the agreement and vote in the United Nations on a new package of sanctions against Iran. Here, Turkey realized that the independence it enjoys is less than it thought, and that the great powers are still holding the strings of the international game.

Add to that the deterioration of its relationship with Russia as a result of their conflicting interests in Syria, and it became between two wriggles between tense relations with Russia and deteriorating ones with the United States and the European Union, only to discover that the international environment that was supportive of its regional ambitions is now taking critical positions against it, even when it allows it to expand its borders. Its role in the region does not allow it in absolute terms, but rather draws limits to this role and reserves its ability to limit it at any moment if the interests of the major powers agree on that ().

C- The crowding of the regional sphere and the emergence of regional alliances to contain the Turkish expansion:

It is no secret to many that the difficulty and complexity of the Middle East region to the extent that one power is dominant and dominant is a form of exaggerated optimism. The region is full of forces aspiring to play a regional role. Egypt and all of them are countries that aspire to lead the Middle East, which indicates that the regional field is characterized by intense competition between Turkey and other powers that aspire to lead the regime.

 Although the region was subjected to a severe shock following the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions, as the power equations changed and a leadership vacuum occurred in the region, and the field became more open for Turkey to seize an opportunity to play this role, Turkey’s tireless attempts to reach the top of the regional pyramid does not mean that other powers will allow it. It has the right to take a leadership position, as Turkey faced resistance from many regional and international parties to appear in the image of the important regional player without being the only one (), and this meaning was further confirmed with the attempts of some countries that witnessed revolutions to restore its own strength and its regional role, and Egypt comes at the forefront Which topped the slogans of “returning to the traditional position” and “the end of dependency” in President Sisi’s orientations towards the external role of Egypt in light of the successive regional transformations that represent, in part, a threat to Egyptian national security, which made it enter into confrontations with Turkey during which it tries to confront it. These confrontations were not limited to Egypt onlyTurkey’s hardline approach and its foreign policy, which is entangled with geopolitics, has led to the emergence of conflicts and clashes with most of the main regional players, and has created new regional competition in both the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and North Africa region. Standing together against the ambitions of President Erdogan and his unbridled policies.

In this context, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and Israel intensified strategic cooperation in many initiatives, especially the extraction of gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean and the announcement of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, and Ankara was marginalized and completely ignored in this process. For its part, France supported the Eastern Mediterranean Energy Initiative, and the UAE provided tacit support for this endeavour. The head of the Israeli Mossad, Yossi Cohen, saw during his meeting with his counterparts in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, that the Iranian power is fragile, considering that the real threat comes from Turkey.

The United States has recently strengthened its military bases in Greece, and has repeatedly called on Turkey to exercise restraint over its maritime disputes with Greece, hinting at interference in the tensions in the eastern Mediterranean, in a way that will not satisfy Turkish politics. After the outbreak of the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region between Azerbaijan (which is supported by Turkey) and Armenia, Turkey witnessed a rapid rapprochement between the United States, France and Russia, aimed at curbing the strong Turkish support for Azerbaijan, including pledges of military assistance.

The structural system of the Turkish approach to regional hegemony and international rise (Fig. 1)

(Turkish Rise and Return System)

Conclusion:

In the previous lines, we have presented the most important features and dimensions of the Turkish system for the rise and return, including its intellectual structure, tools and motivating factors. It has become clear that this system has been subjected to many failures and is still facing challenges that made Turkey face one of three options:The first is that it continues to play the role that it formulated since 2002 with its various tools and strategies, despite the great cost that has become evident in recent times. As for the second option, it is the opposite option, which involves abandoning the role completely, which is unimaginable in the light of past and current Turkish thought and practices. As for the third option, which is the most predictable scenario, it is the temporary retreat to redefine the role and its tools through a truce in which some Its papers and gather more internal strength in order to be able to overcome the escalating challenges that it is facing repeatedly, and this confirms that Turkey is not expected to give up the intellectual basis of its system, as it represents the essence of Turkish-Ottoman thought, just as its aspirations for more power, prestige and influence on the two levels regional and internationalIt will not change, but it can cast a shadow on the tools used.

Although the excessive Turkish expansion in the region reflects a legitimate strategic ambition at the pragmatic level, the pillars of this project do not coincide with the size of the Turkish ambition, which may force it to reconsider the limits of its regional ambition towards reducing it so that the potential gains are paralleled with the confirmed risks, and perhaps for this reason. Turkey began to follow the policy of taking a breather instead of more regional engagement, as it became more aware of the difficulty of the regional conflicts in which it was involved and the high price it had to pay to get out of them in a decent manner because exiting in a humiliating manner is something that is not included in the Turkish calculations, especially with most The sums that were paid in this context, which indirectly led to inciting internal public opinion against its leaders, and to increasing the area of ​​internal influence over the outside.Hence, it is expected that Turkey will follow a kind of tactical calm to absorb the pressures imposed on it, whether from within or without, but it will soon return to achieving its lofty goals and the intellectual structure on which its system of advancement and return was based.

This does not mean in any way that Turkey has failed as a rising regional power, but it does mean that it was able to take advantage of a favorable regional context to prove its strength, but once this context changed, the matter became more difficult than it could imagine. status and between its actual ability and its possession of the tools to achieve this status on the ground. Despite the difficulty of Turkey’s admission of the mistakes it made in its foreign policies, the analysis of the course of events leads to the conclusion that Turkey is now following the policy of limiting losses consciously and consciously, especially after it was exposed to a form of regional isolation, which it tried to find a positive name for and called it “Precious isolation,” but it was, in fact, the embodiment of the failures of the rising power in its regional environment.

SAKHRI Mohamed
SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a bachelor's degree in political science and international relations as well as a Master's degree in international security studies, alongside a passion for web development. During my studies, I gained a strong understanding of key political concepts, theories in international relations, security and strategic studies, as well as the tools and research methods used in these fields.

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