With elections approaching in South Sudan: What will happen to the peace agreement?

The lack of political will to implement the South Sudan Peace Agreement led to a slowdown in its implementation to the extent that the period before the transition was extended twice. Under international pressure, the transitional period was carried out without completing the implementation of the tasks of the pre-transitional period, and neither its tasks nor the tasks of the transitional period were implemented.

The Revitalized Conflict Resolution Agreement in the Republic of South Sudan was signed on 12 September 2018, in Addis Ababa, between the parties to the conflict and civil society after nearly a year of negotiations. The hope was that this agreement would pave the way to sustainable peace and stability, bring about important reforms in state institutions and policies, and create the conditions for a democratic ground leading to free and fair elections. So that the rule will pass to leaders chosen by the citizens who will enter the country into a democratic, multi-party era.

The revitalized peace agreement provided for the formation of a transitional government to implement the terms of the agreement and to supervise the holding of elections two months before the end of the transitional period. It is worth noting that the implementation period of the agreement has been divided into two periods: the eight-month pre-transition period, followed by the 36-month transitional period, and each period has specific tasks in the agreement.

From the period before the transition to the implementation of the agreement

The objective of this period of time is to prepare for the transition so that the implementation of the tasks of the transition period can begin from the first day without delay. Among the main tasks of this period: unifying the forces of the parties to the conflict, establishing a national army and national security agencies that owe allegiance to the homeland and not to personalities regardless of their positions in power. It was also expected during the period before the transitional period that the parties to the agreement would agree, after deliberating between them, to establish the following transitional governance institutions:

1. At the level of national governance: naming members of the Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the Legislative Council, the Transitional National Legislative Council, and the Council of States.
2. At the state level: designating state governors, state cabinets, commissions, and state legislatures.
3. At the local government level: the designation of county governors and members of the local government council in each county.

On the last day of the period before or shortly before the transition, it was expected – according to the terms of the agreement – that the President of the Republic would issue decrees appointing: the Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the two chambers of the legislature, state governors, and state legislatures. All this so that the transitional government of national unity can begin to perform its duties from the first day of the transitional period. After taking the constitutional oath, each of the governors of the ten states issues decisions appointing the state cabinet, commissions, governors, and local councils in his state districts.

Implementation of the Convention began very slowly and with careful selectivity in the materials being implemented. Eight months passed without any significant achievement, which prompted the parties to the agreement to extend the pre-transitional period for another six months until the forces were unified and the formation of a national army and other national security agencies, in addition to agreeing on the occupants of constitutional positions at the three levels of government, as we explained above. However, this additional period passed as the previous one and nothing was accomplished, and the parties were forced to extend the period before the transition again for another hundred days. Thus, the period before the transition became 17 months and 10 days instead of only 8 months as stipulated in the peace agreement.

Therefore, when the period of the second extension of the period before the transition expired, the guarantors of the agreement feared that the repeated extension would lead to the collapse of the agreement before the start of implementation; Accordingly, I pressured the parties to enter directly into the transitional period. Indeed, the formation of the presidential institution was announced on February 22, 2020, and with it the beginning of the transitional period. All tasks of the pre-transition period were moved to the transitional period. Since that date, the parties have been involved in the formation of the governing bodies, unconcerned with the tasks of the transitional period. Until the moment of writing, the parties have not completed the formation of national commissions and local councils in the provinces, which are – as we mentioned above – the entitlements of the period before the transition.

As we have indicated, the holding of free, fair and credible elections is limited to 34 months after the transitional period. In this period of time, it was expected that the provisions of the agreement would be implemented, which contribute to creating a favorable climate for holding the elections in a satisfactory manner for all. These clauses relate to merging forces, creating unified national forces, conducting a population census, adopting a permanent constitution for the country, judicial reform, returning and resettling millions of refugees and internally displaced people to their areas, and enacting laws necessary for the election process such as the Political Parties Law, National Elections Law, and National Security Law. All of these laws are aimed at guaranteeing freedoms to create a healthy democratic atmosphere without which elections cannot be held.

In addition to these requirements, another problem that will hamper the elections if they are not quickly contained is the high frequency of clashes between local communities on the one hand, and between them and the government on the other. In recent days, there were reports of clashes in Tonj area in Warrap State between armed citizens and government forces, as a result of which more than sixty government forces died. Clashes also continued between civil societies: Twij, Abyei, Mayom and Warrap, in addition to heavier clashes between Murle on the one hand. On the other hand, the Nuer and the Dinka

Now, only six months remain until the elections are held, according to the revitalized peace agreement, and none of the conditions necessary to organize the elections have been implemented, and this period is not sufficient to complete them. The question that arises is: Will the elections be held despite the absence of the appropriate grounds that would make them free, fair and credible?

In this article, we will try to answer this question, and we will address the expected consequences if it does not occur on time.

Options for not holding elections on time

It is clear that the failure to implement the agreement is a deliberate act by the largest party to the revitalized peace agreement. This party showed the lack of political will to implement the agreement since the beginning of its implementation, which led to the extension of the period before the transition twice. The same party has also been active recently, calling for elections in 2023 despite the failure to meet the requirements for organizing free and fair elections, which is understood from it that this party wants to impose a fait accompli in the name of elections. No one disputes that this unilateral step represents a risky path as it narrows the options for peaceful solutions to the South Sudan crisis, and may even erupt violence again, especially since the armed groups’ forces have not been unified with government forces and still owe loyalty to their leaders.

Certainly, if the elections are not held on time, the first thing that comes to mind is to postpone their organization until the necessary requirements are implemented in order for the elections to be free and fair and the results of which are accepted by all parties. But does this postponement mean extending the term of the current transitional government? And if so, what is new that will make it implement what it failed to implement in the previous period? If not, what option or options are available?

In light of the lack of political will to implement the requirements of holding free, fair and credible elections, it is not prudent to consider extending the transitional period under the current transitional government; If the goal is to prepare for those elections. What attests to the absence of political will is the unfulfilled issue of uniting the forces, which is a prerequisite for holding the elections. It was supposed to take place before May 12, 2019, but it has not left its place yet, 4 years after the signing of the agreement. How many more years does it need? Parties to implement this action?! So, the problem is not the lack of time, but the absence of political will, and this will not change over time. On the contrary, extending the transitional period under the current government will serve the goals of those who have placed obstacles in the way of implementing the agreement from the beginning, to prolong their presence in power.

The other option is to set a timetable for implementing the necessary requirements for holding free and fair elections, including the unification of forces and the establishment of a permanent constitution for the country, on the basis of which the elections will be held, as stipulated in the peace agreement. Based on this schedule, the parties decide the additional time required to hold the elections. If this schedule exceeds on February 22, 2023, the date specified in the agreement for handing over power to an elected government, as is expected, the new transitional system that will supervise the elections will be negotiated.

Grounds for ending the mandate of the transitional government

The current government of South Sudan derives its legitimacy from the revitalized peace agreement of 2018, and Article 1.1 of the agreement clearly states this. Clause 1.1.1 also recognizes what reads: “The active transitional government of national unity shall be established in Southern Sudan charged with the task of implementing this Agreement” (1) , and Clause 1.1.4 indicates that the term of office of this government is the transitional period. Accordingly, the Government of Southern Sudan has no other legitimacy. There is no constitutional provision or in the revitalized peace agreement that gives it the right to continue after the end of the transitional period on February 22, 2023. So, if there are no elections for the people to choose their government that takes power on February 22, 2023, the sons and daughters of South Sudan will have to return For the founding platform to agree on a road map for the country’s future. This situation did not result in a compelling reason to prevent the government from holding elections, but rather because it did not want to do so.

A similar situation occurred in 2017, in July 2016, an armed confrontation erupted in the presidential palace between the two parties to the 2015 peace agreement, which later expanded into a full-scale civil war. At the outbreak of the war, the question was: In the absence of the First Vice President of the Republic, who was expelled from Juba as a result of armed confrontations and a replacement was appointed by the other side of the agreement, is the 2015 peace agreement still in effect? IGAD, the Troika, and other concerned parties tried to answer this question, and opinions varied between whether the agreement was reeling, standing on one leg, or in the recovery room…etc. All this to avoid admitting that it collapsed, because that would mean the collapse of the Government of Southern Sudan, which was deriving its legitimacy from that agreement, and the emergence of a constitutional vacuum. Finally, the Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, President Festus Mohai, came up with a proposal to “revitalize” the agreement; Which means accepting that she was in the recovery room.(2) . Subsequently, all political parties and civil society in South Sudan were invited to the peace negotiations held in Addis Ababa, in December 2017, which led to the revitalized peace agreement in 2018. The invitation was not limited to the two parties to the agreement at that time, but extended To an estimated number of political and military forces that emerged in that period and civil society. It is this new agreement that has given legitimacy to the current government of South Sudan, as we have said. The main point here is the emphasis on inviting all parties to a round table to agree on the future of the country.

The role of the regional and international community in ending the South Sudan crisis

The international community, especially the United States of America, has played a pivotal role in the search for peace in Sudan since US President George W. Bush appointed his friend Senator John Danforth as a special envoy for peace in Sudan on September 6, 2001 (3) . At that time there were ongoing but intermittent peace negotiations since 1994 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army under the mediation of the Governmental Authority for Desertification and Development (4). The US envoy helped focus the negotiations and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed between the two parties, in January 2005, under President Bush and implementation began under him as well. His successor, President Barack Obama, proceeded in the same direction closely to the peace process as the two parties, Republican and Democratic, adopted a unified policy toward Sudan. The role of the United States of America was not limited only to facilitating mediation, but also to pressure the two parties to commit to implementing the agreement according to the agreed timetables. For example, in light of the incompatibility between the two parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, America insisted on holding a referendum in southern Sudan on its future on time without delay. As for the region, in addition to being represented by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) the role of direct mediation between the two parties, it played the role of guarantor of the agreement. For its part, the United Nations sent peacekeeping forces known as the “United Nations Mission in Sudan”

Therefore, when war broke out in South Sudan, in December 2013, IGAD moved quickly and offered mediation to the two warring parties (the president and his deputy) and they accepted that mediation. Thus, in January 2014, negotiations were launched that led to the 2015 peace agreement (5) . Behind IGAD were the Troika countries, the European Union, the Forum of Friends of IGAD, China and other countries, which – especially the Troika countries, the European Union and Japan – financed the negotiations. As for the United Nations, it deployed its forces in South Sudan immediately after independence, in 2011. It was called the “United Nations Mission in South Sudan” (UNMISS), and it was on the ground when the war broke out, saving thousands of lives of citizens who were targeted by the warring parties.

The South Sudanese blame IGAD and the guarantors of the revitalized peace agreement that they were not up to the responsibility expected of them in obliging the parties to the agreement to abide by its implementation, and they are the ones who signed it on their own with complete satisfaction. The reluctance to implement continued without any of these guarantors and witnesses raising a finger to remind the reluctance to implement the agreement according to the agreed schedule, as the United States did when implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in 2005. Therefore, they hold them partly responsible for the state of affairs in South Sudan now.

An inclusive conference for political forces and civil society in South Sudan

The best option to get out of the crisis at the end of the transitional period without electing the government that will rule the country later is the establishment of an inclusive conference of political forces and civil society in southern Sudan; To negotiate and agree on a timetable for holding free, fair and credible elections, and for the people of South Sudan to choose for the first time in their history who will govern them. This conference is being held in one of the countries of the region, and it is invited – in addition to the parties to the revitalized peace agreement – the opponents whom the government is now negotiating in the Rome forum. The countries of the region, along with the Troika and the United Nations, must play a direct role in establishing and sponsoring the conference. Because it is expected that some parties of the current government will oppose this and insist on clinging to power unjustly. After that, it plays the role of mediator or facilitator for dialogue within the conference between the sons and daughters of South Sudan.

The people of South Sudan are looking for a new timetable for holding free and fair elections, a timetable that would highlight two issues without which elections cannot be held: the unification of the armed forces and the adoption of a permanent constitution for the country. If it is not possible to unify forces sufficiently before the elections, the UN mission will have to provide security during the elections, especially since one of its mandates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is to help implement the Revitalized Peace Agreement and the peace process, protect civilians, and address inter-communal violence (6) ) .

Since 2005, South Sudan has been under transitional governments run by politicians in a power-sharing framework. With the exception of the first transitional government (2005-2011), which was under a united Sudan, other transitional governments failed to transfer South Sudan to a democratic era as evidenced by the absence of any elections in South Sudan since its independence, on July 9, 2011, rampant corruption, and the outbreak of Wars, and the breakdown of the security cord in the countryside. The thing is that the civil war broke out twice between the president and his deputy, so do we need to repeat this experience for the third time? From the old saying: “A believer is not stung from the same hole twice.” Who are the people of South Sudan until they are stung three times?

a summary

The state of South Sudan witnessed a violent civil war after the second year of its establishment, in which all kinds of atrocities were committed against defenseless citizens by both sides of the conflict. The 2015 peace agreement ended the conflict over power-sharing between the two sides. The agreement did not take long, as violence erupted again in the presidential palace between the president and his first vice president, in July 2016, and then developed into another civil war with many sides. The 2018 agreement was a revitalization of the first agreement, and was built, like its predecessor, on power-sharing between the parties to the conflict. The agreement stipulated that elections would be held 34 months after the beginning of the transitional period, provided that specific requirements were implemented to guarantee the freedom and fairness of the elections.

However, the lack of political will to implement the agreement led to the slowdown, reluctance and selectivity in implementing its provisions to the extent that the period before the transition was extended twice, eventually becoming 17 months and ten days instead of the eight months stipulated in the revitalized peace agreement. Under pressure from the guarantors and witnesses of the agreement, the parties were forced to jump into the transitional period without completing the implementation of the tasks of the pre-transitional period. Therefore, until this moment, the parties have not finished carrying out these carried-over tasks, not to mention the tasks of the transitional period itself, and it has been 28 months out of its 36-month lifespan. Therefore, it is not possible to hold elections in the remaining period.

Those who put obstacles in the way of implementing the revitalized peace agreement hope that the transitional period will be extended again and again, as was the case with the pre-transitional period. But that endeavour lacks any basis in the Constitution or the Convention; Because with the end of the transitional period, the agreement will have reached its end and the current transitional government will lose its legitimacy. Therefore, it is necessary to think from now on what will happen to the political and legal situation of the country after the end of the transitional period on February 22, 2023.

The experience in southern Sudan proved the failure of any peace agreement based on power-sharing between its parties, as well as the impossibility of restoring the lost confidence between the President of the Republic and his First Vice President. Therefore, it is necessary to search for alternatives to save the people of South Sudan from the grip of these people, so that they find the opportunity for the first time to choose their leaders. One of the alternatives is to hold an inclusive dialogue conference between political entities and civil society in southern Sudan to think about how to prepare together for the upcoming elections and how to manage them. It is expected that this option will find opposition from some parties of the current government in Juba; Accordingly, the countries of the region, the continent, the international community and the United Nations must play a unified role to ensure the establishment of the conference so that the leaders of South Sudan can have a dialogue to decide about their people, who have seen nothing in the independent state of South Sudan except wars, death and suffering, forcing millions – an estimated third of the population – to seek refuge in neighboring countries and internal displacement. This miserable situation shakes the conscience of any human being.

It is also expected that the international community will play its full role as guarantor and witnesses to the recent agreement in facilitating and nurturing this dialogue between the sons and daughters of South Sudan. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan has a special role now and when the elections take place.

About the author

Lam Akol Ajawin

University professor, South Sudanese politician and former Sudanese Foreign Minister.REFERENCES

(1)– Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Agreement on Conflict Resolution in the Revitalized Republic of South Sudan, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, United Nations website September 12, 2018. (accessed July 10, 2022): www.un.org

(2)Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Summit Final Communiqué No. 31, United Nations website June 12, 2017, (accessed July 10, 2022): www.un.org

(3)White House, “President Appoints Danforth as Special Envoy for Sudan,” United Nations Website, September 6, 2001 (accessed July 10, 2022): www.un.org

(4)Name changed to Intergovernmental Authority on Development. United Nations website 6 March 1996 (accessed July 10, 2022): www.un.org

(5)Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, United Nations website August 17, 2015. (accessed July 10, 2022): www.un.org

(6)Security Council, “The Situation in South Sudan,” Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations website on 12 June 2022. Accessed 10 July 2022: https://bit.ly/3coBMys