Fatah’s Position and Its Factions: The Stance on the Gaza War and Its Implications

The significance of Fatah’s position and its various factions regarding the Gaza war lies in the policies that will influence both the course of the war and the aftermath, particularly since the involvement of Palestinian forces, including Fatah or some of its factions, in managing Gaza has become a prevalent issue. Amid ongoing discussions about Gaza’s future in the context of the current ceasefire negotiations between the resistance and Israel, and the attempts to achieve reconciliation, the latest being in China, a picture of Gaza’s forthcoming governance is forming.

Introduction

The importance of Fatah’s stance on the Gaza war is that it will shape policies affecting the war’s trajectory and its aftermath, as well as the broader Palestinian issue. There is a need for Palestinian unity on essential positions, such as agreeing on the cessation of the war and its sustainability, how to manage the sector afterward, and reconstruction among other related issues. Additionally, fundamental issues that existed before and will continue after the war, such as the unification of the national and struggle programs, must be addressed.

It is noteworthy that attempts to reconcile between Fatah and Hamas have been numerous, including the Algiers Agreement (October 2022), the Alamein meeting (July 2023), Moscow meetings (February 2024), and recently in China on July 23, 2024. All Palestinian factions signed a broad agreement to establish a “Palestinian Reconciliation Government to manage Gaza after the war and focus current efforts on countering the Israeli war and stopping the ‘genocidal war’,” without linking this agreement to executable steps or a timeline.

Clearly, the challenge of achieving Palestinian reconciliation in this narrow and difficult time is significant. However, the ongoing genocide in Gaza has relatively influenced the varied positions within Fatah and its bases regarding the Israeli war on Gaza and the stance it should take. This also follows variations in positions regarding Operation “Flood of Al-Aqsa” and the Hamas movement itself.

This paper examines the positions of the official and unofficial components of Fatah regarding “Flood of Al-Aqsa,” the Israeli war on Gaza, and the Hamas movement and the future relationship with Gaza. It analyzes the stances and actions taken after the war in light of the transformations within the movement and the role it currently plays or might play in the future.

The paper will first review Fatah’s position on armed resistance and the transformations it has undergone since it is the primary determinant of Fatah’s stance on the October 7th war. On the other hand, the developments during this war have impacted the positions of individuals and groups within Fatah.

The Gap Between Fatah and Armed Resistance

The period after Oslo under President Yasser Arafat (1993-2004) saw transformations in Fatah’s structure and approach, though they were not as profound compared to Mahmoud Abbas’s era (2005-present). The movement maintained armed struggle as an option alongside the Oslo path adopted by its leadership.

Arafat’s refusal to abandon the military option helped preserve the balance of Fatah and its revolutionary reservoir. During Arafat’s tenure, there was militarization of the Tunnel Intifada in 1996 with the involvement of Palestinian Authority security forces, and the second intifada (2000-2004) also saw militarization with the participation of PA security forces. Additionally, the establishment of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades as a military wing of the movement led to confrontations with Israel and attacks against it. This resulted in Arafat being subjected to an Israeli military siege and international diplomatic isolation due to his policies and positions. Although no general conference of the movement was held during Arafat’s tenure post-Oslo, some changes in the movement occurred incrementally without a decision to amend the movement’s system or charter. These included:

Fatah’s shift from a national liberation movement to a ruling party, where the leader of the movement is also the leader of the authority adopting a political project based on peaceful solutions and negotiations within a phased agreement, and carrying the slogan of “just and comprehensive peace.” The movement’s leadership became involved in leading the authority and its security and civil institutions.

The legitimacy center in Fatah shifted post-Oslo from the legitimacy of “resistance” and its adherence to Oslo legitimacy and its provisions. Legislative and presidential elections post-Oslo have become the sources of legitimacy.

The movement experienced relative fragmentation due to some leaders rejecting the Oslo option and deciding not to return to the interior, including some members of the Central Committee who became external opponents, such as Farouk Qaddoumi and others. This kept the resistance option present in Fatah’s culture and literature even if it was organizationally abolished.

The stagnation of the movement’s bodies due to a lack of renewal and disconnection from the outside, and not renewing frameworks for over 15 years, led to increased informal polarization within the movement. This was evident during the 2006 legislative council elections when movement leaders and cadres ran independently against the official list. This indicates that the movement’s final state is not definitive and may witness further transformations in various directions, possibly including a return of some factions to accept the resistance option in different forms.

Despite establishing governmental institutions, the authority did not confiscate all of Fatah’s organizational and social roles inside and outside, leaving the organizational work ongoing in its space even if it sometimes conflicted with the authority’s role and institutions. This suggests that Fatah’s margin within the authority remains, alongside the continued culture of the revolutionary line and its history within the movement.

However, this margin did not prevent the deepening of the gap between Fatah itself and the resistance, its factions, and programs.

Mahmoud Abbas assumed leadership of the movement on November 11, 2004, following Yasser Arafat, elected by the movement’s Central Committee. He was then elected as the movement’s president by acclamation during its sixth conference in 2009 and was re-elected in the seventh conference in 2016. During Abbas’s tenure, Fatah underwent transformations that deepened the gap between its revolutionary history and principles and its orientations that completely contradict resistance. The movement officially retreated from the armed struggle approach during its sixth conference and adopted non-violent popular resistance as a strategic option. It declared that peace was the Palestinian strategy adopted during its seventh conference.

These transformations occurred within the framework of the Palestinian Authority’s project aimed at enhancing the security coordination system and reviving the peace process with Israel following the second intifada (2000-2004), and after the Palestinian division between Fatah and Hamas (2006-2007). Abbas subsequently banned Hamas in the West Bank and pursued its members, making armed resistance officially pursued by the Palestinian Authority.

Under the cover of the legitimacy of the authority and the organization, Abbas sought to integrate Fatah into the authority by changing its leadership in the Revolutionary Council and the Central Committee. Some appointments within the movement were made through decrees and decisions contrary to the internal system. These policies contributed to increased polarization and competition for organizational and leadership positions, including the conflict over his succession. This produced violations of the movement’s internal system in various forms of conflict of interest due to dual roles and positions. With the ongoing postponement of presidential elections, Fatah’s legitimacy shifted towards one-man rule, replacing the missing elections with legitimacy derived from power and influence, and completely erasing the legitimacy of struggle. The leadership of Fatah has aged due to the recycling of most positions, negatively affecting its role in international and regional relations as a movement serving the Palestinian Authority and its institutions.

Under Abbas, Fatah faces several crises due to the continuous policy of merging the movement within the authority. The first is the failure of the authority’s political project due to the stalled negotiations with Israel. The second is Hamas’s growing popular competition against Fatah in light of the movement’s continued abandonment of the armed struggle approach. The third is internal splits within the movement, transforming it into independent factions.

The movement also faces other crises that put it to the test, including its entanglement with the ongoing security role of the Palestinian Authority, the continued security coordination with Israel amidst the increasing targeting of Palestinians by Israel, and the extreme right-wing government’s assault on the Palestinian people, while the movement’s leadership insists on adhering to a non-violent popular resistance approach. There is also the crisis of failure to achieve national reconciliation as a public demand amidst the ongoing war on the Palestinian people, and its impact on the future of the movement and its role in Gaza after the war. Additionally, there is the crisis of the movement’s lack of independence from the authority, with some of its leaders tied to the Palestinian Authority’s system and interests, whether economic or official positions such as allowances, appointments, or pensions, in exchange for proving loyalty.

Positions of Fatah Movement and Its Official and Unofficial Factions

The Fatah movement, both its official and unofficial factions, has shown varied positions regarding the “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” and the war on Gaza. These positions are linked to the internal directions that have formed within the movement over the past two decades. The roots of these differing views are tied to their perspective on armed resistance and their relationship with Hamas, as well as their views on the peace process based on the Oslo Accords. Within Fatah itself, there seems to be a divergence in the stance towards what is happening in Gaza. These positions can be divided into official stances issued by the leadership and structures of the movement, and unofficial stances from internal factions and splinter groups.

Official Position of Fatah

Fatah has expressed its official positions either through statements released by the movement, the Central Committee, the Revolutionary Council, or its media commission, or through the outcomes of public meetings and individual media statements.

The majority of Fatah’s official positions have been articulated through statements and comments from President Mahmoud Abbas or the Palestinian presidency’s office. These statements have been linked to his role as President of the Palestinian Authority and have reflected his previous views on armed resistance and the strained relationship with Hamas prior to the war. They continue his previous views from past conflicts, asserting that such confrontations yield “no results on the ground” and that the option of resistance is “costly.” Furthermore, Hamas has been held responsible for initiating the war unilaterally. These positions are part of the ongoing political conflict between Fatah and Hamas, and the failure of both movements’ leaderships to reach a reconciliation agreement through various negotiation rounds held in Arab and foreign capitals. Fatah has adhered to the position of the authority, emphasizing the need to unify arms within the authority’s system and accepting the same approach based on halting armed resistance, which Hamas rejects. Despite signing reconciliation agreements, the two movements have not agreed on any formula regarding this point, and disputes over the details persist.

At the beginning of the war, Abbas made several statements calling for the cessation of the war on Gaza and halting displacement plans, reaffirming the unity of the West Bank and Gaza as territories under the Palestinian Authority according to the Oslo Accords. Abbas also emphasized the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the entity and reference for the Palestinian people, and not the Palestinian factions.

Initially, Abbas showed some reservations following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and did not officially condemn the operation, but he condemned the targeting of civilians by both sides. However, he later blamed Hamas for “providing Israel with pretexts to attack the Gaza Strip” by initiating the October 7 operation.

Fatah itself issued general statements, some bearing its name and others from the Central Committee or the Revolutionary Council. The Media, Culture, and Intellectual Mobilization Commission released over 24 statements addressing general positions and comments on events in line with the movement’s vision. Overall, Fatah’s statements have reflected inconsistent and sometimes contradictory views. Discrepancies may arise between the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council, and the positions within the movement may lack coherence due to the multiple sources of these statements, reflecting the internal disagreements on the approach. The content included a mixture of adherence to the movement’s legacy and slogans, while simultaneously committing to the Palestinian Authority’s project.

Regarding Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Fatah’s positions were contradictory. The Revolutionary Council described it as a “heroic battle” in a statement issued on October 8, 2023, affirming the Palestinian people’s right to defend themselves within the framework of national unity, and calling on the movement’s members and the people to “deepen cohesion in this heroic battle.” Conversely, Fatah described the operation in a separate statement as a “venture,” condemning Hamas and holding it responsible for the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the Palestinian Nakba. This statement was rejected by some Revolutionary Council members who described it as a “controversial statement” not issued according to the usual organizational procedures.

Fatah did not seek to hold regular public meetings to discuss the event and develop practical steps but left this responsibility to President Abbas. The first general meeting of the movement was held on October 31, 2023, nearly three weeks after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. In this meeting, the movement called for a general mobilization to defend itself, the land, and the “national project,” urged an emergency Arab summit, and asserted the people’s right to self-defense. It emphasized that settlement and blockade are the root of the problem, with a strong insistence on halting the aggression as a priority, and held the international community responsible for not enforcing its resolutions despite Fatah’s persistent efforts for peace. This statement contradicted the general direction of the Palestinian Authority and its security apparatuses in the West Bank, which sought to maintain security in the West Bank and prevent the expansion of confrontations and armed actions.

The Central Committee of Fatah, despite being the highest decision-making body in the movement, held only four meetings since the start of the war on Gaza. Its first meeting was on November 6, 2023, a month after the war began. It issued a statement warning against displacement and calling for an end to the war and a political solution to end the Israeli occupation. The statement reiterated rejection of separating the West Bank from Gaza or occupying any part of the Strip, affirming that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and calling for unity and rallying national unity to face challenges. These statements were similar to those made by President Abbas following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood before changing later, i.e., before the committee’s meeting by more than a month. Three additional statements were issued from meetings on November 27, 2023, February 8 and 15, 2024, and another statement on December 18, 2023, without a meeting. All these statements and meetings confirmed the Palestinian Authority’s positions on Gaza, focusing on the same rhetoric of holding the international community accountable, the unity of the West Bank and Gaza, and supporting the PLO.

As for the Revolutionary Council of the movement, as the highest organizational authority, it held only one meeting more than four months after the war began, in January 2024, attended by President Mahmoud Abbas. The Revolutionary Council issued four separate statements since October 7, 2023, addressing violations by the occupation in general and against prisoners in particular, and condemned attacks on movement prisoners, including Zakaria Zbeidi, a member of the Revolutionary Council, and Marwan Barghouti, a member of the Central Committee.

Opposing Positions and Statements within Fatah

Statements from leaders within the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council of Fatah have contradicted the movement’s general stance regarding Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli war. These included statements from Marwan Barghouti, Abbas Zaki, and Jamal Hweil, which were at odds with Abbas’s statements and directions. These opposing statements remained marginal and subdued compared to the official stance of the movement, which is dominated by Abbas and the faction close to the Palestinian Authority circles, controlling appointments, financial allocations, salary systems, and positions within the Authority.

It is noteworthy that the imprisoned leader Marwan Barghouti, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee, enjoys near-universal Fatah consensus and is known for his ability to unify factions and currents due to his revolutionary history and role in the intifada and subsequent imprisonment. This has turned him into a symbol of the movement’s legacy and present. Barghouti’s speeches carry appeals to the masses and are more supportive of the armed resistance approach and Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, calling for popular uprising and confrontation with Israel. Consequently, Israel imposes solitary confinement on him, and his punitive measures have increased following the flood.

Barghouti and his faction have different views and initiatives for unity with Hamas based on utilizing resistance to achieve political goals, reviving the PLO on the basis of Palestinian unity across all its regions, and unifying the Palestinian national front based on democracy, plurality, and full national partnership. They also strive for liberation and the dismantling and defeat of the colonial system.

Abbas Zaki, a member of the movement’s Central Committee, issued a call in his capacity as the General Commissioner for Arab and Popular China Relations within the movement, urging Arab masses to hold solidarity marches with Gaza. He later expressed support for Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, describing the resistance’s performance there as “heroic” and stating, “As long as ‘Mohammed Deif’ is on his feet, we are all fine,” criticizing the peace process as an illusion that distracted Fatah from preparing for combat. He promised that Fatah members would join any future confrontation if Israel moved to annex the West Bank. The movement’s leadership responded to him with a statement saying his remarks were personal and did not represent the movement’s leadership or the Authority.

Another dissenting voice within Fatah is Jamal Hweil, a member of the Revolutionary Council. He was arrested by Israel at the end of June 2024 and is a prominent leader with broad factional support in Jenin camp. Hweil described Operation Al-Aqsa Flood as a “strategic Palestinian victory over Israel.” He opposed the Palestinian Authority’s stance as inadequate for the scale of the event, calling for the withdrawal of recognition of Israel, restoring national unity, and aligning the political project with the aspirations of the Palestinian people to match the scale of sacrifices. He emphasized that Hamas is an integral part that cannot be eradicated or excluded, and called on Fatah members to engage with Israel using all means, including armed struggle.

Third: The Position of Splinter Groups from the Movement

There were two major splits within the Fatah movement due to disagreements with Mahmoud Abbas. One faction was led by Mohamed Dahlan, a former member of the Central Committee, and Nasser al-Qudwa, who was also a former member of the Central Committee.

Dahlan was expelled from the movement in 2011, a decision that was followed by the expulsion of his close associates. Subsequently, he established the “Reformist Stream” within the movement, leading it with members such as Samir Masharawi and Dimitri Dileiani, among others. In the legislative council elections, which were scheduled for 2021 but postponed by Abbas, Dahlan ran on a separate list representing this stream.

As for Nasser al-Qudwa, he founded the “Palestinian Democratic Forum” in 2021 as a splinter group from the movement due to disagreements with Abbas. Abbas punished him by expelling him from the movement and from the Yasser Arafat Foundation that he managed, and by withdrawing his diplomatic passport after al-Qudwa insisted on running in the 2021 elections on a separate list from the movement, known as the “Freedom” list. This list included leaders such as Ahmed Gneim, Jamal Hweil, and the released prisoner Fakhri al-Barghouti, among others. Following this decision, several cadres close to al-Qudwa were also expelled from the movement.

Both of these opposing streams agree on the principle of the need for Mahmoud Abbas to step down. Their leaders have long disagreed with Abbas even before the decisions to expel them from the movement. These factions do not differ with Abbas on the Oslo Accords, as they previously operated within its framework, nor do they differ on the peaceful path related to the two-state solution and Abbas’s approach to it, including the rejection of armed resistance. The core issue was the disagreement with Abbas over powers and positions within the struggle for leadership of the authority. Despite the similar circumstances of the splits, there is a difference in their views on the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation. Dahlan refused to condemn the operation, blaming Israel for it, while al-Qudwa stated in an interview with the Hebrew newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth in February 2024 that he had no intention of defending the “Muslim Brotherhood” due to his disagreements with them. Instead, he proposed working to weaken Hamas after the war through a new government without the movement’s participation. Both streams agree on the future of the Gaza Strip, advocating for the formation of a new Palestinian government in Gaza separate from Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, with an Arab peacekeeping force managing the sector during the transitional phase.

Following the emergence of his stream, Mohamed Dahlan, from his residence abroad in the UAE, sought to repair relations with Hamas as a means to facilitate his party work in Gaza and establish a political base there, leveraging the rifts between Hamas and Abbas. Abbas had banned Dahlan’s stream in the West Bank and pursued and arrested his cadres. Dahlan enhanced his stream’s community and civic activities, including humanitarian and relief work, tribal reconciliation in 2017 based on financial compensation for families of victims of the Palestinian infighting in 2007, assisting youths in getting married, providing aid to the sick, and importing tens of thousands of doses of the COVID-19 vaccine. He also participated virtually in a legislative council session held in Gaza in 2017, and his supporters, along with Hamas supporters, demanded Abbas’s departure on several occasions in Gaza. The activities of Dahlan’s stream contributed to its expansion and increased popularity within the Gaza Strip, which became a focal point for his work.

Dahlan stated after the Al-Aqsa Flood operation that it was a natural reflection of the deadlock faced by the Palestinian people in Palestine and Gaza and that it resulted from Israel’s resort to extremism and violence by the ministers “Ben-Gvir” and “Smotrich”. He called on the world to mobilize efforts to deter Israel from committing massacres in the sector. Meanwhile, Samir Masharawi, Dahlan’s deputy in the stream, explicitly praised the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, calling it a “heroic operation.” In subsequent meetings with media outlets and newspapers, Dahlan proposed a vision for the future of the Gaza Strip, which involves transferring the administration of Gaza from Israel and Hamas to a new independent Palestinian leader capable of rebuilding Gaza under the protection of Arab peacekeeping forces. Dahlan met with Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar, in February 2024, but details of the meeting were not disclosed. It is noteworthy that Dahlan denied, at the end of July 2024, rumors about his intentions to assume a security role in Gaza after Israel’s withdrawal from the sector, with the approval of Israel, Hamas, Arab countries, and international consent. He affirmed his support for any option within Palestinian understandings leading to the rebuilding of the Palestinian political system through a transparent democratic process.

The Reformist Stream, which Dahlan leads, expressed in a separate statement its opposition to Abbas’s step of forming a technocratic government, viewing it as a circumvention of popular, factional, and national demands calling for reform of national governmental and representative institutions and forming a government outside Abbas’s control. It called for building a broad internal front based on national understandings to form a temporary, independent, and specialized government to stop the war first, then rebuild Gaza, prepare for comprehensive elections with a binding timetable, and fight corruption.

The “Palestinian Democratic Forum,” led by Nasser al-Qudwa, believes that new consensual solutions should be sought by establishing a temporary government and that Abbas should step down from the presidency as a condition for achieving national consensus due to his insistence on his program. The agreement with Hamas would involve integrating it into a national political system. Al-Qudwa, along with Samir Masharawi, met with the head of Hamas’s political bureau in November 2023 to discuss developments in the war on Gaza and the internal Palestinian arrangement. All expressed their pride in Palestinian resistance and the steadfastness of the people in Gaza. In later statements, al-Qudwa said that Hamas would emerge from the war “weakened,” making its ability to manage the Gaza Strip difficult. He supported the idea of a deal and a ceasefire and the formation of a governmental body connected to the Palestinian Authority but differing in efficiency and free of corruption. Al-Qudwa’s proposal included the need for an Arab security force to be temporarily stationed in Gaza after Israel’s complete withdrawal from the sector, and this solution would be part of the two-state solution process.

Future Scenarios

Several scenarios emerge regarding the role of Fatah or some of its factions in managing or determining how the Gaza Strip will be administered, given the varied positions and statements within the Fatah movement or its splinter factions, and how these positions impact the movement’s future role in Gaza after the war. The most significant scenarios are:

Scenario 1: Official Participation of Fatah in the Governance of the Gaza Strip, Either Fully or Partially

This participation could mean either a gradual or complete return of the authority linked to the movement based on a factional agreement with Hamas on post-war arrangements or through not waiting for the war’s end and the partial return of the authority through roles in security at crossings such as the Rafah crossing. This is due to Israel’s control over these crossings and Egypt’s request for Israel to withdraw and hand over the Rafah crossing to Palestinian security forces as a condition for its reopening, and Egypt’s refusal to open the crossing under Israeli management.

This scenario could be realized in two ways: First, if conditions leading to it are met, including the ability of Palestinian factions, primarily Hamas and Fatah, to reach a reconciliation agreement linked to practical and phased steps, and Hamas’s acceptance of the authority’s conditions for return, particularly since Hamas rejects compromising the “resistance” weapons. Second, by returning without Hamas’s agreement, where the Palestinian Authority and close factions of Fatah accept partial security roles to assert their presence in Gaza. This would conflict with the Palestinian Authority’s declared conditions for returning to Gaza, which include a complete Israeli withdrawal from the sector, and its refusal to return against Hamas’s will, as this would lead to confrontation and conflict due to the movement and its bases remaining in Gaza. This scenario depends on the outcome of the war between Hamas and Israel, both militarily and politically, and the extent of Israel’s flexibility and acceptance of a role for Fatah or the Authority in Gaza.

Scenario 2: Some Fatah Factions’ Non-Official Roles in Managing Gaza After the War within a Consensus Framework Outside Authority Leadership

This participation might involve reaching a national consensus among all factions and directions within Fatah opposed to Abbas’s approach in the movement and its splinter groups, agreeing with Hamas and other factions on creating an alternative leadership or reviving the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), or an agreement between Fatah splinter factions (Dahlan and al-Qudwa) and Hamas to participate in roles within the sector post-war as part of a broader or partial consensus on initiatives proposed by these entities.

This scenario would be realized if the factions’ leadership fails to reach a reconciliation agreement or if an agreement is reached without implementation mechanisms and a timetable related to the upcoming situation in Gaza post-war, or if the Palestinian factions’ reconciliation efforts between Fatah and Hamas in China, as seen in the Algerian Agreement, encounter obstacles. Indicators of such failure include the significant gap between Hamas’s and President Abbas’s positions and those of his stream.

The first possibility of this scenario, i.e., national consensus among Fatah factions opposing Abbas within and outside the movement, is associated with indicators such as: a near-consensus among these factions on the idea of renewing the Palestinian political system based on “unifying and democratic” principles; making them open to the possibility of convergence

and unity on this idea, and Hamas’s openness to parties advocating national unity that ensures maintaining the resistance program and the role of the movement. This includes Fatah factions linked to the stream close to the prisoner Marwan Barghouti, whom Hamas seeks to release in an upcoming prisoner exchange with Israel, and there is an expectation among the movement and resistance factions that Barghouti could contribute to internal change and the unification of Fatah if he is released and wins the elections. Hamas is also aligning with some Central Committee and Revolutionary Council members of Fatah who call for unity on a common basis and support the “armed struggle” approach.

Hamas is also open to initiatives seeking a unified Palestinian leadership and reviving the PLO on “consensual” bases, such as the Palestinian National Conference initiative launched in February 2024, which represents a cross-factional model to establish a new “national unity” among all factions leading to the revival of the PLO, and could form part of Gaza’s future. Hundreds of influential Palestinian figures from all parties, including Fatah and Hamas, both in Palestine and abroad, signed this initiative individually.

The second possibility of this scenario, i.e., participation of only Fatah’s splinter groups in Gaza’s management, depends on their acceptance or that of any of them to participate in Gaza’s management, especially since Dahlan has denied his acceptance of such a path. The critical factor is the extent of Hamas’s acceptance of Dahlan’s initiative for participation in Gaza’s future; as the movement rejects any initiative that excludes its role in the sector in the future. Dahlan is also not well-received by Hamas’s resistance-oriented factions in Gaza due to his previous security record in the Authority’s security services and his role in the Palestinian infighting between Fatah and Hamas.

Scenario 3: Complete Absence of Fatah and its Streams from Gaza’s Future and Gaza’s Future Being Dependent Only on the Outcome of the War and Its Options

This scenario involves Fatah’s and its factions’ complete non-participation in Gaza’s future, with Gaza’s future depending solely on the war’s outcome, whether Hamas remains in control or Israeli control is established. This would be the case if the reconciliation agreement signed in China fails due to disagreements over implementation mechanisms and plans or if the current Fatah leadership obstructs any reconciliation outside its terms and seeks to control Gaza’s future through relations with regional and international parties, including Israel and Arab parties. This scenario would be reinforced if Fatah’s leadership or its dependence on the Authority remains unchanged.

Conclusion

In light of the situation following the flood and the war on Gaza, this phase has become a foundation for repositioning the paths of the Palestinian issue and its actors, including Fatah, which faced several programmatic and organizational dilemmas before this phase that impacted its status and role. Today, there is a divergence of opinions within the movement regarding the Al-Aqsa Flood, its relationship with Hamas, views on resistance, the idea of Palestinian reconciliation, and the effects of the ongoing war in Gaza, as well as the movement’s required role there. This divergence affects not only the future unity and orientations of the movement but also casts a shadow on its role within the Authority and its project and future.

Given the current discussions on Gaza’s future within the ongoing ceasefire negotiations and attempts to achieve reconciliation, which are among the determinants of the possible paths for the upcoming governance in Gaza, it does not seem that the Authority, in its current structure and performance, has managed to gain the approval of regional parties, including Israel, to play a fundamental role in the sector. Any role it might play will be restricted by conditions and by changes in the Authority’s structure. However, intersecting scenarios present an opportunity for the acceptance of forming another independent force, whether emerging from the Authority and Fatah or from Fatah’s splinters. The latter could mark the beginning of restructuring the Palestinian Authority itself and potentially a new beginning for a redefined Fatah, even if partially. The day after the war in Gaza appears to be a significant step in the trajectory of the Palestinian issue and its forces.

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18. A statistic conducted by the researcher through the Fatah Media and Cultural Mobilization Commission’s website for the period from October 7, 2023, to July 23, 2024, (Accessed: July 20, 2024), https://www.fatehmedia.ps/index.html.
19. “The Revolutionary Council of the Movement: Fatah Is in the Field, and We Affirm Our People’s Right to Defend Themselves and Their Sanctities within the Framework of National Unity,” Fatah Media and Cultural Mobilization Commission website, October 8, 2023, (Accessed: July 19, 2024), https://www.fatehmedia.ps/page-111515.html.
20. “Fatah: Those Who Caused the Reoccupation of Gaza by Israel Have No Right to Determine the Priorities of the People and Are Truly Detached from Reality,” Palestinian News & Information Agency – WAFA, March 15, 2024, (Accessed: July 20, 2024), https://www.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/91920.
21. “Who Issued the Last Fatah Statement Regarding Gaza and Hamas?” UltraSawt website, March 17, 2024, (Accessed: July 20, 2024), https://bit.ly/3ybIKSx.
22. “Statement Issued by the Fatah National Liberation Movement,” Fatah Media and Cultural Mobilization Commission website, October 31, 2023, (Accessed: July 20, 2024), https://www.fatehmedia.ps/page-111627.html.
23. “Statement Issued by the Central Committee Meeting of the Movement,” Fatah Media and Cultural Mobilization Commission website, February 8, 2024, (Accessed: July 21, 2024), https://bit.ly/3Wf7TUy.
24. As part of the researcher’s review of the committee’s statements on the movement’s media commission website, (Accessed: July 21, 2024), https://www.fatehmedia.ps/index.html.
25. Ramallah – “President Mahmoud Abbas Chairs the Revolutionary Council Meeting of the Fatah Movement,” WAFA News Agency, January 31, 2024, (Accessed: July 21, 2024), https://images.wafa.ps/album/Details/9423.
26. As part of the researcher’s review of the Revolutionary Council’s statements on the movement’s media commission website, (Accessed: July 22, 2024), https://www.fatehmedia.ps/index.html.
27. “Palestinian Prisoner Marwan Barghouti Sends a Message to Fatah Cadres, the Palestinian People, and Security Forces,” Russia Today TV, (Accessed: July 22, 2024), https://bit.ly/4bUlMgr.
28. Marwan Barghouti, “Speech of the Imprisoned Leader Marwan Barghouti at the Annual Palestine Forum in Doha,” Institute for Palestine Studies, February 21, 2023, (Accessed: July 22, 2024), https://bit.ly/4bYdgND.
29. “Text of the Appeal by the Fatah Movement’s Commissioner for Arab Relations, Abbas Zaki, to the Leaders of Arab Parties and National Forces,” Fatah Media and Cultural Mobilization Commission website, October 10, 2023, (Accessed: July 22, 2024), https://www.fatehmedia.ps/page-111539.html.
30. “Abbas Zaki to Al Jazeera Net: As Long as ‘Mohammed Deif’ Is Walking, We Are All Fine,” Al Jazeera Net, January 16, 2024, (Accessed: July 22, 2024), [https://bit.ly/4bNLC5N](https://bit.ly

/4bNLC5N).