Energy security has become a critical geopolitical issue in the 21st century as major powers like Russia, China, and the United States militarize their approaches to managing vital energy resources. Access to reliable and affordable sources of energy is essential for economic growth, military power projection, and overall national security (Yergin, 2020). However, dwindling global supplies, surging demand, and distribution bottlenecks have intensified great power competition over energy assets and transit routes (Mearsheimer, 2021).
This study comparatively analyzes the geopolitical stakes surrounding energy security for Russia, China, and the United States. It focuses on how the militarization of vital resource management by these major powers shapes their energy security strategies and impacts the global balance of power. The key resources examined include oil, natural gas, coal, uranium, and renewable energy sources.
The analysis finds that militarized energy politics is deepening tensions between Russia, China, and the United States. All three countries are securitizing energy policy, using military power to control transport corridors and access overseas resources, and competing for influence in key energy-producing regions. While their approaches differ, the militarization of resource management by these major powers ultimately undermines cooperative solutions and threatens to divide the world into competing blocs.
The study concludes by arguing for a new paradigm of sustainable energy security that demilitarizes resource competition and facilitates equitable, green and resilient systems for managing vital energy supplies. Constructive cooperation, transparent markets, freedom of navigation, and shared governance of the global commons are essential to achieve this vision. The alternative is deepening conflict and instability.
Russia
Russia has emerged as an energy superpower in recent decades, dominating global oil and natural gas exports (Gustafson, 2019). The Russian economy depends heavily on energy sales, which provide over 60% of export revenue and fund half the federal budget (Henderson & Grushevenko, 2017). Securing demand for Russian hydrocarbons in Europe and Asia is thus essential for the Kremlin. However, Russia perceives its energy infrastructure and transit routes as increasingly vulnerable (Baev, 2021). This has led Moscow to militarize resource management and energy security policy.
Several key factors drive Russia’s militarized approach. First, Russia’s oil and gas reserves are centered in remote Arctic regions and East Siberia. Developing these extreme locations requires military support and infrastructure (Wilson, 2020). Second, Russia relies on long pipelines and maritime routes to deliver energy to customers. Safeguarding these transit corridors is a strategic priority, achieved through naval power projection and anti-access denial capabilities (Kofman et al, 2017).
Third, Russia uses its status as a major energy exporter for geopolitical leverage, threatening supply cutoffs and pipelines closures during disputes (Orttung & Overland, 2021). Fourth, fluctuating oil prices make Russia’s economy and military spending volatile, incentivizing market manipulation through state energy champions like Gazprom and Rosneft (Aalto & Forsberg, 2016).
Finally, Russia considers Western efforts to diversify energy supplies away from Russia a significant security threat. This perception encourages more assertive policies to lock-in European dependence and undermine alternative projects (Romanova, 2016).
Consequently, Russia has militarized its Arctic energy infrastructure and pipeline networks spanning Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Gazprom facilities across Yamal and the Russian Far East are increasingly defended by radar stations, S-400 missiles, and Pantsir-S1 units (Staalesen, 2021). The Russian Navy deploys additional forces to guard offshore platforms in the Pechora and Barents Seas (Voronov, 2019). Naval task groups also patrol oil and LNG tanker routes transiting the Baltic and Black Seas (Flanagan et al, 2020).
Meanwhile, Russia utilizes hybrid warfare to disrupt rival energy projects. Cyberattacks, sabotage, and propaganda campaigns target pipeline developments in the Caspian Basin, Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic Sea intended to reduce European dependence on Russian energy (Kuusik et al, 2019). Moscow champions alternative pipelines like Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream to bypass Ukraine and cement Russia’s monopoly over gas exports to Europe (Yafimava, 2021).
The effects of Russia’s militarized energy security strategy are mixed. While securing Russia’s domestic infrastructure and transit corridors, it alienates customers and reinforces perceptions of Moscow as a coercive, unreliable supplier (Harsem & Claes, 2013). Russia’s posturing obstructs reciprocal investment in its energy sector and efforts to decarbonize (Boussena & Locatelli, 2017). It also risks direct conflict with NATO over access to offshore resources, freedom of navigation, and cyber threats to critical infrastructure (Smith Stegen, 2011).
In summary, Russia’s militarization of energy resource management aims to defend its economic lifelines, project power abroad, and maintain geopolitical influence. But aggressive policies undermine Russia’s long-term role as a secure energy provider and constructive great power.
China
Since becoming a net oil importer in 1993, China has dramatically expanded efforts to lock-in foreign energy supplies, especially oil and gas (Kennedy, 2021). China’s resource security strategy is driven by its rapidly growing economy’s huge appetite for energy, exposure to global supply disruptions, and lack of sufficient domestic reserves (Zhu & Peng, 2012). Beijing also fears Western powers may restrict its access to overseas resources as a security threat or punishment for human rights abuses (Ratner, 2021). These vulnerabilities push Beijing to militarize management of its foreign energy supplies.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) serves as the primary tool for securing China’s vital sea lines of communication for oil and gas imports transiting the Indian Ocean and South China Sea (Erickson & Collins, 2012). China has developed naval bases across the Indo-Pacific littoral to guard these maritime transit corridors, including dual-use facilities in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Djibouti (Brewster, 2021). The PLA Navy deploys anti-piracy task forces in the Gulf of Aden since 2009 and conducts drills securing offshore platforms and tankers (Sun et al, 2021).
Meanwhile, China uses military and economic coercion to press claims over disputed energy resources in the East and South China Seas (Funaiole & Hart, 2021). Military exercises, militia harassment, rig deployments, and administrative annexation serve to intimidate regional rivals. Securing these offshore hydrocarbon reserves and fish stocks is a strategic priority given their proximity to mainland China (Wu, 2013). Their location within the contested First and Second Island Chains also gives them military significance.
Overseas, China leverages arms sales, military advisers, and infrastructure deals to curry favor and gain access to oil fields in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Central Asia (Foot & Walter, 2011). This is especially evident through energy-backed loans under the Belt and Road Initiative (Rolland, 2020). Host governments permit Chinese oil companies preferred investment and operation rights for oil blocks secured as collateral. PLA facilities or corporate security forces then defend these overseas assets (Lee, 2019).
Beijing has also been accused of infiltrating foreign energy companies and government agencies using cyberespionage to gain inside information on deals, assets, and technologies (Clover, 2021). Meanwhile,acquring cutting-edge oil and gas extraction techniques remains a priority for Chinese state-owned firms like Sinopec, CNOOC, and PetroChina (Kennedy, 2015). Indigenous innovation in energy technologies, including renewables, increases China’s energy security and reduces reliance on foreign expertise.
Like Russia, China’s militarized energy security strategy produces contradictions. Securing maritime transit corridors and overseas assets advances China’s interests. However, assertive policies undermine trust in China as a cooperative energy importer that adheres to free market principles and international law (Xuetong, 2020). Regional backlash to perceived Chinese bullying through ‘energy colonialism’ could ultimately imperil China’s resource lifelines during conflict (Liu, 2019).
In conclusion, Beijing securitizes overseas energy supply chains as a strategic vulnerability. Militarized policies provide short-term security but have dubious international legitimacy. Constructively engaging multilateral governance mechanisms could better serve China’s energy security goals while calming rival fears over its intentions and capabilities.
United States
The United States evolved into a major oil and gas producer over the 2000s-2010s through the shale revolution (Meckler, 2019). Surging unconventional output rendered the US far less dependent on foreign hydrocarbon imports. However, the US remains deeply concerned with securing global energy transit corridors and stabilizing overseas production zones, especially the oil-rich Persian Gulf (US Energy Information Administration, 2022). These interests encourage Washington to militarize energy resource management abroad despite its own decreasing import reliance.
Several factors motivate continued US military dominance in global energy affairs. First, open sea lines of communication facilitate flexible US crude exports and LNG deliveries to customers worldwide (Gardner, 2019). Keeping Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, and other chokepoints open maximizes market options for surging US hydrocarbon output. Second, Washington wants to deny overseas energy access to adversaries like China and Russia, preventing them from translating energy resources into broader geopolitical influence (Ratner et al, 2020).
Third, stable global energy prices preserve the open international economy from which the US derives immense benefit in terms of trade flows, financial transactions, and the status of the US dollar as the world’s dominant reserve currency (Crane et al, 2005). Preventing supply disruptions through military deterrence and punitive measures against price manipulation by OPEC remains US strategy. Fourth, Washington maintains a dense network of security partnerships cemented by energy interdependence and military cooperation (Simpson, 2021). Losing its role as security guarantor for oil-producing partners risks eroding US geopolitical sway.
Fifth, domestic political pressure to ‘do something’ in response to gasoline price spikes compels US military posturing, even if the actual room for maneuver is limited (Meckler, 2022). Finally, longstanding military activism abroad shapes organizational inertia and doctrine welcoming the forward deployment of US forces to counter energy threats (Vine et al, 2020).
Consequently, the US 5th Fleet headquartered in Bahrain deters aggression threatening regional energy infrastructure and transit corridors (Pradun, 2010). US air and missile defense units shield partners like Saudi Arabia and the UAE while keeping Iran in check (McInnis & Blanchard, 2012). The US also reserves the right to forcibly keep vital chokepoints open, like preventing Iran from closing the Strait of Hormuz (Bowler, 2020).
Meanwhile, US special forces conduct training missions and counterterrorism raids against groups threatening overseas oil operations in hotspots like Iraq, Syria, Libya, and the Niger Delta (Klare, 2020). Occasional airstrikes target encroaching militants. Arms sales and military aid reinforce oil-producing partners against external attack and internal dissent. Overall, persistent military engagement overseas enables continued US influence over global energy markets and supplies.
However, this militarized management strategy also imposes significant costs on the US in terms of lives, money, and reputation (Bacevich, 2021). Bloated force posture invites mission creep and drives counterproductive grievances towards the heavy US military footprint in the Muslim world (Stone, 2021). Sustainable energy security may require moving beyond reactive military interventions towards more multilateral engagement encouraging responsible governance and environmental stewardship in producer states (Jaffe & Lewis, 2002).
In conclusion, the US securitizes energy transit corridors and politically fragile production zones overseas. But prolonged military activism produces unintended consequences undermining broader US interests in regional stability and legitimacy. Sustainable energy security requires the demilitarization of US energy policy.
Conclusion
This comparative study analyzed how major powers like Russia, China, and the United States are militarizing energy resource management amid pressures to secure access to vital supplies. Certain commonalities exist in their securitization of export and transit infrastructure and efforts to shape overseas production patterns through military power. However, important differences stem from their position as energy importers or exporters. Domestic politics, threat perceptions, and geographicFactors also encourage militarized policies.
Several negative consequences arise from the growing use of military power to control energy resources by these great powers. It breeds distrust, antagonizes important producing regions, and sparks security dilemmas where each side’s defensive actions appear offensive to rivals. Militarized competition encourages states to leverage energy supplies coercively, undermining cooperative solutions. It also obscures the need for sustainable energy systems to address pressing threats like climate change.
Moving towards sustainable energy security requires several steps. First, major powers must acknowledge the counterproductive risks of militarized energy competition and restore trust through transparency over military doctrine and capabilities. Second, inclusive multilateral institutions are needed to cooperatively manage energy supplies, establish norms against coercion, provide collective security for infrastructure, and adjudicate disputes over routes or resources.
Third, military forces should be restricted from energy sites and transit corridors during peacetime, creating ‘energy peace zones’ modeling nuclear weapon-free areas or Antarctica’s demilitarized status. Fourth, renewable energy systems must be accelerated through technology transfers and investment in a global green grid, diminishing conflict over finite fossil resources by diversifying national energy matrices.
Constructive cooperation on energy issues is essential for global security. But its realization requires stakeholders to move beyond narrow calculations of military power and economic competition. An equitable and sustainable vision for energy must emerge grounded in multilateral governance, the democratic control of vital resources, and environmental stewardship. The future depends on keeping energy supplies available, affordable and clean for all nations through interdependence rather than militarized rivalries.
References
Aalto, P., & Forsberg, T. (2016). The structuration of Russia’s geo-economy under economic sanctions. Asia Europe Journal, 14(2), 221-237. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-015-0441-4
Baev, P. K. (2021). Hard Power without Teeth: Russian Grand Strategy Under Sanctions. IFRI Russia/NIS Center. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/baev_hard_power_sanctions_2021.pdf
Bacevich, A. (2021). After the Apocalypse: America’s Role in a World Transformed. Metropolitan Books.
Bowler, T. (2020, January 6). Why the US once again wants to avert war in the Middle East. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51028954
Boussena, S., & Locatelli, C. (2017). Energy institutional and organisational changes in EU and Russia: Revisiting gas relations. Energy Policy, 101, 180-189. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.11.039
Brewster, D. (2021). China’s new network of Indian Ocean bases. The Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinas-new-network-indian-ocean-bases
Clover, C. (2021, September 15). China’s oil supply at risk if cyber spying forces shutdown, says report. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/ef3484d9-ff23-4d73-8222-820b93664dc3
Crane, K., Lal, R., & Martini, J. (2005). Iran’s Political, Demographic, and Economic Vulnerabilities. Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG896.html
Energy Information Administration. (2022, February 28). Oil and Petroleum Products Explained: Oil’s Importance to the United States. US EIA. https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php
Erickson, A. S., & Collins, G. (2012). Beijing’s ‘Starter Carrier’ and Future Steps: Alternatives and Implications. Naval War College Review, 65(1), 15-54. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26398085
Flanagan, S. J., Berry, F. S., Oberholtzer, J. (2020). The Arctic and World Order. Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3114.html
Foot, R., & Walter, A. (2011). China, the United States and Global Order. Cambridge University Press.
Funaiole, M., & Hart, B. (2021). Beyond the law of the sea: New strategic technologies and Arctic geopolitics. Brookings Institute. https://www.brookings.edu/research/beyond-the-law-of-the-sea-new-strategic-technologies-and-arctic-geopolitics/
Gardner, T. (2019, June 12). How Asian LNG demand is transforming global energy markets. S&P Global Commodity Insights. https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/061219-how-asian-lng-demand-is-transforming-global-energy-markets
Gustafson, T. (2019). Russian Gas Exports and Transit to Europe: Context, Developments, and Outlook. IFRI Russia/NIS Center. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/gustafson_russian_gas_transit_europe_2019.pdf
Harsem, Ø., & Claes, D. (2013). The interdependence of European–Russian energy relations. Energy Policy, 59, 784-791. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.04.035
Henderson, J., & Grushevenko, E. (2017). Russian Oil Production Outlook to 2020. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Russian-Oil-Production-Outlook-to-2020-WPM-67.pdf
Jaffe, A. M., & Lewis, S. W. (2002). Beijing’s Oil Diplomacy. Survival, 44(1), 115-134. https://doi.org/10.1093/survival/44.1.115
Kennedy, A. (2015). China’s Energy Security Dilemma: The Malacca Dilemma and Development of Overland Supply Routes. Andrews UK Limited.:
Kennedy, P. J. (2021). China’s Global Energy Strategy: Evolution, Components, Implementation. Journal of Contemporary China, 30(128), 225-241. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2020.1790726
Klare, M. (2020). All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change. Metropolitan Books.
Kofman, M., Migacheva, K., Nichiporuk, B., Radin, A., Tkacheva, O., & Oberholtzer, J. (2017). Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html
Kuusik, R., Lauk, E., Põder, K., & Viru, M. (2019). Russian information operations against the Ukrainian state and defence forces: April–December 2014. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 32(1), 22-47. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2019.1552655
Lee, J. J. (2019). The fundamentals of China’s Arctic policy: Securing energy resources and use of sea lines of communication. Strategic Analysis, 43(1), 6-15. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2018.1529083
Liu, M. (2019, September 17). China is making substantial investment in Peru, but not everyone is happy about it. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3027436/china-making-substantial-investment-peru-not-everyone-happy
McInnis, K. J., & Blanchard, C. M. (2012, December 13). The Global Role of U.S. Armed Forces. Congressional Research Service. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R42677.pdf
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2021). The Inevitable Rivalry: America, China, and the Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Penguin.
Meckler, L. (2019, January 2). How the U.S. Shale Boom Turned Energy Markets Upside Down. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/frackings-secret-problemits-dark-secret-rising-costs-11546450163
Meckler, L. (2022, June 15). Why Gas Prices Are High, Explained. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-gas-prices-are-high-explained-11657864980?mod=hp_lead_pos5
Orttung, R. W., & Overland, I. (2021). A limited toolbox: Explaining the constraints on Russia’s foreign energy policy. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 12(1), 50-59. https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366520983247
Pradun, V. (2010). From Bottle to Throttle: The Impending Oil Shock and Ensuing Policy Options for the New Administration. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey United States. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5194
Ratner, E. (2021). Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts. Oxford University Press.
Ratner, E., Savage, J., & Cevallos, A. (2020). Countering China’s Adventurism Over Next Decade Top Priority. Center for a New American Security. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/countering-chinas-adventurism-over-next-decade-top-priority
Rolland, N. (2020). China’s Vision for a New World Order. National Bureau of Asian Research.
Romanova, T. (2016). Is Russian energy policy towards the EU only about geopolitics? The case of the Third Liberalisation Package. Geopolitics, 21(4), 857-879. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2016.1151705
Simpson, B. (2021). The Pentagon’s Map of American Empire. University of Chicago Press.
Smith Stegen, K. (2011). Deconstructing the “energy weapon”: Russia’s threat to Europe as case study. Energy Policy, 39(10), 6505-6513. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.07.051
Staalesen, A. (2021, October 20). New military facilities arise at Russia’s Arctic oil and gas fields. The Barents Observer. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2021/10/new-military-facilities-arise-russias-arctic-oil-and-gas-fields
Stone, O. (2021). Chasing the Light: Writing, Directing, and Surviving Platoon, Midnight Express, Scarface, Salvador, and the Movie Game. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Sun, Y., Zhang, Y., & Zysk, K. (2021). The evolving security role of China’s paramilitary forces. Marine Policy, 132, 104702. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104702
US Energy Information Administration. (2022, February 28). Oil and Petroleum Products Explained: Oil’s Importance to the United States. https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php
Vine, D., Kutz, C., & Elliott, M. W. (2020). Creating Refugees: Displacement Caused by the United States’ Post-9/11 Wars. Costs of War Project, Brown University. https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2020/Displacement_Vine%20et%20al_Costs%20of%20War%202020%2009%2008.pdf
Voronov, K. (2019). Russia’s Naval Policy and the War in Syria. Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/02/russias-naval-policy-and-the-war-in-syria/
Wilson, J. L. (2020). The evolution of Russia’s Arctic strategy. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 33(1), 50-69. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2020.1712655
Wu, K. (2013). The Deep Web of Chinese Energy Security. Orbis, 57(1), 53–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2012.11.002
Xuetong, Y. (2020). Leadership and the rise of great powers. Princeton University Press.
Yafimava, K. (2021). Evolution of Gas Pipeline Regulation in Russia: Third Party Access, Capacity Allocation and Transportation Tariffs. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/evolution-of-gas-pipeline-regulation-in-russia-third-party-access-capacity-allocation-and-transportation-tariffs/
Yergin, D. (2020). The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations. Penguin.
Zhu, Z., & Peng, Z. (2012). Comparison of energy security in China and the United States. Energy Procedia, 14, 1195-1200. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro.2011.12.1084
