Grand Strategies in the field of foreign policy: a fundamental study of concepts, images and dynamic nature

The study sought to reach a comprehensive definition of the grand strategy in the field of foreign policy, in addition to identifying its most prominent patterns and different images, as well as searching for the factors causing the dynamism of these strategies. The problem of the study lies in its inability to ask a main question: What are the major strategies, what are their forms, and what are the factors causing their dynamism? In order for the study to achieve the goals it aspires to, it will follow the experimental approach in the field of political studies, in addition to being guided by some models concerned with examining the reasons for the dynamism of major strategies, such as Thompson model, Richard Rumelt model, and Kingdon model. In order for the researcher to reach the desired results of the study, he will divide the study into three sections, namely: The first section:

an introduction

     The concept of grand strategies has its roots in the depths of history: the Romans knew it, as it was found on walls engraved with what is useful for long-term planning in the military field, and Emperor Philip II during the period (1554-1598) worked on formulating strategies that would lay the foundations of the empire Spain, as well as helping him to achieve his expansionist ambitions inside and outside Europe, just as the emperors of the Russian Empire mastered the art of writing and implementing strategies in the modern era for nearly two centuries, specifically in the period (1650-1830). And the second, which had an unavoidable role in shaping the concept of strategy among contemporary thinkers.

      The term “grand strategy” has recently become one of the most prominent framed scientific terms that preoccupied and continues to preoccupy the minds of those involved in foreign and strategic affairs (politicians and theorists, rationalists and interpreters, realists and liberals), especially after the use of this concept became popular among realists. The neo-classic, such as: Jack Snyder and his associates from the neo-classic). The truth is that the formulation of grand strategies and the consolidation of their principles are not at all exclusive to the major states or the great powers only, but rather the aspiring small states may take such a step and lay down a grand strategy for them, but there is no way between a grand strategy that is drawn up by a major international power that builds its foundations on a massive scale. Of the capabilities and major strategies of small states, some of which sometimes do not have the capabilities of self-defense.

     Based on this question, the study aims to reach a few goals, which are defining the major strategies in the field of foreign policy, as well as refuting their different forms, as well as exploring the factors that cause the dynamism of these strategies. In compliance with the nature of the subject matter and the intended objectives, the study will adhere to the experimental approach, as well as relying on some models concerned with examining the causes of the dynamism of major strategies, such as the Thompson model, the Richard Rumelt model, and the Kingdon model.

Division of the study: The researcher will single out the first section of this study to address the most prominent concepts presented in the definition of grand strategies, and the second section will be devoted to presenting images of grand strategies, and in the third section, the researcher will present the dynamic factors of grand strategies.

            The first topic: the definition of major strategies in the field of foreign policy

       The concept of grand strategy appeared in contemporary thought at first glance – as indicated by the thinker Martel – in the writings of military thinkers, then it was circulated by historians, and then transferred to scientific writings in the fields of international relations and foreign policy, and this concept of grand strategy received great attention and care by theorists In the field of international relations, due to what this concept allows, not only to explore the depths of the reality of the behavior of states in the international field, but also to anticipate their activities that they must practice in the future as well. However, the concept of grand strategies in the field of international relations – as stated by Lukas Milevski – It is still one of the concepts that is ambiguous; As thinkers of all walks of life, aspirations and sects have not been able, until recently, to reach a single concept whose vocabulary is interconnected and whose features are clear and agreed upon by all of them, just as there is no clear and precise standard that clarifies the limits of the concept in an unambiguous manner.

       The grand strategy of a state is embodied in its simplest contents in the form of a conceptual framework that is used to describe the reality of certain international situations that already exist, and it also includes perceptions of what these conditions should be like, in addition to including a set of policies designed specifically to achieve the aspirations of its states. These strategies are often aimed by their makers to shape the international environment in a way that is in line with the interests of their nation-states, using several means, including: imposing international rules that serve the desired goals of the strategy, and influencing the choices of the countries of the outside world in accordance with the interests of the countries adopting such strategies. .

      Posen summed it up, as it represents it in the form of “an integrated scheme that contains in its core national interests, threats, sources of power, and policies.” He considered that this scheme is a conceptual framework that helps the nation-state to determine its appropriate position on the scale of the global distribution of power, or any way that qualifies it to achieve that. The historian Gaddis represents grand strategy as a scheme that includes unlimited ambitions – which are expected to happen – and which are inevitably confronted by the limited capabilities of the state.

        A group of theorists – led by Basil Liddell Hart and Paul M. Kennedy – believes that the grand strategy is a plan that prevails for several decades, is comprehensive (as it extends to the military, political and economic sectors of the state), and includes pivotal and vital matters in the case of the vital interests of the state. the state), after it was viewed in the past, specifically by Clausewitz, as a purely military strategy, in other words, he reduced the strategy to its narrow concept that is based on military dimensions.

      Betts believes that the grand strategy is any general, well-articulated plan based on premises or causes that produce results or effects. From it, Daniel W. Drezner and his associates envision the grand strategy in a road map that shows how to use certain means to achieve certain ends. In a related context, Martel reduced the grand strategy to a coherent framework that illustrates the mechanism that enables the state to achieve its major political goals in the outside world.

      And there are those who focus on the security aspects in defining the grand strategy of the state, for example Posen envisions the grand strategy in that way the state takes to preserve itself from the folds of creating a favorable security environment. In a sense that does not deviate much from Posen’s conception, Brands embodies it in that tight mental construction that represents the governing framework for states’ foreign policy, and Luttwak envisions it in the state’s plan that includes ways to implement the state’s goals and evaluate its results, as well as its national interests, especially security interests. The two great thinkers, Rosecrance & Stein, sum it up in the mechanism that enables the state to harness its internal and external resources to provide an environment that guarantees the realization of the state’s national security. The strategist Liddell Hart is based on the functional role in defining strategy, given that the function of the grand strategy is to win the war in order to establish peace. Hence, its function and ultimate goal is to consolidate peace and prevent the escalation of conflicts.

       There is a group of theorists – led by Silove – who believe that the concept of the grand strategy should not be based on the security dimensions of the international environment or on the position that the state occupies among the members of the international community only, but rather it should be based on other dimensions that are no less important than them in the case of political leaders, especially charismatic ones. capable of formulating major strategies capable of changing the directions of history.

     Supporters of geopolitical ideas and schools (such as Mackinder and Mahan) are based on the geopolitical dimensions in defining the grand strategy, as they see that control of the world is through the development of geopolitical strategies.

  Silove believes that the grand strategy is based on three distinct components, namely:

A- Grand plans: They are represented in the detailed product of the carefully studied efforts of decision-makers that are being made in order to translate the national interests of the state in the form of specific national goals in the long term, and clarify the mechanism of comparison between the priority of comparison between these goals, and those efforts also take into account the pronunciation of the grand plan, which must be To include all political, military and economic sectors of the state, as well as the need to take into account the allocation of appropriate means and tools to achieve the national goals of the state.

B- Grand principles: They express the comprehensive general ideas that the ruling elite writes about formulating long-term national goals and the various tools (military, political and economic) that must be harnessed to achieve those goals.

C- Grand behaviors or activities: He imagines them in behavioral patterns in the long term, which are represented in the activities of the state in the international arena when they come as a reflection of the resources it acquires and what it employs from them to achieve its goals.

     Whatever the definitions referred to above, several characteristics can be derived for major strategies in the field of foreign policy. Perhaps the most prominent of these characteristics are the following:

1- Strategies are not based on a set of goals and means, but include harmonization between them as well.

2- The major strategies are formulated for long-term terms, and are not prepared for short-term purposes to deal with current or routine daily events.

3- Grand strategies are not limited to military dimensions only, but include a mixture of political, economic and social dimensions as well.

4- Despite the discrepancy between many of the definitions presented in the definition of grand strategies, there are common denominators on which most of these definitions are based, namely: a plan, an organizing principle, and a pattern of behavior.

  5- A number of elements must be available to countries that seek to implement grand strategies, and perhaps the following are evident from them:

A- Conscious political leadership: Where the grand strategy is at its best when political leaders enjoy a clear vision of the image of the distribution of power in the international arena.

B- Factors of state power, as it is inconceivable – as emphasized by many theorists, led by Modalsky – that weak states adopt effective and influential major strategies like those adopted by the major states, given the coercive power that the latter possesses. Bargaining power, concerted power, and political power resulting from internal cohesion.

C- Political cohesion: where effective and effective strategies require political cohesion that guarantees its continuity until it expires its predetermined term and creates an appropriate environment for achieving its goals. stable roles.

             The second topic – patterns and images of grand strategies

The different forms and patterns of grand strategies contribute to their dynamism or continuity and their transformation or termination. This is what we will explain in the following lines:

   1- Balance of power Grand strategy

         A number of theorists believe that the strategies of the grand balance of power – or as some call it the “balancing grand strategy” – represent a practical option or a serious attempt by which states seek to maintain the existing image of the distribution of power that reflects their interests in a way that leaves no room for anyone. countries to excel in their power factors that would threaten other countries; Which may prepare for the stability of the international system, and these theorists cite examples that are rooted in the depths of history, the case of the Vienna Conference in 1815, through which the active European powers reconciled to preserve the image of the distribution of power in Europe at that time from the folds of adhering to the principle of legitimate rights and opposing revolutionary ideas, in the forefront of which is the right Peoples in determining the destinies of peoples, as well as the Berlin Conference in 1878, which represented a stumbling block in the way of the attempt of Russian hegemony over the Balkans so that the balance of power in that region would not be disturbed in a way that would lead to igniting a world war between those countries.

         On the other hand, a group of theorists questioned the ability of such strategies to achieve stability in an international environment in which actors weave intrigues for each other, and each actor seeks to outperform his counterparts. Which leads to the outbreak of major wars that may lead to transforming the structure of the international system. As the relative balance of power drives countries, whether willing or forced, to adopt aggressive behavior that threatens other countries or drags them into wars that have no interest in them. The types of balancing strategies affect their mechanism of action and dynamism: for example, we find the balancing strategy based on the dominance of a single power, the Hegemonic grand strategy, as is the case with the strategy adopted by the United States in the nineties era, relatively less dynamic than the balancing strategies based on the Allies Grand Strategy.

2- Engagement grand strategy

         Such strategies have several characteristics that make them among the most dynamic strategies, as they are based on the assumption that the state’s external behavior is nothing but the outcome of the interaction of the preferences and desires of local groups and forces (which have common tendencies and are entrusted with formulating the state’s external strategies) with the desires and preferences of other groups. And other local forces in such a way that the state’s external goals and aspirations represent the aspiration of a broad segment of society or as if they are a large social goal around which the state’s “social purpose” gathers forces on the one hand, and on the other hand, the effectiveness of these strategies requires the embrace of the social groups involved in decision-making. In other countries with a goal, and since a significant number of these groups (whether within the country wishing to integrate or within other countries that also wish to integrate) are constantly changing in their preferences and desires; It is only natural that such strategies become as dynamic as possible

  3- Interdependence grand strategy

This strategy is one of the forms of cooperation strategies, and the realization of this strategy requires the availability of several conditions, including:

A- Availability of mutual and multiple channels of communication between the societies of countries wishing to adopt this strategy.

B- The countries’ keenness to implement joint and agreed-upon cooperative activities, and to take the necessary measures regarding their effects.

C- The relationship between the issues of cooperation between the concerned countries should not be based on hierarchy or discriminatory. In other words, those countries should not allocate more relative weight to one issue of cooperation at the expense of other topics of cooperation. Hence, she should give all subjects the same amount of care.

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D – There is no room for the use of military force or even the mere threat of it between the countries concerned.

         It should be noted that the aforementioned conditions are merely necessary conditions for countries to adopt interdependent strategies; So it is not enough for it to happen; The success of such strategies requires the availability of international frameworks or entities that include all countries aspiring to adopt these strategies and work under their banner, as well as making political changes in these countries in a way that guarantees the germination of local political groups that believe in cooperative and participatory values, as well as handing over the reins of power to people who put They set their sights on the principle of interdependence and make mutual benefit the language of dialogue between them. Moreover, political leaders must adopt flexible and flexible concepts of borders and separators between what is internal and what is external.

4- Reform grand strategy

    The reform grand strategy is one of the most sensitive strategies to change in societal values, as the intellectual elites in society seek to replace new social values ​​with existing social values ​​and work to consolidate and prevail them to become the prevailing societal values ​​responsible for shaping the governing social rules and laying the foundations of a political culture emanating from Its social reality is expressive of it. That is the culture from which new reformist values ​​and principles emerge from which the governing principles of the state’s external orientations embraced by the political leaders are derived. The societal value system, and not only monitoring the capabilities that ensure the reform of this system, but also the modification in the external behavior of the state to come in line with those reform values. For example, the reform values ​​contributedThe Prostrika movement in the former Soviet Union brought about a change in the orientations of the Soviet leaders during the era of Mikhail Gorbachev, which helped change the Soviet strategy at the time as a result of the redefinition of the Soviet identity and the new reformist values ​​it established.

 5- The zero-sum grand strategy

        A zero-sum grand strategy is based on four realistic assumptions, namely: the chaotic nature of the international environment, suspicion and doubt about the intentions and actions of other countries, and it comes at the forefront of the national goals of the state, the goal of self-preservation, and the assumption of rationality and prudence in the political decision-making process. The last assumption is precisely what separates the dynamics of this strategy, as decision makers constantly choose between the desired benefit of adopting the strategy and the cost that the state may incur from establishing such a strategy. Its costs exceed, while it is reconsidered in its entirety or one of its elements in the event that its costs exceed the benefits arising from its adoption.

6- The Institutionalist Grand Strategy

      Major institutional strategies are those pursued by countries working together under the umbrella of one international organization or institution. These strategies are characterized by several characteristics, including:

A- The existence of a joint agreement between the countries affiliated with the organization, and the rules governing and controlling the actions of those countries are deduced from this agreement.

B- The controlling and governing rules are obligatory, and they must be observed by all concerned countries, and they represent a restriction on the member states’ exercise of the manifestations of power. These rules are also inflexible; Hence it is difficult to change it.

C- The rules regulating the work of these organizations should not only be observed by the governments of the states, but rather they should be observed by the social groups within the states as well, since such rules could only be set to achieve the interest of the member states as well as the social groups residing in them.

         It should be noted that institutionalist grand strategies come at the bottom of the list of dynamic strategies, and at the forefront of the most inflexible and rigid strategies. It has a mandatory character, and the grand strategy remains throughout its life, which may exceed decades, imprisoned in the perception and rules of work specified by the concerned institutions until its prescribed period ends or the political institutions change, whichever is sooner.

                     The third topic – the dynamics of grand strategies

       Most specialists in international affairs point out that the dynamic nature that characterizes grand strategies stems from several things, including: the motives or motives for adopting these strategies, institutional factors, the difficulty of predicting sudden events, the change in strategic priorities, and the change in the balance of power, and this is what will happen. We highlight it in the following lines:

1- The motives for adopting grand strategies by countries

       By extrapolating many studies in the fields of international relations and foreign policy, it was found that there is no agreement among those preoccupied with theorizing in the field of grand strategies about one or more motives that may lead countries to adopt grand strategies; Therefore, in this part, we will seek to address the most prominent of these motives in order to reach the motives and reasons that drive countries to adopt major strategies in the field of foreign policy.

     A group of researchers – led by Martel – believe that states may pursue grand strategies with implementational motives, because they believe that any grand strategy is based on two main pillars, namely: the verbal argument: it means the textual form of the strategy that is developed by the decision-makers in the state In it, it explicitly states the goals or major objectives of the state, and the implementation mechanism: It means the methods and means that qualify the state to achieve its goals stipulated in the first component or the first pillar (the verbal operative).

        Countries may adopt major strategies motivated by beliefs or ideologies, for example, the United States adopted the strategy of encircling the communist tide during the era of bipolar arrangement for ideological motives, as well as the major US strategy for confronting international terrorism after the events of September 11, 2001.

         Krasner believes that countries may draw up major strategies for them with the motive of acquiring power. For example, Hitler sought to expand at the expense of neighboring regions in theory because he adopted a nibbling strategy, due to his keenness to exploit the economic resources in those regions in order to increase the strength of the German state. It is worth mentioning in this regard that the state’s adoption of a strategy is not only intended to increase its national strength factors, but states may drift to adopt major strategies with the aim of developing their strength factors through bullying others or adopting what is known as alliance strategies, and these alliance strategies were one of The reasons that prompted the major powers to engage in two world wars in the twentieth century.

    The major powers may be eager to pursue a major strategy in order to keep up with other friendly major countries or balance great worm countries, for example, West Germany sought during the era since Germany ran the tails of defeat after the fires of World War II subsided and even before the Berlin Wall cracked to adopt strategies of It would keep pace with the United States of America during the era of bilateral coordination, and Russia also adopted a strategy of Russification in some areas of interest of the former Soviet Union to balance American hegemony in those areas.

       The rising international powers may accelerate their adoption of major strategies to secure their peaceful rise and avoid the dangers of armed confrontation that could impede the growth of their power in one way or another. Governance in China until our era. The third-class powers may be keen to adopt major strategies that would delude the major powers with a level of powers greater than they are in actual reality, and one of the most prominent examples of this is Iran’s keenness to adopt major strategies to delude the United States and other major powers with Iran’s superpowers in a way that exceeds its real capabilities. .

       Grand strategies derive their dynamic character from two levels. The first is represented in the nature of the changing international environment, which may force states to change or modify their tactics or means (which are determined in advance when formulating the strategy), as a result of the state on its own changing or changing these means. To take action or initiate a specific action to seize an opportunity that such changes may provide on the one hand, and on the other hand, this modification or change may come in response to urgent changes in the international environment that dictate the state to take a specific reaction, which may force the decision-maker to modify specific tactics and means. advance or replace it. The second level is that level that relates to linking policies:

        Indeed, the dynamic characteristic of grand strategy does not at all make it identical with what is called an emergent strategy. The first is based on pre-prepared measures, while the second is based on adaptive or adaptive improvisational measures. It is also possible that an amendment takes place in one of the elements of the grand strategy during the implementation period. On the other hand, all the elements of the emergency strategy appear in the event of an emergency, in addition to that the strategy The major as well as the emergency strategy have the characteristic of dynamism, although the second is more dynamic than the first.

      The truth is that a fine line separates the dynamism of grand strategies and their transformation, as the first phenomenon appears on the surface in the event of a change in the tactics of the grand strategies or a change in the active plans in order to preserve the realization of the interests of the state that it previously launched when drawing up its grand strategies (and that is from a tactical change in the policies of The external state, its security strategy, its short and medium-term goals, its reactions towards the outside world, the agreements concluded and interventions in areas of interest, etc…). For example, the nature of the vital interests of the state will change, or the image of the international system will change, or the ideology of the state will change..etc.) The grand strategy of the state will undergo a transformation, and this transformation will result in the birth of a new strategy.

2- The official institutional determinants of grand strategic change.

       A group of theorists, led by Simon, attributes the greatest role in the dynamics of the grand strategies of states to formal organizations (Simon, 1991, p.3), as these institutions are entrusted with drawing up foreign policies and formulating their strategies, and they are the ones that are able to do so if arrows fail to pass. Changing the surrounding circumstances of the strategy to estimate that the strategy set in advance by it will continue in its goals and means, or that such circumstances push the state to take tactical measures in order to modify or change the goals of its strategies and the methods of achieving them.

         There is no doubt that such institutions, in order to be able to carry out such tasks, must be based on groups of essential elements, which are: work mechanism goals, methods of communication, environment, specific tasks, technological and financial resources, and individuals, and individuals must be rational. Rationality, or in other words, to be a rational actor, and the rational actor is the cornerstone of official institutions and the most important element among the previous elements, given that he is entrusted with defining and laying down all the foundations, principles, and mechanisms for implementing all the goals of the strategy. The availability of such an element for the formulation of strategies is a guarantee, with other factors remaining unchanged, that they will continue until the end of their terms.

        A central question comes to mind here: Is the behavior of individuals in charge of making grand strategies for states the same as the behavior of official institutions that express states? Or in other words, does the behavior of individuals in charge of making major strategies match the behavior of official institutions? The answer for many researchers is negative, and if this hypothesis is correct (that is, the behavior of the individuals in charge of making strategies is not the same as the behavior of the official institution, and they are not two sides of the same coin), then such a hypothesis will add a new complex dimension to the dynamic equation of the grand strategies of states. The behavior of official institutions is not merely the arithmetic mean of those in charge of decision-making in them and does not reflect the behavior of a single party or group.

        The dynamism of grand strategies may not only be affected by limited rationality and the relative collective behavior of individuals in charge of making them within the official state institutions, but may also be affected by the pattern and shape of these institutions as well. “” (at the beginning of the sixth decade of the last century), and distinguished through it between four main patterns of official political institutions, namely:

1- “mutual-benefit associations” Mutual-benefit associations: where the benefit resolves when individuals own its membership.

2- Business concerns: the main beneficiary is the one who owns it.

3- Service organizations: the main beneficiaries are customer groups.

4- Commonwealth organizations: where the main beneficiary is the general public.

       Issuing official institutions of any style or type – as emphasized by Woman – grand strategies that express the aspirations of states is not an easy matter, as the birth of such strategies from the folds of those institutions goes through a complex series of interactions between a group of variables, some of which are located within the institution itself (or What is known as the internal capabilities of the organization “The Resource-Based View of the Firm”: It refers to all the internal capabilities that the strategy maker can harness to formulate his strategy), and some of them come from outside the organization “externally oriented focus” (which is represented in all the obstacles or challenges facing The maker of the strategy as well as all the incentives and factors predisposing to adopt the most appropriate options among the available options.

  Supporters of the latter theories assume that the state’s choices and strategies come mainly as a response to international developments (threats and incentives); Hence, many strategies are put in place to preserve the survival of the state in the international environment. Therefore, strategies change or change in the event that international conditions change in favor of the state or changes occur in external threats that may endanger the survival of the state. For example, the researchers “Goren” and “Podeh” believe that the events of the Arab Spring and the geopolitical changes they caused in the East In the Middle East and the repercussions it may cause on Israeli national security, the Israeli leadership had one of two options to preserve Israeli security: either to make fundamental changes in its strategy to face potential challenges in the event that the Arab Spring resulted in strong nation-states, or to make tactical adjustments In its strategy to seize the opportunity to move forward in the completion of the path of peace operations, which has not yet been completed.

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    Skidmore classified the reasons for the dynamism of grand strategies and the reasons for their change in a classification that does not go far in content from the classification mentioned above. That is, the state’s strategies change for external reasons. The state comes from the international environment, and the “institutional” approach: it is based on the assumptions of the liberal perspective, and it is based in its analysis of the reasons for the dynamism of major strategies on local causes and variables.

     Despite the significant discrepancy between the two groups of theories explaining the dynamism of grand strategies, they agree that they perform the same function, which is to search for the reason for the change of strategy from one pattern to another, and the rates of change that may occur as a result of moving between the different forms and patterns of strategies.

      Some researchers – led by Braumoeller – tried to put a more systematic framework and a middle model between the two aforementioned theories, because it did not rely in its interpretation of the strategies of the major countries, not only on the external or systemic levels, nor on the individual levels related to the “individuals bottom” of the strategy makers. alone, but on a scientific framework based on not just the interaction between these two levels, but the complementarity between them as well.

       Braumoeller bases his analysis on the fact that there are some systemic variables that float to the surface and he called them Constituency demands, or what is known as the pool of elected or candidate influences (similar to the list of candidates in the electoral process within political systems, one or more of which is expected to win and then is expected to become a player politically active). All of these elected influences, or at least one of them, generate, in the event of their occurrence, a state of discontent or dissatisfaction when they come against the desire of states. This prompts the decision-maker to take reactions and measures that will change or revise its strategies in order to bring about systemic changes in a way that prepares for the emergence of a satisfactory image that the state aspires to and is compatible with its aspirations.

     It is clear from the foregoing that the dynamism of the grand strategies of the states according to Braumoeller comes as a result of systemic incentives or structural motives, and they do not bear fruit unless they are adopted by major powers, as it is not possible for states other than the major powers to bring about changes in the structure of the system. Perhaps the best examples of this are the elected influences that faced the United States prior to the First and Second World Wars, which led it to abandon the policy of isolation. And it led it to adopt major strategies such as the international alliance and integration, in order to prepare the international system for a new situation in which it would become one of its poles.

3- Difficulty predicting sudden events (a “black swan” event)

      The phenomenon of the black swan – whose word was coined in the field of international relations by the thinker Nassim Taleb – refers to the difficulty of predicting sudden events, due to the limited knowledge of both individuals and groups based on policy and strategy making, and this limited knowledge may make the possibility of unexpected events (whether Partially or completely) is a strong candidate, as it is difficult for any major strategy, no matter how much you love its formulation, the comprehensiveness of its objectives, the firmness of its principles and the coherence of its pillars, to predict all sudden events and changes that may occur in the international arena at any moment, which may result in confusion for some decision-makers, and Which may occur in the future in light of an international environment dominated by an atmosphere full of uncertainty and countries’ doubts about each other’s intentions.The examples of this are endless, including, but not limited to, the events of September 11 and the change in US strategy that brought about, as well as the fundamental modification in the US strategy caused by the global financial crisis.

       There is no doubt that the cognitive limitations of both individuals and groups are affected by what is known as the phenomenon of “collective ideas”, which means all concepts and perceptions shared by decision-makers and citizens alike on how to use the political system and international conditions to provide the best environment for achieving the interests of the nation-state.

        According to the theorist Legro, the collective ideas (which undoubtedly affect the formulation of the strategies of the major countries) change when two things happen: the first: when Najla’s shock occurs, revealing the failure of previous perceptions of the reality of the international environment, and the second: when new ideas and perceptions cloud the atmosphere and gain acceptance. It is widespread among decision makers and the general public alike, and finds those who defend it in its early days and in the stages of implementation.

   Collective ideas and perceptions influence grand strategies – as Legro emphasized – through two basic stages, namely:

A- The occurrence of an international shock that results in a decline in faith in the prevailing belief or perceptions, and the consequent widespread decline in its legitimacy, the spread of its invalidity and failure, and the increasing need to reconsider it.

B- The stage of consolidation of the new changes: This stage is a function of a set of variables, including: the number of ideas and beliefs that can be replaced by new ideas and beliefs, and the expected initial implementation results of these ideas or beliefs.

 In other words, according to the Legro model, if an international shock occurred and cast a shadow over the collective ideas in a country that affected it, then at least one of the following possibilities would occur:

A- If an international shock occurred and it was not able to change the constants of the existing collective ideas, the strategy that the state follows will remain valid without failing or transforming.

B- If an international shock occurred and resulted in a change in the collective ideas, then the strategy will take its way to transformation, and in such circumstances it will take one of the following forms:

    – Adopting a new strategy, where decision makers have the ability to replace new ideas that are expected to succeed with existing ideas that have been proven to fail.

Consolidating the existing strategy in the event that the state is unable to replace the existing ideas with new collective ideas, or in the event that the new initial ideas are expected to fail.

     Legro proceeded to classify the types of major strategies that the state may adopt in the international arena, and classified them into three main types, namely: integration strategies, isolation strategies, and radical or revolutionary strategies. Legro believes The state’s adoption of one of these three patterns or turning away from it to adopt others occurs through two basic stages, namely: the change in the prevailing value patterns as a result of the occurrence of an international shock for any reason, and the definitive proof of the inadequacy of the prevailing values, and the endeavor towards consolidating new values, and these new values ​​are What might prompt the adopter of strategies to adopt a new strategy.

       In summary, regarding the Legro model: Since we are based on collective values ​​in understanding the extent of stability or change in the major strategies of states and their transformation, he believes that the strategies of states will continue and operate at a steady pace unless their predetermined deadline comes when they are formulated, or when an international incident occurs that results in a shock. It can push countries to change their collective ideas, whichever comes first.

4- Change in priorities and goals

       Priorities are among the most important pillars on which grand strategies are based. It is not conceivable that a grand strategy for a country would be formulated without expressly or implicitly stating the priorities of that strategy. There are an infinite number of priorities that the country may seek behind its strategies. A solid line below self-preservation or the survival of the state and above global domination and control over the capabilities of the international system in a certain period of time.

      Grand strategies are linked whether or not to their priorities, as grand strategies reflect in their simplest contents the outcome of the controversial visions about how the interests of the nation-state can be achieved, arranged in an order that reflects its priorities.

        The concept of primacy in the field of grand strategies is a loose concept with multi-faceted meanings. For example, it is noted that the priorities of the contented state (whether those that sit on the throne of the international system or its allied countries and are content with their position on the scale of global power distribution) center around the consolidation of its existing hegemony. And defending and preserving it “accepts its dominance and seeks to maintain it”, while we note that one of the most important priorities of the strategies of the major powers that are not content with the image of the existing distribution of power in a particular international arrangement is to resist the stereotyped, behavioral and rules of the game imposed by the powers or the dominant force in the system the international community, and is actively seeking to overthrow it.

      Determining the priorities of major strategies is not an easy matter, as it may lead – especially to a group of realists – the priorities of some major strategies to international wars, especially in the event that countries adhere to these priorities and these priorities fall within the vital interests of the state, especially when these countries do not find it difficult to Harnessing the necessary resources to achieve them. For example, the insistence of the neo-conservative movement in the United States on achieving the priorities of the American strategy known as the global war on terrorism led to the refutation of rogue states and the United States launching its war machine on a number of them, especially Iraq.

      It should be noted here that strategy makers should be careful not to place excessively ambitious goals on the list of its priorities without the state having the means to achieve those ambitious goals, as this may lead to the doomed state, for example when Hitler placed the top priority of the expansionist strategy during During the Second World War, he aimed to control the world, and he had neither the capabilities nor the means to reach his ambitions. He passed away and Germany perished.

         Narizny began to envision a unique framework unfamiliar to his predecessors in the field of foreign policy, in which he singled out the role of three local economic groups in determining the national interest of the strategies of major countries in the international field, and envisioned these groups in the following groups:

A- The first groups: They are those groups that encourage exporting to the major powers (the Central Powers) or investing in them. One of the priorities of these groups is to work to prevent friction or skirmishes between the major powers, and they work to encourage the major powers to expand and spread internationally, sign international agreements, respect international law and all activities that facilitate economic activities.

B- The second groups: They are those groups that profit from exporting to marginal countries or benefiting from investing in them. These groups aim for the countries of the periphery or the periphery to adopt strategies that would allow hosting some of the interventions or expansions of the major powers (the center) in certain areas.

C- The third groups: They are the military benefit groups: they consist of a group of military personnel, bureaucrats, and some members of defense institutions who profit from the expansion of government spending. Such groups seek to impose expansionist strategies that depend on large government expenditures, in order to allow them to impose a margin of profit. Increased government spending on armaments.

     And these three main groups that differ in their priorities, interests, and visions of the national interest of the state impose their major choices and strategies through which they support their candidates to fight electoral battles in order to reach power or recruit those who support them in the focus of external decision-making, and Narizny believes that the strategies adopted by the major countries (states The center) is dynamic due to the change in its priorities, and this change results from the outcome of the interaction between the ruling economic group and other groups opposing it, or even just other social groups that oppose the policies of domination or reject the exacerbation of internal debt, economic stagnation, or any disruption in the financial system of the state in return for spending. on expansion strategies.

       Perhaps also among the most prominent examples in this regard: the change in the priorities of the containment strategy pursued by the United States in the face of its traditional opponents (the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries) during the era of bilateral coordination as a result of the interaction between the three groups in the advanced concept; As the emergence of a group of major events in that period, including:

 5- The change in the balance of power

       The structural realists believe that the dynamism of grand strategies is due to what is known as “strategic adaptation,” and it means that countries are constantly adjusting or changing their policies and strategies to keep pace with changes and developments that occur in the international arena or the balance of power in them. For example, the structural realist Stephen It is believed that states may adopt defensive strategies and alliances and counter-alliances arise as a result of coordinating pressures and the influence that the structure of the international system can produce on these states, and it is also believed that the structure of the international system and what it includes of the image of the distribution of power may market states – as they do not possess factors of strength It qualifies it to do so – to adopt strategies such as hegemony, international spread, and balancing.

       A few of the structural realists asserted (Proverbs:Christopher Layne) that the structure of the international system and the image of the distribution of power that it includes can not only push countries to adopt certain strategies in the event of stability of the state system, but also shifts in the global balance of power may drive countries to adopt some major strategies that are compatible with the nature of such transformations For example, Layne gave his advice to the maker of the major US strategies to take into account the US strategies in light of the power shifts taking place in the structure of the current international arrangement, to build on the global “offshore balancing” strategy, which takes into account the presence of new emerging powers that have areas of competing interests for the states. The United States of America is the case of Russia and China) instead of being built on global trans-regional hegemony “extratregional hegemony” that was definitely appropriate for the nineties of the last century (when the opportunity was available for the United States to exercise the role of the sole dominant pole onAll layout controls.

      Supporters of the liberal trend see the grand strategies as a purely local way out or product. In other words, the grand strategies of states may come as a reflection of the local balance of power among the groups participating in external decision-making. As it is in the light of democratic countries that the strongest political groups that have the ability to dominate power can work their policies and strategies according to their visions and in a way that achieves the interests of their country that they represent before the outside world, so the dynamism of the strategies of the major countries in them is affected by the folds of change in the ruling partisan leaderships, and the interests of the groups Political, and the change in economic, political and social factors within the state that in turn affect these leaders.

It should be noted that there are many factors leading to the dynamism of grand strategies, and many theoretical attempts and frameworks have been made to examine the impact of these factors as we have shown above, but these attempts are partial. light on it and ignore the influence of other factors, which prompted some theorists to present more abstract theoretical models, which take into account several factors in their analysis of the causes and factors of the dynamics of major strategies, and perhaps the most prominent of these models, the Kingdon model, and the Richard Rumelt model, and the Thompson model, And the model of Clark and his associates, and this is what we will highlight in the following lines:

      In his model, Kingdon concluded that the cause of the transformation of the major policies and strategies of states and the emergence of new policies is the change in three independent and separate processes, namely: the change in international data, problems, the throes of an international problem, and the general policies of the state or the political reality and local politics. The change of major strategies begins with changes in the international environment, such as the emergence of certain threats and the disappearance of others, the emergence of new major international powers, or the decline in the dominance of existing dominant international powers. The occurrence of such data or the emergence of such problems draws the attention of states to reconsider existing policies and adopt policies. New foreign policies that are in line with these international developments, and the adoption of such policies would bring about a change in the local politics of the state because of its reflection on the positions and interests of the local powers within the states.

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  Richard Rumelt came up with a model and developed it after him, Walter A. McDougall, in which he explained the reasons for the dynamism of grand strategies, and limited the dynamism factors to the following reasons:

1- Failure to identify the true state resources and capabilities.

2- Miscalculation of the strategic objectives.

3- Difficulty in identifying the problems that may face the strategy.

4- Choosing shallow goals that do not rise to the levels of the state’s aspirations.

5- Failure to identify strategic opponents and competitors.

6- Strategies should be based on misconceptions about the characteristics of the state

7- Dispersal of the efforts of the bureaucratic participants during the process of formulating the strategy.

8- The state’s inability to accurately identify the areas in which it has comparative competitive advantages.

9- Failure to distinguish between the state’s opponents and its friends on the international scene.

10- Failing to identify the actual cognitive skills of the individuals in charge of formulating the strategy.

11- The failure of decision-makers to understand their individual characteristics.

     Thompson inaugurated a unique model, which provided extensive reasons for the dynamism of the grand strategies of the state, as he emphasized that the grand strategies of states change with the factor of change in one or more of the following five factors:

      problem definition-correspondence, international shocks, policy entrepreneurs, contestation, reinforcement. It is worth noting that the dynamism of the state’s grand strategy may become more significant if all of these factors change steadily at the same time. At that time, states may have no choice but to modify or switch the tactics of their major strategies.

     Thompson’s model is based on the assumption that: the throes of environmental developments are of the degree of an international problem or an international shock (such as a change in the nature of international threats or the international balance of power and other matters), and this shock was able to cause a challenge to those involved in setting public policies, and it was able to As well as influencing the balance of support and opposition to government policies at home, as well as allocating the necessary resources to deal with them. In such circumstances, the situation is ripe for the state to adopt a new grand strategy. Mathematically, it can be said: There is a direct relationship between the transition to a new grand strategy and each of: the enormity of the international problem, the magnitude of the shock that the international problem issues to the participants in public policy-making, the tendency of local forces to abandon existing policies and support change to respond to the effects of the shock, and the availability of the necessary resources to change.

         Clark and Kevin came up with a model that examines the factors of stability of major strategies, and found out from an experimental study that the most stable strategies are those that have the following characteristics:

1- “Balanced”: This means that strategies must include the state’s priorities and national interests in all fields (political, military, economic, and societal values) in a balanced manner that does not tolerate exclusion or marginalization of any of them.

2- Prudent: that is, caution and caution, that is, the strategy must be prudent, in other words, based on the principle of caution and caution.

3- Principle: In the sense that the strategy is based on certain inalienable principles that are difficult to transform or change except when absolutely necessary.

4- “Purposive”: the strategy must include a number of objectives that the state seeks to achieve.

5- Continuity: In the sense that the strategy does not change only due to the change of those in charge of its implementation.

Conclusion:

       Despite the emergence of the term grand strategies in many areas, especially the military fields, from time immemorial, the sunrise of this term in the field of foreign policy did not pass for only a few decades, so it did not take its abundant luck and did not obtain an adequate share of research and exploration from Those concerned with theorizing in this field accepted it, and despite the strenuous attempts of some of them aimed at reaching a comprehensive framework or a unified model that could provide a clear explanation for all the dimensions of the grand strategies of states, none of them succeeded, nor did it escape criticism as faultless as nature. The complexity of major strategies and the multiplicity of factors that add to their dynamism, and the different orientations and intentions of those in charge of setting their priorities. In any case, the study concluded the following results:

First – There is no agreement among those involved in the field of foreign policy about one comprehensive definition of grand strategies. Despite this, Posen’s attempt to reach a clear formula for the concept of grand strategy was accepted by the majority of theorists in the field of foreign policy. or ride with it.

Secondly, the study concluded that there are many forms and patterns of major strategies in the field of foreign policy, and despite the variation in the patterns of these strategies, they are united by one denominator, which is the characteristic of dynamism, and that feature is a double-edged sword, in other words, it may allow the flexibility of this strategy in In the event that the compass errs at a stage of implementation, the decision-makers will have many opportunities to restore the direction of the strategy towards the right direction, allowing the realization of this nation-state’s interests on the one hand, and on the other hand, the dynamic nature of the major strategies may result in their failure and the adoption of others so that they are more capable of Achieving the interests of the nation-state.

Third, the study concludes that the dynamic nature of grand strategies is what distinguishes between stable grand strategies and their unstable theory, as a fine line separates the dynamics of stable grand strategies that operate under a level in which their vocabulary is cohesive and their dynamic factors interact below the level that makes them lose their ability to achieve their functions (i.e. The organizing mechanism overcomes any disturbance factors that may creep into it that would wreck the strategy or prevent it from performing its functions) and between those unstable strategies that suffer from the incoherence of their vocabulary and whose dynamic factors interact above the level that guarantees its stability; Which would prevent the achievement of its objectives and impede the performance of its functions, which may result in its failure; And then the decision-makers began to search for alternatives.

Layton, Peter; Grand Strategy Alternatives, white paper, STRATEGIC MULTILAYER ASSESSMENT,
MARCH 16, 2019,p.9

2. Thierry Balzacq ,Peter Dombrowski, and Simon Reich; Introduction: Comparing Grand Strategies in the
   Modern World. In: Comparative Grand Strategy: A Frame and Cases, edited by Theirry Balzacq,Peter
   Dombrowski, and Simon Reich, Oxford University press,2019,p.1
3. William C. Martel, Martel, C. W. (2015). Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice. The Need for an Effective
   American Foreign Policy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,p.11
4. Sebastian Blidaru, The Concept of Grand Strategy and the Specific case of the Russian State,
   RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES , Vol. 13, no 1, 2020,p.50
5. Thierry Balzacq and Others;op.cit,p.5
6. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars
   (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984),p.7,p.13
7. Alexander Kirss; Does Grand Strategy Matter?, Strategic Studies Quarterly , Winter ,2018,p.118
8. Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S.
   Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014),p.3
9. Alexander Kirss; op.cit, p.118
10. Sebastian Blidaru; op.cit, p.50
11. Clausewitz, Carl von (1989) On War ed. and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton:
    Princeton University Press,pp. 605- 609
12. Sebastian Blidaru; Op. cit, p. 51
13. Daniel W. Drezner, Ronald R. Krebs, and Randall Schweller, The End of Grand Strategy: America Must
    Think Small, Foreign Affairs , May/June 2020,p.108

14. Martel, William C. 2015. “Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American
    Foreign Policy.” In. New York: Cambridge University Press,p.32
15. Posen, Barry R. 2015. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. Ithaca: Cornell University
    Press,p.1
16. Brands, Hal. 2014. What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry
    S. Truman to George W. Bush. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,p.3
17. Luttwak, Edward N. (2009) The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire Belknap Press: Cambridge,p. 409
18. Stephen M. Worman, The Grand Strategies of Middle Powers: Organizational Determinants and
    Constraints, PhD dissertation, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL
    AFFAIRS ,UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH,2021,p.3
19. Layton ,Peter, 2019, pp. 1-8 .
20. Alexander Kirss; Op. cit, p. 119
21. Jacob Shively, LOST AMBITION: GRAND STRATEGY STABILITY AND ABANDONED CHANGE
    IN THE JIMMY CARTER AND GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS, PhD dissertation , the
    faculty of the University Graduate School, Indiana University, 2014 pp.5-7
22. Silove, N. (2018). Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‟Grand Strategy”. Security Studies,
    27(1), p. 49
23. Daniel W. Drezner; op. cit, p.108
24. Modelski, George(1962); A theory of foreign policy(New York: Praeger), p.27
25. Petersen, Kira(2012); Four Types of power in international relations: Coercive power, Bargaining power,
    Concerted power, and institutionalized power(Paper for IPSA, No.XXII, World congress of political science,
    Madrid),pp.4-15.
26. Daniel W. Drezner; op. cit, p.108
27. Layton, Peter; on cit., pp. 7-9
28. Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph pp. 24-25
29. Robert, Keohane and Joseph, Nye,1989,pp.24-25
30. Timothy J. McKeown, ‘The Big Influence of Big Allies: Transgovernmental Relations as a Tool of
    Statecraft’, pp. 204-22 in Helen V. Milner and Andrew Moravcsik (eds.), Power, Interdependence, and
    Nonstate Actors in World Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009,pp204-210
31. Koslowski, Rey and Kratochwil, Friedrich, ‘Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet
    Empire’s Demise and the International System’, International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring
    1994,pp.215-247
32. Hillison, Joel R. The Potential and Pitfalls of a Zero-Sum Grand Strategy, Orbis , 2019,pp.241-242
33. Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars,
    Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 30-31
34. Ibid.
35. Hammer; op. cit.
36. Krasner,2010
37. Daniel W. Drezner; op. cit, p.109
38. Alexander Kirss; Op. cit, pp120-122
39. Jacob Shively; op. cit, pp.19-21
40. Stephen M. Worman; op. cit,pp.30-31
41. Simon, 1959,p.256
42. Bendor, Jonathan, and Thomas H. Hammond. 1992. “Rethinking Allison’s Models.” American Political
    Science Review 86 (02),pp.312-313
43. Stephen M. Worman; op. cit,pp.33-34
44. Blau and Scott, 1962,p.42
45. Stephen M. Worman; op. cit,pp.38-39
46. Goren & Podeh, 2013

47. Skidmore, David (1996) Reversing Course: Carter’s Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of
    Reform Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press,p. 4
48. Stephen M. Worman; op. cit,pp.20-21
49. Thompson, William R. , The 1920–1945 Shift in US Foreign Policy Orientation: Theory, Grand Strategies,
    and System Leader Ascents. Foreign Policy Analysis (2014),Vol. 0,p.5
50. Ibid.
51. Taleb N., 2007
52. Jacob Shively; op. cit, pp.12-13
53. Jacob Shively; op. cit, pp14-15
54. Legro, Jeffrey W. (2005) Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order Cornell
    University Press: Ithaca, p. 4
55. Thompson, William R; op. cit,pp.2-3
56. Jacob Shively; op. cit, pp14-16
57. Hillison, Joel R.; on cit., p. 245
58. Clark, Joseph R.; Russia’s Indirect Grand Strategy, Orbis, February 2019, pp.226-227
59. Parpiani, Kashish; Prescribing an American Grand Strategy for the Era of Renewed Great Power
    Competition, MCU Journal vol. 10, no. 2, Fall 2019,p.150.
60. Friedman, Benjamin H. and Logan, Justin; Why Washington Doesn’t Debate Grand Strategy, Strategic
    Studies Quarterly , Winter 2016, p.18
61. Ibid, pp. 14-18
62. Thompson, William R. ; op. cit,p.4
63. Ibid.
64. Moyar,Mark , 2009,p.594.
65. Legro; on. cit, pp. 44-45
66. Walt, Stephen M. (1987) The Origins of Alliances ,Cornell University Press: Ithaca,pp. 2 – 5
67. Christopher Layne,p.2006,p.p6-14
68. Jacob Shively; op. cit, pp.8-10
69. KINGDON, JOHN W. (1995) Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd edition. New York: Harper
    Collins
70. Walter A. McDougall, Can the United States Do Grand Strategy?, Orbis, Fall 2017,pp.491-492
71. Thompson; on. cit, p.9
72. ibid, pp. 9-10
73. Murdock, Clark and Kallmyer, Kevin; Applied Grand Strategy: Making Tough Choices in an Era of Limits
    and Constraint, Orbis, Fall 2011, pp.550-551
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