The Islamic Republic of Iran is currently facing the most challenging tests it has encountered in over four decades. Although it has experienced numerous external crises since 1979, the current crisis may be the largest and most threatening to its hold on power. In a message issued on September 28, 2024, following the assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in the attacks launched by Israel on the southern suburbs of Beirut the day before, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei attempted to assert that this change would not impact the strength and cohesion of the party. However, this does not negate the fears that the Iranian regime harbors regarding the repercussions that may arise from these events, particularly given the security breaches it is currently experiencing. A prominent manifestation of these breaches was evident in the assassination of Hamas Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh inside a security facility affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard on July 31, 2024.
Numerous reports indicate that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself has been moved to a more secure location within Iran. Notably, Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei—considered a candidate to succeed his father—has halted the teaching of “External Jurisprudence and Principles” at the seminary, attended by over 700 students. This course represents the final stage for obtaining the rank of ijtihad in Shia jurisprudence. Many interpret this move as an attempt to safeguard the Supreme Leader’s son from potential personal targeting in light of the security vulnerabilities that Iran is currently experiencing and that its security apparatus has failed to contain.
Potential Repercussions
Undoubtedly, the outcomes of the current Israeli war in Lebanon exert significant pressure on Iran, particularly as they may lead to several consequences, which can be outlined as follows:
Increased Likelihood of Direct War with Israel: Israel’s insistence on adopting an aggressive approach in its military escalation against regional adversaries suggests that it is no longer ruling out direct engagement with Iran. It has begun targeting the military capabilities of Iran’s allies, such as Hamas and, currently, Hezbollah. This may indicate that Israel is indeed preparing for a large-scale direct war with Iran. It was notable that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered direct threats to Iran during his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 2024, just hours before the assassination of Nasrallah, stating that if Iran attacked Israel, the latter would retaliate everywhere. This reflects the current ruling elite’s view in Tel Aviv that preventing a recurrence of events similar to those of October 7, 2023, primarily requires dismantling the military capabilities of their adversaries to neutralize the risks posed by their determination to enhance these capabilities.
Iran Accelerating Nuclear Bomb Production: Within various circles of the regime, there is a belief that current events reflect a strategic scheme embraced by both Israel and the United States, aiming to eliminate the Iran-aligned “regional axis” in preparation for a reshaping of security and strategic arrangements in the Middle East in line with their interests. Iran undoubtedly recognizes that its vigorous efforts to establish a regional deterrent, viewed as the primary mechanism for protecting itself from external threats and minimizing the chances of direct war, have ultimately failed. This is evidenced by the significant dismantling of Hamas’s military capabilities and the assassination of key leaders within Hezbollah, alongside efforts to undermine its military strength. Consequently, in light of the possibility that these events could serve as a precursor to a military attack against it—whether by Israel, the United States, or both—Iran may resort to its alternate strategy regarding nuclear weapons.
Several Iranian officials have hinted in recent times at the possibility of Iran “changing its nuclear doctrine,” suggesting a potential revision of the fatwa issued by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2003, which prohibits the production and storage of nuclear weapons, or even its complete annulment. This would allow Iran to engage in such a path, especially as it now possesses sufficient fissile materials to approach this stage, lacking only certain technical components necessary for nuclear warheads, such as the production of a nuclear trigger and missile heads to carry the bombs.
It is noteworthy that the International Atomic Energy Agency reported on August 29, 2024, that the amount of uranium enriched by Iran at various levels has reached 5,751.8 kg, which is equivalent to 28 times the amount stipulated in the nuclear agreement (202.8 kg). Furthermore, the quantity of uranium enriched to 60%—which is close to the level needed for bomb production (90%)—has reached 164.7 kg. This quantity requires only 2 kg to be sufficient for producing four nuclear bombs if Iran decides to pursue this route. Khamenei’s close associate and former foreign minister, Kamal Kharrazi, indicated on May 12, 2024, that “Iran may change its nuclear doctrine if it is threatened.”
A Rift Between Iran and Its Proxies: Despite the statement issued by the Iranian embassy in Beirut on September 27, 2024, which carried a threatening tone by asserting that these “military operations will change the rules of the game,” Iran’s overall position remains characterized by “conciliation” toward Israel’s military strategy against it and its proxies since October 7, 2023. This stance may lead to negative repercussions for relations between Iran and its allied militias in countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, as well as Sunni factions like Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Iran has refrained from intervening to support its proxies, whether Hamas or Hezbollah. In the former case, it has been careful to distance itself from the “Flood of Al-Aqsa” operation. In the latter case, it has signaled to Hezbollah that it is not prepared to engage in a regional war with Israel. Consequently, this may prompt its proxies to expand their operational latitude at both local and regional levels, which may not necessarily align with Iran’s interests and calculations, especially since Iranian influence over these proxies has diminished somewhat following the assassination of former Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020.
Confusion in the Field Movements of Iranian Proxies in the Region: The powerful military strikes faced by Hezbollah may impact the operational movements of other proxies, given the prominent role Hezbollah has played in mediating between some of its allied militias, which occasionally experience conflicts over wealth and influence, such as between the Shia militias in Iraq. Additionally, Hezbollah has been instrumental in training militia personnel in the use of heavy weaponry, including ballistic missiles and drones, as is the case with the Houthi militia in Yemen.
Hezbollah’s current focus on reorganizing its ranks, through appointing a new secretary-general and first-tier cadres, may detract from this role it has played recently. Some discussions have even suggested that Hezbollah—rather than Quds Force commander Ismail Qaani—has inherited the influence left by Qassem Soleimani following his assassination.
Threats to Regional States from Iranian and Militia Actions: Although President Masoud Bezhkian’s government currently seeks to improve relations with neighboring countries, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council states—as evidenced by Bezhkian’s upcoming visit to Qatar on September 30, 2024—the pressures Iran is facing due to Israel’s ongoing war in Lebanon may drive it to take escalatory actions that could impact its relationships with these countries.
The pace of Iranian threats—especially from the Revolutionary Guard—against American interests and bases in the Arabian Gulf may resume. Iran is likely to allow its allied militias to adopt a similar approach, as evidenced by emerging indicators. For instance, Abu Alaa al-Waeli, the secretary-general of the “Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada” militia in Iraq, issued a statement on September 27, 2024, threatening to target UAE interests in the event of war. Similarly, the so-called “Islamic Resistance in Bahrain – Saraya al-Ashter” issued a statement on September 21, 2024, “blessing” the “martyrdom of Hezbollah leader Ibrahim Aqeel” and confirming “unity against the evil Zionist-American axis.”
A Critical Predicament
In conclusion, it can be stated that the Iranian regime is currently facing a critical predicament. The pressures it faces to intervene in support of its proxies do not appear to be trivial and may indeed compel it to engage in the current escalation, along with the dire consequences that such involvement may entail. On the other hand, its insistence on maintaining its current stance of not responding to Israeli pressures or succumbing to the “trap” set by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—according to Iranian officials—could severely impact its ability to control the performance and movements of its proxies in the future.
