In September of this year, the United States imposed sanctions on 16 Venezuelan officials, including leaders of the National Electoral Council allied with President Nicolás Maduro. This was due to allegations by the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden that these officials were obstructing the process of holding free and fair elections in the country. The sanctions also targeted military, intelligence, and government officials accused of “intensifying repression through intimidation, arbitrary detention, and censorship.”
These officials were appointed by Maduro, who himself has been under U.S. sanctions since 2017. These latest sanctions come just over a month after the Venezuelan presidential elections and shortly after opposition candidate Edmundo González fled to Spain. With this move, the number of Venezuelans subject to U.S. sanctions now totals around 20,000 individuals, alongside 100 entities.
On August 6, 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on “Tabacalera del Este,” a large tobacco producer in Paraguay. The U.S. government accused the company of illegally funneling millions of dollars to Horacio Cartes, who served as Paraguay’s president from 2013 to 2018. Cartes was sanctioned by Washington for corruption charges in 2023. The company, also known as Tabesa, denied the allegations, claiming that the sanctions represented an “abuse of power” by the U.S. government. Cartes denied all corruption allegations, stating that he no longer holds shares in Tabesa nor is he directly involved with it. These examples illustrate how the United States extensively relies on sanctions to manage its relations with Latin American countries, which raises questions about the motivations behind this strategy and its effectiveness.
Sanctions Landscape
The United States has used sanctions as a key tool in its foreign policy toward countries in the Western Hemisphere in the following ways:
1. Diverse Targets of U.S. Sanctions: The U.S. has imposed sanctions on the governments of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. There are also U.S. sanctions targeting individuals who may be government officials or people involved in illegal activities. Some of the most well-known sanctions in history are those imposed on Cuba, with an economic embargo that has lasted for more than 60 years. Similarly, Venezuela faces various types of sanctions, including restrictions on its oil industry, visa bans, and asset freezes for Venezuelan officials.
On November 10, 2021, President Joe Biden signed the Reinforcing Nicaragua’s Adherence to Conditions for Electoral Reform Act, known as the RENACER Act, to increase sanctions on the country after the re-election of Daniel Ortega. This act mandates that international financial institutions place stricter limitations on providing financial assistance or loans to projects in Nicaragua, while also adding sanctions to promote fair elections, reduce corruption, support independent media, and monitor the Central American country’s relations with Russia.
Meanwhile, in Central America, successive U.S. administrations have imposed specific sanctions on dozens of officials from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras due to issues related to corruption. Some private and public companies and government entities in various countries in the region have also been subject to U.S. sanctions.
2. Using Sanctions to Pressure Certain Regimes: Although U.S. sanctions in Latin America were initially imposed to combat specific political regimes, such as the communist government in Cuba, they have evolved to target various alleged violations according to Washington, including terrorism sponsorship, drug trafficking, corruption, and human rights abuses. For instance, on May 15, 2024, the Biden administration imposed visa restrictions on more than 250 individuals, including many members of the Nicaraguan government and their families, for supporting what was described as President Daniel Ortega’s regime’s “assault on human rights,” according to a statement from the U.S. State Department. Since November 2021, measures have been taken to impose visa restrictions on over 1,400 officials in the country.
3. Sanctions Tied to U.S. Interests: It is evident that the sanctions the U.S. has imposed on some Latin American countries and entities are primarily driven by U.S. interests, though they are sometimes framed by foreign policy objectives, especially regarding defending democracy and protecting human rights. For instance, the sanctions on Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua have often been a response to domestic political calculations, including pressure from U.S. citizens of Latin American descent, who form an influential voting bloc in key swing states, particularly Florida.
4. Countering the Influence of U.S. Adversaries in Latin America: In other cases, sanctions have been a reaction to the growing cooperation between certain Latin American governments and Washington’s adversaries, particularly Russia and Iran. In May 2024, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on three entities based in Nicaragua, including the Russian Interior Ministry Training Center in Managua (RTC), claiming the center was training individuals under the command of the Ortega-Murillo government “under the authoritarian playbook of the Russian government.” Additionally, six entities based in the region are listed by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control for sanctions related to Iran.
5. Addressing the Threat of Organized Crime Groups: At times, Washington has imposed sanctions on organized crime groups that pose a national security threat due to their involvement in drug trafficking and migrant smuggling. For example, in July 2024, Washington imposed sanctions on the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua, alleging it was responsible for a wave of kidnappings, extortion, and other violent crimes linked to migrants across Latin America and the United States. The U.S. also offered a $12 million reward for the arrest of three leaders of the MS-13 gang from El Salvador and the Primeiro Comando da Capital from Brazil, both of which are under U.S. sanctions. While Colombia and Mexico are not sanctioned as states, Washington maintains sanctions against individuals and companies involved in drug trafficking networks, such as the Sinaloa Cartel or the Gulf Clan, which primarily operate in these countries.
The effects of U.S. sanctions on certain Latin American countries have been varied, with their effectiveness differing from one case to another. These impacts can be seen in the following ways:
1. Damaging national economies: U.S. sanctions have worsened economic conditions in some Latin American countries, although they were not the primary or direct cause of the deterioration. For instance, Venezuela’s economic collapse occurred years before international and U.S. sanctions were imposed on Nicolás Maduro’s government, due to factors like corruption and mismanagement. Nevertheless, it would be extremely difficult for Caracas to achieve economic recovery without the removal of these sanctions, especially those targeting oil. A report by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) concluded that U.S. sanctions have caused Venezuela to lose between $17 billion and $31 billion in revenue. Cuba, being a small island, is highly dependent on trade for survival. A 2021 estimate by the Cuban government found that the U.S. economic embargo has cost the country nearly $144 billion, a figure acknowledged by the United Nations.
2. Increasing the marginalization of the most vulnerable populations: U.S. sanctions have had unintended consequences on the citizens of the targeted countries. Research by Francisco Rodríguez, a senior research fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), found that the significant decline in Venezuela’s oil exports—largely driven by U.S. sanctions—led to a collapse in the country’s import capacity, exacerbating the hunger crisis. Another report, co-authored by economist Jeffrey Sachs and CEPR co-director Mark Weisbrot, found that U.S. sanctions contributed to an increase in deaths, with 40,000 Venezuelans dying in just one year.
According to leading economists and researchers, the widespread economic damage caused by U.S. sanctions has fueled an unprecedented migration flow from Venezuela to the U.S. and across Latin America. Approximately 7.7 million Venezuelans have fled, most of them to neighboring countries, including nearly 3 million to Colombia alone, with the U.S. being deeply affected. On some days last year, up to 3,000 Venezuelans attempted to enter the U.S. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador commented that U.S. economic sanctions forced people to migrate from Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, and urged the U.S. to allocate some of the funds it sends to Ukraine toward economic development in Latin America.
These negative effects of sanctions may explain the popular aversion to U.S. sanctions in Venezuela. According to polling company Datanalisis, 74% of Venezuelans no longer support international sanctions against their country, compared to 17% who do. Nearly 30% of the population blames sanctions for the current situation. Notably, 76% expressed interest in lifting oil sanctions in a country burdened by high debt and low wages. On the other hand, personal sanctions against certain officials are supported by 52% of Venezuelans.
3. Deepening the decline of U.S. influence: The U.S. has a long history of intervening in the internal affairs of Latin American countries, whether through military tools or support for military or soft coups, in addition to imposing stringent sanctions on some nations. This has led to a decline in the positive attitudes of Latin American people toward Washington, as well as a reduction in U.S. influence in what is considered its backyard.
Furthermore, U.S. sanctions have drawn strong criticism. For instance, many analysts, experts from the United Nations, and heads of state have described U.S. policies as stifling and violating human rights. During the COVID-19 pandemic, it was difficult for sanctioned countries, particularly Cuba, to receive humanitarian and medical supplies. There is also an almost global isolation of the U.S. regarding its stance on the sanctions it imposes on Cuba. In November 2023, the United Nations General Assembly voted to lift the U.S. embargo on Cuba. On this occasion, the resolution, which was approved for the 31st time, received 187 votes in favor, with only two opposing votes from the U.S. and Israel, while Ukraine abstained.
4. Expanding the maneuvering space for Washington’s adversaries in the region: Although U.S. sanctions have often been targeted, focusing on senior leaders and government officials, they have proven ineffective in dislodging the leaders that Washington views as authoritarian. For instance, the communist regime in Cuba has been under sanctions for over 60 years, yet these sanctions have failed to overthrow it. While the desire to ease U.S. sanctions has prompted Venezuelan President Maduro to engage in dialogue with the opposition, these sanctions have not led to a significant change in the behavior of Maduro’s regime or other leaders subject to U.S. sanctions toward their political opponents, nor have they pushed them to take concrete steps toward democracy and human rights.
The most significant impact of the U.S. tightening its sanctions on some governments in the region, which have been excluded from the international banking system, has been their strong push to form greater economic partnerships with Washington’s adversaries. These adversaries have provided a lifeline and safe haven in the face of international pressure and isolation, helping these governments stay in power. For instance, amid fuel shortages in Venezuela due to refinery failures, Iran sent multiple shipments in defiance of U.S. sanctions. One interesting consequence of continued U.S. sanctions and pressure on Central American countries is that some, such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras, have abandoned diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favor of establishing diplomatic relations with China. This move has drawn sharp criticism from the U.S. and raised concerns about its interests and influence in the region.
5. Sparking tensions with Washington’s allies: In August 2024, the Paraguayan government ordered U.S. Ambassador Marc Ostfield to leave the South American country, escalating tensions with one of Washington’s key allies in Latin America. Paraguay is one of the few remaining countries in the region that maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan and has shown strong support for Israel in its war with Hamas. The tension in relations between the two countries followed the Biden administration’s imposition of sanctions on a tobacco company linked to the country’s powerful former president, Horacio Cartes, who still holds significant influence over Paraguay’s ruling Colorado Party. Cartes’ loyalists control the majority of seats in Congress. His supporters are pressuring current President Santiago Peña to defend the former president and distance Paraguay from Washington.
The Effectiveness Limits
From the above discussion, it can be said that U.S. sanctions imposed on certain governments, individuals, and entities in Latin America have rarely succeeded in achieving their intended purposes. This may be due to the inability of U.S. administrations, in general, to form a broad coalition of regional governments to support or participate in the enforcement of these sanctions. The region has deep-rooted historical traditions of adhering to the principles of non-interference and respect for national sovereignty, including rejecting unilateral coercive measures by Washington. While neighboring countries criticize the Venezuelan president Maduro’s regime, they have opposed imposing further sanctions. Some, like Brazil, have even called for lifting existing sanctions.
Additionally, certain internal considerations have made the U.S. administration under President Biden, in particular, hesitant to impose strict sanctions on some countries. This hesitation stems mainly from concerns that sanctions might trigger a new wave of migrants to the U.S., a highly sensitive issue during this year (2024), especially with the upcoming U.S. presidential elections. Moreover, U.S. sanctions have not been clearly defined in their objectives and have been linked to unattainable goals—such as regime change, as in the case of Cuba. Furthermore, these sanctions have not been flexible enough to offer incentives for changing the targeted behavior. In the case of Cuba, the easing of sanctions was presented as a binary choice: democracy or nothing.
Another factor contributing to the limited effectiveness of U.S. sanctions policy in Latin America is that the sanctioned countries have found other allies who have strengthened their ability to circumvent these sanctions and endure the pressure imposed on them.
