Has a full-scale war erupted between Israel and Hezbollah, or, as many observers in Israel believe, is it still simmering at the boiling point, on the verge of total war? This situation appears to be an effort to exert maximum pressure on Hezbollah, pushing it to accept Israel’s terms for a settlement that resembles surrender rather than engage in a prolonged conflict from a weakened position. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s statements continue to emphasize support for the Gaza Strip and retaliation for its leaders, portraying itself as reacting to Israeli aggression. However, the indicators of the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah suggest a different reality than Hezbollah’s narrative. A new form of warfare has emerged, differing in style, preparation, and nature.
Amidst the debate over whether war has truly broken out or if this is just the peak of escalation, comparing the current situation to previous conflicts, especially the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, presents miscalculations. The starting point for this new conflict is marked by nearly a year of attrition warfare after the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation. Even with nearly two decades of time since 2006, the nature of wars, weaponry, tactics, infrastructure, and all aspects of warfare have evolved into what is now called “fifth-generation warfare.”
As a result, this conflict does not necessarily need to begin with a large-scale tank invasion, such as Israeli Merkava tanks rolling toward Beirut. Nor can we expect the current round of hostilities to end through a return to implementing UN Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war, without political negotiations.
Shifts in the confrontation:
The recent phase of the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah reflects a significant shift in Israel’s military tactics, while Hezbollah remains on a similar path, sticking to its established strategy. This divergence highlights Hezbollah’s struggle to adapt to new realities or innovate responses, particularly as one of the key elements of this evolving confrontation has been the increased effectiveness of Israel’s military capabilities. Several indicators illustrate the changing dynamics in this conflict.
Targeting Hezbollah’s command and control: Israeli actions have focused on crippling Hezbollah’s leadership structure, causing paralysis and instability. A prime example of this is the targeting of Hezbollah’s internal communication network, which has hampered its logistical ability to relay orders from its leadership to its fighters. In a single strike, Israel achieved multiple objectives: an intelligence breakthrough, the decimation of mid-level commanders, and a disruption in communication capabilities. These actions have also had a psychological impact on Hezbollah’s base, shaking confidence in the party. Many within Hezbollah now question the leadership’s ability to manage the situation effectively or counter Israel’s intelligence and operational superiority, despite claims of Hezbollah’s advancements in this area.
Another element of Israel’s strategy has been precision strikes aimed at key figures within Hezbollah’s decision-making and military leadership circles, leaving the political wing struggling amidst the chaos. Israeli officials, including Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, have openly stated that these assassinations are part of an effort to weaken Hezbollah and settle personal scores, as seen after the killing of senior military commander Ibrahim Aqil.
The next key focus in Israel’s targeting strategy has been Hezbollah’s “escalation chain.” The assassination of Fawad Shukur, commander of the elite Radwan Brigade, two months prior to the assassination of his successor Ibrahim Aqil, illustrates this methodical approach. Israel has also targeted Hezbollah’s main commanders, crippling its ability to maintain leadership continuity. Despite Hezbollah’s hierarchical structure, the repeated decapitation of its leadership suggests that the organization’s decision-making processes will become increasingly erratic as Israel methodically dismantles its chain of command.
Miscalculations and the “pattern shift”: It is a mistake to measure the current conflict based on the 2006 war or any previous wars. The lead-up to this war cannot even be compared to a year of attrition warfare between Israel and Hezbollah since October 8, 2023. Each war has its own unique characteristics.
As previously mentioned, Israel has employed a selective targeting strategy against Hezbollah’s senior military council, reflecting an advanced form of “shadow war.” Most of the commanders targeted by Israel were not widely known, either within Hezbollah or the broader Lebanese public, although many were on the United States’ most-wanted list for their role in attacks on U.S. embassies and military personnel in the 1980s. Now, these figures have become more visible, alongside the exposure of Hezbollah’s middle-tier leadership in a process marked by the interception of their pager and walkie-talkie communications.
This evolving approach differs from Israel’s 2006 invasion with tanks and ground forces. Based on current results, one week of operations, from the communications system breach to the assassination of Aqil, has yielded more significant outcomes than the entire five-week span of the 2006 war.
A crucial lesson learned from this conflict is the recalibration of the balance of power. While many expected Israel to rely solely on its air force to prepare for a ground invasion, Israel’s attack on Hezbollah’s communication network highlights the critical importance of logistical capabilities in modern warfare. Additionally, Israel’s intelligence advantage has been a decisive factor.
On the other hand, Hezbollah has sought to expand its capabilities horizontally, focusing on improving its missile and drone capabilities to penetrate Israeli defense systems. However, despite Hezbollah’s advancements in missile technology, Israel has managed to exploit known vulnerabilities and capitalize on its strengths through precise, impactful strikes.
It is also important to recognize that Israel has grown accustomed to waging prolonged conflicts. Betting on Israel’s exhaustion, as part of an attrition strategy or due to issues such as military mobilization or internal political-military tensions, has proven to be a miscalculation. Instead, Israel has achieved a degree of “strategic turnaround,” a reality that Hezbollah may have failed to grasp due to errors in judgment, timing, or constraints beyond its control.
Non-Ideal Timing:
The timing of Israel’s attack plan does not appear ideal for Hezbollah, as Iran is currently seeking a deal with the United States. This means that Hezbollah is constrained by Iranian calculations. An indication of this is seen in the recent visit of Esmail Qaani, the commander of Iran’s Quds Force, to Baghdad. According to press reports, his visit focused on mending internal rifts between proxies and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani.
The actions of Iran-aligned Iraqi factions, such as their drone attack on the Israeli port of Eilat on September 25, remain symbolic in nature. It is conceivable that each strike Israel directs at Hezbollah sends a message to Tehran, as the infiltration of communication systems concerns Iran. Conversely, Israel faces fewer constraints from U.S. pressure and enjoys guarantees of support.
Cooling Off Opportunities:
From a political standpoint, despite all the war rhetoric, both sides—Israel and Hezbollah—still have options for de-escalation. Even Israel, which currently sees itself in a position of strength, could choose to de-escalate after achieving around 90% of the understandings through the mediation efforts of U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein.
In terms of military capabilities, Hezbollah still holds Israel’s northern front under the shadow of its rockets and retains a massive stockpile, according to Israeli military assessments. Unlike Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah also has a continuous supply line.
It is too early to undermine Hezbollah’s military capabilities in this regard, even if it hasn’t managed to score significant strategic gains in its offensive into Israeli territory. However, these capabilities are temporarily restricted by Israel’s efforts to exchange fire control in the northern front for fire control in southern Lebanon, as well as its attempts to force Lebanese citizens to flee in response to attacks, similar to what is happening in northern Israel.
Once again, the challenge remains thinking beyond traditional patterns. Israel may be primarily aiming to exploit Iran’s desire for a deal with the U.S. in order to weaken Hezbollah now. In the future, it could rely on the U.S. administration to derail any potential deal with Tehran, or alternatively, pressure Iran into a confrontation that would undermine a deal Israel does not want, allowing it to focus on the nuclear file after the war.
On the other hand, Hezbollah might bet on other opportunities to cool down the situation, if it wishes to continue in this direction. This could involve shifting focus to Lebanon’s internal affairs by attempting to resolve political crises, such as the presidential vacuum, or engaging with the U.S. envoy. Ultimately, it’s important to note that we are still in a crucial exploratory phase between the two sides—Israel and Hezbollah. Therefore, the main question should not be whether this is a time of war or not, as it is, in every sense, a state of war regardless of the terminology.
