Some Western reports have indicated that the United States has recently delivered military aid to Ghana, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire. This aid was originally intended for Niger, but as relations between Washington and Niamey deteriorated, the U.S. was forced to withdraw its forces from Niger. This has raised several questions about Washington’s direction in bolstering its military presence in West Africa and how these actions relate to its new Africa strategy.
Military Moves:
Recently, there have been significant U.S. military activities in the West African region, which can be summarized as follows:
Military Aid: Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin have accepted the military aid that the United States offered them, which mainly includes several American armored vehicles. These vehicles were initially allocated for Niger but were redirected after rising tensions with authorities in Niamey following the military coup that ousted Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum, a key Western ally, particularly of the U.S., in the African Sahel region. On the other hand, the ruling military council in Niamey has adopted an anti-Western stance, leading to the withdrawal of U.S. forces, following the French withdrawal in August 2024. A report from the French “Africa Intelligence” site revealed that more military equipment is being prepared by the U.S. for countries like Ghana, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire.
Deployment of Special Forces: The American newspaper The Wall Street Journal reported the arrival of U.S. special forces in West Africa, along with the relocation of some military aircraft to the region. This move coincides with Washington’s efforts to renovate an airport in Benin, at a cost of approximately $4 million, to enable it to accommodate U.S. helicopters. Additionally, cooperation with Côte d’Ivoire has been strengthened, as a group of U.S. special forces has been stationed in Abidjan. The report also mentioned ongoing negotiations between the U.S. and Chad regarding the return of U.S. special forces to a base in N’Djamena.
Frequent Visits by AFRICOM Commander: In recent months, there has been an uptick in visits by the commander of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), Michael Langley, to West African nations, especially Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin. These visits are part of the U.S.’s ongoing review of its AFRICOM strategy concerning West Africa. They also highlight the strategic importance of this region in Washington’s new African policy, which was evident during U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s tour of West Africa in January.
Repositioning:
The recent U.S. movements in West Africa suggest a significant repositioning of American forces in the region, as shown below:
Restructuring U.S. Forces: The U.S. Department of Defense has tasked a team of 10 special forces personnel to study how to redistribute the approximately 1,100 troops that were stationed in Niger across three military sites and an airbase in Agadez. Washington is now looking to deploy these forces to coastal West African countries, particularly Benin and Côte d’Ivoire. This aligns with statements made by the AFRICOM commander, who hinted that the U.S. is currently working with its regional allies in West Africa, particularly Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin, on plans to reposition forces that were in Niger. The drone base in Agadez was a central component of AFRICOM’s mission in West Africa, and it appears that Washington is now seeking an alternative base.
Restoring Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Capabilities: The U.S. aims to counter the growing influence of al-Qaeda and ISIS in the Sahel and West Africa. In recent months, there has been a noticeable increase in terrorist activities by both groups. Following the U.S. withdrawal from its strategic base in Niger, its ability to influence counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts in the Sahel and Sahara region has significantly diminished. By repositioning its forces in West Africa, Washington may regain its capacity to impact counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the Sahel.
Washington’s Engagement with the Sahel and Sahara States: Although the U.S. is currently repositioning its forces, it is adopting a broader approach as part of its new Africa strategy, which seeks to engage with all African nations, including those in the Sahel and Sahara that have experienced military coups, toppling U.S. allies and bringing anti-Western military councils to power. This was reflected in AFRICOM’s commander’s remarks about evaluating military cooperation with Sahel countries, including the new Sahel Alliance, comprising Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Based on this evaluation, Washington will determine the nature of its relationships with its new African partners. Similarly, the U.S.’s new strategy in Africa aims to strengthen its relationships with countries across the continent. This was demonstrated when Washington recently voiced its support for the idea of granting Africa two permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. Some reports have also indicated that President Joe Biden is planning a visit to Angola in the coming days, which, if it happens, would be the first visit by a U.S. president to sub-Saharan Africa since former President Barack Obama’s visit in 2015.
Countering Russian and Chinese Influence: The current U.S. actions in West Africa are part of Washington’s efforts to counter the growing influence of Russia and China in the region. In this context, the AFRICOM commander accused Russia and China of leading a disinformation campaign in the Sahel to undermine U.S. influence in the Sahel and West Africa. He noted that the U.S. is now working to counter this campaign. There is also growing American concern over China’s increasing influence in West Africa. After a period of reduced Chinese involvement in the continent in recent years, Beijing’s participation in Africa has been on the rise again, as seen in the 9th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in early September 2024. The forum focused heavily on Chinese competition with the West, particularly the U.S., in Africa, with Beijing positioning itself as a more reliable partner for African nations, including those in West Africa.
Potential Repercussions:
In the context of current U.S. movements in West Africa, there are several potential repercussions that may result from these actions, which can be presented as follows:
The first repercussion could involve the establishment of new U.S. military bases. With the ongoing losses to American interests in the Sahel region, especially after the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Niger and the decision by Chad’s ruling military council to suspend U.S. military activities at the Adji Kossi base, Washington is seeking to intensify its presence in West Africa. Some Western reports have linked this with U.S. aspirations to establish new military bases in West African countries. In this context, recent visits by AFRICOM Commander Michael Langley to West Africa over the past few weeks aimed to discuss this matter with certain countries in the region. This aligns with unconfirmed reports from July 2024, which revealed plans to establish a U.S. military base in the Odienne region in the northwest of Côte d’Ivoire.
A second possible repercussion is the replication of the Sahel scenario. Some estimates suggest that the increasing U.S. military presence in West Africa might serve as a pretext for terrorist groups in the Sahel to expand their activities further into West Africa. They could use the anti-Western sentiment in this region, exploiting the U.S. military presence to rally support internally and recruit more members for terrorist groups. This could exacerbate internal polarization within West African nations, increasing the likelihood of a repetition of the Sahel scenario. This might take the form of military coups, though this is less likely, or the emergence of governments in these countries that prefer closer ties with China and Russia at the expense of their traditional relations with the West. Nigeria could be seen as a clear example of this shift.
The third repercussion is the intensification of international competition. Military cooperation has become one of the most prominent tools in the U.S.-China rivalry, especially in Africa. While the U.S. seeks to reposition its forces in West Africa and strengthen its military cooperation with African countries, China is also enhancing its military cooperation, particularly with West African nations. Beijing has announced plans to spend around $140 million to train 6,000 African military personnel, making China the second-largest arms supplier to Africa after Russia.
China is also working to strengthen its long-term relationships with Africa’s emerging leadership, which will later assume key positions in Africa’s military and political institutions. This strategy aligns with Beijing’s “Global Security Initiative” (GSI) launched in 2022, which aims to offer an alternative security system to the one led by the U.S. This provides African countries with various security options. However, these ambitious Chinese aspirations are causing growing concern in the U.S., especially amid talks of Beijing’s efforts to establish a permanent military base in West Africa, which would be China’s second on the continent after its only base currently in Djibouti. Washington views this potential Chinese military presence in West Africa, which would give Beijing a military foothold on the eastern coast of the United States, as a threat to its interests.
This may explain why the U.S. recently allocated approximately $5 million to train special forces in Gabon, aiming to prevent China from establishing a military base there. This reflects the escalating U.S.-China rivalry for military influence in West Africa.
In conclusion, the U.S. is trying to adopt a new approach in Africa to compensate for the losses resulting from its previous strategy, which reduced its influence in the Sahel and Sahara regions. In this context, Washington aims to reposition its forces in West Africa and review AFRICOM’s strategy concerning the region, expanding its military presence in coastal West African states without completely severing ties with the new Sahel alliance. This is an attempt to maintain U.S. influence and interests in the Sahel region, even if it comes at a higher cost.
At the same time, the U.S. is placing significant emphasis on countering China’s growing influence in the region, which is expected to have important ramifications on the geopolitical landscape. Over the long term, this may further entrench polarization in the region.
