International Rivalry in Central Asia : A New Great Game ?


Central Asia has always represented the strategic and commercial crossroads of civilizations between Europe and Asia and its peoples were linked together by geography and history. Since the mid-fifteenth century, relatively stable ethnic communities corresponding to the five main nationalities (Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Tajiks, Kyrgyz) have lived in the territory roughly corresponding to the The borders of what is now Central Asia.

By the nineteenth century, Tsarist Russia had become the dominant power over the territory that was incorporated into the Russian Empire after the defeat of the Qajar state; This worried the British on the northern borders of India, which led to the transformation of the region into the center of a diplomatic and geopolitical competition between Tsarist Russia and the British Empire called the “Great Game” (1); The concept that came to refer to the struggle between the major powers for hegemony and power.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the five Central Asian countries gained their independence within the former Soviet borders, which is a difficult legacy shaped by Stalinist policies and local nationalist aspirations. These borders gave the peoples of Central Asia modern states and border disputes that contributed to the failure of any integration path between the countries of the region, in addition to the lack of seriousness of the authoritarian and corrupt regimes of these countries in this regard. This made the region appear, as Brzezinski described it, as a vacuum of power, tempting powerful neighbors to intervene and dominate the region (2).

With the change of the global geopolitical landscape affected by the rise of China and Russia’s attempts to restore its international position on the one hand, and the United States’ pursuit to maintain its leadership of the international system on the other hand, many regional arenas become an arena for competition between major powers, and therefore Central Asia is likely to be an arena for competition due to its strategic location and resources, as well as the fragility of their national systems and their lack of independent and effective regional cooperation formulas or institutions that made them less immune to competition from major powers.

This paper seeks to provide a definition of the Central Asian region and to highlight the geostrategic vision related to this region for Russia, China and the United States. And finally, a discussion of the question: Does the new great game exist in Central Asia?

1. Eurasian Balkans

Inspired by the Heartland Theory, coined by Sir Halford John Mackinder, the creator of the term “Eurasia”, Brzezinski , in his book The Great Chessboard, likened Central Asia—plus the Caucasus and Afghanistan—to the Eurasian Balkans. According to his view, the pluralism of nationalism and the weakness of political entities in both the European Balkans and Central Asia are similarities that justify calling Central Asia the Eurasian Balkans.

The Eurasian Balkans (see map 1) constitute the inner heart of Eurasia, Brzezinski described as a vacuum of power that makes it tempting to interfere and dominate it by its powerful neighbors – Russia and China – as well as the geopolitical importance of this region due to its strategic location, which includes the transportation network Unavoidably formed, intended for direct connection between the richer and more active western and eastern fringes of Eurasia, in addition to being of economic importance due to the vast natural resources enjoyed by that region, which has oil and gas reserves in addition to uranium, gold and other minerals.

Map No. (1) Eurasian Balkans

1
Source: Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Grand Chessboard, p. 124

In this paper, we will focus on the Central Asian countries known as the “STANS” countries, which are five former Soviet republics (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), which constitute the largest part of the Eurasian Balkan area.

Stan countries appeared on the international stage as independent modern states in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union within the borders of the former Soviet republics, and it extends over a geographical area (399.400) km2 (see Map 2) and has a modest population density. The largest by area is Kazakhstan and the smallest is Tajikistan (see Table 1). These countries have borders with Russia, China, Afghanistan, and Iran. They are also landlocked countries where they do not have sea ports overlooking open seas. Only Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have beaches overlooking the Caspian Sea, which is a closed sea that these two countries share with Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan.

Map No. (2), Source: Encyclopedia Britannica.

2
Source: Encyclopedia Britannica.

Table 1: Area by country, million km2

CountryKazakhstanUzbekistanTajikistanTurkmenistanKyrgyzstan
space2.7250.4480.1430.4910.199

Stan has a population of 76,729,350 (see Table 2), about half of whom live in cities. These peoples consist of major nationalities (Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Tajiks) and are clearly differentiated despite the close culture created by historical ties in terms of their participation in Islam and Turkish ethnic origins. In addition to these nationalities, there are Russian, Tatar and Ukrainian communities, mostly concentrated in northern Kazakhstan. The peoples of the region are considered to have a young age group, as the average age in them is (27.6 years). 

Table 2: Population by country

UrbanMedian age (years)PopulationCountry#
%5127.834,503,773Uzbekistan1
%57.730.719,255,723Kazakhstan2
%27.322.49,994,579Tajikistan3
%35.626.06,753,780Kyrgyzstan4
%52.526.96,220,286Turkmenistan5
%4826.976.729.350Central AsiaTotal
Reference: WORLDOMETERS

In 2021, the region’s gross national product amounted to $322 billion (see Table 3), nearly 60% of which went to oil-rich Kazakhstan. The two smallest mountainous republics are Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are also the most backward and resource-poor Stan countries.

Table 3: GDP by country (2021)

GDP growth (annual %)GDP            per capita (US$)GDP (billion، US$)Country #
4.010,041190.81Kazakhstan 1
7.41,98369.24Uzbekistan
6.37,61245.23Turkmenistan
9.28978.75Tajikistan 4
3.61,2768.54Kyrgyzstan 5
322.57Central Asia Total
Reference: WORLD BANK DATA

The region also has resources that make it important to global energy security with its oil and natural gas production and its oil reserves (see: Table 4). In addition, the region produces more than half of the world’s uranium supplies (Kazakhstan 45%, Uzbekistan 7.2%). (See: Tables 4 and 5).

Table 4: Natural gas reserves by country

 World Ranking   World Share (MMcf)Gas ReservesCountry#
6%3.8265,000,000Turkmenistan1
15%1.285,000,000Kazakhstan2
19%0.965,000,000Uzbekistan3
Reference: WORLDOMETERS

Table 5: Uranium production by country (2021) of total world production

 World SharProduction from mines   (tonnes U)Country#
%45.1421.819Kazakhstan1
%7.23500Uzbekistan2
Reference: World Nuclear Association

Because of the nature of their authoritarian regimes, the Stan states have not succeeded since their independence in achieving political development or addressing chronic economic and social problems such as unemployment, corruption and low wages; This made it rank low in freedom and transparency indicators (see: Table 6).

Table 6: Freedom and Transparency Indicators by Country

Transparency  world rankingCPI* /100Global freedom scoreCountry#
14427 ↓27Kyrgyzstan1
10237 ↓23Kazakhstan2
14028 ↑11Uzbekistan3
15025 –8Tajikistan4
16919 –2Turkmenistan5
Reference: FREEDOMHOUSE  CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX – *CPI: The Corruption Perceptions Index

Despite the non-smooth transition of power coupled with popular unrest such as those in Kazakhstan (3) and Uzbekistan (4), authoritarian regimes in the region have managed to ensure relative political and social stability, yet the risk of fragility still appears to be exacerbated by security risks such as international terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime and illegal immigration; This makes these countries highly vulnerable (see Table 7).

Table 7: State Fragility Index by country

FSI RankingFSI ScoreCountry#
118th59.5Kazakhstan1
102nd66.5Turkmenistan2
88th63.9Uzbekistan3
70th75.0Tajikistan4
66th77.1Kyrgyzstan5
Reference: Fragile States Index

At the regional level, those countries have not yet succeeded in forming independent regional structures and platforms for effective and active cooperation among them on the one hand, as well as a mechanism for dealing with border disputes (5) that ignite chronic military skirmishes on the other (6) . It does not seem that Kazakhstan’s attempts, which it started since its call for the first consultative meeting between the leaders of “Stan” countries, in 2018, succeeded in overcoming the obstacles to forming a regional platform for the countries of the region. The last consultative meeting of the leaders of these countries, which was held in July 2022, He could not come up with a collective mechanism to discuss common regional issues after both Turkmenistan and Tajikistan refused to sign the “Treaty of Cooperation and Good Neighborliness” (7) which hinders local and regional development due to the failure to resolve many outstanding issues such as the sharing of water resources, transportation routes and security in the region; What causes the region to continue in the power vacuum it is experiencing.

2. Russian Federation: Nearby

The relationship between the Russian Federation and the countries of Central Asia is a relationship that has been shaped to a large extent by history. Russia has maintained close ties to the Central Asian region, not limited to economic and security issues, but also to cultural ties, in addition to the presence of immigrant workers and the community of communities residing in Russia. To have the greatest influence in this region, which it cannot imagine outside its vital geopolitical surroundings (8); Therefore, it will not accept that anyone contests its influence there. Russia’s vision for the Central Asian region has three main dimensions:

  • The first dimension relates to security cooperation and the military presence

Russia inherited from the Soviet Union special advantages in terms of military and security relations with Central Asian countries in terms of armament and joint Russian military training for the armies of those countries, which gave it great military influence, whether on bilateral frameworks or the collective framework represented by the Collective Security TreatyFounded in 1992, Russia sought, prompted by its concern about the American deployment in the region after the latter’s war on Afghanistan, to transform it, in 2003, into the Collective Security Treaty Organization(9), which has joint forces for rapid response, and its membership included, along with Russia, Belarus and Armenia, three Central Asian countries are: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The latter two can be considered as fundamental pillars of the Russian military and security strategy related to Central Asia due to their important strategic location; Where Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan host on their soil fixed Russian military bases capable of carrying out limited ground operations; This makes both countries highly dependent on Russia for their security.

Russia has not stopped developing its military influence (10) in Central Asia under two declared titles: maintaining stability, such as what happened when sending Russian forces to Kazakhstan, border security and combating terrorism that can infiltrate across the border from Afghanistan to the region, behind this declared goal. In which there is a lot of exaggeration, two other goals can be noted: the first relates to Russia’s desire to balance with China’s rising influence in the region and also to maximize its security and military role within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the second title relates to resisting any attempt by the United States to find a foothold in the Central Asian region, especially After leaving its bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

  • The second dimension is related to energy in the oil and gas sector

Energy related issues are intertwined with Russia’s geopolitical concerns on the one hand that Russia views energy as a capital that it employs in creating its image as an indispensable force (11). In light of this, it is possible to understand and analyze the Russian initiatives related to energy, which place them in the basket of national security components and the strengths of Russia. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, with their production capabilities and oil and natural gas reserves, as well as their coasts on the Caspian Sea, together form the center of gravity of Russia’s concerns related to maintaining an influential energy position in Central Asia.

  • The third dimension relates to Russia’s economic interests

In recent years, Russia’s economic role in the Central Asian region has declined in favor of China, which has replaced it in the forefront of the economic partners of the Central Asian countries, but it has maintained an important presence in the economies of the region. By establishing the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which includes, in addition to Russia and Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Russia tried to reduce the decline in its economic role through the integration of the economies of the Eurasian Economic Union countries with their economies and the full openness of the markets of those countries to their companies. On the other hand, Russia receives migrant workers from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, according to Russian government figures (12), and more than 7.8 million registered workers from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan work in Russia, in 2021, their remittances accounted for 30% of Tajikistan’s GDP and about 28 percent in Kyrgyzstan, in 2020, according to the World Bank.

3. China: Shadow of the Dragon

During the past three decades, China has become a major partner of the Stan countries to the extent that it seemed impossible to imagine the future development of the region without cooperation with Beijing, which in turn views the region as an integral part of the security and stability of China’s western regions due to its geographical proximity. Moreover, the location of Central Asia makes it part of the land transit projects of the Belt and Road Initiative linking China with Europe and the Middle East, and China is also aware of the richness of these lands in natural resources, especially in the field of energy.

Table No. (8) shows the trade exchange between China and Central Asian countries

Import from ChinaExport to ChinaCountry
$10.3B$9.42BKazakhstan
$445M$5.32BTurkmenistan
$4.88B$1.29BUzbekistan
$998M$37.4MTajikistan
$2.6B$47MKyrgyzstan
$19.233B$16.114BTotal
Source: OEC.World

In addition to the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which brings together China and Central Asian countries as well as Russia, India, Pakistan and Iran, China has sought to find additional ways for high-level dialogue and strategic communication with these countries by launching, in 2020, a periodic meeting mechanism for foreign ministers of China and Stan countries. Under the name of the China Plus Five Countries Group (C + C5) (13). At the second group meeting held in Xi’an, on May 12, 2021, under the theme “Joining a Common Destiny in the Future” (14) The Chinese president made proposals to increase regional cooperation in the field of development and trade exchange and expand investment in the energy industry and transmission and high-tech fields such as artificial intelligence, big data and cloud computing. He also announced that China will provide over the next three years $500 million in assistance to these countries. to support national development projects; It will also hold 5,000 training courses to help countries develop health, alleviate poverty, improve agriculture and communication, and develop professional IT talents in various fields. Tourism, art and training workshops for young leaders there.

The Belt and Road Initiative and Regional Connectivity Projects  

By virtue of its location, the region forms a major part of the six road transit projects of the Belt and Road Initiative as two important corridors pass through the region: the New Eurasia Land Bridge and the China-Central Asia and West Asia Economic Corridor (15).

The new economic corridor of the Eurasia land bridge

Source: OBOReurope
Source: OBOReurope

The new Eurasia Land Bridge is one of the most ambitious Belt and Road projects to link transportation between China and Europe via Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus with the aim of reducing transportation time, increasing competitiveness and simplifying customs procedures.

China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor

2
Source: OBOReurope

Whereas, the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor will connect western China with the Mediterranean, via Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey.

In addition to the road transit projects of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has cooperated with countries in the region in infrastructure projects that include the construction of many transport and energy infrastructure such as the Khorgos Gate in Kazakhstan (16) , which is the largest land port in the world, as well as the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway ( 17) , All of these projects would place China (18) in a dominant position in the Central Asian region and link the countries of the region with it through economic agreements and joint projects that contribute to the development of trade and the growth of its revenues to those countries.

Confronting the Three Evils in Central Asia

China’s security and military role in Central Asia stems from its so-called principle of the three evils, which for it: international terrorism, religious extremism and separatism, and at the same time its concern related to the security and stability of the northwestern regions of China inhabited by the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Province inside China. and securing the Wakhan Corridor, a narrow and difficult-to-control mountainous region in Afghanistan that separates Tajikistan and Pakistan and extends to China. For a long time, China’s strategy in ensuring its security interests has been based on its role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Russian military presence in the region, in addition to maintaining good relations, continuous communication and exchanging experiences with senior defense officials in the countries of the region.

With the advent of 2016, the previous strategy of China began to change towards seeking a direct Chinese military and security presence in the region. In this context, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have gained particular importance in China’s security interests due to their proximity to Xinjiang and their importance to the transport infrastructure projects associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. It has become clear to Beijing that having influence in these two countries and ensuring their internal stability are two main conditions for the successful completion of Belt and Road projects in regions further away in Central Asia.

China took the first serious step in this direction from the gateway to Tajikistan under the guise of a financing agreement for the construction of posts for the Tajik border guards in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan, close to the Afghan and Chinese borders(19); Where the Chinese allocated $ 19 million to build a complex for the Tajik border guards that supervises a number of border posts and training centers along the Tajik-Afghan border. These centers were put under undeclared supervision with the Chinese People’s Armed Police (PAP) of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security. The same year also witnessed the first joint exercises between Tajik and Chinese forces (20) outside the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the development of a quadripartite counter-terrorism cooperation and coordination mechanism involving China with Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan to enhance security cooperation between those countries (21). The American withdrawal from Afghanistan accelerated Chinese steps in Tajikistan, so that it was announced (22) that Tajikistan had agreed to build a Chinese military base on its border with Afghanistan in a location overlooking the Wakhan Corridor. In addition to the new base, the agreement included the conversion of the existing secret Chinese base (23) In the Pamir Mountain in Gorno-Badakhshan region to a permanent base, despite insisting in the past to deny its existence, the new base is scheduled to belong to the rapid reaction group (special forces) in Tajikistan funded by China.(24) and the Kyrgyz National Guard (25).

China’s strategy in dealing with the Kyrgyz side took a different form for different considerations, the most important of which is the low level of risks in Kyrgyzstan compared to neighboring Tajikistan, and instead of a direct military presence, it sought to find a foothold by licensing private security companies under the pretext of protecting employees, workers and property in Chinese projects in Kyrgyzstan (26) , especially with the escalation of anti-Chinese sentiment and the outbreak of demonstrations and acts of violence that affected the Chinese and their property there. 

Since 2016, the number of military exercises conducted by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with national armies in Central Asia has increased to a semi-periodic and regular character, only two of which have been conducted with the participation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it has also activated military educational exchange programs and increased the number of officers from Central Asian armies accepted into Chinese military academies in addition to developing curricula for military training and education in local military academies (27). In addition, China has increased its assistance in the field of military technology to the armies of Central Asian countries.

4. The United States: Rediscovering Central Asia

The United States was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of the five Stan states and establish diplomatic relations with them. However, the interest of the United States of America in this region was uneven. As Kazakhstan received the lion’s share of the United States’ attention, it was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan’s independence. The United States was interested in Kazakhstan’s decision to abandon the nuclear legacy it had inherited from the Soviet Union, so it sought to develop close bilateral cooperation with Kazakhstan after its accession, in 1993, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons As a non-nuclear-weapon state, the United States assisted the Kazakhs in removing nuclear warheads, weapons-grade materials, and their supporting infrastructure. In 1994, Kazakhstan transferred more than half a ton of weapons-grade uranium to the United States (28). This cooperation continued until 2021; Together, the parties completed programs to close nuclear test tunnels, converted two of the three research reactors in Kazakhstan to use low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, and removed all non-irradiated HEU fuel from Kazakhstan. The United States and Kazakhstan still work together at the Nuclear Security Training Center near Alma-Ata, which opened in 2017, with funding from the United States, 29 and trains and prepares local, regional and international nuclear security specialists.

The deal that Kazakhstan signed, in 1992, with Chevron was worth $20 billion (30).The development of the Tengiz field has a role in encouraging American companies, such as ExxonMobil, General Electric and Halliburton, to come and invest in Kazakhstan to develop Kazakh oil and gas fields, whether those located in the north of the country or in the Caspian Sea region, which have become a large share of investments in the field Kazakh energy. Currently, more than 700 US companies operate in Kazakhstan (31), and US companies have invested $54 billion over three decades (32). According to Mirzan Yusupov, head of the Kazakh Investment Authority, there has been “in recent years, a gradual increase in the interest of American companies in the manufacturing sectors, including agribusiness, as well as in engineering, transportation and logistics. In 2019, the volume of direct investment from The United States reached a record $5.5 billion, a quarter of the total investment flow into the country”(33).

The Afghanistan war, 2001, strongly returned the region to the circle of American geopolitical attention, and the United States of America sought to establish a military presence in that region, which Russia did not object to at first, which made it easier for the United States to persuade Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to host American soldiers in its bases in their country, and indeed it allowed Uzbekistan for US forces stationed at Karshi-Khanabad Air Base(34), which the Americans used to provide air support for their operations in Afghanistan. 2005, after the United States protested against human rights violations by former President Islam Karimov during his suppression of popular protests (35), and in 2012, Kyrgyzstan, under pressure from Russia and China, demanded that the Americans hand over and exit the base (36), and once the the statesThe United States from the Manas base(37) no longer has any military presence in the Central Asian region.

Since 2015, the United States, in its dealings with Central Asian countries, has pursued a strategy of a regional nature, and has reaffirmed this nature in its strategy for the region, which was issued in the spring of 2020 and titled “Strengthening Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity”(38) in which it focuses on supporting regional cooperation and dialogue through First: Its establishment of the C5+1 platform, which brings the United States together with the five Stan countries with the aim of increasing the possibilities of political and security dialogue on common issues and attracting foreign investment. Second: Development in the region through cooperation with the US Agency for International DevelopmentWhich contribute to supporting various development programs such as exchange studies that allow students from that region to study at American universities, support the formation and financing of regional coordination committees to deal with pollution and manage water resources, and standardize documentation and systems of documentation and data collection used in accordance with international compliance standards. The US Agency for International Development plays an important role in strengthening ties with communities in these countries and in strengthening US soft power.

Recently, the United States is trying to return to the region by sponsoring the US Central Command for annual military exercises, such as the one hosted by Tajikistan, in August 2022, and the United States announced that these exercises focus on international stability operations, combating terrorism, and enhancing cooperation and joint capabilities among the participating countries. 39). Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Pakistan and Uzbekistan, in addition to the United States, participated in these exercises, followed by a bilateral training between Tajikistan and the United States for five days that was enough to provoke Russian anger against the Tajik ally (40). In the past, the United States bet on the possibility of enhancing regional cooperation between Stan countries in a way that strengthens their sovereignty in order to be more immune to Russian and Chinese interference and also allows coordination with them in the security field and maintaining stability in the region, but the United States’ exit from Afghanistan has greatly weakened its influence .

After the occupation of Afghanistan, 2001, the United States found itself unintentionally involved in the region and had to explore it (41). Today, it is clear that Washington needs to rediscover the region again and develop new strategies to deal with it in the context of competition with China and in light of the repercussions caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the most important of which is the return of interest in energy sources and transportation routes.

5. Neo-revisionism

This part of the paper seeks to answer the question: What is the revisionist style of both Russia and China based on the theoretical assumption that both China and Russia are a Neo -Revisionist State (42). 

China and Russia are described as neo-revisionist states, differing from traditional revisionist states such as Nazi Germany and Japan, which sought to completely change the international system based on the Westphalian foundation , while Russia and China constantly affirm their commitment to the basic principles of the international system, which include the primacy of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. , the importance of international law, and the centrality of the United Nations, especially with regard to the main role of the United Nations Security Council, as they are members of many international and regional structures. In other words: both countries do not have the ability to access the resources needed to radically challenge the power of the United States, and on the other hand, both countries have not offered an alternative to the current international order and their demands have been limited to modifying the rules of power distribution in the international system and recognizing their own geopolitical spheres of influence.

This does not mean that China and Russia have identical vision and agenda and thus their style, tools and behavior as revisionist states are different from the other, some argue that Russia is ‘ revisionist ‘ more powerful than China at the moment 43; Because Russia is facing a downward path, China’s future appears to be brighter. Others point out that China simply operates more efficiently under the current international system so it has an open window of opportunity (44), while Russia’s window was closed once it invaded Ukraine earlier this year, putting it in a near-direct confrontation with the United States, the dominant power in the world. international system.

When comparing Russia’s distortive behavior based on power politics with China’s, we find that the latter – despite the escalation over Taiwan – has maintained a level of soft balance with the United States, which involves forming alliances or diplomatic cooperation with a limited ceiling, and maintaining this balance is linked to three conditions, They are: the first: that the behavior of the United States is a source of growing concern without reaching the stage of a threat to sovereignty; Finally, China continues to maintain a soft balance to avoid direct and open confrontation (44).

In light of the different revisionist style of both countries, we can see the relations between China and Russia as a cautious partnership with two heads and two different visions. What unites the two parties in this partnership is the United States, which ranges between confrontation in the Russian case and a soft balance in the Chinese case.

6. Is there a new major game in Central Asia?

Central Asia represents for Russia the close neighbor in which it is keen to have the greatest influence, but Russia realizes that its economic influence and its soft power are gradually eroding; Therefore, it preferred to find a formula of complementary cooperation with China that would allow it to balance with it by distributing roles between the two powers in the Central Asian region, so that the military and security role would be entrusted to Russia, and the economic and development role would belong to China. In addition, the attractiveness of immigration to Russia for work has gradually declined since 2014 as a result of Western sanctions on the Russian economy, and this matter has been further exacerbated by the recent return of a large number of migrant workers to their country after the outbreak of the Russian war on Ukraine, and the Russian economy has been affected by the massive sanctions imposed by the West on Russia.

China’s focus in Central Asia is focused on dealing with what it considers a security challenge related to the stability of Xinjiang Province, and in this context it preferred to follow gradual and calm steps in building its security presence in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and at the same time it is keen to avoid provoking the Russians who are apprehensive about the decline of their position in their neighborhood. In addition, China considers Central Asia, specifically Kazakhstan, a vital and central region to ensure the success of the Belt and Road Initiative. Finally, the region’s rich sources of energy are a source of temptation for China.

What distinguishes China from Russia in relations with Central Asian countries is the clarity and consistency in the vision and the projects related to them and the steps for their implementation and the financing capacity of China, in addition to allowing the leaders of these countries to engage in the formation of these projects at the national level, while Moscow rarely consulted with its partners in Asia Central Asia with regard to Eurasian integration, preferring to present traditional ties and a common history rather than practical benefits. Therefore, the Russians lacked clarity and consistency similar to that enjoyed by the Chinese, and as a result of the strengthening of corruption and local poor governance, the benefits that officials obtain in Central Asian countries from Chinese projects It is larger than what Russian companies offer. 

Moreover, the official elites in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan, are suspicious of the principle of the Russian world advocated by Putin and of Russia’s ambitions in the borders that Russian officials express from time to time. On the other hand, it became clear to these elites how limited Russian power had been so modest in the war on Ukraine.

Supporting the sovereignty of Central Asian countries, encouraging regional cooperation among them and protecting American investments were the priorities of the United States, and these priorities will likely not change, especially since the United States does not have a real opportunity to find a military foothold for itself or for NATO in the region to monitor the activities of terrorist groups that may return to Afghanistan. Therefore, it is likely that it will continue to communicate via the C5 + 1 platform and at a bilateral level, support the Central Asian countries with aid and encourage its allies such as the European Union and Japan to increase their investments in Central Asia, allowing the ruling political elites in the Central Asian countries to be more bargaining. with China and Russia. On the military side, India appears to be a suitable party to coordinate with it in terms of monitoring terrorism, especially since India has an air base in Eni – Tajikistan.

The United States has capabilities to enhance its soft power in a way that surpasses China, whose negative feeling and mistrust towards it is increasing among the peoples of Asian countries, especially in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, due to the persecution practiced by China against the Uyghurs and the Kazakh and Kyrgyz minority in China, and many Central Asian countries host large minorities of Uighurs. This is in addition to China’s policy of lending and investing in infrastructure with Central Asian countries, and it is likely that the United States will work to enhance the patriotic feeling of the peoples of this region and support the Uyghur cause; Which would increase the difficulties of China in the region.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are the two countries that have the greatest opportunities to achieve economic growth and political stability more than the rest of the countries in the region, so it is likely that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will continue to seek to diversify their trade and investment ties and balance their relations with both Russia and China through closer political, security and economic relations with the United States Preserving it, and this will give the latter an opportunity to reposition itself in the region again and develop security and military relations based on mutual benefits with those countries that need this balance, and this in turn will launch a new great game, because it is difficult to say now that there is a new great game in Central Asia; As the United States cannot now seriously and decisively threaten the hegemony of Russia and China in the region, but it will nevertheless be interested at the present time in weakening Russia in Central Asia in general, and on the other hand, monitoring Chinese activity in the region.

About the author

Firas Borzan

Syrian writer specializing in international affairs.REFERENCE

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  6. Two civilians killed as guards clash at Kyrgyz-Tajik border , Aljazeera, 28 January 2022,   https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/28/guards-clash-again-on-kyrgyz-tajik-border- ceasefire-falters (date of entry: August 23, 2022)
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  8. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 02.07.2021 ، http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202107030001  (تاريخ الدخول: 27 أغسطس/آب 2022)
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  12. Hashimova U., China Launches 5+1 Format Meetings with Central Asia, The Diplomat, 20 July 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/china-launches-51-format-meetings-with-central-asia/ (Date of entry: August 28, 2022)
  13. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on May 12, 2021 , https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202105/t20210512_9170742.html (accessed August 28, 2022)
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  20. China joins Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan in security alliance , REUTERS , August 4, 2016 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security/china-joins-afghanistan-pakistan-tajikistan-in-security-alliance – idUSKCN10F1A6   ( Date of access: September 1, 2022 )
  21. China to build outpost for Tajikistan special forces near Afghan border , REUTERS, 28 October 28, 2021 https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-build-outpost-tajikistan-special-forces-near-afghan -border-2021-10-28        (Date of entry: September 1, 2022)
  22. In Central Asia’s forbidding highlands, a quiet newcomer: Chinese troops , Washington post, Feb. 18, 2019  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-central-asias-forbidding-highlands-a-quiet-newcomer-chinese -troops/2019/02/18/78d4a8d0-1e62-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html (Accessed date: September 3, 2022)
  23. The National Guard of Uzbekistan conducts joint anti-terrorist exercises with the People’s Armed Police of China . 2022)
  24. Kyrgyz-Chinese exercises “Cooperation-2019” were held in Urumqi foto.html _  
  25. Media: Small “armies” of fighters from China will guard the Chinese in Kyrgyzstan. Is it possible?  https://knews.kg/2019/08/26/smi-malenkie-armii-bojtsov-iz-knr-budut-ohranyat-kitajtsev-v-kyrgyzstane-vozmozhno-li-eto/ _ 2022 )
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  27. KASSENOVA. T, HOW TO KEEP 600 KILOGRAMS OF KAZAKH HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM SAFE, War on the Rocks, 1 APRIL 2022 https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/project-sapphire-how-to-keep-600-tons-of- kazakh-highly-enriched-uranium-safe/ (Accessed September 8, 2022)
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  34. Kyrgyzstan Wants Military Role to End at US Base – Radio Free Europe, 23 October 2021 https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/world/asia/panetta-meets-with-milita… (Date of access: 12 September 2022)
  35. Schorzman D, Staging Base for Afghan War Handed Over to Kyrgyzstan, New York Times, 3 Jun 2014 https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/world/asia/staging-base-for-afghan-w… (Accessed date: September 13, 2022)
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  38. Is the SCO waiting for reform? Details of Patrushev ‘s speech –   Weekly Arguments and Facts
  39. Maynes. C.W، America Discovers Central Asia – Foreign Affairs -March/April 2003 – https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2003-03-01/america-discovers-central-asia
  40. Sakwa، Richard (2019) Russian Neo-Revisionism. Russian Politics، 4 (1). pp. 1-21. ISSN 2451-8921، page 12
  41. Review of International Studies، Volume 45، Issue 4، October 2019، pp. 689 – 708 
  42. Evan A. Feigenbaum, ‘Reluctant Stakeholders: Why China’s Highly Strategic Brand of Revisionism Is More Challenging Than Washington Thinks ‘ -highly-strategic-brand-of-revisionism-is-more-challenging-than-washington-thinks-pub-76213 (Accessed: 13 September 2022 )
  43. Review of International Studies، Volume 45، Issue 4، October 2019، pp. 689 – 708 

SAKHRI Mohamed
SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and International Relations in addition to a Master's degree in International Security Studies. Alongside this, I have a passion for web development. During my studies, I acquired a strong understanding of fundamental political concepts and theories in international relations, security studies, and strategic studies.

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