The 14th Iranian presidential elections appear different from previous ones. While signs of electoral competition are absent from Tehran’s general scene, the situation is different in the electoral headquarters of the six candidates, the televised debates broadcast by Iranian television, and organized public meetings. Supporters gather at headquarters and meetings, and the situation is also different in cyberspace and on social media, as if the political discussion and debate about this process and the overall political situation has moved from the street, metro stations, and taxis to Telegram, X, Twitter, Instagram, and other platforms.
Here in Tehran, in train stations, markets, and other crowded places, unlike previous electoral cycles, no one is talking about the 14th presidential elections, and there is no trace of their heat on the skin of the city that previously witnessed crowded electoral processes and debates in the streets between supporters of candidates. However, the situation appears different in the electoral headquarters of the six candidates and the debates broadcast live on Iranian television, as well as organized public meetings, where supporters gather at headquarters and meetings. The situation is also different in cyberspace, as if the give and take and political discussion about this process and the overall political situation has moved from the street, metro stations, and taxis to Telegram, X, Twitter, Instagram, and other platforms. This is not surprising, as results of a survey conducted by ISPA in 2016 indicate that 6 out of 10 people have an account on one social media platform or another.
In another survey from 2022, 78.5% of Iranians use at least one social media platform.
This situation may carry indicators of the process of change that Iranian society has witnessed and is witnessing, as generations change and priorities and interests change as well. What was convincing to previous generations is no longer finding buyers today.
“Sha’ban Bimokh”: Recalling the Past
Amid a state of political competition and tension between Iranian presidential candidates, Mohammad Hashemi, a well-known reformist figure, recalls the story of “Sha’ban Bimokh” (Sha’ban the Brainless), referring to Sha’ban Jafari, a person known before the revolution who was fiercely loyal to the Shah and led thugs in the streets against Mohammad Mossadegh to overthrow him. Jafari, who became the talk of the people at the time, was not a person with social or political thought, nor did he understand the workings of government and intellectual and political currents. He practiced violence without knowing why he was doing this and what he wanted from the chaos he was causing.
In recalling this well-known figure in Iranian society, who has become a proverb for those who clash and fight without awareness, Hashemi says: The presidency is a different matter, and “Sha’ban Bimokh” should not be allowed to reach the position of president.
Hashemi and many reformists direct overt and covert criticism at the principlist candidate, Zakani, seeing that he makes populist promises that will not help in saving the country from the state its economy has reached. They blame the Guardian Council and consider it responsible for approving the eligibility of personalities they see as unfit for this position.
Debates and Candidates’ Promises
While Zakani uses rhetoric in electoral debates that does not please his competitors and opponents, and the same goes for candidate Ghazi Zadeh, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf tries to be careful in his vocabulary. Mostafa Pourmohammadi appears to have a different personality from everyone else, discussing issues calmly and realistically, avoiding personal and family slander. Saeed Jalili focuses on showing the failure of Rouhani’s government and still maintains his opposition to the nuclear deal, insisting on internal capabilities to advance the economy and tools capable of thwarting sanctions.
No one in Tehran denies the difficulty of the economic situation. Although some propositions attribute the causes to structural problems in the Iranian economy, several indicators say that successive rounds of sanctions have had their effect on the Iranian economy and society and affected people’s livelihoods. Therefore, the economic aspect takes precedence over others in terms of voter orientations, as one poll indicates that 70% see the economy as the most influential factor in their electoral decisions.
What makes the candidates’ position difficult is their ability to present an economic program capable of convincing people of the ability to solve living and economic dilemmas in a way that reflects on people’s daily lives and livelihoods. Economic indicators do not stand in favor of any of the candidates, as inflation has reached high levels, with the annual inflation rate reaching about 40% in 2022. Iran experienced the highest level in 12 years in 2023 before it started to decline during the first months of 2024 to reach 32%. These unprecedented rates of inflation have had negative effects on the prices of basic goods and services, which has placed a burden on the budgets of Iranian families, and the prices of some food items have risen by up to 80% in some cases.
This is accompanied by an unprecedented rise in housing prices, reaching 60% over two years. Ghalibaf focused on this aspect and promised to grant land plots to facilitate house building. The difficult economic situation is accompanied by a high unemployment rate of over 11%, with the unemployment rate among youth in the age group (15-24 years) reaching 21% in 2023.
Candidates’ propositions vary on the economic front, but they all agree on the existence of dilemmas that require radical solutions.
Attack on the Nuclear Deal and Rouhani Responds
The second debate seemed in large part as if it was holding a trial for Rouhani’s policy on the nuclear file without the man being present. The volume of accusations was so large that it made him respond with a letter sent by his office to the committee responsible for propaganda in the presidential elections, complaining about “the accusations and insults directed by some candidates,” which the letter described as “contrary to the directives of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and a violation by some candidates of ethical principles and turning the debate into an arena for defamation and sabotage.” Rouhani also demanded that the Iranian television administration grant him the right to respond to the accusations targeting him.
The debate was devoted to issues of an internal nature such as government support for citizens and poverty levels, in addition to the health and education systems, and the migration of elites. However, it went beyond that to issues related to foreign policy, including nuclear negotiations and the upcoming presidential elections in the United States, and the future of relations between Tehran and Washington in the event of the return of former President Donald Trump to the White House. There was a confrontation between the candidates that was not without accusations.
The relationship with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the disagreement about it was an entry point for a verbal confrontation between the candidates. Jalili said: “Some in the country used this file as a pretext to cover up their failure,” addressing Pourmohammadi by saying: “Why didn’t you stand up to corruption when you were head of the Inspection and Control Department?” Pourmohammadi responded to these accusations by saying that he worked in recent years with the former Minister of Economy to address these problems, and addressed Jalili by saying: “During that period, we held more than one meeting and you were present, and interestingly, you said then that you had no problem with moving forward in agreeing to the conditions of the FATF, but your condition was the resignation of officials in Rouhani’s government.”
The issue of sanctions and oil sales was also present in the altercations that took place between the candidates. Pourmohammadi said: Ghalibaf’s talk about a role for parliament in increasing oil exports is not correct, and the rise in Iranian oil sales was due to the war in Ukraine and tensions in Taiwan, and US President Joe Biden also helped in this before the elections in the United States. Therefore, the parliament’s measures had no significant effectiveness in this regard.
He warned that “betting on the status quo remaining is not correct… and if Trump returns to the White House, we will then enter a new crisis.” Zakani spoke sarcastically about Pourmohammadi, saying: “The Trump phobia that Pourmohammadi suffers from will not lead the country anywhere.”
In the same direction, Ghalibaf spoke, considering that “sanctions are not a piece of paper, they will certainly harm the country, the people, the economy, and production growth,” and confirmed that he “is not against negotiation in principle, but we must know how to negotiate.”
Zakani leveled accusations at former President Hassan Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, describing his presidency as “eight black years in Iran’s history.”
Hijab and Freedom of Access to Electronic Sites
The third debate, which was broadcast by Iranian television, was devoted to discussing a number of problematic social issues, foremost of which are mandatory hijab, cyberspace, and blocking electronic sites. It was clear that some candidates were at opposite ends on these issues.
The reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, described the policy adopted in dealing with women regarding the issue of hijab as adopting methods that cannot be accepted and treating Iranian women in an unethical manner, which necessitates developing a policy to correct this course. He recalled the experience of the Shah’s regime in banning the hijab, and said: “Just as it was not possible to forcibly remove the hijab of Iranian women before, it will not be possible to impose the hijab on her by coercion today.”
Saeed Jalili considered that the focus on women’s issues is politically exploited by the West at a time when Western civilization has failed to provide solutions to women’s problems. He added: “Today they are silent about the killing of thousands of women in Gaza, but they were mobilized against the killing of a woman in Iran… despite the fact that the Islamic Republic has pushed women to the forefront and presented a model for Muslim women.”
Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi moved the issue of women to another square, as he saw that “what worries Iranian women is not the hijab, but discrimination in opportunities.”
Ali Reza Zakani said: Women who do not adhere to the hijab should only be treated with respect and the correct implementation of the law.
He promised to withdraw the Hijab and Chastity Bill if he wins, and warned of the consequences of imposing the hijab on women. Ghalibaf commented on Pourmohammadi, saying that the Chastity and Hijab Bill has not yet become law, considering that violence against non-veiled women is condemned and that bad hijab and not wearing the hijab is a scourge on the nation, family, and society.
Pourmohammadi described cyberspace as a world full of thousands of opportunities and threats; one must understand this space and its importance, evaluate the threats emanating from it well, and seize opportunities. He said: “Our children have been raised on cyberspace since childhood, and the solution is not to deprive them of the opportunities it provides and focus only on blocking… especially since Iran is a strong country with high scientific capabilities and the ability to produce content in this space.”
Ghalibaf announced his opposition to blocking and interfering in people’s lives in cyberspace and considered it religiously forbidden.
Pezeshkian pointed to the negative effects left by the process of blocking sites on people’s economic income; “as many who used to earn their living from the internet have become unemployed.”
He addressed Ghalibaf and Zakani, saying: “We are all against blocking the internet and against forced hijab, but those who deploy police to monitor hijab in the metro and pay huge sums for that are talking here about respecting women,” “When they sit on the debate chair, they say they defend women’s rights and oppose blocking, but in reality they seriously seek to do so.”
He called for improving the internet infrastructure and not increasing barriers to people’s access to it, considering this a condition for catching up with development in various fields such as artificial intelligence, while taking into account the necessary security controls for this. Saeed Jalili confirmed that local platforms have the potential to create wide-scale job opportunities with government support.
Opinion Polls: Pezeshkian Advances
All opinion polls conducted by various entities in Iran have not left the trio (Ghalibaf, Jalili, Pezeshkian), and their latest results talk about the progress of the reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, in the period of June 22 and 23, 2024, shortly after results showing Ghalibaf’s progress. The results of three polling centers, namely: “Meta (affiliated with Imam Sadiq University), Shenakht (a private research institution associated with Ferdowsi University in Mashhad), and ISPA (affiliated with ISNA news agency)” spoke of Pezeshkian’s progress with 24.4%, while the results of polling centers varied regarding who follows Pezeshkian. The “Meta” Foundation poll placed Ghalibaf in second place with 23.4%, then Saeed Jalili came third with approximately 22%, but Jalili came in second place in the (ISPA and Shenakht) poll, contrary to the results of “Meta”, with 24% in the ISPA poll and 20% in the Shenakht poll.
Conclusion
It is not possible to rely definitively on opinion polls to predict the winner in the elections to be held next Friday, but it is clear that the chances of the reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, are rising as a potential winner in these elections, and he may advance in competition with Mohammad Ghalibaf or Masoud Jalili. There are many reasons behind this progress, most notably the entry of Javad Zarif into Pezeshkian’s campaign, where he tours Iranian provinces and fiercely debates his competitors, using smart political language in mobilization. The reformist leader, Mohammad Khatami, spares no effort in supporting Pezeshkian and calling for voting for him “to save Iran.” As for Pezeshkian, he presented himself well in the debates and his campaign is managed in a smart and different style.
The turnout may not exceed 53%, continuing the low voting rate that began since the 2019 elections; as there is nothing to date indicating that the candidates have succeeded in convincing the gray category that has not yet decided to participate in the vote. On Tuesday, during Iran’s celebration of Eid al-Ghadir, the Supreme Leader of the Revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, urged the Iranian people to participate heavily in the presidential elections scheduled for next Friday, and to elect the most suitable. He warned the presidential candidates against allying with anyone who “deviates even slightly from the principles of the Islamic Revolution.” Khamenei, who had previously confirmed that any vote in the ballot box is a yes to the Islamic Republic, saw that “the Iranian people, after 3 days, will be facing a great test, and I ask God Almighty that the Iranian people come out of these elections with their heads held high.”
The low turnout and the presence of a number of principlist candidates may mean dispersing votes and going to a second round of elections, and unless the principlist current witnesses withdrawals from candidates in favor of one candidate, this may come at the cost of losing the elections.
Whatever the case of the next president, the difficult and intractable files in the economy, politics, and society will be waiting for him without having much time.
Here is an English translation of the provided text about the six candidates for the Iranian presidential election:
Who are the six candidates for the Iranian presidential election?
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf
- Born in Torqabeh, Mashhad province, in 1961.
- A principlist politician and former member of the Revolutionary Guards.
- Was commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya headquarters from 1994-1997, a huge economic group affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards.
- Was commander of the Air Force in the Revolutionary Guards from 1997-2000.
- Held the position of Director of Public Security from 2000-2005.
- Previously ran in the 2005 presidential election and the 2013 Iranian presidential election, but lost to Hassan Rouhani, coming in second with 6,077,292 votes.
- Elected mayor of Tehran for two terms, succeeding Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after he became president.
- Currently holds the position of Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly after being elected to a new term as Speaker of the Assembly in May 2024.
Saeed Jalili
- Born in Mashhad in 1965.
- Holds a PhD in Political Science and is fluent in English and Arabic.
- Diplomat and current member of the Strategic Council for Foreign Relations, member of the Expediency Discernment Council, and the Supreme Leader’s representative in the Supreme National Security Council.
- Was Secretary General of Iran’s National Security Council and head of the Iranian nuclear negotiation team from 2007-2013 during the term of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
- Enjoys the support of the Stability Front (Jebhe Paydari), a principlist political bloc that won most of the seats in the Consultative Assembly in the elections held in early March 2024.
Masoud Pezeshkian
- Born in Mahabad, West Azerbaijan province, in 1954.
- Iranian politician and physician, and representative for Tabriz, Azarshahr, and Osku in the Consultative Assembly.
- Held the position of First Deputy Speaker of the Iranian Parliament in the 10th term of parliament.
- Was Minister of Health in the government of former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami.
Alireza Zakani
- Born in Rey, south of Tehran, in 1965.
- Current mayor of Tehran municipality.
- Holds a degree in nuclear medicine from Tehran University of Medical Sciences.
- Was a representative for Qom city in the 2020 legislative elections.
- Worked as head of the research center affiliated with the Consultative Assembly.
- Appointed mayor of Tehran in 2021.
Mostafa Pourmohammadi
- Born in Qom in 1958.
- Completed preliminary and advanced stages in the seminary (fiqh, usul al-fiqh, and philosophy) in Qom, Mashhad, and Tehran.
- Holds a degree in Islamic jurisprudence and Sharia (equivalent to a PhD) from the seminary.
- Has authored works on political rights and the theoretical foundations of political thought in Islam.
- Held the position of Minister of Interior in Ahmadinejad’s government.
- Dismissed from this position in 2007 due to a dispute related to the President’s son-in-law, Rahim Mashaei, where Pourmohammadi opposed Mashaei’s appointment as Vice President.
- Held the position of Minister of Justice in Rouhani’s first government.
Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi
- Born in Mashhad in 1971.
- Representative for Mashhad city in the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th terms of the Consultative Assembly.
- In the 9th and 10th terms, he was secretary and member of the Presidium Committee.
- Was the First Deputy Speaker of the Consultative Assembly.
- An ear, nose, and throat specialist doctor and was previously a member of parliament.
- Worked as president of Semnan University of Medical Sciences.
- Was one of the candidates for the 13th presidential election in 2021, which was won by the late President Ebrahim Raisi.
