Tunisia has long been a country of emigration, with citizens seeking opportunities abroad. However, in recent years it has also become a site of transit and settlement for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, Syria, Bangladesh and elsewhere. This complex migration reality intersects with Tunisia’s fragile democratic transition and struggling economy. Irregular migration flows through unauthorized channels pose risks but also reflect the agency of migrants seeking better lives.
This article examines the drivers, experiences and governance of irregular migration in Tunisia. It considers the socioeconomic causes behind irregular departures by Tunisians, as well as factors attracting migrants from more unstable regions. The article explores smuggling networks facilitating unauthorized movements and the dangers faced by migrants. It analyzes Tunisia’s policies, along with European Union partnerships that prioritize border control over human rights. Overall, the article underscores the importance of a nuanced evidence-based approach balancing security, humanitarian needs and development goals.
Defining Irregular Migration
Irregular migration refers to crossing international borders without complying with legal requirements. This includes entering or staying in a country without authorization. Irregular migration occurs through unauthorized border crossings, visa overstays, migrant smuggling or fraudulent documents. It is driven by factors like poverty, conflict, persecution, and lack of regular pathways. [1]
The term “illegal migration” is avoided by many organizations as it criminalizes migrants when irregular status may result from desperation rather than choice. The UN prefers terminology like “undocumented” or “unauthorized” migration. [2]
Categories of irregular migrants include asylum seekers whose claims are unprocessed, trafficked persons moved coercively, and economic migrants seeking better opportunities without permits. Migrants often face stigma and exploitation due to their unauthorized status. [3]
In Tunisia, departures across the Mediterranean to Europe by boat without travel documents are a major component of irregular migration. Tunisia is also a transit point for sub-Saharan Africans seeking to reach Europe. Settlement of migrants without legal status has grown, along with asylum seekers.
Causes of Irregular Tunisian Emigration
Tunisia has a long history of labor emigration spanning colonial-era workforce programs to post-independence recruitment of workers by European countries. France, Italy and Germany are major destinations. Remittances from Tunisians abroad remain vital to the economy. [4]
However, legal emigration options are decreasing due to European immigration restrictions. Irregular departures from Tunisia have consequently risen, dominated by youth jobseekers but also including professionals, students and entire families. Key motivations include: [5]
Unemployment:
Despite significant educational attainment, Tunisia suffers high youth unemployment exceeding 30%. This fuels desires to migrate. Jobs in the large informal sector are insecure.
Governance Disillusionment:
Ongoing corruption, policy paralysis and security failures have diminished hope, especially among youth, in Tunisia’s democratic transition. This propels emigration.
Income Inequality:
Tunisia has substantial regional socioeconomic divides between prosperous coastal areas and marginalized interior regions. Poverty and lack of opportunity in lagging regions spurs irregular migration.
Smuggler Marketing:
Smugglers promote images of easy visas and jobs in Europe on social media to recruit clients. False perceptions drive migration.
Family/Community Culture:
Emigration is embedded in some community cultures. Families finance irregular migration of youth seen as fulfilling expectations and bringing status.
Inadequate Legal Pathways:
With limited legal work visas, family reunification options, or refugee resettlement, irregular journeys become the default choice.
By departing without authorization, Tunisians risk exploitation, violence and abuse. But irregular migration continues rising as legal pathways close and socioeconomic frustrations mount.
Drivers of Irregular Immigration Through Tunisia
In addition to outbound flows, Tunisia has become a significant transit and destination country for regional migration from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. This results from:
- Geography – Tunisia’s proximity to Europe attracts migrants who aim to cross the Mediterranean. Its long coastal and desert borders are also relatively porous.
- Conflicts – Tunisia’s relative stability makes it an escape for migrants from war zones like Libya, Syria or the Sahel region.
- Ties – Historic cultural, university and business links between Tunisia and many sub-Saharan countries facilitate migration.
- Smugglers – Tunisia is promoted by smugglers as an easier transit point to Europe compared to chaotic Libya despite similar risks.
- Economy – Tunisia’s mix of informal and formal sectors enables undocumented employment for some migrants.
- Asylum – While refugee protection is weak, Tunisia grants prima facie refugee status to Syrians which attracts some. [6]
However, racism, exploitation, police harassment, and lack of long-term residency plague the migrant experience in Tunisia. Most still see it as a stepping stone to Europe.
Human Smuggling Networks
Sophisticated smuggling networks facilitate most irregular migration to, through and from Tunisia. Following the 2011 revolution, security weaknesses enabled smuggling networks to expand and become more organized. Some key features include: [7]
- Reach across Tunisia, sub-Saharan Africa and Europe with collaborators spanning source, transit and destination countries.
- Cash Flows via informal hawala transfers and revenue in the millions, though smugglers at ground level earn little.
- Online Recruitment via social media targeting youth seeking better lives.
- Route Control with armed gangs and corrupt officials managing sea, desert and forest crossing points.
- Deception about risks of sea journeys and availability of European jobs and visas.
- Abandonment of migrants after extracting payments, leaving them adrift.
- Impunity and lack of prosecution, with arrests limited to low-level boat crew abandoners.
- Diversification into other criminal activities like drug trafficking and terrorism financing.
The lucrative profits and low risks have increased professionalization of smuggling networks. Tougher security measures divert routes but do not deter migration demand. More migrants take the Sahara route entering Tunisia overland. [8] Hardened organized crime now dominates migrant smuggling.
Dangers and Abuses Facing Migrants
Migrants, especially those traveling irregularly, are extremely vulnerable to exploitation, violence and rights violations:
- Sexual violence, assault, torture by smugglers, security forces or fellow migrants.
- Forced labor, abduction for ransom by criminal groups along transit routes.
- Deadly risks in deserts and at sea including dehydration, drowning, hypothermia.
- Human trafficking for sex work or forced begging in Tunisia’s informal economy.
- Physical dangers of harsh terrain, vehicle accidents and dangerous sea crossings on overcrowded boats.
- Lack of access to justice and social services due to status fears.
- Constant insecurity, racism, discrimination and police harassment as undocumented migrants.
- Prolonged detention in substandard facilities for apprehended migrants and asylum seekers. [9]
Migrant women and children face compounded risks, as do visible minorities. Witnessing deaths of fellow migrants causes deep trauma. While Tunisia is relatively safe, abuses still occur widely across migrants’ dangerous journeys.
Irregular Migrant Profiles and Trends
Reliable data is lacking given the unauthorized nature of irregular migration. However, some profiles and trends stand out: [10]
- Tunisians trying to reach Italy and France, mainly single young men from lagging regions but also some families.
- West Africans like Ivoirians, Malians and Guineans aiming for Europe, transiting through Tunisia.
- Egyptians seeking work opportunities in Tunisia’s informal labor market.
- Bangladeshis brought by smugglers to work in Tunisian sweatshops or cross to Europe.
- Syrians granted asylum but desiring onward mobility to Europe for family and jobs.
- Sub-Saharan students and professionals staying irregularly after studies or contracts end.
- Stateless individuals from MENA countries unable to regularize status for lack of nationality.
Both transit migration towards Europe and settlement in Tunisia are rising. But data is speculative given irregularity. Migrant characteristics change based on geopolitics like Afghanistan regime shift or Ukraine war. Precise trends are hard to discern, underscoring needs for research.
Entrenching Irregularity: Lack of Status Options
Tunisia lacks legal pathways for migrants to enter or normalize status. Narrow policies exclude many from work permits or residency. Asylum procedures are flawed. This entrenches irregularity.
The inadequate legal framework dates to the Ben Ali era focused on security not migrant rights. Reforms are slow despite constitutional guarantees of liberty for all. [11]
Tunisia’s laws prohibit status for adult irregular migrants, restricting regularization to certain nationalities or humanitarian cases like trafficking. Children born in Tunisia are also denied citizenship rights. [12]
Asylum seekers face barriers submitting claims and acquiring refugee status. Less than 5% of applicants succeed. Recognition rates are higher for Syrians but low for sub-Saharan Africans. [13]
Without realistic regularization options, migrants remain stranded irregularly. This expands the informal labor pool, risks of exploitation and incentives for onward dangerous travel.
Integrating Irregular Migrants
Despite restrictions, some initiatives assist irregular migrants in Tunisia through advocacy, services and training:
- Civil society organizations provide humanitarian aid, counseling, healthcare access, language classes and vocational training. [14]
- International agencies like UNHCR work to enhance refugee protection, including resettlement options that are still very limited. [15]
- Migrant-led associations offer peer support, cultural activities and essential shelters. [16]
- Small programs enable selected migrants to attend university or take Tunisian classes. [17]
- Local communities accommodate migrant day labor and offer shelter on occasion despite tensions. [18]
However, such efforts remain ad-hoc and reach a fraction of irregular migrant populations. Migrants primarily rely on their own precarious livelihoods and social networks. Legal status and sustainable integration remain distant prospects without major reforms. But grassroots solidarity resists the worst marginalization.
Tunisia’s Evolving Migration Policy Environment
Tunisia lacks a clear comprehensive national migration strategy. Policymaking remains fragmented between ministries of interior, social affairs, employment and foreign affairs. However, some developments are noteworthy: [19]
- New Constitution (2014) enshrines liberty and freedom of movement for all, providing basis for progressive reforms.
- National Strategy on Migration (2017-2020) lays out recommendations including on migrant integration and protection. But implementation is slow. [20]
- Legal reforms (2018-2020) incorporated rights protections and alternatives to migrant detention, though impact is limited. [21]
- Technical Agency for Migration was established in 2021 to provide data, analysis and coordination across government.
- Public discussions slowly reducing negative perceptions of migrants and asylum seekers. But racism persists.
- Increasing civil society advocacy makes migration issues more visible and pressing for policymakers.
- Limited informal regularization programs initiated on case-by-case basis but not expanded more systematically.
The legal-institutional framework thus remains restrictive overall but is slowly evolving in a more rights-based direction. However, interior politics stall major reforms. External cooperation also focuses Tunisia more on deterrence than protection.
Tensions in EU Cooperation on Migration
The European Union exerts significant influence on Tunisia to cooperate on curbing irregular migration in exchange for aid and trade benefits. But tensions persist on human rights.
Key elements of EU cooperation include: [22]
- Funding for border forces, equipment and surveillance technology to enhance enforcement and interdiction capacity.
- Support for migrant detention centers despite poor conditions.
- Partial externalization of EU asylum procedures by assessing some claims in Tunisia.
- Pressuring Tunisia to accept returned migrants rejected from Europe, despite unclear legal basis.
- Development aid for Tunisia conditional on cooperation in reducing migrant flows towards Europe.
Tunisia accepts much EU migration cooperation to maintain vital European diplomatic and financial support. But programs like forced returns face domestic criticism for violating rights. [23]
EU deals also do not offer Tunisia expanded legal labor migration options for its own nationals in return for control efforts. Imbalances foster resentment. [24]
Overall, EU cooperation treats Tunisia more as a migration buffer zone than partner. This overlooks root causes and forces Tunisia into the impossible position of policing Europe’s borders despite limited capacity.
New Realism on Irregular Migration?
Recent shifts suggest greater realism is emerging in Tunisia’s migration policymaking. While conservative elements still dominate politically, some pragmatic officials recognize repressive approaches are untenable, pushing gradual rethinking on integrating migrants.
Small regularization programs for irregular migrants working in agriculture or construction signal tentative openness to human realities over ideological resistance. [25]
Increased capacity building for refugee status determination and protections shows slow learning, despite remaining flaws in asylum policies. [26]
The new migration agency and ongoing policy reviews suggest migration is climbing the policy agenda. But concrete changes remain piecemeal.
Discussions on establishing a quota-based legal labor migration scheme highlight recognition that emigration pressures require managed systems rather than just extralegal flows. [27]
Tunisia’s heavy reliance on remittances and Europe’s own demographic needs also compel reassessing closure policies over time.
However, major reforms remain blocked by political instability, European pressure, and bureaucratic inertia. But rising pragmatism on migration could enable Tunisia adopting a more balanced, rights-based approach.
Conclusion
Irregular migration poses complex challenges in Tunisia. Continuing irregular departures and growing unauthorized immigration reflect governance failures, economic exclusion and unmanaged mobility pressures. Smugglers exploit desperation while migrants face abuse and trauma.
But simplistic security solutions deny human agency and regional realities. Migration results from rational hopes for better lives, not just criminal greed or chaos. Recognizing migrants’ courage and aspirations amid policy constraints is key for ethical governance.
With vision and responsibility, Tunisia can pivot towards rules upholding both sovereignty and humanity. This requires bargaining more assertively with Europe to define partnerships on Tunisia’s terms, not just European fears. A bold compromise combining development, mobility and rights could align Tunisian and migrant dreams.
Tunisia’s young democracy has inspired Arab aspirations before. Its next revolution could pioneer a 21st century social contract where mobility is not a crime, but a regulated path to prosperity. That will take difficult reimagination of identities, economies and policies.
Realism acknowledges most irregular migration cannot be halted abruptly. But its dangers can be mitigated by expanding regulated channels matching skills to opportunities. Development must also provide viable home alternatives.
With refugeehood proliferating worldwide, cooperation on protection systems beyond obsession with border control is essential. Basic humanitarianism must supersede transitory politics.
The journey ahead requires difficult balances between security and openness, idealism and pragmatism. But offering regulated roads that divert migrants from exploitative trails is the only durable solution.
If democracies cannot accommodate human mobility, they will be overwhelmed by its inevitable tides. The rights of individuals in existential pursuit must have a place in any new social compact. That ethical globalization remains unfinished business across the Mediterranean and beyond.
References:
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[2] United Nations. “International Migration Report 2020.” Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2020. https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/undesa_pd_2020_international_migration_highlights.pdf
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