In early September 2024, the Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Russian ambassador to Tehran, Alexey Dedov, to protest Moscow’s support for the creation of the Zangezur Corridor. This corridor would connect the Republic of Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave, which is entirely located in Armenian territory and runs along the northern border between Iran and Armenia.
This came after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to the Azerbaijani capital, Baku, on August 18, 2024. During this two-day state visit, Putin met with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, where the right of Baku to possess a land corridor connecting it to the Nakhchivan region was reaffirmed. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also emphasized the necessity for Armenia to implement the border and corridor agreement reached after the 2020 war between Baku and Yerevan, which includes the creation of the mentioned corridor.
Under Article 9 of this agreement, the isolated region of Nakhchivan would be linked to Azerbaijan via the Zangezur Corridor, a narrow passage that runs along the Armenia-Iran border and would be patrolled by the Russian Federal Security Service.
Iran’s Opposition:
Iran views the creation of the Zangezur Corridor as a geopolitical and economic threat due to several factors.
Geographic Isolation from Armenia: The corridor, as planned, would link Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave along the Armenia-Iran border, isolating Iran geographically from Armenia and, consequently, from the neighboring Eurasian region and access routes to Eastern Europe. This would deprive Iran of several economic and geopolitical advantages at a time when Tehran is already under U.S. and European sanctions over its nuclear and missile programs, as well as its regional role in the Middle East. Moreover, Western accusations of Iran supplying weapons to Moscow in its war against Kyiv have further isolated Iran. Additionally, Iran has ambitions to position itself as a potential alternative energy supplier to Europe amidst the EU’s embargo on Russian energy due to the ongoing Ukraine war.
Given the strategic threat posed by this corridor, Iran has expressed clear opposition. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, emphasized his country’s refusal to close its border with Armenia during his meeting with both President Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the Astana Summit in July 2022. This stance was reiterated by various Iranian circles, especially following Putin’s visit to Baku in August 2024. Iranian media, particularly the Tasnim News Agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), strongly criticized Russia’s support for the corridor. In a statement, Tasnim emphasized that Iran “will not accept any changes to its borders or security parameters” and described the corridor as a “delusional project” that will not be created due to Iranian opposition. The agency further highlighted that it would reduce Iran’s number of neighboring countries from 15 to 14 by effectively closing one of its gateways to Europe.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed this stance, stating, “Any threat to the territorial integrity of our neighboring countries or any attempt to redraw borders, whether in the north, south, east, or west, is a red line for Iran.” Similarly, Ibrahim Azizi, chairman of the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, emphasized that Iran considers the Zangezur Corridor a red line and will respond firmly to any changes.
Impact on Iranian Transit Routes: Iran perceives the Zangezur Corridor as an attempt to deprive it of the revenues from Turkish exports passing through to Central Asia. It would also cut off its access to transit fees from Azerbaijani trucks traveling to the Nakhchivan exclave in Armenia. This is significant given the March 2021 agreement between Iran and Azerbaijan that allowed Azerbaijani goods to transit through Iran after Armenia failed to implement Article 9 of the 2020 ceasefire agreement. If the corridor is completed, Azerbaijan would no longer need to use Iranian territory for transit, and Iran would be forced to pay transit fees to use the corridor to reach either Azerbaijani or Armenian lands.
These developments coincide with Turkey’s efforts to complete the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, which connects Afghanistan to Turkey via Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, bypassing Iran, Russia, and China. This project is seen as undermining Iran’s efforts to develop the North-South Corridor, which connects its southern ports in the Persian Gulf and Oman Sea to Central Asia and the international waters of the Indian Ocean.
Fear of Increasing Turkish Influence: Iran’s geopolitical and economic concerns over the Zangezur Corridor are coupled with fears of growing Turkish influence in the Caucasus. Turkey’s strong ties with Azerbaijan and its broader regional ambitions pose a direct challenge to Iran’s position. Since 2009, Turkey and Azerbaijan have regularly conducted joint military exercises, most recently the “Caucasus Eagle” drills, which included Georgian participation in June 2024. Iran views these developments as a direct threat to its influence in the region.
The potential creation of the Zangezur Corridor would increase Turkish influence even further, as it would provide Turkey with a direct land route to Central Asia, establishing a geopolitical and economic arc around Iran to the north.
Concerns Over Azerbaijani Nationalism: Iran fears that the increased influence of Azerbaijan and Turkey on its northern border, if the Zangezur Corridor is established, could fuel separatist sentiments among the Azerbaijani population in northwestern Iran. Ethnic Azerbaijanis make up over 20% of Iran’s population, and Tehran has accused Baku of supporting separatist movements in these regions. Any rise in Turkish and Azerbaijani nationalism could reignite calls for secession, complicating Iran’s already complex ethnic composition and potentially sparking separatist movements not only in the Caucasus but also across other parts of the country.
Complicating Potential Nuclear Negotiations: Some Iranian commentators have linked the promotion of the Zangezur Corridor to Iran’s efforts to reduce tensions with the West and revive the nuclear deal. They argue that Moscow may be using the corridor to preempt any rapprochement between Iran and the United States, as Russia views improved relations between Tehran and the West as a threat to its interests. Former Iranian MP Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh has even suggested that “Russia wants to see Iran besieged” and that “Tehran’s opening to the West is a nightmare for Moscow.”
These observers point to Moscow’s efforts to derail any potential steps toward reconciliation between Iran and the West, as seen in the breakdown of talks between Iran and the 4+1 group during the presidency of Ebrahim Raisi, allegedly due to the Ukraine crisis.
Continued Cooperation:
Despite the renewed tensions between Iran and Russia over the Zangezur Corridor, cooperation between the two countries continues in many strategic areas. Key aspects of their recent collaboration include:
Alleged Iranian Missile Supplies to Russia: Western reports in early September 2024 claimed that Iran had recently supplied Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, such as the Fateh-360, with a range of around 500 miles. These missiles were reportedly transported via the Caspian Sea to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. Iran has denied these allegations, calling for other countries, implicitly referring to the West, to stop supplying weapons to the warring parties. Iranian military officials have also denied these claims.
If true, these reports would signify a deepening of military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow, which has already grown significantly since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war. Iran has reportedly supplied Russia with drones, particularly the Shahed models, which have been widely used by Russia in the conflict.
At the same time, speculation has increased about Iran’s impending receipt of Russian Su-35 fighter jets, although Moscow has not yet confirmed the deal.
Talk of a Comprehensive Agreement: On September 2, 2024, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov announced that Moscow and Tehran would soon finalize preparations for a comprehensive cooperation agreement, with only a few technical details remaining. This agreement is expected to cover all aspects of partnership between Iran and Russia.
Lavrov’s statements may have been intended to ease tensions following Putin’s visit to Baku. Additionally, Iran’s ambassador to Russia, Kazem Jalali, revealed that a meeting between Iranian President Masoud Bezhkian and Putin is expected on the sidelines of the upcoming BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, in late October.
De-escalation of Iranian Criticism of Russia: Although Iranian officials and media have launched sharp attacks on Russia over its stance on the Zangezur Corridor, recent days have seen a softening of these criticisms, particularly from conservative outlets. These media have shifted focus to portraying Russia’s support for the corridor as an attempt to pressure Armenia in response to Yerevan’s recent westward shift. They have also emphasized that Russian influence in the region counters Israeli influence, arguing that the only beneficiaries of a rift between Iran and Russia would be the United States and Israel.
In conclusion, while Iran opposes Russia’s position on the Zangezur Corridor, this has not affected the broader cooperative relationship between the two countries. It suggests that their interests and policies do not always align, but they continue to collaborate on other fronts, particularly in response to Western pressures on both states.
