The recent period, up until the dawn of today (July 31, 2024) with the announcement of the assassination of Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, reflected intensive activity for the return of the assassination policy that Israel has consistently followed as part of its strategy to deter adversaries over the past decades. One of the most prominent of these was the assassination of Hamas leader and founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in March 2004. Meanwhile, the recent assassination operations targeting Hamas’s top leaders came in line with what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on November 22, 2023, directing the Mossad to work against Hamas leaders, including outside Gaza. Consequently, these operations impose new complex calculations regarding the course of the war in the Gaza Strip according to the new rules drawn by Tel Aviv through these operations, in a way that imposes the need to understand the potential escalation outcomes according to the calculations of the Palestinian resistance movements as well as the Israeli calculations.
Calculations of the Palestinian Resistance
The targeting of a prominent leadership figure like Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh, who had represented the movement in negotiation rounds throughout the past period, imposes new calculations that the movement faces at the present time, especially regarding the approach to dealing with the course of the war in the Gaza Strip, and the path of negotiations that have recently resumed. This is in addition to calculations of its response to this operation, according to the following points:
1- Rearranging papers and neutralizing the organizational impact of the operation: The movement will be required as an initial move to rearrange its papers, organize its ranks and fill the void left by the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, although this issue faces some challenges related to the ongoing war currently in the Gaza Strip. The process of selecting a leader for the movement according to the organizing rules within the movement requires that it be done through the Central Shura Council, which consists of movement leaders from different regions, and usually the selection is based on internal consensus and voting. Therefore, the movement may resort to choosing one of the first-tier leadership figures – even temporarily – until conditions are suitable to follow the normal procedures in selection, provided that the chosen figure enjoys acceptance and is agreed upon by the movement’s leaders inside and outside the Strip. This is not an easy task but it is necessary to neutralize the organizational impact of the assassination operation and show the flexibility of the movement’s structure in dealing with emergency circumstances.
2- Tendency towards “extended deterrence” in response through unity of fronts: Hamas may tend in its response to this qualitative operation of assassinating the movement’s leader to activate the “extended deterrence” umbrella provided by other confrontation fronts, specifically the northern front that is expected to respond to Israel as a result of the assassination operation that took place on July 30 in the southern suburb of Beirut, which targeted one of the most prominent leaders of the Lebanese Hezbollah, Fouad Shukr, who is referred to as the most prominent military official in Hezbollah and the second man after Hassan Nasrallah. This tendency may be reinforced by Hamas’s limited ability for mutual deterrence response at the same level of targeting through the field in light of the decline in the movement’s military capabilities, especially the missile capability that it relied on to respond to such operations.
Also, the spatial circumstance of the targeting scene in the Iranian capital imposed that there be a response from Tehran, which may also tend to respond indirectly through its arms, especially Hezbollah, so that it is a unified response to the assassination of both Shukr and Haniyeh. It is likely to be a response within the framework of “Gray Zones” for escalation without all-out war, similar to the Iranian response to targeting the Iranian consulate in Syria last April (2024), and the subsequent Israeli attacks in Isfahan, which came to establish deterrence and not escalation to all-out war. This is reinforced by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s commitment to the rule of “Plausible deniability”, which provides space for flexibility in the adversary’s reaction according to the rules of engagement defined between them without leading to a comprehensive confrontation between the two sides. This was reflected in Benjamin Netanyahu’s office issuing instructions to ministers to “refrain from commenting on the death of Ismail Haniyeh”.
3- Suspending negotiations and intensifying pressure messages to the Israeli interior: Despite the movement’s dealing with a degree of flexibility with the Israeli targeting operation a few days ago, which was targeting the leader of the movement’s military wing Mohammed al-Deif, and as a result killed Rafeh Salameh, commander of the Khan Yunis Brigade, which was not followed by suspension of negotiations, the qualitative targeting operation that took place today will push the movement to suspend negotiations, especially since the messages of this targeting reflect the Israeli position on the entire negotiation scene and post-war scenarios, which triumphs for the vision of the extreme right. In this context, the movement may intensify pressure messages to the Israeli interior, especially since this recent operation carries a risk to the lives of their relatives among the prisoners, and reflects Netanyahu and his government’s indifference to the lives of the prisoners, given its significant impact on the course of negotiations that represent the only hope for their return alive after the failure of the military path to liberate them has been proven, and if it succeeded in a limited way, but in return caused the death of numbers equal to the numbers of liberated prisoners.
Israeli Calculations
The succession of Israeli targeting during the past period, which came simultaneously with rounds of negotiation facing obstacles, reflected Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s determination to complete the military path, and adopt an approach of maneuvering in negotiation to buy time and escape forward from his internal crises, and his bet on the continuation of the war to ensure his chances of staying in the political scene in the aftermath of the current war, and enhance his electoral chances with the extreme right current to ensure his re-election in any upcoming elections, which guarantees him to avoid concluding his political history and legacy he will leave – as the longest-serving prime minister in the history of the Hebrew state – with this humiliating defeat by Hamas. The following is a review of the most prominent determinants of the Israeli position, especially in the wake of recent assassination operations, as follows:
1- Continuation of Israeli military pressure and promotion of victory: The government coalition seeks to continue the military approach as the most effective path to resolve the conflict and achieve “complete victory” according to Netanyahu’s promotion, and at the tactical level, coalition leaders promote that the pressure generated from the military path improves the position of the Israeli negotiator and ensures good conditions for a ceasefire agreement without concessions. This trend is reflected through the military targeting carried out by Tel Aviv against resistance movement leaders, despite its awareness of its negative impact on the course of negotiations and the regional calming process. This also comes in line with its pursuit to restore the deterrence equation, especially with regard to enhancing the ability for qualitative targeting and credibility in deterrence, in connection with the operation it had announced at the end of last year under the name “Nili” (an abbreviation of a biblical phrase in Hebrew meaning “Eternal Israel will not lie”) to target senior Hamas leaders, which was followed by the announcement of the assassination of Hamas leader and deputy secretary general of the movement, Saleh al-Arouri, who was targeted in the southern suburb of Beirut on January 2, 2024, and subsequent successive targeting. Thus, the coalition aims through these operations to confirm the feasibility of continuing military pressure as the only path that leads to achieving the war’s goals in terms of defeating Hamas (militarily and politically), and liberating prisoners, without making concessions that represent submission to defeat in favor of Hamas.
2- Pressure from extreme coalition parties to reject negotiation: The positions of extreme parties in the coalition continue to oppose signing an agreement that would stop the war, and even sought to sabotage any agreements, by raising the ceiling of their demands and red lines for withdrawing from the coalition. In addition to defeating Hamas, they added new conditions represented in the necessity of not withdrawing from the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphia axis, which was expressed in statements by a number of leaders of extreme parties, most notably Bezalel Smotrich, who confirmed on July 22, 2024, in statements directed at Netanyahu not to sign the deal and continue to enhance military pressure on Hamas in order to achieve all the war’s goals, and also attacked security agency leaders because of their position supporting an “illegitimate” deal according to his description. Also, Israeli Settlement Minister Orit Strock from the “Religious Zionism” party had threatened, on July 16, 2024, during her visit to the Kerem Shalom crossing to bring down the government if the army withdraws from the Philadelphia axis and the Netzarim axis.
Netanyahu seizes these statements of rejection to send reassurance messages to his partners, to expand his margin of maneuver and evasion in dealing with the terms of the ceasefire agreement, as he announced on July 12, 2024, “red lines” for Israel to agree to the deal proposal, represented in freedom to resume military action against Hamas, maintaining military presence and continued control of the Israeli army over the Philadelphia axis on the border and over the Rafah crossing, which are conditions he knows well the expected rejection from Hamas. Thus, he returns the negotiation path again to a state of stalemate, which is the same approach he followed during previous negotiation rounds.
3- Personal calculations of Netanyahu and his party: These rejecting positions of Netanyahu’s partners in the coalition converge with his personal desires and his party, especially in light of the growing realization that they will suffer a big loss in any upcoming elections if the victory that can overcome the failures of October 7, 2023 is not achieved, the features of which began to unfold following the issuance of a preliminary report during the past days that includes part of the results of the investigation into the events of October 7, 2023. Despite some reliance on these moves by the military level to release some preliminary reports confirming the failures in dealing with the events, which would increase pressure on the government coalition to acknowledge its responsibility for the failure, and thus show flexibility in dealing with the political path to release prisoners, these moves issue opposite signals to coalition leaders of the need to complete the military path until the date of holding elections in 2026, relying on changing the equation in their favor through achieving what they consider “achievements” that temporarily renew their legitimacy, such as assassination operations carried out by Israel and finding the bodies of prisoners, which gains them some time to reach the point of victory that can be promoted internally to their voter base from the extreme right.
This trend is reflected in the statements of prominent Likud member and Minister of Culture and Sports Miki Zohar in an interview dated July 11, 2024, in which he confirmed that “the disintegration of the coalition that will lead us to elections we will find ourselves in the end in opposition for many years to come, this is very clear, there is no element of fear of elections here, but it is an element of reality”, adding: “Anyone who calls for elections is acting incorrectly”. This statement reflects the reality of this coalition dealing with the current war against the Gaza Strip with the logic of managing an electoral campaign through which it aims to maximize its political gains that it can reap if this campaign continues, and has not gone to the stage of electoral silence that it has not yet prepared for.
4- Calculations of the American position: With US President Joe Biden’s announcement of his withdrawal from running in the upcoming presidential elections on November 5, 2024, and nominating his vice president Kamala Harris instead, observers see that this change would affect the agenda of priorities of the current administration, especially regarding foreign issues, foremost of which is the Israeli war against the Gaza Strip, in terms of not relying on accelerating the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement that allows pushing efforts to sign a strategic partnership agreement with Saudi Arabia, which will retreat in favor of interest in internal issues that the American voter will be more concerned with, and thus the impact of the American position envisioned to be played by US President Joe Biden will diminish, which was revealed by the behind-the-scenes of Netanyahu’s visit to Washington during the past days, and what happened during his meetings with the US President and his Vice President. Despite reports confirming that both parties demanded Netanyahu to complete the truce deal, although Harris’s tone of speech was harsher than Biden’s, he returned to reflect the marginal impact of these demands, and instead showed his bet and reliance on considering the red lines set for him by his partners in the coalition, in terms of the need to complete the war and defeat Hamas militarily and politically and end its rule in the Strip. In addition to confirming the rejection of the American vision based on the importance of the “two-state solution” option within the scenarios of the day after the war in the Gaza Strip, so it was arranged for the Israeli Knesset to vote during the past period to reject the establishment of a Palestinian state, a few days before the date of his visit to Washington.
Here it should be noted that although these calculations are going in favor of the Israeli side, the transformations of the regional scene in terms of escalating conflict and the possibility of its drift into a wide regional confrontation in which Washington will be involved, may push US President Joe Biden and his Vice President to pressure Netanyahu to reach a calming formula even temporarily during which multiple confrontation arenas are cooled, at least until the date of elections, but the flexibility of the Israeli government in responding to this pressure may be limited if it plans to exert pressure on the current administration through the current escalation to enhance the chances and opportunities of its preferred candidate former President Donald Trump in the upcoming elections.
What’s Next?.. Is the Day After the War in Gaza Approaching or Moving Away?
In light of what has happened during the past days of much water in different directions regarding the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip and the course of negotiations, in a way that oscillates the signals issued between negative and positive that makes the observer of events believe at times that it is very close to a ceasefire agreement and is a prelude to announcing the end of this raging war for ten months, and at other times, finds that the interactions happening are like someone walking in place and not leaving it, the course of what has become known as the “day after” the war has become characterized by a kind of ambiguity.
It can be said that what leads this illusion factor is the Israeli side that adopts the principle of “evasion and lack of resolution”. At a time when it reflects flexibility towards the negotiation path to send through it reassurance messages to the families of prisoners inside and reduce external pressure, it returns again, during the course of negotiation, and sabotages it with obstacles that it realizes the difficulty of pushing the course of negotiation with it such as the assassination operations it carried out during the recent period and targeted during it prominent military leaders inside the Strip and political leaders leading negotiations from abroad, to reflect its true desire to continue the war and gain time that keeps the government coalition for as long as possible to reach the point of victory that can be promoted in right-wing public circles in preparation for any potential elections after the war.
In this context, some scenarios can be presented that will govern the Israeli position during the coming stage, with which the element of illusion of optimism or pessimism regarding the course of negotiation and the answer about whether we are approaching the day after the war or moving away from it will be guided, as follows:
1- Continuation of the state of no peace and no war with tactical targeting: The variables of the current context reflect the tendency of the Israeli coalition led by Netanyahu to adopt a state of “no peace” and a state of “no war in the broad sense” during the coming period in order to ensure the continuation and survival of the coalition until the date of holding elections in 2026, relying on the continuation of the war to achieve its goals related to defeating Hamas and liberating prisoners, and in the meantime the coalition will work to achieve what it considers tactical “achievements” that enhance the legitimacy of the military path that Tel Aviv insists on through carrying out targeting of Hamas leaders and depleting its military and human capabilities, in addition to imposing more local pressure from Palestinian citizens against the movement whose opinion poll results reflect the relative shift in its positions, and the occurrence of division over support and endorsement of Hamas, as according to the results of an opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, published on July 10, 2024, more Gaza residents believe that Hamas will not be the ruling force in the future, where half of Gaza Strip residents said that Hamas will return to control the Gaza Strip, while slightly more than half of Gaza Strip residents said they prefer the return of Hamas compared to about two-thirds in the West Bank. While more than a quarter of Gaza Strip residents said they prefer the establishment of a new Palestinian authority with an elected president, parliament and government.
2- More concessions from Hamas to conclude a “partial and not comprehensive agreement”: The Israeli coalition may go to conclude a partial agreement similar to the truce that was reached in the first months of the war last November so that its conditions are represented in the release of Israeli prisoners in exchange for the release of Palestinian prisoners, while retaining the right of the Israeli side to object and amend the list of names of Palestinian prisoners, especially those with life sentences, without this agreement including a complete ceasefire, and Tel Aviv may rely on reaching this scenario on the transformations of the current context, which may push Hamas – according to Israeli perceptions – to reconsider its conditions and make more concessions regarding the truce deal under the pressure of local pressure from the residents of the Strip, as well as the military pressure carried out by Israel by targeting the movement’s leaders, in addition to shifts in regional and Western support positions, especially the transformations of the scene in the American electoral race, and its impact on the form of support for Israel, especially in light of Tel Aviv’s reliance that the elections will bring former President Donald Trump known for his supportive positions for Israel and with him this time his new vice president James David Vance who is extreme in his support for Israel.
3- Acceptance of a truce proposal carrying mutual concessions: The current state of escalation on different fronts in Lebanon and Yemen that is likely to slide towards a comprehensive regional confrontation on multiple fronts, along with increasing pressure from the Israeli opposition and families of prisoners and Israeli displaced persons, may lead to imposing more pressure on the coalition and pushing it to accept a truce agreement, within the framework of a regional settlement, to calm the fronts, during which both parties show a degree of flexibility regarding the conditions set, so that Hamas demands are taken into account, which will be required to show flexibility to make amendments to them, and at the same time takes into account Netanyahu’s submission commitments towards the extreme parties in the coalition to ensure coalition stability. The coalition may engage in this process without acknowledging any written commitments that lead it to necessarily complete all stages of the agreement, so that it is satisfied only with the first phase scheduled for six weeks according to the announced terms of the agreement and without reflecting at the same time bad faith in not completing the agreement. Therefore, it is envisioned that the coalition will deal with this scenario if it embarks on it as a tactical scenario to rearrange papers and relieve pressure.
Overall, the variables of the current context in terms of the state of uncertainty that surrounds the positions of the crisis parties, and even the extension of this state to the positions of some regional and international parties involved, lead to make the escalation paths that will in turn affect the scenarios of the day after the war in the Gaza Strip, open to all possibilities. However, the Israeli position will be more inclined to combine the first and second scenarios related to imposing the fait accompli regarding the Israeli conditions for accepting a temporary and not comprehensive truce agreement, so that the alternative is to continue the current situation in terms of the state of no peace and no war and the continuation of the attrition scenario for the movement inside the Strip, while neutralizing regional confrontation fronts or reducing their impact to the acceptable limit according to the defined rules of engagement, so that they do not constitute an external pressure factor on Tel Aviv. Regarding the pressures of the internal front, there is a growing awareness among coalition leaders of their ability to control the course of things with regard to imposing the fait accompli on the interior and promoting the military path. This is in addition to relying on American intervention to enhance the “extended deterrence” umbrella to prevent regional confrontation fronts from embarking on an escalation scenario that leads to a wide regional war, and thus, managing the expected response from these fronts to recent targeting operations is likely to be according to the gray areas of escalation without all-out war that will be governed by a zero-sum equation with which the cost of damage rises for all parties. This may put us in front of recalling the scene of the round of escalation and direct confrontation witnessed by Iran and Israel last April and ended with limited strikes that worked to establish deterrence and not escalate it to the level of all-out war.
