Despite increasing discussions about the intensification of military cooperation between Iran and Russia in the near future—where Iran supplies Moscow with ballistic missiles in exchange for Russia providing Tehran with Sukhoi-35 fighter jets, alongside the impending signing of a strategic cooperation agreement—this has not prevented the resurgence of Iranian criticism of Russia’s policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus, especially concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
On September 2, 2024, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Russian ambassador to Tehran, “Alexey Dedov,” to protest remarks made by Russian Foreign Minister “Sergei Lavrov.” Lavrov emphasized Russia’s commitment to implementing the ceasefire agreement brokered on November 9, 2020, between Russian President “Vladimir Putin,” Azerbaijani President “Ilham Aliyev,” and Armenian Prime Minister “Nikol Pashinyan.” The agreement included reopening transport routes between the main part of Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan via the Zangezur Corridor, which does not align with Iran’s interests. Iran was not a party to the agreement and sees it as cutting off its borders with Armenia and isolating it between Turkey and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus.
Multiple Considerations
Several factors help explain why Iran has renewed its criticism of Russia’s role in the Caucasus, particularly concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis:
Warnings from Iranian Factions on “Bezhkyan’s” Policy Toward Russia: Since taking office, Iranian President “Masoud Bezhkyan” has focused on strengthening relations with Russia, seeing it as a key global power that has historically supported Iran in facing Western crises and sanctions. This became more important after the nuclear agreement stalled following former U.S. President “Donald Trump’s” withdrawal from the deal on May 8, 2018, and the subsequent re-imposition of U.S. sanctions starting on August 7 of the same year. The reopening of this contentious issue with Russia may stem from a desire by several Iranian factions to warn against the consequences of deepening ties with Moscow. These factions argue that Russia has previously adopted policies that conflict with Iran’s interests and has used their relationship to manage its own conflicts with Western countries.
Bezhkyan’s Attempt to Strengthen Relations with the West: This step by Iran could be tied to Bezhkyan’s efforts to open channels of communication with Western countries and revive negotiations over the nuclear deal, with the aim of lifting most U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran, which have exacerbated the country’s economic crisis. In other words, this action could be a signal from Bezhkyan’s government to Western countries that its priority lies in developing cooperation with them, and that there are limits to expanding relations with Russia, which depend on how far this cooperation with the West can go. Notably, some factions in Iran have started to emphasize that renewing negotiations with Western countries to reach a deal, either to maintain the nuclear agreement or establish a new one, is unlikely while Iran continues to provide military support to Russia in its operations in Ukraine. This issue has attracted special attention from Western countries and could hinder the renewal of these negotiations or the reaching of any agreement.
Pressuring Moscow on Arms Deals: It is possible that Iran’s summoning of the Russian ambassador to protest Russia’s stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is linked to Iranian frustration with Russia’s hesitation to confirm the finalization of a deal to supply Tehran with Sukhoi-35 fighter jets. This deal has become a high priority for Iran, especially after the recent military escalation with Israel revealed a significant gap in Iran’s air force capabilities. Despite Iran’s persistence, Russia has yet to officially confirm that it will proceed with this deal, even after the visit of Russian Security Council Secretary “Sergei Shoigu” to Tehran on August 5, 2024, and despite the assassination of Hamas political leader “Ismail Haniyeh” on July 31, 2024. The assassination prompted Iran to threaten a retaliatory strike against Israel, which it sees as a duty. Moscow, however, remains cautious. While it values Iranian drone and ballistic missile technology for its operations in Ukraine, delivering Sukhoi-35 fighter jets to Iran at this critical juncture in the Middle East—amid Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza and related regional military escalations, including with Iran—could raise tensions with Western countries to unprecedented levels. Additionally, it might provoke Israel to take escalatory measures in Ukraine, having previously refrained from providing significant military support to Kyiv, even under U.S. pressure, to maintain its understanding with Russia in Syria. This hesitation by Russia may have frustrated Tehran, which views it as another sign that Moscow is using its relationship with Iran to manage its conflicts with Western countries, possibly prompting Iran to reignite the contentious issue of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Growing Concerns Over Russian-Turkish Coordination in Syria: Iran closely monitors Russian efforts to normalize relations between Turkey and the Syrian government, following Turkish President “Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s” desire to “move past” longstanding disputes with Damascus that stem from Turkey’s support for opposition forces in the Syrian conflict since 2011. While Iran does not oppose the normalization of relations between Ankara and Damascus, it resists the idea of this happening without its involvement or through a unilateral Russian mediation. Moscow’s goal may be to exclude Iran from the process of restructuring security arrangements between Ankara and Damascus, aligning with its broader strategy in Syria to curtail Iran’s influence on the ground after the end of the armed conflict in favor of Syrian President “Bashar al-Assad.” In response, Tehran has sought to reinforce its presence in Syria on multiple fronts—political, economic, cultural, and social.
Managing Disagreements
Despite the tensions, it seems unlikely that Iran will escalate its differences with Russia, at least in the short term. Both countries are preparing to sign a 20-year strategic cooperation agreement, and Iran remains hopeful that Russia will expand military cooperation to fill its air force gap, especially as Iran anticipates potential direct military confrontation with Israel.
Moreover, Iran’s efforts to renew negotiations with the West only increase the importance of maintaining strong relations with Russia, as Moscow serves as a crucial international ally that Tehran can rely on during periods of Western pressure and sanctions, bolstering its bargaining position in negotiations.
