Military coups have become a recurring spectacle in West and Central Africa, making the continent home to the highest number of coups in the world. On August 30, 2023, Gabon became the second country in this politically unstable region to experience a military coup within less than two months, following the overthrow of Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum on July 28. Following disputed presidential election results in Gabon, military leaders seized control, declaring General Brice Oligui Nguema as the new leader of the transitional government.
The military takeover in Libreville starkly reflects the prevailing trend in this region of Africa. This coup in Gabon marks the eighth of its kind in West and Central Africa since 2020, with military leaders having ousted the leaders of Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and Chad. While regime change is by no means new in sub-Saharan Africa, the frequency of such events in the area dubbed the “coup belt” is increasingly concerning.
Interestingly, the power grab in Gabon, as in many recent coups, was not violent; it generally appeared to enjoy popular support—or at least lacked overt public opposition—representing a significant deviation from the post-independence trends in the region. After the coup in Gabon, military officials immediately placed President Bongo under house arrest, closed all borders, and completely halted government operations. In the face of a torrent of regional and international criticism regarding the coup, General Nguema, the former head of the presidential guard who assumed power, claimed that President Bongo was enjoying “all rights as an ordinary Gabonese citizen” during his detention.
The Struggle Against Coups
Historically, African leaders have employed various strategies to “protect their regimes from coups.” African governments, both military and civilian, have often adopted similar strategies, though military regimes tend to lean more toward military measures for protection, while civilian governments seek to safeguard themselves through popular support. However, economic troubles, insecurity, rampant corruption, and widespread mismanagement have alienated African leaders from their electorates, making them more vulnerable to coups.
One of the key mechanisms African heads of state use to protect their regimes is the establishment of multiple competing military forces. While most African countries maintain national armies, these armies can shift their priorities and institutional interests, transforming them into political entities with their own goals and aspirations independent of the state. Consequently, African leaders often fortify themselves by creating other armed units composed of elite forces such as presidential guards, police, national security, special forces, and “commando” units to prevent the military from seizing power and to serve their own interests. These units are typically smaller than the national army but are usually well-trained and equipped. Crucially, these armed units often belong to the same ethnic group as the head of state. Nevertheless, these special units frequently leverage their privileged positions and proximity to power to execute successful coups. In fact, many recent regime changes in Africa, including those in Gabon and Niger, have seen these special units take the lead.
The military adjustments made by Cameroon and Sierra Leone following the coup in Gabon highlight the efforts to preempt potential coups that might mirror those in the region. For instance, Cameroonian President Paul Biya made ministerial adjustments within the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces, while his Sierra Leonean counterpart, Julius Maada Bio, appointed American Jerry Torres as his national security advisor. Torres is known for his work in American lobbying, following the arrest of senior military officials.
Factors of Social Discontent
Coup leaders have capitalized on widespread public discontent in Central and West Africa, primarily linked to poor governance, violent extremism, insecurity, corruption, electoral fraud, and dictatorial claims to power. The recent coups in Gabon, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Sudan have garnered varying degrees of civilian support and witnessed limited violence, likely encouraging coup leaders to pursue anti-democratic power grabs.
This apparent civilian support for coups in Africa can be attributed to several factors, including dissatisfaction with previous governments, an urgent desire for change, and hope that coup leaders can address the country’s issues. This civilian backing for coups raises concerns among African leaders and indicates widespread public discontent with the current political situation in many Central and West African countries. For instance, recent pro-coup demonstrations in Niger starkly symbolize this disillusionment.
While there may be a relationship between these civilian grievances and the rise of coups in this region of Africa, they do not represent the primary or sole cause. Other factors also contribute to such political upheavals.
Overall, the influence of successful coups, the presence of regional guarantees—even if limited—the prevalence of social, economic, and political issues, along with geopolitical rivalries, all combine to drive coups in politically fragile states worldwide.
Limited External Pressures
So far, the extent of the role played by geopolitical rivalries—particularly the competition for influence between Moscow and the West—in fueling coups and instability in Central and West Africa remains untested. Although the situations in various countries in the region are complex and multifaceted, geopolitical dynamics such as proxy conflicts, competition for resources, information warfare, and diplomatic maneuvers among global powers have all exacerbated the political fragility of some African nations.
Specifically, the 2021 coup in Mali and, more recently, the coup in Niger have highlighted the deep geopolitical rivalry between Moscow and the West over their strategic interests in Africa. Following the withdrawal of French forces from the country after the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, Niger and Gabon emerged as potential sites where Paris and its allies could confront Russia and other competitors. Shortly after the regime change in Niger, thousands of pro-coup demonstrators marched through the capital Niamey, denouncing France (Niger’s former colonial power), waving Russian flags, and setting fire to the gates of the French embassy.
Some sources suggest a role for Russia in supporting this trend. For instance, Logically, a U.S.-based technology firm focused on exposing misinformation online, reported that Kremlin-affiliated social media channels launched a disinformation campaign, undermining Paris and openly supporting the coup in Niger as a clear attempt to solidify Moscow’s influence in the country.
On the other hand, amid the growing number of coups in Africa, the reactions from regional organizations and states—including the threat of military intervention—have had minimal impact, doing little to end this trend. While the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations, and Western governments have imposed some sanctions on coup leaders, these measures have had limited success in restoring civilian rule in these nations.
Conversely, coup leaders in some African countries have recently united—perhaps bolstered by apparent civilian support—defying regional and international opposition to coups, as well as threats of sanctions or military intervention. Although ECOWAS previously intervened to restore stability in Gambia, Mali, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone, the clear unity among coup leaders in the region, the notable civilian support (or lack of opposition) for them, and concerns regarding the historical legitimacy and credibility of the regional organization have complicated matters in Africa. In most cases, the African Union has taken a firm stance against coups, despite lacking the authority to impose sanctions.
Challenges After Coups
The geopolitical competition between Russia and Western nations is expected to intensify in the near future. While the direct attribution of responsibility for coups in African countries to Moscow is contentious, there is no disagreement over the Kremlin’s efforts to increase its influence and promote anti-Western sentiments in the region. Russia is anticipated to exploit the prevailing instability to position itself as a key player. The anti-Western information campaign, which has notably resonated with populations in West and Central Africa, underscores Moscow’s significant efforts to expand its geostrategic influence.
Conversely, the power grabs by coup leaders raise profound concerns about the region’s regression in its pursuit of democracy. Given the complex array of issues contributing to these coups—issues that remain unaddressed—the risk of regime changes will persist in the medium to long term. The success rate of these coups may tempt other countries in the region to pursue similar changes in their governments, especially in nations grappling with widespread frustration over the efficacy of their entrenched systems.
While some primary justifications for coups include insecurity, poor governance, economic hardships, and electoral fraud, empirical evidence indicates that coup leaders offer very few viable alternatives for civilians after assuming power. Recent trends also suggest that some post-coup governments exhibit limited tolerance for political opposition, restrict civil liberties, and undermine constitutions and independent institutions.
Furthermore, in light of the backdrop of political stagnation, significant security challenges, a wave of sanctions, and a potential decline in foreign direct investment in the African countries that have experienced coups, their economies are likely to continue facing headwinds. This situation ultimately threatens to negate the very purpose for which the coups were initially executed.
Finally, military coups are expected to have dire consequences for the overall security situation in Central and West Africa, particularly concerning the challenges of terrorism and militia violence. For instance, a potential withdrawal of American and French forces from Niger is likely to undermine counter-terrorism efforts in the Lake Chad Basin. This, in turn, exacerbates the existing instability in West and Central Africa, potentially fostering the growth of terrorist and rebel groups in the region.
