Process of Legitimacy in Political System

Legitimation does not increase the material interest of the subordinates or make the order or rule more ‘pleasant’. But it serves a need – to follow norms that conform, and do not conflict with their values.

In the context of organisations, Etzioni writes that they set norms enforce rules and regulations which have to be complied with. For compliance, they rely on power and try to get it through the system of rewards and punish­ments, even manipulation, indoctrination, and training. In such a situation of power, it is not necessary that the recipients of order or subordinates agree to it, or accept it as morally justified. But exercise of power in this manner keeps them alienated.

They will conform only to those actions which are backed by power. The subjects would not volunteer information, show initiative, or cooperate. In case, power weakens or is rendered inadequate, the recipients would start following their own norms or replace the former power-wielders from positions of authority.

When orders arc issued or rules set in conformity with the accepted values, compliance is much deeper and more effective. The subjects ‘internalise’ the rules, and voluntarily act and cooperate in executing the policies. They find order and discipline less alien­ating. Rather, they would continue to follow rules and orders even when an organisation’s power is lessened and weakened.

Legitimation does not increase the material interest of the subordinates or make the order or rule more ‘pleasant’. But it serves a need – to follow norms that conform, and do not conflict with their values. There is distinction between normative satisfaction of the need for justice or legit­imacy and the need to find opportunities to gratify other needs. Some orders are legitimate and gratifying whereas other orders may be legitimate, but not gratifying, still others may be illegitimate but not gratifying. Organisa­tions require legitimacy, that is, conformity with values. It is closer to conformity with a higher sense of morality.

In the context of governments, legitimacy can be classified into two broad groups:

(1) Numinous legitimacy which is based on faith in the divine origin of rule; and

(2) Civil legitimacy which exists when a system of government is based on agreement between equally autonomous constit­uents, who have come together to cooperate toward some common good.

Weber relates his typology of authority to sources and kinds of legitimation as (i) traditional, (ii) rational-legal or bureaucratic, and (iii) charismatic.

In political science, legitimacy is the right and acceptance of an authority, usually a governing law or a regime. Whereas authority denotes a specific position in an established government, the term legitimacy denotes a system of government—wherein government denotes “sphere of influence”. An authority viewed as legitimate often has the right and justification to exercise power. Political legitimacy is considered a basic condition for governing, without which a government will suffer legislative deadlock(s) and collapse. In political systems where this is not the case, unpopular régimes survive because they are considered legitimate by a small, influential élite.[1] In Chinese political philosophy, since the historical period of the Zhou Dynasty (1046–256 BC), the political legitimacy of a ruler and government was derived from the Mandate of Heaven, and unjust rulers who lost said mandate therefore lost the right to rule the people.

In moral philosophy, the term legitimacy is often positively interpreted as the normative status conferred by a governed people upon their governors’ institutions, offices, and actions, based upon the belief that their government’s actions are appropriate uses of power by a legally constituted government.[2]

The Enlightenment-era British social philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) said that political legitimacy derives from popular explicit and implicit consent of the governed: “The argument of the [SecondTreatise is that the government is not legitimate unless it is carried on with the consent of the governed.”[3] The German political philosopher Dolf Sternberger said that “[l]egitimacy is the foundation of such governmental power as is exercised, both with a consciousness on the government’s part that it has a right to govern, and with some recognition by the governed of that right”.[4] The American political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset said that legitimacy also “involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society”.[5] The American political scientist Robert A. Dahl explained legitimacy as a reservoir: so long as the water is at a given level, political stability is maintained, if it falls below the required level, political legitimacy is endangered.[1]


Legitimacy is “a value whereby something or someone is recognized and accepted as right and proper”.[6] In political science, legitimacy usually is understood as the popular acceptance and recognition by the public of the authority of a governing régime, whereby authority has political power through consent and mutual understandings, not coercion. The three types of political legitimacy described by German sociologist Max Weber are traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal:

  • Traditional legitimacy derives from societal custom and habit that emphasize the history of the authority of tradition. Traditionalists understand this form of rule as historically accepted, hence its continuity, because it is the way society has always been. Therefore, the institutions of traditional government usually are historically continuous, as in monarchy and tribalism.
  • Charismatic legitimacy derives from the ideas and personal charisma of the leader, a person whose authoritative persona charms and psychologically dominates the people of the society to agreement with the government’s régime and rule. A charismatic government usually features weak political and administrative institutions, because they derive authority from the persona of the leader, and usually disappear without the leader in power. However, if the charismatic leader has a successor, a government derived from charismatic legitimacy might continue.
  • Rational-legal legitimacy derives from a system of institutional procedure, wherein government institutions establish and enforce law and order in the public interest. Therefore, it is through public trust that the government will abide the law that confers rational-legal legitimacy.[7]


Numinous legitimacy

In a theocracy, government legitimacy derives from the spiritual authority of a god or a goddess.

  • In ancient Egypt (c. 3150 BC), the legitimacy of the dominion of a Pharaoh (god–king) was theologically established by doctrine that posited the pharaoh as the Egyptian patron god Horus, son of Osiris.
The coat of arms of the Holy See, the seat of Papal government
  • In the Roman Catholic Church, the priesthood derives its legitimacy from a divine source; the Roman Magisterium dogmatically teaches that Jesus Christ designated St. Peter the supreme and infallible head of the entire Christian Church, and thus each bishop of Rome is sanctified, legitimate, and possesses these charisms as well.

Civil legitimacy

One measurement of civil legitimacy is who has access to the vote, including women are able to vote

The political legitimacy of a civil government derives from agreement among the autonomous constituent institutions—legislative, judicial, executive—combined for the national common good. One way civil society grants legitimacy to governments is through public elections. There are also those who refute the legitimacy offered by public elections, pointing out that the amount of legitimacy public elections can grant depends significantly on the electoral system conducting the elections. In the United States, this issue has surfaced around how voting is impacted by gerrymandering,[8] the United States Electoral College’s ability to produce winners by minority rule and discouragement of voter turnout outside of Swing states,[9] and the repeal of part of the Voting Rights Act in 2013.[10] Another challenge to the political legitimacy offered by elections is whether or not marginalized groups such as women or those who are incarcerated are allowed to vote.[citation needed]

Civil legitimacy can be granted through different measures for accountability[11] than voting, such as financial transparency[12] and stake-holder accountability. In the international system another method for measuring civil legitimacy is through accountability to international human rights norms.[citation needed]

In an effort to determine what makes a government legitimate, the Center for Public Impact launched a project to hold a global conversation about legitimacy stating, inviting citizens, academics and governments to participate.[13] The organization also publishes case studies that consider the theme of legitimacy as it applies to projects in a number of different countries including Bristol, Lebanon and Canada.[14]

“Good” governance vs “bad” governance

The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commission (OHCHR) established standards of what is considered “good governance” that include the key attributes transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and responsiveness (to the needs of the people).[15]

Input, output and throughput legitimacy

Assessing the political legitimacy of a government can be done by looking at three different aspects of which a government can derive legitimacy. Fritz Scharpf introduced two normative criteria, which are output legitimacy, i.e. the effectiveness of policy outcomes for people and input legitimacy, the responsiveness to citizen concerns as a result of participation by the people. A third normative criterion was added by Vivien Schmidt, who analyzes legitimacy also in terms of what she calls throughput, i.e. the governance processes that happen in between input and output.

Negative and positive legitimacy

Abulof distinguishes between negative political legitimacy (NPL), which is about the object of legitimation (answering what is legitimate), and positive political legitimacy (PPL), which is about the source of legitimation (answering who is the ‘legitimator’).[citation needed] NPL is concerned with establishing where to draw the line between good and bad; PPL with who should be drawing it in the first place. From the NPL perspective, political legitimacy emanates from appropriate actions; from a PPL perspective, it emanates from appropriate actors. In the social contract tradition, Hobbes and Locke focused on NPL (stressing security and liberty, respectively), while Rousseau focused more on PPL (“the people” as the legitimator). Arguably, political stability depends on both forms of legitimacy.[16]

Instrumental and substantive legitimacy

Weber’s understanding of legitimacy rests on shared values, such as tradition and rational-legality. But policies that aim at (re-)constructing legitimacy by improving the service delivery or ‘output’ of a state often only respond to shared needs.[17] Therefore, substantive sources of legitimacy need to be distinguished from more instrumental ones.[17] Instrumental legitimacy rests on “the rational assessment of the usefulness of an authority …, describing to what extent an authority responds to shared needs. Instrumental legitimacy is very much based on the perceived effectiveness of service delivery. Conversely, substantive legitimacy is a more abstract normative judgment, which is underpinned by shared values. If a person believes that an entity has the right to exercise social control, he or she may also accept personal disadvantages.”[17]

Perceived legitimacy

Establishing legitimacy is not simply transactional; service provision, elections and rule of law do not automatically grant legitimacy. State legitimacy rests on citizens’ perceptions and expectations of the state, and these are co-constructed between state actors and citizens.[18] What legitimises a state is also contextually specific. McCullough et al. (2020) show that in different countries, provision of different services build state legitimacy. In Nepal public water provision was most associated with state legitimacy, while in Pakistan it was health services.[18]


Max Weber proposed that societies behave cyclically in governing themselves with different types of governmental legitimacy. That democracy was unnecessary for establishing legitimacy, a condition that can be established with codified laws, customs, and cultural principles, not by means of popular suffrage. That a society might decide to revert from the legitimate government of a rational–legal authority to the charismatic government of a leader; e.g., the Nazi Germany of Adolf Hitler, Fascist Italy under Benito Mussolini, and Francoist Spain under General Francisco Franco.

The French political scientist Mattei Dogan‘s contemporary interpretation of Weber’s types of political legitimacy (traditional, charismatic, legal-rational) proposes that they are conceptually insufficient to comprehend the complex relationships that constitute a legitimate political system in the 21st century.[19] Moreover, Dogan proposed that traditional authority and charismatic authority are obsolete as forms of contemporary government; e.g., the Islamic Republic of Iran (est. 1979) rule by means of the priestly Koranic interpretations by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. That traditional authority has disappeared in the Middle East; that the rule-proving exceptions are Islamic Iran and Saudi Arabia.[clarification needed][citation needed] Furthermore, the third Weber type of political legitimacy, rational-legal authority, exists in so many permutations no longer allow it to be limited as a type of legitimate authority.[clarification needed]

Forms of legitimate government

In determining the political legitimacy of a system of rule and government, the term proper—political legitimacy—is philosophically an essentially contested concept that facilitates understanding the different applications and interpretations of abstract, qualitative, and evaluative concepts such as “art”, “social justice”, et cetera, as applied in aesthetics, political philosophy, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of religion.[20] Therefore, in defining the political legitimacy of a system of government and rule, the term “essentially contested concept” indicates that a key term (communism, democracy, constitutionalism, etc.) has different meanings within a given political argument. Hence, the intellectually restrictive politics of dogmatism (“My answer is right, and all others are wrong”), scepticism (“I don’t know what is true, and I even doubt my own opinion”), and eclecticism (“Each meaning gives a partial view, so the more meanings the better”) are inappropriate philosophic stances for managing a political term that has more than one meaning[21] (see Walter Bryce Gallie).

Establishing what qualifies as a legitimate form of government continues to be a topic of great philosophical controversy. Forms of legitimate government are posited to include:[citation needed]

  • Communism, where the legitimacy of a Communist state derives from having won a civil war, a revolution, or from having won an election such as the Presidency of Salvador Allende (1970–73) in Chile; thus, the actions of the Communist government are legitimate, authorised by the people. In the early 20th century, Communist parties based the arguments supporting the legitimacy of their rule and government upon the scientific nature of Marxism (see dialectical materialism).
  • Constitutionalism. where the modern political concept of constitutionalism establishes the law as supreme over the private will, by integrating nationalism, democracy, and limited government. The political legitimacy of constitutionalism derives from popular belief and acceptance that the actions of the government are legitimate because they abide by the law codified in the political constitution. The political scientist Carl Joachim Friedrich (1901–1984) said that, in dividing political power among the organs of government, constitutional law effectively restrains the actions of the government[22] (see checks and balances).
  • Democracy, where government legitimacy derives from the popular perception that the elected government abides by democratic principles in governing, and thus is legally accountable to its people.[22]
  • Fascism, where in the 1920s and the 1930s it based its political legitimacy upon the arguments of traditional authority; respectively, the German National Socialists and the Italian Fascists claimed that the political legitimacy of their right to rule derived from philosophically denying the (popular) political legitimacy of elected liberal democratic governments. During the Weimar Republic (1918–1933), the political philosopher Carl Schmitt (1888–1985)—whose legal work as the “Crown Jurist of the Third Reich” promoted fascism and deconstructed liberal democracy—addressed the matter in Legalität und Legitimität (Legality and Legitimacy, 1932), an anti-democratic polemic treatise that asked: “How can parliamentary government make for law and legality, when a 49 per cent minority accepts as politically legitimate the political will of a 51 per cent majority?”[23]
  • Monarchy, where the divine right of kings establishes the political legitimacy of the rule of the monarch (king or queen); legitimacy also derives from the popular perception (tradition and custom) and acceptance of the monarch as the rightful ruler of nation and country. Contemporarily, such divine-right legitimacy is manifest in the absolute monarchy of the House of Saud (est. 1744), a royal family who have ruled and governed Saudi Arabia since the 18th century. Moreover, constitutional monarchy is a variant form of monarchic political legitimacy which combines traditional authority and legal–rational authority, by which means the monarch maintains nationalist unity (one people) and democratic administration (a political constitution). [24]
  1.  Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (pp. 124–188). New Haven (Connecticut) and London: Yale University Press, 1971
  2. ^ Phelps, Martha Lizabeth (December 2014). “Doppelgangers of the State: Private Security and Transferable Legitimacy”. Politics & Policy42 (6): 824–849. doi:10.1111/polp.12100.
  3. ^ Ashcraft, Richard (ed.): John Locke: Critical Assessments (p. 524). London: Routledge, 1991
  4. ^ Sternberger, Dolf: “Legitimacy” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (ed. D.L. Sills) Vol. 9 (p. 244). New York: Macmillan, 1968
  5. ^ Lipset, Seymour Martin: Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (2nd ed.) (p. 64). London: Heinemann, 1983
  6. ^ Chen, Jing (2016). Useful Complaints: How Petitions Assist Decentralized Authoritarianism in China. New York: Lexington Books. p. 165. ISBN 9781498534536.
  7. ^ O’Neil, Patrick H. (2010). Essentials of Comparative Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. pp. 35–38. ISBN 978-0-393-93376-5.
  8. ^ Dews, Fred (2017-07-06). “A primer on gerrymandering and political polarization”. Brookings. Retrieved 2018-06-26.
  9. ^ Edwards, George C. (2011). Why the electoral college is bad for America(Second ed.). New Haven. ISBN 978-0-300-18087-9. OCLC 889943106.
  10. ^ Liptak, Adam. “Supreme Court Invalidates Key Part of Voting Rights Act”. Retrieved 2018-06-26.
  11. ^ “Governance & Accountability”. Retrieved 2018-07-10.
  12. ^ “Home – Financial Transparency Coalition”. Financial Transparency Coalition. Retrieved 2018-07-10.
  13. ^ “Finding Legitimacy”. Retrieved 2018-07-10.
  14. ^ “Viewpoints – Centre for Public Impact (CPI)”. Centre for Public Impact (CPI). Retrieved 2018-07-10.
  15. ^ “Good Governance and Human Rights”. OHCHR. Retrieved 2018-07-10.
  16. ^ Abulof, Uriel (2015). “Can’t Buy Me Legitimacy”: The Elusive and Illusive Stability of Mideast Rentier Regimes. Journal of International Relations and Development.
  17. Jump up to:a b c Weigand, Florian (April 2015). “Investigating the Role of Legitimacy in the Political Order of Conflict-torn Spaces” (PDF)SiT/WP. 04/15.
  18. Jump up to:a b McCullough; et al. (2020). Reconstructing our understanding of the link between services and state legitimacy (PDF). ODI.
  19. ^ Dogan, Mattei: Conceptions of Legitimacy, Encyclopedia of Government and Politics 2nd edition, Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan editors, Vol. 2, pp. 116-219. London: Routledge 2003
  20. ^ Initially published as Gallie (1956a), then as Gallie (1964).
  21. ^ Garver (1978), p. 168.
  22. Jump up to:a b Charlton, Roger: Political Realities: Comparative Government (p. 23). London: Longman, 1986
  23. ^ Schmitt, Carl: Legality and Legitimacy (Jeffrey Seitzer translator). Durham (North Carolina): Duke University Press, 2004
  24. ^ Tahmazyan, Daniel. “Is the Empire Eternal?”. Retrieved 2021-06-06.
SAKHRI Mohamed
SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and International Relations in addition to a Master's degree in International Security Studies. Alongside this, I have a passion for web development. During my studies, I acquired a strong understanding of fundamental political concepts and theories in international relations, security studies, and strategic studies.

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