Geopolitics StudiesStrategic studies

Reasons and motives for the Israeli presence in Central Asia

The dissolution of the Soviet Union, in 1991, into sixteen republics, gave many global and regional powers opportunities to establish relationships and build partnerships with these republics to serve their national interests and strategic goals. The global and regional powers have paid special attention to the countries of Central Asia because of their wealth and natural resources, and the geopolitical position they possess of great importance. Israel, despite the great distance that separates it from this region, was among the regional powers that realized the strategic value of the relationship with the countries of Central Asia, and sought, after declaring independence, to establish relations with them.

This paper examines a set of factors that prompted Israel to try to find a foothold in Central Asia, and the reasons that motivated the regimes in the countries of this region to rapprochement with Israel. The paper deals with the strategies adopted by Israel to strengthen its presence in Central Asia and the conditions that helped it achieve this goal. The paper also seeks to highlight the forms of Israeli presence in this region as reflected in the manifestations of cooperation and patterns of partnerships that have been established between the two sides for more than three decades. The paper explores the prospects for this relationship and its future by analyzing intertwined levels of transformations that may result from challenges that curb the momentum that characterized these relationships, or opportunities that can transfer them to a new phase of development and prosperity.

Motivations of the Israeli presence in Central Asia

The importance of the Central Asian region for Israel stems from a number of strategic and economic factors. Israel has subordinated its vision of the relationship with the countries of Central Asia to the “strategy of the parties,” which was formulated by its first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, in the fifties of the last century, which was based on an attempt to reduce the impact of anti-Israel policies by building alliances with non-Arab states and groups located in its periphery. regional. This was the most important reason behind the Israeli keenness to establish special relations in the sixties, seventies and nineties of the last century with the Shah’s Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia, and the Kurds of Iraq (1) . For Israel, building relations with Central Asian countries achieves, at the present time, another aspect of the bets on the strategy of the “alliance of the parties” which is to improve its ability to contain powers that are in a state of hostility or competition with them, such as Iran and Turkey, and to cooperate with them in facing common challenges. Like the “danger” of Islamist groups (2).

By inaugurating the relationship with countries with Central Asia, Israel has also sought to shift the center of gravity of the Islamic world to the north in a way that improves Israel’s position in the regional balance of power by marginalizing and reducing the importance of the Arab region in the Middle East, and this is what the “parties” strategy aims at (3) . Despite the great development that took place in Israel’s relations with many Arab countries after the signing of the normalization agreements, the uncertainty that prevailed in the short experience of the Arab Spring and the temporary rise of political Islam and jihadist movements that threatened Israel’s relations with powerful countries in the Arab world, specifically Egypt. The strategy of the “alliance of the parties” determines Israel’s foreign policies, including through the strengthening of relations with Central Asia.

Israel seems interested in exploiting the position of the Central Asian countries in the Islamic world, specifically its membership in Islamic regional and international forums to preserve its interests and reduce the chances of these forums issuing decisions hostile to it.

Indeed, some of Israel’s bets on Central Asian countries have been realized in this context. Whereas, when Kazakhstan assumed the presidency of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, in 2011, whose summit was held in Astana, it broke the traditions of the organization at that time and invited representatives of Israel to attend a session on the economy that emerged from the conference as an observer (4) . When the summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization was held in Tehran in 1996, Kazakhstan threatened to withdraw from it due to pressure exerted by Iran on the Central Asian countries to sever their relations with Israel (5) . When the “Goldstone” report was issued by the “Human Rights Council” of the United Nations, which accused Israel of committing war crimes against humanity during its war on Gaza in 2008, representatives of the Central Asian countries abstained from voting (6). The Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, took advantage of his relations with the Iranian leadership and tried to mediate between Israel and Iran to release 13 Iranian Jews accused of spying for Israel, and made efforts to try to mediate the return of the Israeli pilot, Ron Arad, who was captured in the First Lebanon War, and the soldier, Gilad Shalit , who was captured by Hamas, in 2006 (7) .

Israel believes that deepening relations with the countries of Central Asia and helping them to confront the Islamic groups that support the regimes there hostility enhances the orientation of these regimes to preserve their secular character; Tel Aviv fears that the fall of these regimes will lead to a rapprochement between these countries and parties in a state of hostility or competition with Israel, especially Iran, and this is what made it strengthen its security cooperation with those countries (8) . 

Israel has seen in the relations with the Central Asian countries a way to neutralize some of the strategic risks that these countries could be the source of. For example, Israel tried to use its relationship with Kazakhstan, the largest Central Asian country, which owns 20% of the world’s reserves of uranium, to persuade it not to supply Iran with this element as one of the main components on which its nuclear program is based. hostile to this element and its use in the production of “dirty” bombs (9) . Besides, Israel gets about a quarter of its oil imports from Kazakhstan (10) . 

Relations with Central Asian countries are of particular importance for Israel because tens of thousands of Jews who immigrated to it on the eve and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union came from this region, especially from Uzbekistan, in addition to the fact that Jewish communities still maintain a presence in this region (11) .

On the other hand, many incentives have prompted the Central Asian countries to respond to Israel’s desire for rapprochement with them. These countries have sought to build relations with the United States, which has become the only pole in the post-Cold War world order in terms of balancing its relations with China and Russia.

Given the special nature of the relationship between the United States and Israel, and the overwhelming influence of the Jewish lobby and organizations on decision-making circles in Washington, the regimes in Central Asia saw building relations with Israel as a requirement to achieve their interests in Washington. Moreover, the need of these countries for foreign investments that would enable them to exploit their resources and improve their economic conditions made them interested in persuading Jewish investors from the United States and Israel to take the initiative to launch projects in them. “Islamic forces” that pose a challenge to their stability; The regimes in these countries feared the infiltration of jihadist forces from neighboring Afghanistan, especially when the Taliban movement took control of Afghanistan for the first time, in 1996.

This trend was expressed by the former Uzbek President, Islam Karimov, during his visit to Israel in September 1998, when he spoke openly about Islamic “fundamentalism” as one of the common challenges for both Israel and his country (12) . In addition, the regimes in Central Asia saw the establishment of relations with Israel and cooperation with it specifically in the field of combating “terrorism” as a means in and of itself to enhance their image in the West as “moderate” regimes (13) .

 In addition, the Central Asian countries wished to benefit from the Israeli expertise in the technical field, especially in the field of agriculture, which constitutes the source of weight for the economies of these countries, particularly in the post-Soviet era, in addition to the areas of public health, transportation and technologies. advanced.

The mechanisms of Israeli infiltration into Central Asia

Although Israel maintains varying levels of relationship with the five Central Asian countries: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, it has paid special attention to strengthening relations with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in particular. This is due to the natural resources that the two countries possess, the fact that they embrace large Jewish communities, especially Uzbekistan, and the geopolitical position they enjoy of great importance that has enhanced their influence in the regional environment (14) . 

Israel has adopted three mechanisms of action in its quest to infiltrate Central Asia and build strong relations with its countries: diplomatic work, implementation of development projects and cultural and social activities within these countries, and the use of the services of Jewish organizations in the region and the West.

In terms of diplomatic work, Israel was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of the Central Asian countries after their separation from the Soviet Union. Israel inaugurated diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan on April 2, 1992, and with Uzbekistan on September 25, 1994, although contacts between the two sides began in February 1992, while Israel opened an embassy in Turkmenistan in June. June 2013, and manages its relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan through its embassies in the Kazakh capital, Nur-Sultan, and the Uzbek capital, Tashkent. The former president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Aliyev, was the first head of a Central Asian country to visit Israel, having visited it in 1993, while the former Uzbek president, Karimov, visited it in 1998; While the former President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, visited her in 1995 and 2000, and visited her for treatment in 2013 (15) .

Former Israeli President Shimon Peres visited Kazakhstan in June 2009; In his reception, President Nazarbayev said: “Kazakhstan sees Israel as an important partner in the Middle East, with which it has multiple manifestations of cooperation” (16) . Former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited Kazakhstan in November 2001, while his successor, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited Uzbekistan in 1998 and Kazakhstan in 2016.

Israel has entrusted the task of implementing economic projects and supervising cultural and social activities aimed at building bridges of communication with local communities in the Central Asian countries, to the International Cooperation Center of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called the Mashav, which was inaugurated in 1958; As this center is responsible for designing and implementing economic cooperation and cultural exchange activities with the countries of the region (17) .

The Jewish businessmen in Central Asia and the West played an important role in strengthening Israel’s relations with the regimes in this region. The Jewish businessman, Alexander Mashkevich, who holds dual Israeli and Kazakh nationalities, and who was very close to President Nazarbayev, contributed to accelerating the pace of rapprochement between Israel and this country (18) . The Uzbek-born Israeli businessman, Lev Levy, who headed the Jewish Congress in Bukhara and was the first president of the Federation of Jewish Communities in the countries that made up the Soviet Union, played an important role in strengthening relations between Israel and the countries of Central Asia; He had close relations with Benzarbayev and the former Uzbek president, Islam Karimov (19). The Central Asian Jewish Congress, which was based in Astana, contributed to a closer relationship with the representatives of the Jews in Central Asia and the systems of government there; It turned into a forum through which dialogues were conducted that aimed, among other things, at strengthening the relationship between the countries of the region and Israel; President Nazarbayev attended some sessions of this dialogue (20) .

President Karimov, who was betting in particular on strengthening his country’s relations with the West, had close relations with the American Jewish leaders, who bet on their role in helping him build bridges with the United States; He declared his country’s desire to cooperate with both the United States and Israel in confronting “extremist Islam” (21) .

The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, Sodik Sobiev, acknowledges the crucial role of the Jewish communities in Central Asia in strengthening the relationship between the countries of this region and Israel (22) .

Forms of the Israeli presence in Central Asia

Israel has endeavored to establish its presence in the Central Asian region through a range of aspects of economic, security and diplomatic cooperation with the regimes in its countries and by building bridges of communication with local communities.

economic cooperation

The Israeli strategy to penetrate the countries of Central Asia relied on focusing in the first stage on economic penetration, through the establishment of mega projects, the provision of aid and the signing of economic agreements, paving the way for Israeli companies affiliated with the public and private sectors, and Israeli businessmen to invest in those republics, and by presenting themselves as an active mediator. To attract Western and American capital to those countries, and open the doors of Washington and other Western capitals to them.

Israel has been keen to keep many aspects of economic cooperation with Kazakhstan, its largest economic partner in the region, secret for strategic and security considerations. It releases limited data about the reality of trade exchange with this country, especially with regard to its imports of energy and its exports of weapons and weapons. This is what prompted the Israeli “Central Bureau of Statistics” not to discuss the data related to Israel’s imports of Kazakh oil (23) . Israel did not reveal the route of the line taken by the ships transporting oil from Kazakhstan to it for security reasons, although economic reports indicated that it is transported from refineries located on the coasts of the sea, Qazvin and Al-Aswad (24) .

It is estimated that Israel imports 25% of its oil needs from Kazakhstan, which is its fifth largest trading partner in Asia, which invested in the 1990s in developing an oil refinery in Haifa port (25) . According to the former Israeli ambassador to Kazakhstan, Ran Ishai, the value of Israel’s exports of Kazakh oil amount to 1.4 billion dollars annually (26) .

Until 2009, 52 Israeli companies operated in Kazakhstan; Where it invested in 105 projects, but there was a decline in the presence of these companies in the Kazakh market due to allegations about widespread corruption and bureaucracy and the lack of development of this market to keep pace with technological developments (27) . Israeli imports from Kazakhstan include: wheat, metals, cotton, and plastics, and their value, in 2020, amounted to about 327 million dollars (28) . While Israeli exports to Kazakhstan, in 2021, amounted to about $32.5 million, but these exports do not include military exports, about which no information is provided (29) .

In the wake of the global food crisis that followed the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Israel turned to Kazakhstan, which pledged to supply 70 goods worth $360 million (30) . Israel has encouraged its private sector companies to invest in Kazakhstan; The Tel Aviv government guaranteed 65% of the loans granted by banks to Israeli companies investing in Kazakhstan, and Israel’s Bank Hapoalim agreed, in 2007, to extend the level of credit to the Kazakh Bank of Turan Alim to help it finance 85% of Israel’s medium and long-term export contracts (31 ) .

Kazakhstan has worked on enlisting the services of pressure groups inside Israel to persuade its government and Israeli businessmen to intensify their investments in it, specifically through an institution led by Nimrod Novik, advisor to former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (32) .

What about Uzbekistan?

Compared to Kazakhstan, trade between Israel and Uzbekistan is modest. In 2020, the value of Uzbek exports to Israel amounted to $2.42 million, while Israeli exports to Uzbekistan, in the same year, amounted to $35.9 million (33) . Israeli economic circles attribute the low level of cooperation and trade exchange with Uzbekistan to the conditions imposed by the Uzbek government on the movement of investment and its adoption of a tight control system over economic activities and the transfer of funds, which affected the investors’ motivation to invest there, including the Israelis (34). But the year 2021 witnessed a remarkable development in the presence of Israeli companies in Uzbekistan due to the shifts in the government’s dealings in Tashkent with foreign investors, which contributed to persuading Israeli investors to increase their presence in the Uzbek market. Since Uzbekistan suffers in particular from a shortage of potable water, it has been concerned with the water technologies that Israel developed to improve its ability to exploit its water resources, which led to the signing of many agreements between Israeli companies and the Uzbek government (35) . It works in the field of water technologies, medical devices, infrastructure, and smart cities. It is active in Uzbekistan (36) .

With regard to trade exchange between Israel and the rest of Central Asia, it is very low. In 2020, the value of Israel’s exports to Turkmenistan amounted to $1.12 million, while Turkmenistan’s exports to Israel amounted to $809,000 (37) .

Military and Security Cooperation

Although Israel maintains official diplomatic relations with Central Asian countries, it manages its relations with these countries, specifically Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in the military and security fields, in secrecy. Israel and Kazakhstan started building their military and security relations after the events of September 11, 2001 (38) . The Central Asian countries were concerned with diversifying their sources of armament and reducing their dependence on military exports from Russia and China, which made them turn to Israel (39) . In January 2014, Israel and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on military cooperation and strengthening cooperation in the field of military technologies, including cooperation in the production of drones, and techniques for securing borders, without revealing the rest of the terms of the agreement (40).. Israeli military industries companies sell weapons to the armed forces and the Kazakh police, including drones, guided missiles, control systems and communication devices (41) .

And last May (2022), a factory belonging to the Kazakh Aerospace Industries obtained a permit to produce drones from the Israeli company Elbit (42) . IMI companies Elbit, Aerospace Industries, IMI and Gilat participated in the Defense Industries Fair in Kazakhstan in 2010 and 2012 (43) .

These companies have cooperated with the Kazakh Military Industries Complex “PZTM” in developing the “MLRS”, “LAR” and “EXTRA” missile systems that rely on Israeli technologies (44) . The Israeli army trained the Kazakh armed forces to use the “Iron Dome” system to intercept missiles; Where he conducted training on the system inside Kazakh military facilities (45). The directors of the most important Israeli arms manufacturers, especially the Military Industries Corporation (IMI), Elbit, and the “Rafael” company for weapons, visited Kazakhstan in order to agree on joint projects, including the modernization and development of army vehicles and cooperation in the field of satellites (46) .

With regard to Uzbekistan, it reached an agreement with Israel, during the visit of its former president, Islam Karimov, to Tel Aviv in September 1998, on cooperation in the field of security and combating terrorism (47) .

The Uzbek Ministry of Defense signed a deal with the Israeli arms company “CAA Industries” according to which it would provide both the army and the police in the country with weapons of war (48) . Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is active in Uzbekistan, accused Israel of helping former President Karimov kill Uzbek opposition elements in the city of Andijan, in 2005 (49) .

The totalitarian nature of the regimes in Central Asia has contributed to an increase in their dependence on software produced by Israeli cyber companies, led by the “NSO” company, which is famous for developing the “Pegasus” program that is used in espionage operations. A report by Amnesty International showed that the smartphones of four opponents of the regime in Kazakhstan had been hacked with this program (50) . The Israeli companies “Verint Systems” and “Nice” have also sold cyber software used to monitor opposition activists to countries in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan (51) . The government of Uzbekistan signed a deal with the Israeli company “Candiru” to provide it with “cyber weapons”, and it was found that the Uzbek government has cooperation relations with the company “NSO” (52) .

Building links with local communities

MASHAV oversees the implementation of projects that improve Israel’s ability to build links and communicate with local communities in Central Asia through “heart-to-heart” diplomacy (53) . The center implements projects to rehabilitate doctors, nurses and medical staff in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (54) . The headquarters of the Jewish Agency in Tashkent plays an important role in inaugurating Hebrew language schools and clubs for Jewish youth and has supervised cultural activities not only in Uzbekistan, but in all Central Asian countries (55).. Many bilateral institutions and bodies aimed at strengthening bilateral relations specifically with Kazakhstan have been formed, including the Kazakh-Israel Parliamentary Friendship Association, the Kazakh-Israel Joint Committee for Trade and Economic Cooperation, the Friends of Kazakhstan Club in Israel, and the Kazakh-Israel Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The MASHAV Center launched a Twitter account entitled “Israel in Uzbekistan”, which deals with manifestations of cooperation and communication with the local community and manifestations of the development of the relationship between Tel Aviv and Tashkent. Jewish religious references in Israel played a role in normalizing relations with Central Asian countries; The Chief Rabbi of Israel, Yona Metzger, had previously visited Kazakhstan, in 2004, and met Nazarbayev and presented him with the “Moshe Ben Maimonides” award on behalf of Jewish organizations for his role in perpetuating “tolerance” (56).. Israel also sought to enhance communication between the political elites on both sides; In mid-February 2021, a video conference was held between the President and members of the Knesset with the President and members of the Uzbek Senate (57) .

The future of the relationship between Israel and Central Asia

The future of the relationship between Israel and the countries of Central Asia depends on three main factors, namely: the assessment of the two sides of the relationship of its importance and the possible transformations that may occur in this assessment, trends in the impact of the presence of regional and global powers in the region, and the future of the balance of power in the global system after the end of the confrontation between Russia and the West following the invasion of Ukraine.

With regard to Israel, all the justifications that prompted it to strengthen the relationship with Central Asia, which were previously mentioned, still exist, including the centrality of the “strategy of alliance of the parties” as a determinant of directing Israeli foreign policy. The frequent assessments issued by the Israeli strategic assessment forums warn that the positive changes that occurred in Israel’s relationship with the Arab world following the signing of the normalization agreements will not guarantee the absence of vibrations in the regional environment, similar to those that occurred in the wake of the Arab Spring revolutions. This calls for continuing to work on building links and partnerships with other powers that can improve the relationship with them and enable Israel to achieve its interests, especially Islamic countries (58). At the same time, the normalization agreements did not diminish the importance of the relationship with Central Asia for Israel. For example, despite the great development that has occurred in the relationship between the Emirates and Israel at all levels, and although part of the Emirati oil is currently exported to Europe through the Israeli “Eilat Ashkelon” pipeline, Israel cannot dispense with its oil supplies from Kazakhstan ( In addition to Azerbaijan and Russia) and dependence on Emirati oil due to fear of shifts in the regional environment.

On the other hand, with regard to the justifications for the Central Asian countries to continue the pace of the relationship with Israel, things seem more complicated. These countries, although they are still interested in benefiting from the Israeli expertise in the technical and military fields, the relationship with Tel Aviv at the same time is no longer a requirement of its involvement in the international community, as it was after its independence. If these countries have responded to the Israeli desire to build bridges with them on the grounds that such a step improves their ability to build relations with the West, specifically the United States, then after more than 30 years of independence and the entrenchment of its international and regional standing, the value of this determinant in directing the relationship has declined. These countries are in Israel. In addition, even in terms of the need for advanced technologies and weapons, Israel is facing strong competition from other regional powers in Central Asia. For example, Kazakhstan has become more dependent on Turkey to secure its requirements for drones, after it was dependent on aircraft produced by the Israeli military industries. Since the middle of this year, the Turkish Aerospace Industries “TUSAŞ” has been producing its Enka attack drones inside Kazakhstan.(59) .

At the same time, geopolitical facts contribute to pushing Central Asian countries to balance the relationship with Israel with its relations with other regional and global powers in a way that reduces the value of these relations for Tel Aviv. Since most of the Central Asian countries are landlocked countries, they are forced to manage their foreign policies by observing complex and sometimes conflicting geopolitical balances, and this forces them to arm themselves with diplomatic capabilities that enable them to build relations with the largest number of countries. In order to build objective expectations about the future of the relationship between Israel and the countries of Central Asia and its strategic value for Tel Aviv, it is necessary to take into account the impact of the complex system of relations that link it with the great powers and regional parties, especially Iran, Russia and the United States. 

If one of the most important goals of Israeli foreign policy at the present time is an attempt to besiege and isolate Iran and reduce its ability to continue its nuclear program, the realities of geography make Central Asian countries unwilling to be a partner to Israel in achieving this goal. Iran, which is a vital sea port for the exports and imports of Central Asian countries, has intensified its economic and diplomatic activities in these countries, and it is Kazakhstan’s second largest trading partner after Turkey (60) .

The public dispute that erupted between Kazakhstan and Israel in 2016, when it became clear that Kazakhstan was going to supply Iran with uranium, indicates the challenges facing the relationship between the two sides due to the Kazakh need to balance the relationship with Tehran. The Israeli Prime Minister at the time, Benjamin Netanyahu, rushed to Astana to meet with President Nazarbayev to urge him not to supply Iran with uranium, or at least to ensure that it is not used in its nuclear program and used in the manufacture of radioactive weapons “dirty bombs” (61) .

The status of the relationship with Iran has increased among the Central Asian countries in the wake of the sanctions imposed on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine. As these countries became interested in alternatives to Russian ports, especially Kazakhstan, which became interested in increasing its oil exports to the world through Iranian ports (62) . The direction of the Central Asian leaders in their foreign visits during 2022 and 2021 indicates the scale of these priorities regarding the status of the relationship with both Iran and Israel. If the last visit to Israel by a head of state in Central Asia was more than a decade ago, this year Tehran received the President of Kazakhstan, Kassem Zumart Tokayev, the President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, and the President of Turkmenistan, Berdimuhamedov, while Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi met with his Uzbek counterpart, Shaukat Mirjavat, in Ashgabat.

Russia’s relationship with Central Asian countries and its role in the region could also have an impact on the future of its relationship with Israel. All Central Asian countries, with the exception of Turkmenistan, are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which gives Russia significant influence in the region. Although Russia’s relationship with these countries has witnessed ups and downs, the turmoil in Kazakhstan at the beginning of this year, and its use of Russian forces to quell the widespread protest movements against the regime in “Nur-Sultan” established Russia’s position and role in this region. In addition to the fact that Russia is usually sensitive to the interference of other powers in areas it considers vital to its national security, the tension that occurred in its relationship with Israel following its invasion of Ukraine and the positions of the Yair Lapid government regarding the invasion, which angered Moscow, may push it to impede Tel Aviv’s relationship with these countries. If it manages to maintain its position and influence in the region after the end of the current confrontation with the West.

Given the limited material and diplomatic resources of Israel and its need to safeguard its interests in many parts of the world, it often needs the American umbrella to help it achieve its foreign policy goals. Hence, the level of the United States’ presence in the Central Asian region is an important factor in determining Israel’s ability to maintain or develop its presence in the region. In April 2021, the United States and the five Central Asian countries launched the “C5+1” group, which represents a platform for strategic dialogue between the two sides, in preparation for the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. The United States organized a huge exercise last August in Tajikistan with the participation of the armies of the five countries within the framework of the membership of the six countries in the “C5+1”. It can be assumed that the more serious the United States is about maintaining a strong presence in Central Asia, the more it contributes to creating an environment that allows Israel to maintain its interests there.

In addition, the level of stability of the current regimes in Central Asia will play a role in determining the direction of the relationship with Israel. Since these regimes, which combine totalitarianism, secular orientation, and corruption, some of them face strong opposition movements, any shifts in the structure of these regimes could lead to a change in the direction of their foreign policies, including the relationship with Israel. Perhaps this is explained by Israel’s position on the confrontations between the regime and the opposition forces in Kazakhstan at the beginning of this year, which was contrary to Western positions on these events. The Israeli Foreign Ministry issued a statement expressing its hope for restoring calm and order and stressing the good and strong relations between Israel and Kazakhstan at the level of the two peoples and cooperation between the two governments, without expressing any criticism of the repressive regime’s behavior (63).. This reflected Israel’s desire that these disturbances not result in the downfall of the regime, which was keen to develop the relationship with Israel.

a summary

Although both Israel and the Central Asian countries continue to have multiple patterns and levels of cooperation between them, the transformations that have occurred in the internal, regional and international environments may reduce the value of the strategic returns that Tel Aviv is betting on achieving through the relationship with the countries of the region. The role of the relationship with Israel has declined as an entry point to improve the ability of Central Asian countries to build deeper relations with the international community; The presence of strong regional and international competitors to Israel in the Central Asian markets reduces the motivation of the countries of the region to develop the relationship with Tel Aviv. At the same time, Iran’s growing geopolitical position in Central Asian countries and its increasing impact on the economic conditions in them, specifically after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, reduces the level of Israel’s bets on using this relationship to besiege Tehran and harm its interests.

Although the Arab-Israeli conflict was not one of the determinants that directed the positions of the Central Asian countries towards Israel, and although the normalization agreements between Israel and the Arab countries encourage these countries to publicize and develop their relations with Israel, the reversal of the nature of the balance of power within the internal Israeli political arena In the future, it may affect the motivation of these countries to develop their relations with Tel Aviv. If the frequent opinion polls indicate that the Kahanite movement led by Itamar Ben Gvir, who vows to enact laws regulating the expulsion of Palestinians and the Judaization of Al-Aqsa Mosque, will represent the telescope in the upcoming Israeli elections, the policies that the Tel Aviv government will adopt in the future may frustrate its attempts to maintain the current relationship pattern by many From the countries of the world, including the countries of Central Asia.

Al-Masdar Al-Jazeera for Studies – the article entitled Israel in Central Asia: Cooperation and Partnerships Consecrated for Decades, published on September 28, 2022.

About the author

449ae5333f744156af843ec8880cddb2_6.PNG

Saleh Al Naami

 Researcher and journalist specializing in Israeli affairs and its Arab, Palestinian and Islamic intersections.

Reference

  1. For an account of the principles of the “Party Alliance” strategy, see: Eyal Zisser,” Israel and the Arab World – Renewal of the Alliance of the Periphery”, Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies, A World Association of Academics and Researchers, GREECE, Volume 5, Issue 4, 2019): Pages 225-240..
  2. ARIEL BEN SOLOMON, ” Israel ties warming with Central Asian countries”, JERUSALEM OST, OCTOBER 15, 2018,( accessed AUGAST 12, 2022): https://bit.ly/3SOn0S3.
  3. This conclusion reached by the two Israeli researchers, Gil Feiler and Kevin Lim, see: Gil Feiler and Kevjn Lim, Israel and Kazakhstan: Assessing the State of Bilateral Relation, (the begin-sadat strategic studies, TEL AVIV, 2014), p 11
  4. MICHAEL BISHKU,”The Relations Of Central Asian Republics

Of Kazakhstan And Ozbekistan With Israel”, Middle Eastern Studies, (vol.48, no.6, November 2012): p 933.

  1. Feiler, Lim, ibid, p 35..
  2. MICHAEL BISHKU,”The Relations Of Central Asian Republics

Of Kazakhstan And Ozbekistan With Israel”, Middle Eastern Studies, (vol.48, no.6, November 2012): p 936.

  1. Ibid, p. 935.
  2. Israel Emerges as a Player in Central Asia”, eurasianet, (accessed august 21, 2022): https://bit.ly/3KrNDsf.
  3. MICHAEL TANCHUM, ” Iran, uranium and Israel’s stakes in Kazakhstan’s leadership transition”, JERUSALEM POST, MARCH 1, 2017, (accessed august 13, 2022): https://bit.ly/3JWMybY.
  4. Samuel Ramani, ” ISrael-Kazakhstan Partnership”, THE DILOMATA, july 19, 2016, (accessed AUGUST 20, 2022): https://bit.ly/3pvG8a7..
  5. Israel Emerges as a Player in Central Asia”, eurasianet, (accessed august 21, 2022): https://bit.ly/3KrNDsf
  6. “Uzbekistan and Israel agree to cooperate in the security field,” KUNA, September 15, 1998, (access date: September 12, 2022):  https://bit.ly/3Ubgl5s
  7. BISHOP, ibid.
  8. This is what Zhfeet bin Lul, Israel’s ambassador to Uzbekistan, says. See: Tuba Sarouf, “If there are opportunities for Jewish-Muslim brotherhood, then Uzbekistan represents this model.” November 2021, (access date: September 4, 2022):  https://bit.ly/3THeLYE
  9. Feiler, Lim, ibid, p 21..
  10. BISHOP, ibid, p 934.
  11. Antoine Blua, “Israel Emerges as a Player in Central Asia”, Eurasianet, Aug 15, 2001, (accessed Sep 1, 2022)  : https://bit.ly/3CN570E
  12. BISHOP, ibid, p 932..
  13. P. Berman and l. Goldman, ” Cracked De Beers”, Forbes, Sept. 15, 2003, (accessed August 11, 2022): https://bit.ly/3AdcpZK..
  14. BISHOP, ibid, p 933..
  15. Ibid, 934.
  16. Lasrov, op. cit.
  17. Feiler, Lim, ibid, p 26.
  18. oil, Cyber and Weapons: Inside Israel’s Relationship With Kazakhstan”, Haaretz, Jan 11, 2022, (accessed August 14): https://bit.ly/3AewhMf.
  19. Samuel Ramani, ” ISrael-Kazakhstan Partnership”, THE DILOMATA, July 19, 2016, (accessed AUGUST 20, 2022): https://bit.ly/3pvG8a7.
  20. Ibid.
  21. BISHOP, ibid, p 929.
  22. https://bit.ly/3K7EUvm .  
  23. “Israel Exports to Kazakhstan”, trade economics, (accessed 21 august, 2022): https://bit.ly/3QGW8lw.
  24. “Kazakhstan Ready to Supply 70 Goods Worth $360 Million to Israel”, THE ASTANA TIMES, JULY 15 2022, (accessed  AUGUST 20, 2022): https://bit.ly/3PD3wNq.
  25. Feiler, Lim, ibid, p 24.
  26. Map, “Israel-Kazakhstan Partnership”, ibid.
  27. https://bit.ly/3QKowmX .
  28. Israel Emerges as a Player in Central Asia”, eurasianet, (accessed  august 21, 2022): https://bit.ly/3KrNDsf..
  29. Maariv, November 12, 2021, (accessed September 4, 2022):  https://bit.ly/3THeLYE .
  30. “After UAE, Uzbekistan opening its doors to Israeli companies”, Israel Hayom, September 20, 2021, ( accessed September 4, 2022): https://bit.ly/3emZRGP.
  31. https://bit.ly/3RjY6sv .
  32. Roger N. McDermott, ‘Kazakhstan-Russia: Enduring Eurasian Defence Partners”, (DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 2012): p. 36.
  33. Map, “Israel-Kazakhstan Partnership”, ibid.
  34. ERIK BLACKWELL, ” Kazakhstan, Israel Strengthen Military Cooperation”, THE ASTANA TIMES, JANUARY 22, 2014, (accessed 20 AUGUST 2022): https://bit.ly/3Cl6lQr.
  35. oil, Cyber and Weapons, ibid.
  36. ibid.
  37. Feiler, Lim, ibid, p. 31
  38. ibid.
  39. Map, “Israel-Kazakhstan Partnership”, ibid.
  40. Feiler, Lim, ibid, p 23.
  41. “Uzbekistan and Israel agree to cooperate in the security field,” KUNA, September 15, 1998, (access date: September 12, 2022):  https://bit.ly/3Ubgl5s
  42. “Israeli Companies Are Already Enjoying the Warming Relations with Uzbekistan”, entrepreneur, November 5, 2020, (accessed September 3, 2022): https://bit.ly/3TElimQ.
  43. BISHOP, ibid, p 932.
  44. oil, Cyber and Weapons, ibid.
  45. Ibid.
  46. “Israeli Companies Are Already Enjoying the Warming Relations with Uzbekistan”, ibid.”
  47. This is the description given by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, Sudik Sobiev, to the activities and projects carried out by this center in the countries of Central Asia. See: Lasrov, op. cit.
  48. BISHOP, ibid, p 935.   
  49. Ibid.
  50. Feiler, Lim, ibid, p 24.
  51. “For the first time ever, Israeli and Uzbek parliament heads meet officially”, Knesset, February 17, 2021, (accessed August 20, 2022): https://bit.ly/3pz3xrc
  52. This is what the Israeli National Security Research Center warned of. See: Authors Group, “The Regional Arena: After a Decade of Vibration, Normalization Expands” (Hazira Hazoret: Asur by Talla Nurmilizatsia Merhifet), Center for National Security Research, January 6, 2021, January 6, 2021:  https:/ /bit.ly/3BcqmaM
  53. “Kazakhstan begins production of Turkish “Anka” aircraft, Sputnik, May 11, 2022, (entry date: September 4, 2022):  https://bit.ly/3KLCUZT .
  54. James M. Dorsey,” Iran Looms Large in Central Asia Despite Sanctions and Saudi Financial Muscle”, the begin-sadat strategic studies, March 24, 2020, (accessed AUGUST 14, 2022): https://bit.ly/3pj1fwl.
  55. MICHAEL TANCHUM, ” Iran, uranium and Israel’s stakes in Kazakhstan’s leadership transition”, JERUSALEM POST, MARCH 1, 2017, (accessed august 13, 2022): https://bit.ly/3JWMybY.
  56. Zaki Shaikh, ” Kazakhstan, Iran focus on trade, transit, and transportation “, Anadolu agency, JUNE 20, 2022, (accessed 20 AUGUST, 2022): https://bit.ly/3QVGD95.
  57. HERB KEINON ,”Israel and Kazakhstan: When bland Foreign Ministry statement says it all”, Jerusalem POST, JANUARY 9, 2022, (accessed August 13, 2022): https://bit.ly/3bQk8Uo

vote/تقييم

SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a bachelor's degree in political science and international relations as well as a Master's degree in international security studies, alongside a passion for web development. During my studies, I gained a strong understanding of key political concepts, theories in international relations, security and strategic studies, as well as the tools and research methods used in these fields.

Related Articles

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Back to top button