The pattern of migration to the European continent has been favored by many neighboring populations, especially during times of war and conflict. In 2015, the world witnessed the beginning of an unprecedented crisis known as the European migrant crisis, when more than a million people (half of them Syrian) fled to European shores, according to estimates from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration. The majority of migrants reached Europe through illegal means, leading to the loss and drowning of many.
Currently, Europe is facing a new surge in illegal migration. In 2022, the number of arrivals in Italy increased more than tenfold compared to 2019, with over 138,000 illegal migrants entering the country by sea. With rising rates of illegal migration, the European Union had to reconsider its approach with non-EU countries and its international cooperation strategies on migration matters to find effective solutions that benefit all parties and control the flow of illegal migration.
Although no formal agreement has been reached, the negotiation stance approved by the 27 interior ministers in the European Council in June 2023 implicitly suggests a more restrictive approach against those entering European territory illegally. This highlights the importance of the research paper from the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), titled “Cracks in the System? Reevaluating External Migration Policies to the European Union.” In this paper, researchers Matteo Villa and Fabio D’Agano provide an overview of the various solutions that have been tried in recent years, highlighting their effects and controversies, and exploring options for the future.
Motivations and Initiatives:
In 2011, several Middle Eastern countries witnessed protests due to poor economic conditions, rising food prices, and other issues. However, these protests led to widespread political unrest and economic instability, driving large numbers of people to flee to Europe in unprecedented numbers. The situation became even more challenging for the EU with the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015.
This sudden large-scale movement placed significant pressure on the European Union in terms of handling migrants and asylum seekers. Furthermore, the migration crisis caused tensions between EU countries themselves, particularly between initial reception countries like Italy, Malta, and Greece, and final destination countries such as Germany and Sweden. These disagreements raised questions about the effectiveness of key EU structures, such as the Schengen Agreement for free movement across European countries, and the Dublin Regulation, which concerns the agreement on receiving and processing asylum applications within Europe.
In this context, the EU’s approach has focused on reducing the number of arrivals through bilateral agreements, such as the EU-Turkey action plan in March 2016, aimed at curbing the number of asylum seekers entering Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean route. This plan included returning illegal migrants attempting to enter Greece back to Turkey. In February 2017, the Italian government signed a memorandum of understanding on migration with the Libyan government under the EU’s guidance. This agreement included providing financial and technical support to the Libyan coastguard to strengthen the EU’s maritime monitoring capabilities and track Libyan militias involved in human trafficking.
In addition to Libya, the EU coordinated with Niger to curb illegal migration along the central Mediterranean route. Niger is a hub for migrants heading north. The adoption of Law 36 of 2015 in Niger marked a turning point in the international cooperation strategy to combat migrant smuggling. Moreover, the creation of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) in 2015 was part of these efforts.
Assessment of the Current Situation:
Based on international efforts, the number of people attempting to leave Africa illegally has decreased, but this decline has been short-lived and has not eradicated the phenomenon. Migration flows through Turkey and Libya continue, and new crossing routes have emerged, most notably through Tunisia.
In the first six months of 2023, 51% of the migrants who arrived in Italy came from Tunisia, compared to only 45% from Libya. Additionally, the percentage of illegal migrants who were intercepted dropped to 23%, less than half the average rate during the period of 2018-2021. The agreement with Libyan militias has not stopped illegal migration or the emergence of a smuggling market in Tunisia.
It is important to note that more than half of the migrants who arrived in Italy through Tunisia were citizens of Ivory Coast (28%), Guinea (23%), or Tunisia (13%)—indicating that the majority of migrants come from countries near departure points in North Africa, such as Tunisia or Egypt.
The researchers believe that the European Union (EU) should adopt comprehensive policies that involve multiple external partners, including countries of origin for both current and potential migrants. This is especially important given the expected increase in migration from sub-Saharan Africa in the coming years due to several factors, including climate-induced migration, or “climate migration.”
The researchers also emphasize that any proposed migrant reception system must include an effective mechanism for returning migrants, especially those who are undocumented, to their home countries—a right that is guaranteed to the receiving state in principle. They argue that Europe’s lack of decisiveness on this issue encourages more illegal arrivals. Between 2015 and 2019, only 19% of non-EU arrivals who were ordered to leave Europe were actually returned.
It is also important to consider the possibility that countries of origin may not wish to cooperate with receiving countries due to cost-benefit calculations. Accepting the return of undocumented migrants from Europe could lead to a decrease in remittances and an increase in security risks. As a result, Balkan and Eastern European countries appear more willing to cooperate with the EU and accept returnees, as they have a clear interest in maintaining good diplomatic relations with Europe for political and economic benefits. Therefore, the EU might adopt a conditionality approach with uncooperative countries of origin, making returns a requirement for receiving various types of support.
Blending Migration and Development:
In this context, the researchers refer to the “European Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI),” which is a blend of providing aid and cooperating on migration. Through this instrument, the EU pledged €79.5 billion to third countries for the period from 2021 to 2027, with 10% of the financial package earmarked to address migration and forced displacement issues.
However, this approach conflicts with the principle of allowing developing countries to allocate the funds they receive as they see fit. Additionally, remittances from migrants may exceed the size of European aid, reducing the willingness of countries of origin to cooperate. For example, in 2018, remittances from France, Germany, and Italy to Morocco amounted to €1.2 billion, while Morocco received €148 million that same year from the EU’s Trust Fund for Africa and €182 million for inclusive development support from the EU.
Proposed Alternatives:
In recent years, the EU has expanded its approach to external partners and explored new options regarding migration. Below are three alternatives that could be included in the European migration strategy:
1) Negative Conditionality: Using sanctions as a means to pressure external partners into compliance. This would involve applying political pressure on non-cooperative third countries through threats or the direct adoption of various measures. Visa policies, both positive and negative, could be used as leverage to increase the likelihood of cooperation in readmitting their citizens.
2) Positive Conditionality: Offering incentives to third countries, such as mechanisms related to development, including NDICI and the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). These policies require a deep examination of the balance between short-term human mobility and long-term development, along with careful consideration of their ethical implications and regulatory mechanisms.
3) Legal Migration Pathways: Legal migration must be the cornerstone of any effective migration system. The EU labor market still suffers from a skills shortage in many sectors, and workers from African countries could help fill this gap. Therefore, the issue is not with migration in general, but with illegal migration.
To address the sudden increases in the number of illegal arrivals and asylum requests, the European Commission has linked its proposals for reforming the migration system to proposals for enhancing legal migration. The latest of these reforms was the major overhaul of the new migration pact in September 2020. In 2022, the Commission proposed a reform of the Single Permit Directive, an instrument dating back to 2011. This proposal is part of the “Skills and Talent” package, which addresses the EU’s deficiencies in legal migration and aims to attract the skills and talents needed from abroad.
Conclusion:
The researchers stress the need for the EU to negotiate on equal footing with countries of origin, while opening more legal pathways for work in EU countries. This would give the EU the right tools to demand that countries of origin fulfill their obligation to take back undocumented migrants residing in Europe. Negotiations in the field of migration offer the best prospects for improving the effectiveness of the EU’s external legal migration policies.
Source: Matteo Villa and Fabio D’Aguanno. Cracking at the Seams? Reassessing the EU’s External Migration Policies, ispi, Policy Paper. 2023.
