Water security issues in the Horn of Africa, particularly concerning the Nile Basin, have garnered significant attention from research institutions and decision-making bodies in both the region and the West over the past decade. New developments—most notably, the signing of the Entebbe Agreement by most Nile upstream countries in 2010 and the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) the following year—have prompted these bodies to assess their impact on the balance of power in the region, as well as regional security and stability. Diplomatic efforts, particularly after the resumption of negotiations following the signing of the Declaration of Principles in March 2015, have intensified. Egypt has made securing a legally binding agreement on the filling and operation of the dam a priority in discussions between its political leadership and foreign officials from both regional and international contexts.
After the failure of U.S.-brokered negotiations, Egypt took the issue to the United Nations Security Council in June 2020, citing it as a threat to regional peace and security. Despite ongoing efforts to reach an agreement through African Union mediation, Egypt raised the issue again after Ethiopia’s second unilateral filling of the dam, prompting the Council to issue a presidential statement in September 2021. This statement called on the three countries—Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan—to engage constructively in negotiations and reach a binding agreement within a reasonable timeframe regarding the dam’s filling and operation.
From the perspective of Western powers, the previous U.S. administration (under President Trump) was keen on resolving the issue. This led to several rounds of negotiations, resulting in a preliminary agreement that Egypt signed in February 2020. However, Ethiopia refused to sign, citing the need for further consultations, while Sudan also refrained from signing. The U.S. administration applied some symbolic pressure by suspending a small portion of aid to Ethiopia due to its rigid stance, which the Ethiopian government used to claim it was under pressure to sign the agreement. Meanwhile, the European Union focused on technical cooperation in water matters, sparking controversy when it decided in 2017 to provide financial and technical support to the Nile Basin Initiative, despite Egypt suspending its membership in protest of the upstream countries signing the Entebbe Agreement. However, the failure of GERD negotiations and Ethiopia’s unilateral filling of the dam prompted the EU to issue a statement in July 2021 expressing regret over Ethiopia’s actions and offering to play a more significant role in negotiations beyond its current observer status. The statement noted that a binding agreement could pave the way for foreign investments to enhance water, food, and energy security in the region. This sentiment was echoed in the joint statement by Egypt’s Foreign Ministry and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs at the conclusion of the ninth Egypt-EU Council meeting in Luxembourg in June 2022.
Despite the failure of the most recent negotiation rounds in late 2023 and Ethiopia’s continued unilateral filling of the dam, the past two years have seen a decline in international attention to the GERD and water issues in the region. The Biden administration has taken a more restrained approach to direct mediation in the GERD negotiations, focusing instead on Ethiopia’s internal conflicts, particularly the civil war in the Tigray region, which began in November 2020. The European Union seems to have adopted a similar stance after Ethiopia repeatedly rejected Sudan’s proposal—supported by Egypt and welcomed by the EU—to expand the mediation team to include the United States, the EU, and the United Nations alongside the African Union. Additionally, developments in Sudan, such as the ousting of the transitional government in October 2021 and the ongoing civil war since April 2023, have impacted Sudan’s position in the GERD issue and the overall negotiations.
Despite these complexities, several reasons warrant renewed international attention to water issues in the Horn of Africa, particularly regarding Ethiopia’s policies as an upstream country on several international rivers. These reasons can be summarized as follows:
First, Ethiopia’s policy of initiating projects on international river basins that originate from its territory without consulting other countries or conducting environmental and social impact studies has become a recurring trend, extending beyond the Nile Basin to other rivers. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a renowned security think tank, released a significant policy paper in 2020 titled “Water Security and Water Management in the Horn of Africa.” This paper examined Ethiopia’s policies regarding the Juba and Shabelle River Basins and their impact on water and food security in Somalia. The paper highlighted that Ethiopia’s plans, developed in 2005 and 2007, to implement irrigation and hydropower projects in the Juba-Shabelle Basin could potentially use “almost all available water in the basin” and have “severe negative impacts” on Somalia, where the portion of the basin within its territory serves as its agricultural heartland. Ethiopia has already begun constructing the “Genale Dawa” dams in the early 2010s. The paper cites a 2018 World Bank estimate that Ethiopian dams could reduce water flow to Somalia’s Shabelle Basin by 80%. As a result, according to the paper, Ethiopia’s projects could “force Somalia to rely entirely on rain-fed agriculture rather than irrigated farming.”
The report notes that Ethiopia did not notify Somalia about the construction of these dams, citing the lack of a stable government in Somalia at the time. Although Ethiopia objected to Somali projects presented to the World Bank in the 1980s on the grounds that they could establish vested rights for Somalia over the river’s waters in the absence of any agreement regulating its use, Ethiopia has refused to adhere to any rules in exploiting the river over the past two decades.
This Ethiopian pattern is repeated in the Omo-Turkana river basin. Despite Ethiopia providing incentives to the Kenyan government by exporting energy generated from the “Gibe” dam series, it did not inform Kenya, nor did it conduct environmental and social impact studies. This led to the World Bank’s refusal to fund these projects, which resulted in a decline in Lake Turkana’s water levels and impacted the activities of local communities, as noted by international civil society networks concerned with rivers, such as International Rivers.
Secondly, the threats to water security due to Ethiopian projects have direct implications for human security in the region. Some investigative reports have begun documenting the impacts of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in Sudan, and similar reports and studies are needed on the impact of Ethiopian dams on the Juba and Shabelle rivers on food and human security in Somalia. In an article for the Alternative Policy Solutions program, I pointed out the need for studies on the social and humanitarian consequences of water policies that the Egyptian government has been forced to adopt to confront the current water scarcity and the potential repercussions of the GERD.
Thirdly, water security issues intersect with many regional conflicts in the area and are often politicized. These issues can sometimes act as an additional factor in already strained relations or trigger specific policies for certain powers. A paper from the Stockholm Institute, previously referenced, explains that Ethiopia’s policy towards Somalia has been based on a divide-and-conquer approach to weaken the Somali state and maintain control over shared water resources originating from Ethiopian lands. It is clear that this principle, which relies on strengthening regional governments at the expense of the federal government, continues to guide Ethiopia’s policy towards Somalia. This is evident in Ethiopia’s recent agreements to establish a military base in Somaliland. Another aspect of politicizing water is the use or threat of using water as a bargaining chip in negotiations. A 2021 report by the International Crisis Group on the border conflict around Al-Fashaga between Ethiopia and Sudan noted how this issue intersects with the GERD negotiations.
Fourthly, the number of stakeholders with interests and influence in the region is increasing, which often complicates these conflicts. This includes the role of some Gulf states in supporting Abiy Ahmed’s regime in his war in Tigray and China’s backing of Ethiopia’s dam projects on international rivers.
Fifthly, climate change will intensify water security issues, thereby increasing the likelihood of conflicts over it in the future. While researchers disagree on the rainfall rates in the Horn of Africa and the Nile Basin, they agree on the rise of extreme climatic events, such as severe droughts and floods. This explains the Egyptian negotiator’s insistence on reaching an agreement on the filling and operation of the GERD during these critical periods.
