With the changing nuclear eras, the standards and mechanisms for arms control have varied. The succession of these eras has been linked to two main factors: technological breakthroughs that have changed the shape, capabilities and size of nuclear arsenals, and structural shifts in the international system. The excess influence between these two factors was reflected in developments in nuclear policies and doctrines, and the core concepts they entail, foremost among them “deterrence”, which is also a concept that changes over time. Keith B. Payne was the first to highlight this connection in his rooting of the Second Nuclear Age (1996), as previously during the First Nuclear Age, the connection was only to the idea of the international system.
During what is now known as the “Third Nuclear Age”, which Patrick J. Garrity dates back to about a decade ago, it can be said that the traditional rules of nuclear arms control or those associated with the Cold War era have ended. The effectiveness of all nuclear treaties and agreements of the bipolar world order era has ended, the last of which is the New START treaty, which is theoretically still in effect until 2026, but has ended procedurally after its suspension. Thus, it can be said that the control mechanisms that remained in place over two nuclear ages are no longer valid for the third age.
Two Paradoxes:
It is noted that there are two paradoxes that should be addressed, which may constitute two fundamental features of the current nuclear age:
- The first paradox relates to the synchronization between all variables and sequential succession. The technological leap leads to a change in the nuclear structure, which casts its shadow on possession rules, the nature of proliferation, deterrence laws, and arms races, while at the same time there are signs of structural change in the shape of the international system. The outcome of this equation is reflected overall in the law of control, as reaching a point of understanding in light of current nuclear and political manifestations is both difficult and dangerous.
There are many scenarios in this context, but the common denominator between them is that the process of reaching the point of balance will depend on all factors. In other words, what is the final outcome after modernization, and what will the shape of the international system lead to, especially since the process of peaceful transition in the international system is doubtful amid everything that is happening.
- The second paradox relates to the idea of inevitability. Can the current state of “nuclear uncontrolled escalation” be considered inevitable? The scene cannot be reduced to developments in the Russian-Ukrainian war, while nuclear armament reports, specifically over the course of NATO conferences from Wales 2014 to the alliance’s diamond jubilee in 2024 currently being prepared in Washington, all contain indicators pointing to the inevitable end of nuclear arms control activities.
The necessities of modernization (almost mandatory) can be considered in light of the obsolescence of nuclear arsenals (the US nuclear triad, for example, is undergoing comprehensive modernization), the non-inclusion of emerging nuclear powers such as China in previous treaties and agreements while it is the fastest growing and developing according to most estimates, the failure of conventional deterrence to prevent the outbreak of major conflicts around the world in which nuclear powers have become a party, in addition to the non-inclusion of non-strategic weapons (tactical nuclear) as well.
Transitional Issues:
In light of the current fluidity in the nuclear landscape and international system, there are several issues that can be addressed in light of trying to explain the reality and future of nuclear arms control:
- Advanced technological leap: The technological leap was a feature of the previous nuclear age, but the current nuclear age was primarily associated with a compound and accelerated leap, in terms of the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in the modernization process, the huge leap in carriers and launch platforms, in addition to the tremendous progress in the fields of space communications and satellites. Along with these manifestations, perhaps this leap has implications and repercussions that go beyond the traditional technical dimension, which can be seen in the context of the following indicators:
a. Leap jump: The leap does not only include the dimension of artificial intelligence, but it includes countless other factors, some of which are known and declared, and others enter the realm of ambiguity and non-disclosure but there are indications of it. Artificial intelligence is also a more advanced process than technological automation.
b. Capabilities standard: By reviewing the SALT, START and New START treaties, it appears that the quantitative factor and range governed the process of arms reduction and proliferation mechanisms, but in the current period there is a standard problem in capability. In this context, it should be noted that in the Second Nuclear Age, for example, Paul Bracken raised the issue of the ambition of sub-great or regional powers, specifically in the Middle East, to possess the nuclear bomb, and replace “ideology” with “nationalism”, which may apply to the Iranian case.
c. Race levels: This is another danger point, as non-strategic weapons were not included on the list of control mechanisms, while they have become a central issue in light of the current state of uncontrolled escalation and escalating conflicts, and manifestations of proliferation and weapons transfer in the case of Russia and NATO in light of the Ukrainian war, for example. But most importantly, the modernization that the arsenal of non-strategic weapons involves in the era of unmanned vehicles, and the nature of converging conflict arenas. Nevertheless, it is necessary not to necessarily link the paths of modernization and nuclear escalation, and it is not necessarily assumed that an arms race will lead to a nuclear confrontation, but the danger of confrontation cannot be ruled out from calculations at the same time.
- The new nuclear Cold War: Despite the prevalence of the term “new nuclear Cold War”, it does not appeal to the great nuclear powers, especially Russia, whose Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov rejected this formula in statements last June, while China maintains silence as part of its policy of “nuclear ambiguity”, while the United States adopts in its 2024 strategy a policy of “competitiveness”, and NATO adopts what is called “nuclear rivalry” with both China and Russia.
The term “New Cold War” may be problematic from the angle of comparison with the previous Cold War, as that era was preceded by the American nuclear attack on Japan, and finally brought down the curtain on World War II. Nevertheless, the formation of the bipolar international system led to the nuclear arms race between the two great powers at the time; the United States and the former Soviet Union.
The first steps to limit nuclear armaments began with a global initiative after about two decades of the arms race, when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force in 1970, although nuclear states have not signed it to this day. But in subsequent stages, treaties to reduce the global nuclear arsenal between the two poles began, and the SALT, START and New START treaties were signed.
The current global nuclear landscape appears different, as the effectiveness of nuclear treaties has ended, even if procedurally the New START treaty is supposed to be in effect until 2026, but it was frozen in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which is another indicator in Cold War comparisons.
- Nuclear doctrine and policies:
a. Emergency and response: The process of changing doctrine is also a common feature among members of the nuclear club, and it is naturally possible for these doctrines to change, but can it be imagined that the rates of change in nuclear doctrine reflect its strategic perspective? In another formulation of the question, are we facing a real doctrine variable or a variable in nuclear policies that are more amenable to change and modification according to developments and nuclear planning to respond to the state of emergency? For example, will Russia change its military doctrine according to President Putin’s announcement last June based on the field situation in Ukraine and new attack, defense and armament policies? Or will it await NATO’s announcement? Or both together?
b. Deterrence reviews: When addressing the issue of deterrence, which is an ongoing topic of discussion, it can be said in general that reality is more complex than theory. For example, the “nuclear strike” is one of the most dangerous current issues, as in light of the tremendous destructive power of modern nuclear weapons, and the speed and payload of launch platforms, the fraction of a nuclear second has become a significant difference. In this context, the annual report issued by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), last June, drew attention to an important dimension in the issue of determinants and motives, by referring to the geopolitical dimension in current global conflicts, whether in the prolonged Russian-Ukrainian war while it is increasing in ferocity, or in the case of Taiwan between Washington and Beijing.
This view is reinforced by what international reports have revealed that the resumption of dialogue between China and the United States may not have led to the required guarantees in curbing escalation and not resorting to nuclear force, and that despite the importance of dialogue in itself, it left room for maneuver in this space, and the significance of that is NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s statements about deterring the two nuclear adversaries; China and Russia.
- Russia or China? This issue (Russia or China?) is related to the American perspective and by extension NATO and the approach to arms races. The American perspective points to “competitiveness” in the case of Beijing; due to the accelerating growth of Chinese nuclear armaments, which estimates indicate are superior in rates of arsenal growth and modernization together. Perhaps it can be said that despite the escalation in Russian nuclear discourse, it is still disciplined, and Moscow has experience in the matter of control, and precedents for curbing uncontrolled escalation even in the last meters such as the Cuban crisis in 1962.
But the Chinese case seems different and without precedents or experiences that can be relied upon, and the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue for Washington and Beijing may seem deeper than the Ukrainian case, taking into account the presence of two nuclear powers in Europe in addition to the American nuclear umbrella in non-possessing countries (Italy, Turkey, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands). In addition to Taiwan, there are also fears in Japan, as well as tension between the two Koreas, which is a more complex issue.
In this regard, American estimates point to a successive annual increase in nuclear warheads in China; as the possession rate reached about 500 nuclear warheads, and although the succession formula is an estimated matter, it may be taken as a pretext in arms races, according to most Chinese trends. Although China practices a policy of “ambiguity”, it is conceivable that it is not primarily concerned with the quantitative issue, as much as interest in the growth of the nuclear triad, especially maritime; because it sees, for example, that the backbone of the American arsenal is the navy, and this conviction was increased by the establishment of the AUKUS alliance in 2021, which includes the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.
Escalating Uncontrolled Escalation:
As mentioned earlier, Russia and the United States froze the last nuclear arms control agreement “New START”, and Moscow withdrew ratification of the Comprehensive Ban Treaty in November 2023, and in the same month Russia announced the termination of the 1993 agreement on cooperation in the field of nuclear arms reduction with Japan. All these developments reflect symptoms of the phenomenon of uncontrolled escalation, but the phenomenon should be diagnosed in general, which can be addressed in the following points:
- State of proliferation: Within one year from 2023 to 2024, the number of nuclear warheads scheduled to be deployed according to the New START treaty (1,550 strategic nuclear warheads, and 700 long-range missiles and bomb launchers with a maximum) exceeded almost double; as there are approximately 3,904 nuclear warheads in a state of alert.
- Growing demand: There is also additional demand for proliferation; as Poland expressed its willingness to host nuclear weapons from NATO in response to Russia’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.
- Autonomy calculations: Current interactions raise the issue of nuclear autonomy regarding decision-making, not possession, which is a debate related to the American umbrella, and there is a European debate, and another in South Korea in this regard.
- Increasing spending: According to indicators from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute last June, the United States leads spending rates to keep pace with a modernization plan over the next decade, estimated at about $1.5 to $2 trillion, while Washington spent about $51.5 billion with an annual increase of 18% in 2023. It is followed by China, which spent $11.9 billion last year, then Russia with a spending rate of $8.3 billion. Outside the main nuclear club of great powers, other nuclear states (India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel) are carrying out simultaneous modernization processes of the nuclear arsenal.
- Nuclear alliances: It seems there is a process of reshaping, in addition to structuring the structure of global nuclear alliances. In 2021, the AUKUS alliance was announced, whose structure focuses on underwater nuclear platforms (submarines), in addition to the nuclear structuring process within NATO. On the other hand, President Putin’s Asian tour last June, specifically to North Korea, highlighted the issue of nuclear alliances, and the role that Moscow could play in modernizing nuclear platforms in Pyongyang.
Alternative Tactics:
It is difficult to limit the manifestations of arms races; due to the different nature of existing compound and multi-faceted races; rather, the traditional enumeration process that was previously followed is an estimated matter. For example, warheads in operational status cannot be counted, in light of the hypersonic missile boom, which can carry a number of warheads.
On the other hand, it is difficult to limit non-strategic capabilities at the same time. For example, since the end of World War II, it is unknown what is the true size of American tactical nuclear weapons in the status of European bases although there are actual numbers. The same is true for the warheads that Russia deployed in Belarus and Kaliningrad, in addition to other platforms in the triad, especially stealth and those operating underwater.
It is not believed that the idea of returning to arms control is possible before reaching a full cycle of the nuclear race, or the outbreak of a nuclear war either by way of escalation or loss of control, and misjudgment and miscalculation. On the other hand, there is an optimistic current that bets on restoring international balance smoothly and peacefully, or that nuclear innovations themselves may address fears, through the following:
- Defensive innovations: Artificial intelligence can play a vital role in the process of control and defense, and this is an extremely important issue, especially with the transition to levels of non-strategic or unmanned weapons, which is a point raised by the case of North Korea regarding modernizing its arsenals and platforms, which may include unmanned vehicles (drones).
- Nuclear crisis management: As a tactical alternative, there are technical experiences in managing nuclear crises, but they were not of the magnitude of the ability to address current imbalances, and the widening level of nuclear threat. In this regard, Professor Andrew Futter, an expert in contemporary global nuclear policy, points to the responsibility of the United States as a superpower concerned with controlling the rules of the nuclear game; which holds it responsible for preparing for the coming danger curve at the turning point that is no longer hypothetical as much as it has become probable.
In the end, it can be said that the era of traditional nuclear arms control has ended according to the manifestations of the previous nuclear age, but the manifestations of new nuclear arms control have not yet begun. Just as it is not necessary to measure against previous patterns of racing and capabilities, it is also not necessary to measure against experiences and precedents of arms control. As a result, it can be imagined that we are facing a stage of nuclear transition between two different eras.
