Nigeria and its neighbor, Cameroon, share many similarities, including a 1,975-kilometer border stretching from the tri-border area at Lake Chad in the north to the Atlantic Ocean in the south. Both nations also share historical issues and a variety of ethnic groups living along the Nigeria-Cameroon border, particularly in northwest and southwest Cameroon, known as “Southern Cameroon” or the “Anglophone regions.” A significant portion of the population in these areas speaks English, which further complicates the separatist crises that have intensified in recent years in both Nigeria and Cameroon.
This paper examines the separatist crises in Nigeria and Cameroon, exploring their causes, the cooperation between their movements, and the local, bilateral (Nigerian-Cameroonian), and regional implications.
1. The Separatist Crisis in Nigeria
Nigeria’s separatist tendencies date back to the colonial era, stemming from the disparate nature of pre-colonial states, empires, and kingdoms that the British colonial administration merged into one entity under the name “Nigeria.” Separatist agitations persisted after Nigeria’s independence and became pronounced among the country’s more than 250 minority ethnic groups. However, today, the calls for separation are now prevalent among Nigeria’s three major ethnic groups, which make up more than half of the population and dominate key areas of power: the Hausa and Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the southwest, and the Igbo in the southeast.
Active separatist movements in Nigeria include the “Oduduwa Republic,” advocating for Yoruba independence, the “Arewa Republic,” calling for northern independence (some view the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency as a separatist agenda in the north), the Niger Delta Liberation Front, and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), both of which demand the independence of the Niger Delta Republic in the far south. However, the “Indigenous People of Biafra” (IPOB) and its armed wing, the “Eastern Security Network,” stand out as the most significant movements currently involved in the Nigerian separatist crisis.
IPOB’s strength lies in its roots in the “Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra” (MASSOB), which advocated non-violence in pursuing its separatist goals. IPOB operates primarily in the southeastern region, where the Igbo ethnic group dominates, and has forged alliances with other separatist groups, including the armed “Niger Delta Avengers” active in the far south. The Niger Delta region is home to over 40 ethnic groups, including the Ijaw, Edo, and Urhobo.
A. The Current Crisis and Its Origins
The current separatist crisis can be traced back to the tenure of former Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, a Fulani from the north. Under his administration, separatist agitations in southern Nigeria and the north-central region reached unprecedented levels due to escalating violent clashes between herders and farmers, as well as deadly attacks by armed bandits, often attributed to Fulani groups. There was a widespread belief in these areas that Buhari’s government was lenient with the perpetrators, leading Yoruba activist Sunday Adeyemo Igboho to launch a campaign in 2021 to expel Fulani herders from Yoruba lands.
Sunday Adeyemo Igboho was arrested in neighboring Benin in July 2021 and released in October 2023, after the inauguration of Nigeria’s current President Bola Tinubu, a Yoruba. Following Tinubu’s rise to power, separatist calls in southwestern Nigeria somewhat subsided. Yoruba separatist movements tend to focus less on historical grievances, unlike the Igbo, who frequently reference the Nigerian Civil War (also known as the Biafran War), which took place from July 6, 1967, to January 15, 1970.
In southeastern Nigeria, separatist agitations have taken on a new dimension, with accusations that the north is attempting to Islamize the entire country, including the non-Muslim southern regions. The Igbo, in particular, feel marginalized by the Nigerian federation, echoing the grievances that sparked the civil war. These sentiments have fueled IPOB’s rise since its founding in 2012 by Nnamdi Kanu, with the aim of reviving the Biafran Republic. IPOB’s activities intensified after Buhari’s electoral victory in March 2015, with “Radio Biafra,” a key media arm, spreading hate speech and inciting violence against the new government. Kanu openly called for armed support from the Igbo diaspora to further the movement’s goals.
The armed “Niger Delta Avengers,” which emerged publicly in March 2016, represent the grievances of ethnic groups in the oil-rich Niger Delta, such as the Ijaw, the fourth-largest ethnic group in Nigeria. These groups claim that the majority of oil wealth benefits other parts of the country, while the Niger Delta suffers from environmental degradation caused by oil extraction, destroying traditional livelihoods based on fishing and agriculture.
It’s worth noting that the Igbo also reside in parts of the far south, particularly in Port Harcourt, one of the region’s major cities. Ethnic groups in the Niger Delta share feelings of marginalization with the Igbo, contributing to IPOB’s significant presence in the far south. However, recent events suggest that armed separatist groups in the Niger Delta oppose being part of a “Biafra” (an independent Igbo state), despite their cooperation with Biafran movements.
B. The Turn to Violence
IPOB saw a major shift in 2015 when security forces opened fire on peaceful IPOB protesters demanding an independent Biafran state. The killings and mass arrests of IPOB members and supporters continued throughout October, November, and December of that year. In 2017, the Nigerian government banned IPOB, and in late 2020, the group formed an armed wing called the “Eastern Security Network.” Since January 2021, IPOB and other separatist groups have engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Nigerian government in southeastern Nigeria, targeting government infrastructure, including prisons and public buildings, resulting in the deaths of numerous police officers. The latest attack occurred in May 2024, when the Nigerian army attributed the killing of 11 people (six civilians and five soldiers) at a checkpoint in Abia State to IPOB.
The Eastern Security Network, IPOB’s armed wing, has enforced widespread lockdowns in southeastern states, especially since Kanu’s arrest in Kenya and extradition to Nigeria in June 2021. The group also called on local residents to observe a stay-at-home order every Monday and on any day Kanu appeared in court. Although Kanu, through his lawyer, announced the cancellation of the lockdown in July 2023, the armed wing continues to enforce it in many communities and cities across the region.
The Crisis in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon
The current separatist crisis in Cameroon is referred to as the “Ambazonia War,” the “Anglophone Crisis,” and the “Cameroonian Civil War.” Its roots can be traced back to the colonial era when Germany colonized Cameroon from 1884 to 1920. Following Germany’s defeat in World War I, French and British forces occupied Cameroon, dividing it into two regions: French Cameroon (which today forms the largest part of Cameroon) and British Cameroon (comprising Northern and Southern Cameroon). While French Cameroon gained independence on January 1, 1960, as the Republic of Cameroon, British Cameroon came under the control of Nigeria, which would only gain independence from Britain on October 1 of the same year.
A significant portion of British Cameroon’s population favored independence and the formation of their own state, but this option was denied by a United Nations-sponsored referendum. The region was divided on its future within the context of independent Nigeria. After several interventions from the UN and political elites from both Nigeria and Cameroon, Northern British Cameroon, predominantly Muslim, opted to join Nigeria (today forming part of Nigeria’s Sarduana Local Government Area), while Southern British Cameroon, with a Christian majority, chose to join Cameroon. Today, Southern British Cameroon is known as the North-West and South-West regions, or the Anglophone regions of Cameroon.
Subsequent events led to legal disputes and violent confrontations. In 1961, Cameroon brought a case to the International Court of Justice, challenging the union of Northern British Cameroon with Nigeria. Meanwhile, some Southern British Cameroonians were disillusioned with their union with Cameroon due to the dominance of Francophone regions and systems. Additionally, Cameroon filed a lawsuit against Nigeria in 1994 over the Bakassi Peninsula, which Nigeria officially ceded in 2006. Tensions escalated in 1972 when Cameroon’s President Ahmadou Ahidjo, from the northern and Francophone region, ended the federal system in Cameroon, erasing regional autonomy that had previously recognized the specificities of each region. Tensions increased further after President Paul Biya took office in 1982 and centralized power even more.
A. The Current Crisis: Movements and Objectives
Before 2016, most of the demands from residents of the Anglophone regions in Cameroon revolved around the restoration of regional autonomy within a federal Cameroon to address grievances linked to their distinct identity from the Francophone population. Anglophones also accused the Francophone regions of dominating the central government, despite the Anglophone regions being resource-rich. Anglophones make up only about 20 percent of Cameroon’s population.
In late 2016, Anglophone lawyers and teachers organized peaceful protests against the government’s imposition of French as the working language. The Cameroonian government responded with a harsh crackdown, leading to clashes with police and civilian deaths, which further fueled discontent in the Anglophone regions. By mid-2017, many Anglophones shifted their demands from regional autonomy to full secession from Cameroon. The situation turned violent as clashes between Cameroonian security forces and Anglophone armed groups escalated.
On October 1, 2017, Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe, leader of the Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front, declared the independence of the Anglophone regions from Cameroon. On October 31, 2017, the Interim Government of the Republic of Ambazonia was formed, with Sisiku becoming the president of “Ambazonia.” By 2019, it was estimated that over 20 separatist militias were active in the Anglophone regions, some of which were unidentified. Among these groups, the Ambazonia Defence Forces, officially established on September 9, 2017, by the Ambazonia Governing Council, became prominent, launching what they called a “War of Independence” through guerrilla warfare against the Cameroonian government forces.
B. Recent Developments
In January 2018, Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe, the self-declared president of “Ambazonia” who supported dialogue with Cameroonian President Paul Biya, was arrested along with 46 other separatists in Abuja, Nigeria. A military court in Cameroon sentenced him and nine of his followers to life imprisonment, convicting them of terrorism, secession, and other charges.
In late 2019, amid the ongoing crisis, the Cameroonian Parliament passed a bill granting “special status” to the Anglophone regions (North-West and South-West), which offered greater autonomy to the Anglophones in managing their local affairs. However, this measure failed to calm the conflict or halt the fighting between separatist forces and the government. Anglophone leaders argued that the Cameroonian government did not adequately consult them before drafting the law and that the special status would not lead to any real change. Despite creating regional assemblies with more powers for Anglophones compared to those of Francophone regions, these assemblies were perceived as weak and controlled by governors appointed by the Cameroonian capital, Yaoundé. Furthermore, the government showed little interest in using these assemblies to address issues of identity, education, justice, and language raised by the Anglophone population.
On the international front, efforts to mediate the conflict included Canadian-led mediation attempts. In January 2023, Canada’s foreign ministry announced its readiness to mediate, but this initiative stalled after the Cameroonian government issued a statement denying that it had requested any external mediation in negotiations with separatists. Since then, the fighting has continued, with reports of deadly attacks and a death toll reaching 6,000 people. More than 900,000 people have been internally displaced, and 60,000 have fled the country. One of the most recent attacks occurred in May 2024, when at least five Cameroonian security personnel were killed by armed separatists.
Cooperation between Nigerian and Cameroonian Separatist Movements
There is consensus on the existence of actual alliances between separatist movements in southern Nigeria and Cameroon, dating back to before 2010. Media reports indicate that armed groups active in the Niger Delta, which finance themselves through revenues from stolen Nigerian oil—particularly the separatist “Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta”—were assisting the “Bakassi Self-Determination Movement,” active on the Nigerian-Cameroonian border, and the “Southern Cameroons National Council,” one of the older separatist movements in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon.
This cooperation has evolved in recent years. In April 2021, a virtual meeting took place on Facebook between Nnamdi Kanu, leader of the separatist “Indigenous People of Biafra” (IPOB) in southeastern Nigeria (part of which is just 150 kilometers from the Anglophone regions of Cameroon), and Cho Ayaba, leader of the “Ambazonian Defense Forces,” the armed wing of the “Ambazonia Governing Council,” one of the major separatist organizations in the Anglophone regions. During this meeting, the leaders announced a military and strategic partnership aimed at “securing their shared border and ensuring the open exchange of weapons, intelligence, and personnel.”
In September 2021, Cameroonian security officials confirmed a shift in the attacks carried out by separatist movements in the Anglophone regions since the crisis turned violent in 2017. This statement followed two attacks by Anglophone militants that resulted in the deaths of 15 Cameroonian soldiers, where the militants used advanced heavy weapons for the first time, including anti-tank missiles and rocket launchers. This development enhanced the power of these movements and sustained their attacks on Cameroonian security forces.
Implications
The separatist crises in the neighboring countries of Nigeria and Cameroon have political, economic, security, and regional implications, which can be summarized as follows:
A- In the case of Nigeria:
The proliferation of separatist crises threatens the unity and political stability of Nigeria. The spread of “terrorists” and bandits from the north to the south, combined with repeated armed confrontations between Fulani herdsmen and local farmers without substantial government intervention, has reinforced the sense of injustice among some ethnic groups. This has led to increased separatist agitation in some states and regions, as well as actions that could further destabilize security, such as the decision by governors in central northern Nigeria in 2022 to allow residents to carry arms to defend themselves against attacks by “terrorists” and armed bandits.
Nigeria has also experienced worsening economic crises in recent years, with significant revenue losses due in part to reduced crude oil production. This decline is linked to insecurity in the Niger Delta, where armed groups and separatist movements are active. In March 2024, oil production fell by 7% on a monthly basis. Oil from the Niger Delta accounts for nearly 90% of Nigeria’s revenues, including 95% of export earnings and over 80% of government revenues.
For the past three years, cities and communities in southeastern Nigeria have suffered from economic paralysis, underdevelopment, and the inability of local governments to carry out their administrative functions. This is due to kidnappings, brutal killings, and attacks on educational institutions, security offices, and commercial centers, carried out by militants from the “Eastern Security Network,” affiliated with IPOB.
B- In the case of Cameroon:
The Anglophone crisis poses a threat to the rule of Cameroonian President Paul Biya, who is 91 years old and seeking an eighth presidential term, despite significant dissatisfaction among Cameroon’s youth with his leadership. Recent developments related to this crisis, such as civil disobedience, ghost towns, and the long-term closure of schools by Anglophone residents, indicate a near consensus among Anglophones on the need for separation, reflecting a decline in their desire for fair integration and coexistence with Francophones.
Economically, the Anglophone regions contribute about 20% of Cameroon’s GDP. Key industries in these regions include oil, timber, cocoa, coffee, and rubber, in addition to intensive agriculture, with large farms owned by the Cameroonian government and smaller ones that supply Douala and countries within the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). Violent activities and armed attacks in the area have harmful effects on the national economy and revenues.
This is reflected in the country’s declining GDP growth rate, which dropped to 3.9% in 2019 from 5.8% in 2015 (before the current conflict began in 2016). Internet outages, especially in the heavily connected Anglophone regions, cost the country $846 million. Travel restrictions and insecurity have caused hundreds of local businesses to leave and disrupted the movement of people, goods, and services.
C- In the regional context:
Cooperation between armed separatist movements in Nigeria and Cameroon exacerbates the challenges faced by the security forces of both countries in securing and monitoring their borders. A violent incursion by Cameroonian militants into the Nigerian side of the border village of Biliti in December 2023 underscores this point. Cameroon’s location at the crossroads of West and Central Africa may offer these movements—particularly the “Ambazonian Defense Forces” and IPOB—a safe haven, making it harder for the governments and security forces of both countries to control the regions effectively.
The separatist crises, especially as they escalate into intense armed confrontations with growing collaboration between active groups in Cameroon and the Niger Delta, can complicate security in Nigerian waters and worsen piracy issues in the Gulf of Guinea, which stretches from Liberia to Angola. This could affect the shipping industry and trade along the Gulf, particularly as the Niger Delta was a key center for arms smuggling before the Anglophone crisis erupted in Cameroon in 2017.
Despite the current mix of mistrust and cautious cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroon, increased collaboration among separatists could push Abuja and Yaoundé to elevate their security coordination. At present, their cooperation primarily focuses on combating Boko Haram, with both countries’ security forces granted the right to cross borders when pursuing armed groups in the north. However, the continued threat of Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad Basin, along with growing unrest in southeastern Nigeria from separatist groups collaborating with Cameroonian militants, could stretch the security forces of both nations further.
Moreover, Nigeria’s and Cameroon’s relationships with Western powers could be affected by their increasing use of force and refusal to engage in dialogue with most separatist groups. Both countries’ security forces have faced allegations of human rights violations in their handling of separatists. Nigeria’s recent difficulties in purchasing weapons from Western countries were attributed to accusations of human rights abuses by its military. Meanwhile, UK politicians have demanded clarity from Nigeria on the detention of Nnamdi Kanu, a British citizen and the leader of IPOB, criticizing Nigeria’s refusal to grant him consular access.
Conclusion
The rise of separatist movements and the use of threats and violence by these groups in Nigeria, Cameroon, and other sub-Saharan African countries paint a clear picture of fragile governance and weak democratic cultures. Many citizens and ethnic groups have negative views of the constitutional mechanisms available to address their grievances and demands. In Nigeria, federalism has remained a paper policy rather than a practical reality, while in Cameroon, the government continues to centralize power, making it harder for some regions to access it.
Ultimately, resolving these crises will require reassessing how both states address them and creating political platforms that allow protesters to voice their concerns. In Nigeria, the president and state officials must see calls for independence as a warning sign of the country’s dysfunction and address urgent social and economic issues to prevent further rebellions. In Cameroon, the special status granted to the Anglophone regions needs to be reformed through intensive negotiations to address its shortcomings, which would help boost regional autonomy and facilitate a lasting peace agreement. The African Union and regional organizations can play a role as mediators in this process.
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