Central Asian countries are a vital artery linking Asia and Europe. This region stretches from the Caspian Sea in the west to China and Mongolia in the east, and from Afghanistan and Iran in the south to Russia in the north. Due to this strategic significance, the interaction of Western powers, particularly Europe and the United States, with these countries has a significant impact on regional economic and security matters. However, this interaction faces a challenge from Russia and China. Historically and culturally, Central Asian countries are connected to Russia as they were part of the former Soviet Union before gaining independence. Geopolitically, these countries have sought modernization, focusing on infrastructure development and increasing ties with China.
In this context, a report by Vladislav Inozemtsev titled “Central Asia and the Exploitation of Historical Opportunities,” published by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), analyzes the economic and geopolitical situation in Central Asia. The report explores the history of Western economic and political intervention in the region following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and evaluates Russia and China’s current ambitions regarding Central Asia. It also examines the steps both powers have taken to assert their influence. The report suggests concrete measures to enhance Western presence in this critical region, highlighting Central Asia’s potential as a complement or partial alternative to Russia as a source of energy and essential commodities that Europe lacks due to disrupted supply chains following the war in Ukraine.
Historical Perspective:
The first decade of Central Asia’s independence was devastating, as the collapse of the centrally planned Soviet economy led to economic chaos, resulting in a regional GDP drop of at least 35% by 1995. At the same time, challenges in building national identity led to a series of internal conflicts within the region’s countries. However, steps toward international cooperation between Russia and the West, combined with a fascination with globalization in its economic, social, and even political forms, opened a window for Central Asia to engage with the West as a means of recovery.
Nevertheless, cooperation between Central Asian countries and Moscow remained critical to the region’s interactions, up until the late 1990s. Turkmenistan was the exception, pursuing an isolationist policy. After gaining independence, all Central Asian countries, except Turkmenistan, signed a collective security agreement with Russia. Since then, military cooperation with Russia has remained strong. Yet concerns over dependency and the pursuit of additional sources of growth pushed Central Asian countries to seek other partners to secure their development. As Russia became increasingly reliant on commodity exports in the 1990s and quickly shifted from being a reliable buyer to a strong competitor, the need for diversification and new exploration partners became evident.
The economic shift towards the West produced its first political results in Central Asia in 1999 when Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty and joined GUAM, a bloc created by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova to foster deeper cooperation with major Western powers. Although this happened when relations between Russia and the United States were beginning to deteriorate, Moscow was preoccupied with another war in Chechnya and the presidential transition from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin. By 2003, Central Asia had established strong economic ties with the West, significantly redirecting its foreign trade from Russia to Europe.
Eurasian Dominance:
The mid-2000s marked a critical period for the post-Soviet region in general and for Central Asia in particular. In less than two years, relations between Russia and the West deteriorated, and both the European Union and the United States imposed sanctions on Uzbekistan that lasted until 2009. Uzbekistan’s president quickly signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with China and withdrew from the GUAM group. All these developments significantly altered Russia’s plans and drew greater attention from the Kremlin to Central Asia. Moscow sought to restore influence and control in the region through various geopolitical and economic initiatives aimed at consolidating political power and enhancing economic cooperation among the former Soviet states.
The Kremlin focused on the “Eurasian Economic Union,” a bloc that, in addition to Russia, primarily includes Central Asian countries. While Russia was not the most crucial investor or indispensable trade partner for the region, it played a vital role in other areas. For Kazakhstan, Russia was essential as a transit country for its exports and imports. Moreover, three of the five Central Asian countries—Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—became dependent on Russia as a primary destination for their migrant workers.
Militarily, Russia remained the dominant military and political power in the region during these years, with Central Asia’s military and technological reliance on Russia continuing. Unlike in business and economics, Central Asian countries failed to break away from their dependence on Soviet and Russian military and security models. Overall, the report views Russia’s “integrationist” project as ineffective, especially given the weak economic integration, limited political cooperation, and Russian cultural chauvinism, which opens up opportunities for Western powers in the region.
China Enters the Fray:
For centuries, China exerted its influence in Central Asia through a series of trade and political pillars along the Silk Road. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China was quick to recognize the sovereignty of Central Asian states. However, relations developed slowly due to the limited economic potential of Central Asian countries and the Chinese leadership’s downplaying of their need for hydrocarbons. Additionally, Beijing did not take Western interests in the region into account. All this changed with the region’s rapid economic growth and increased U.S. presence due to the “war on terror.” A friendship and cooperation treaty between China and Kazakhstan was signed in 2002, followed by similar agreements with its neighbors.
With the rise of President Xi Jinping, China adopted a new, economically expansive strategy, announced in Xi’s historic 2013 speech titled “One Belt, One Road.” Over the next decade, China paid significant attention to the region. Chinese investments and trade were almost entirely focused on the resource sector, which suffers from inherent limitations, as well as on agricultural development, which raised serious concerns among local populations. Many believe that China aims to purchase large amounts of arable land.
However, Beijing’s increasing influence in the region should not be seen as irreversible, especially since China is often viewed as culturally alien and too assertive to be an appropriate partner, according to the report.
Additionally, China’s cooperation with countries outside the region raises concerns about Beijing’s ambitions for dominance. Furthermore, China’s slow recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, along with debt issues and defaults, heightens fears of a possible economic slowdown in Asia.
Western Engagement:
By the end of 2023, the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape in Central Asia had evolved significantly. Perhaps the most important development is the “return of history,” which is manifested in both Russia and China emerging as global competitors to the West, if not outright adversaries. This, along with the failure of U.S. attempts to stabilize Afghanistan and establish democracy there, places Central Asia at the crossroads of three critical regions: Russia, China, and the Islamic world, all of which are engaged in anti-Western rhetoric and positions, according to the report. Under these conditions, the Central Asian countries are seen as ideal partners for the West.
The opportunity for partnership is reinforced by the changing geopolitics of energy. With Europe’s resolve to reduce its dependency on Russian energy, it has become crucial for the West to find new energy sources. Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, the world’s largest uranium producer, is the most rational choice. So far, Central Asian oil and gas have reached Europe via routes passing through Russian territory. Working with Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries to create alternative routes to the European market through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey may help alleviate this issue in the medium and long term.
On the other hand, the West holds transformative power that could be activated in the region. Central Asian countries are secular and fear the rise of religious extremism, especially from neighboring Afghanistan, and are looking to the West for ways to modernize their economies. By 2022, both Europe and the U.S. had solidified their positions as the region’s largest investors, with more than $100 billion invested in various sectors of the regional economy since the start of the 21st century.
Practical Steps:
The report proposes a set of recommendations for Western powers to enhance their role in Central Asia in the face of the Chinese-Russian challenge. These include unleashing the potential of the region’s energy resources for use by European countries by developing a middle corridor through the Caspian Sea, linking Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe, either through Turkey or the Black Sea. Additionally, competing with China in infrastructure development by using world-class European engineering and Western financial resources that exceed China’s financial capabilities is also suggested.
Moreover, there is a need to develop a strategic principle to replace imports from Russia to EU countries with goods from Central Asia, including diversifying uranium sources by collaborating with Kazakhstan in the nuclear energy sector. A high-level coordination center between the EU, U.S., and Central Asia could be established to enhance Western presence and military cooperation. Kazakhstan, with its prominent foreign policy initiatives, including those focused on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, could also act as a counterbalance to Moscow in promoting peace and security.
The report also emphasizes the importance of Western powers cooperating with local authorities to enhance education, science, and technology in Central Asia to counter skill drain and boost competition with Russian and Chinese universities. Focusing on improving education standards and offering opportunities for youth to achieve excellence could be an effective tool in resisting extremism in the region. Furthermore, Western support for local entrepreneurs in Central Asia could combat corruption, strengthen the rule of law, introduce modern financial technologies, and open access to global capital markets, turning the region into an alternative hub for Russian companies seeking to escape Putin’s regime.
Finally, the West needs a more proactive stance in Central Asia, focusing on European expansion and boosting cooperation to address geopolitical challenges and seize economic opportunities in the region.
source: Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Central Asia: Making Use of a Historic opportunity”, Russie.Eurasie.Visions, No. 132, Ifri, December 2023.
