Since Armenia’s defeat in what is known as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and Azerbaijan’s final takeover of the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September 2023, Armenia has recognized the necessity of adopting a new approach in its foreign policy. This shift involved moving away from its historical strategic alliance with Russia—after perceiving that Moscow had abandoned it in its conflict with Azerbaijan—and instead focusing on deepening cooperation with the West, particularly with European Union countries. The aim was to build a policy based on strategic balance and explore cooperation with middle powers that could play an influential role outside the two warring camps of Russia and the West.
Important Indicators:
Recently, several indicators have emerged showing how Armenia has opened up to cooperation with the West and strengthened its partnership with it. This is seen as a key to achieving lasting peace with Azerbaijan, while the West also seeks to capitalize on Yerevan’s declining trust in Moscow as a security guarantor to establish a foothold in the South Caucasus. These indicators include:
Extensive Western Military Support:
The military cooperation, or rather the Western military support for Armenia, is one of the most prominent signs of the recent rapprochement between the two sides. Given Armenia’s need for military and defensive support after losing the Nagorno-Karabakh region, especially in light of its desire to move away from its Russian ally—who had been Armenia’s primary military supporter—it is significant to note that Russian arms accounted for about 98% of Armenia’s total arms imports. Specifically, Russian arms made up about 94% of Armenia’s total imports in the first decade of the 21st century, and from 2011 to 2020, 95% of Armenia’s military arsenal was purchased from Russia. Consequently, Western countries have significantly supported Armenia militarily, reducing the proportion of Russian arms to less than 10%, according to Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan.
This support began with the United States conducting limited military exercises with Armenia under the name “Eagle Partner,” with the first iteration held in September 2023 and the second in July 2024. The goal was to enhance coordination among units participating in international peacekeeping missions. In October 2023, France agreed to sell Armenia three GM 200 radar systems and Mistral anti-aircraft missiles, along with assisting in training the Armenian ground defense forces and supporting efforts to modernize and reform the army. In November 2023, France began supplying rifles, radar systems, and armored vehicles to the Armenian forces. In March 2024, during a visit by French Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastien Lecornu to Yerevan, an agreement was reached to supply rifles and discuss the sale of air defense systems. In June 2024, it was announced that France would sell self-propelled Caesar howitzers to Armenia. On July 22, 2024, the European Union decided to support Armenia with 10 million euros through the European Peace Facility to enhance the logistical capabilities of the Armenian armed forces, strengthen Armenia’s resilience, and expedite the integration of its armed forces in potential future international military missions, including those deployed by the EU. Additionally, Armenia agreed to the deployment of an EU border monitoring force in southern Armenia along the border with Azerbaijan. This is the first mission of its kind by the EU in a traditionally pro-Russian ally, indicating a Western interest in further integrating Armenia into its sphere and freezing its defense relations with Russia.
Facilitating Political and Economic Cooperation:
The Western military support for Armenia has been accompanied by another level of political and economic cooperation. On March 12, 2024, the European Parliament passed a resolution reaffirming its support for strengthening relations between Armenia and the EU. It stated that if Armenia wished to apply for EU membership, EU institutions should support this step. This followed a statement by Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan on March 9, 2024, indicating that Yerevan was considering applying for EU membership. To crown this mutual effort to strengthen relations, a joint summit between Armenia, the EU, and the United States was held in Brussels on April 5, 2024. The summit reaffirmed support for Armenia and its European aspirations, providing assistance for its economic development.
The EU pledged 270 million euros to support Yerevan over the next four years, investing in the energy sector. The U.S. also announced 65 million euros in economic aid to Armenia, reflecting the summit’s focus on supporting the Armenian economy and reducing its dependency on Russia. The summit’s statement emphasized the U.S. commitment to a secure and reliable energy future for Armenia and the diversification of its energy sources, as Yerevan’s energy self-sufficiency stands at only 30%, heavily relying on Moscow for energy supplies. During a visit by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State to Yerevan in June 2024, James O’Brien confirmed continued U.S. support for the Armenian government to bolster reforms in various sectors. On July 17, EU member states approved the start of formal negotiations with Armenia regarding the easing of visa requirements for Armenian citizens.
Dissolving the Alliance with Russia:
Alongside these extensive Armenian efforts to cooperate with the West, Yerevan has also taken steps aimed at gradually disengaging from its strategic alliance with Russia. Some of these steps include Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s announcement on February 22, 2024, that Armenia had suspended its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) led by Russia. Pashinyan further announced on March 12, 2024, that Yerevan had given Moscow a deadline until August 1 to withdraw its border guard troops stationed at Zvartnots Airport in the Armenian capital since 1992.
By July 31, these troops had indeed completed their withdrawal, prompting criticism from the Russian Foreign Ministry, which claimed that Yerevan risked causing irreparable damage to Armenian-Russian relations and endangering Armenia’s security and economic development. Additionally, on March 19, reports emerged that most Armenian banks would cease accepting cards linked to the Russian MIR payment system starting at the end of March, in compliance with Western sanctions against Russia. On June 12, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan reiterated before his country’s parliament the suspension of membership in the CSTO, intending to withdraw from it at an appropriate time.
Assessment of the Trend:
Armenia’s strategy of deepening its relations with the West is based on the assumption that such cooperation will provide it with a security guarantee against the geopolitical threats it faces, particularly with regard to the conflict with Azerbaijan. Additionally, it is believed that this cooperation would enhance the presence of the West in the South Caucasus and thereby mediate in reaching an agreement with Azerbaijan. However, evaluating this trend reveals that this assumption may not be entirely accurate, considering several influencing factors:
Adverse Positions: Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey view Armenia’s moves towards the Western camp with dissatisfaction. Moscow has leverage over Armenia, which it can use to force Armenia to alter its foreign policy. This leverage includes actions such as halting natural gas exports or deporting Armenians from Russia, which would impact Yerevan financially due to the significant remittances from Armenians abroad. Moreover, Moscow has substantial control over Armenia’s energy infrastructure and the country’s trade relations, which heavily depend on Russia. The trade volume between the two countries exceeded $4 billion in 2023. Additionally, Russian forces remain stationed in Armenia, notably at the 102nd military base in Gyumri, which houses around 3,000 soldiers and is set to remain until 2044. Furthermore, Russia might encourage Azerbaijan to resume military operations against Armenia.
Recent months have already witnessed some tensions and armed incidents on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, with Baku even showcasing its military strength in Nakhchivan near the Armenian border. On July 26, Baku reported that Armenia had fired heavy weapons across the border and blamed the United States and the European Union for encouraging what it termed provocations. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev described the April 5 meeting between Armenia, the EU, and the US as an attempt to isolate Azerbaijan. Similarly, Turkey’s stance is not much different from that of Moscow and Baku. Turkey criticized the April 5 meeting as biased and argued that it undermines the neutral approach that should form the basis for resolving the region’s complex issues. It also suggests that such a move paves the way for turning the South Caucasus into a geopolitical flashpoint. This implies that Armenia’s endeavor to deepen cooperation with the West still faces significant challenges due to its complex relations with neighboring countries and the ongoing militarization of these relations, especially with Azerbaijan, supported implicitly by Russia and Turkey. This support has influenced the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, potentially impacting Armenia’s foreign policy in the near future.
High Western Cost: Despite the repeated steps taken by Western countries to support Armenia, a closer look at the scale and nature of Western aid to Armenia reveals that Western countries, particularly the EU and the US, are either unable or unwilling to bear the full cost of supporting Armenia or fully integrating Yerevan into the Western camp. While military supplies have been provided to Armenia, no Western country has assumed the role of security guarantor in place of Russia. Moreover, the economic support for Armenia remains insufficient to significantly reduce its reliance on Russia or serve as a replacement for its economic ties with Moscow. Additionally, it is evident that the Western camp does not yet possess strong tools to compel Azerbaijan to sign a peace agreement with Armenia.
On the contrary, it appears that Armenia is the one making concessions, such as the Armenian Prime Minister’s announcement of steps to amend the constitution—a key Azerbaijani demand for a peace agreement. The Armenian constitution stipulates that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Armenian territory. Furthermore, Armenia’s shift away from Russia will require considerable time and financial resources, which the Western camp currently appears unable to bear, given the substantial costs associated with supporting Ukraine in its war with Russia and the recent support for Israel following the conflict in Gaza since October 7, 2024. Additionally, Western countries cannot afford to expand the current quasi-cold war with Russia, China, and Iran into the Caucasus, as this could lead to more severe conflicts.
Transitional Alliances: Given the long-term nature of Armenia’s potential transition to a full alliance with the Western camp, Yerevan has begun engaging in what can be termed alternative alliances that may provide some of its needs while awaiting a Western alliance, especially in terms of defense and military support, as well as enhancing its strategic balance with its external environment. Two main alliances are emerging in this context: the first with India and the second with Iran. Both have prospered to some extent following the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020. India naturally supported Armenia during this conflict, given that Pakistan supported Azerbaijan. Defense cooperation has been a key aspect of this bilateral relationship. This year, Armenia purchased four Swathi radars from India.
In 2022, an agreement was signed for India to export missiles, shells, and ammunition to Armenia, followed by a 2023 agreement to export India’s Akash air defense system to Armenia. In 2023, India became the main arms supplier to Armenia, replacing Russia. The same applies to Iran. Defense relations were a crucial entry point for strengthening ties with Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Although Iranian weapons were not directly supplied to Armenia, Iran served as a key conduit for Indian arms to Armenia. In 2023, Iranian media reported that Iranian forces had been deployed in Armenia’s Syunik province, which borders Azerbaijan. In July 2024, reports indicated that Iran and Armenia had reached an agreement for a $500 million arms export deal, including drones such as Shahed 136, Shahed 129, Shahed 197, and Mohajer, as well as air defense missile systems like Khordad 3, Majid, Khordad 15, and Arman.
In conclusion, it remains uncertain how serious the US and Europe are about fully supporting Armenia in its move away from the Russian alliance. Armenia currently stands in a position similar to that of Ukraine and Georgia before Russia invaded them for making significant steps toward Western alliance, which affected national security and Russian strategic interests. However, the current geopolitical conditions make it unlikely that Armenia will face a similar reaction from Russia in the short term due to Moscow’s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine. The trajectory of Armenia’s shift may depend on the outcome of the war in Ukraine and the extent to which the Western camp can push Armenia to become another front in its confrontation with Russia.
