The crises within the current international system are escalating, driven by the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and the likelihood of its expansion amidst heightened tensions between Israel and Hezbollah. Additionally, the deadlock in negotiations concerning the Gaza War and the persistent conflict in Ukraine contribute to this complex landscape. Many nations are also grappling with severe economic crises. Furthermore, the ongoing U.S.-China rivalry across various regions adversely affects the stability of several areas, particularly in the Indo-Pacific and Africa.
In this context, the report titled “Geopolitical Forecasts for the Third Quarter of 2024,” published by Stratfor in September 2024, discusses the potential features of global interactions for the fourth quarter of the year. It suggests that existing conflicts will likely continue to impact the international system and its stability. Furthermore, increased tensions between China and the United States are expected, particularly concerning Congressional visits to Taiwan and financial support from Chinese institutions to Russia. Economic challenges facing numerous countries will also persist.
Key Trends
The report outlines several overarching trends expected in global interactions during the fourth quarter of 2024:
Potential Expansion of U.S. Support for Ukraine Post-Elections: Following the U.S. presidential elections, President Joe Biden, who will remain in office until January 20, 2025, is likely to expand support for Ukraine. This expansion could be particularly pronounced if former President Donald Trump, the Republican nominee, wins the election. In such a scenario, the Biden administration may more explicitly permit Ukraine to utilize Western-provided weapons deep within Russia and may seek to offer additional financial support to Kyiv, although significant resistance is anticipated in Congress.
Possibility of Biden Increasing Pressure on Israel: While it is unlikely that the outgoing Biden administration will make major decisions that could negatively affect the campaign of Vice President Kamala Harris, the White House may become more willing to exert pressure on Israel to end the Gaza conflict and reduce tensions with Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Iranian government after the elections.
Continued Tensions Between the U.S. and China: Tensions with China are expected to persist during the final months of the Biden administration. The White House may impose sanctions on certain Chinese financial institutions involved in facilitating trade with Russia in dual-use goods. Such sanctions could provoke retaliatory actions from China, potentially targeting American companies. Should Trump win the elections, he may push governments and businesses to accelerate their emergency plans in anticipation of a possible increase in U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports, which may include diversifying their economies.
Ongoing Monetary Policy Easing by the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank: Both the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank are expected to continue easing monetary policies, which will improve financing prospects for emerging and developing economies. However, the risk of social and political unrest will remain high in countries facing financial difficulties. A slowdown in inflation in the U.S. and Europe will allow both banks to continue lowering interest rates.
Potential Financial Struggles for Some Nations: Countries such as the Maldives and Bangladesh are anticipated to encounter financial difficulties due to weak macroeconomic policies and excessive borrowing. While governments will largely remain committed to International Monetary Fund reforms, they may adjust their policies as necessary to mitigate social and political opposition while maintaining adherence to IMF agreements. The report indicates that the risks of sporadic unrest will remain high in countries benefiting from IMF programs, regardless of whether they are undergoing debt restructuring, such as Ghana and Sri Lanka, or have largely avoided such measures, like Egypt and Pakistan.
Expectations for COP29 to Reach an Agreement on New Financing for the Developing World: Negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement to replace the previous commitment by wealthy nations to provide $100 billion annually for climate financing to the developing world by 2025 are likely to be a key discussion point at the upcoming climate summit in Baku, Azerbaijan, from November 11 to 22. The United States and the European Union may push industrial nations not currently classified as advanced economies under the UN framework for climate change, including China and Saudi Arabia, to contribute, although such contributions are unlikely to be formalized. Additionally, the outcome of the U.S. elections may influence climate talks, with a Trump victory likely leading to diminished American interest in supporting any related plans.
Crises in the Middle East
The report highlights several potential trends in the Middle East as follows:
Ongoing Conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon: The situation in the Middle East is heading toward increased tensions, particularly with the ongoing escalation in Gaza and mounting pressures among the conflicting parties. This raises concerns about the prolonged duration of the conflict. A ceasefire in the near future seems unlikely, as Hamas refuses Israel’s demand to maintain some military presence in the region to prevent the resurgence of armed threats, complicating the prospects for an agreement. In Lebanon, tensions persist between Hezbollah and Israel, with Israel attempting to compel Hezbollah into negotiations regarding withdrawal from the border. Meanwhile, Hezbollah continues to support Hamas and resist these pressures.
It is probable that there will be further overt and covert clashes between Israel and Iran, with Israel targeting more Iranian military officials and infrastructure that supports missile and drone threats. In response, Iran is likely to retaliate with limited strikes via drones and missiles, aiming to amplify political ramifications without sparking a full regional conflict.
Israel’s sustained pressure on Hamas, including the assassination of additional leaders and continued U.S. support for the campaign in Gaza, may lead to a ceasefire on Israeli terms. If this occurs, it could be followed by regional de-escalation from Hezbollah and Iran. However, despite both Israel and Hezbollah not seeking a comprehensive war, targeting politically sensitive objectives, such as high-ranking leaders or civilians, could swiftly escalate tensions into a broader conflict.
Limited Economic Reforms in Iran: Iranian President Masoud Bezhakian is expected to implement some modest economic reforms, but progress on social issues will likely be limited. Bezhakian’s technocratic approach indicates that his administration will focus on economic policies in this quarter. He is expected to propose his first budget, which will include plans for economic reform likely requiring targeted budget cuts and possibly a formal reduction in the Iranian military’s budget share, though actual funding may not be significantly affected. Major social or political reforms are not anticipated in this quarter, as Bezhakian’s government composition suggests a reluctance to challenge the conservative Iranian political system.
Stalemate in the Iranian Nuclear Issue: The deadlock regarding the nuclear issue is expected to continue through the last quarter of 2024, with any potential breakthrough dependent on the outcome of the U.S. presidential elections. A victory for Vice President Kamala Harris could increase the chances of reaching a new nuclear agreement.
Bezhakian may attempt to engage with the United States to initiate negotiations; however, it is unlikely that the Biden administration will seriously engage in such talks before the elections, and possibly even afterward if tensions in Gaza persist. If former President Donald Trump wins, the likelihood of an agreement between the U.S. and Iran would diminish, whereas a Harris victory would enhance the prospects for a long-term agreement. Harris’s administration is likely to pursue diplomatic options with Iran, though no short-term progress is expected due to the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas.
Continued Economic Challenges in Turkey: The Turkish central bank faces pressure from emerging businesses to lower interest rates, yet an immediate reduction is unlikely. Although inflation is gradually declining, it remains relatively high, prompting the central bank to be cautious about lowering rates amid slowing economic growth in Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who previously opposed high-interest rates, has supported Turkey’s medium-term program issued in September 2024, which outlines the country’s macroeconomic policy for the next three years. This program prioritizes combating inflation and boosting growth in key sectors, including agriculture, industry, and tourism. By maintaining a tight monetary policy, Turkey’s inflation rate is likely to decline further by the end of the year, though this may also lead to slower economic growth, particularly in the manufacturing and automotive sectors, due to high interest rates that businesses and consumers are likely to continue facing.
European Policy Overview
The report highlights the key aspects of the expected European policy as follows:
The French government is facing multiple challenges in passing the budget for 2025. According to Stratfor, the French government will struggle to get the budget approved in a highly divided parliament, a situation stemming from the early parliamentary elections in July 2024. The most likely scenario is that the government will fail to pass the budget and will then seek parliamentary approval at least to continue tax collection and issue decrees for essential public spending on a monthly basis until a new budget can be passed.
There is a possibility that the government may have to resort to constitutional powers to bypass a parliamentary vote, which could prevent a financial crisis but would also heighten the risk of significant social unrest, potentially leading to a vote of no confidence that could oust the government. On another front, a budget agreement could be reached if the government manages to negotiate a compromise with the moderate forces in parliament.
In the UK, discussions are set to begin regarding resetting relations with the European Union, as indicated by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. The British government will intensify its diplomatic efforts in this regard during the fourth quarter of 2024, formally launching discussions with Brussels to improve relations following Brexit, while also seeking to establish a bilateral defense agreement with Germany, which could pave the way for a broader security agreement at the EU level in 2025.
Alongside these diplomatic endeavors, the UK is also likely to pursue more trade deals with partners outside of Europe, coinciding with its efforts to reset relations with the EU. Negotiations with India and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are expected to accelerate during the fourth quarter of 2024. Additionally, the UK will officially join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Furthermore, the British government intends to raise taxes and cut spending. It will present its first budget in October 2024, which is likely to include tax increases and spending cuts amidst a stricter financial environment, continuing the approach of the previous government. The ruling Labour Party has announced its commitment to maintaining fiscal discipline. Treasury Secretary Rachel Reeves has pledged not to increase income tax, VAT, or national insurance, suggesting that the tax increases will likely target financial transactions, capital gains, and inheritance taxes. Planned measures may also include raising the windfall tax on energy companies, ending tax credits for private schools, and phasing out the tax system for non-residents entirely.
In Poland, the likelihood of internal tensions is rising with an increase in the number of Ukrainian refugees. Social and political tensions are expected to intensify as more Ukrainian refugees flee harsh winter conditions amid deteriorating energy infrastructure due to Russian attacks. These tensions could challenge Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s commitment to providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
Lastly, potential disagreements may arise between the coalition governments in Germany and Italy over the 2025 budget. In Germany, the government will seek parliamentary approval for a budget that includes a funding gap of 12 billion euros (approximately 13 billion dollars) and a costly pension reform that links the minimum pension level to the average wage until 2039, both of which may encounter last-minute resistance in parliament, causing renewed tensions within the ruling coalition.
In Italy, the government will implement painful austerity measures as part of a financial adjustment plan to reduce its structural deficit, including spending cuts and adjustments to the retirement age for certain categories. These measures could lead to disputes within the coalition government, especially concerning regional elections in Liguria and Emilia-Romagna. In both cases, it is unlikely that the ruling coalitions in Germany or Italy will collapse as a result of the tense budget discussions during the fourth quarter of 2024.
Transformations in Eurasia
Eurasia is expected to experience significant changes in its interactions, characterized by the following developments:
The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war will see an intensification of deep strikes as winter approaches. Both Russia and Ukraine will slow down their offensive operations with the onset of colder weather, which will lead to an increase in deep strikes, particularly as Russia targets Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Russian forces are likely to continue their offensive operations in the first half of the fourth quarter of 2024, focusing on “Bakhmut” and “Toretsk” in the Donbas region, while also improving their positions in the Kharkiv area and around Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk region. However, a significant breakthrough by Russia is not anticipated, as Ukrainian forces are expected to repel most of these attacks. In the latter half of the quarter, the pace of operations by both sides will slow down further due to worsening weather conditions, which will lead each side to expand their deep strike campaigns against the other.
The likelihood of serious negotiations for a ceasefire in the Ukrainian war remains low. Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region will likely focus on fortifying their positions and inflicting losses on Russian troops. The United States is expected to enhance the effectiveness of Ukrainian strikes by supplying joint air-ground missiles and easing restrictions on the use of ballistic missiles. Regardless of the outcome of the upcoming U.S. elections, the current administration under President Joe Biden is likely to support Ukraine in its final weeks and push for another supplemental support package.
In October 2024, the ruling “Georgian Dream” party is projected to win enough seats in the parliamentary elections to form a government. This outcome suggests that the country is moving toward increased authoritarianism and isolation from the West, particularly as the government continues to suppress opposition voices. Consequently, opposition parties may organize widespread protests, accusing the ruling party of fraud, while the government and security forces will likely portray these actions as attempts to destabilize the country, justifying expected severe crackdowns on the protests.
Moldova will continue its efforts to strengthen ties with the European Union, emphasizing its commitment to enhancing its Western integration. It is likely that the current president, Maia Sandu, will be re-elected in the upcoming presidential elections, even if they take place in two rounds. Her victory may trigger small-scale protests from increasingly desperate pro-Russian political forces, but these groups will have limited capacity to obstruct Moldova’s integration with the EU in the coming years, especially leading up to the parliamentary elections in 2025.
Finally, the prospects for military escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan are diminishing. Azerbaijan’s desire to present a peaceful image to the international community is expected to reduce its interest in any military escalation against Yerevan during the fourth quarter of 2024, indicating a lower risk of violent clashes. However, peace talks are likely to remain stalled due to Azerbaijan’s renewed demands for constitutional changes in Armenia and the incomplete bilateral border demarcation process, along with a lack of agreement on regional transit corridors.
Asian Interactions
Asian countries are experiencing a range of political and economic interactions in the fourth quarter of 2024, which can be summarized as follows:
The new Prime Minister of Japan is expected to continue strengthening military, security, and economic relations with the West, particularly with the United States and South Korea. This includes supporting efforts to enhance the resilience of Western supply chains and imposing restrictions on China’s semiconductor sector. It is likely that the new leader will adopt a similar approach to Fumio Kishida, emphasizing constitutional reforms and supporting an expanded defense budget. However, candidates for the Japanese premiership have differing views on corporate taxes, consumer support, and wage issues, and the winner of the election will play a decisive role in these matters.
In terms of Sino-American relations, tensions are likely to persist regarding Taiwan and Russia. The United States may impose sanctions on Chinese financial institutions due to their trade with Russia, risking economic retaliation from China. Before leaving the White House in January 2025, President Biden is expected to implement several sanctions on Chinese financial entities, prompting China to respond in kind through legal means, such as anti-sanctions laws or by adding entities to an unreliable entities list.
Congressional leaders may visit Taiwan during the U.S. elections, potentially triggering military exercises from China in critical waterways. These exercises could disrupt supply chains and shipping continuity in the Luzon Strait, Taiwan, and the Miyako Strait.
The Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are expected to be a hotbed of tensions in the coming period, possibly leading to further escalation. The Philippines has reported that China is building artificial islands in the Spratlys, and Manila is actively working to prevent this, having deployed advanced vessels to monitor land reclamation activities. It is anticipated that there will be increased military activities by the Chinese military in this region in the near future.
In Jammu and Kashmir, India, legislative elections will take place on September 25 and October 1, 2024, marking the first elections since the Indian government revoked the region’s special status in 2019 and converted it into a centrally governed territory. These elections will serve as a litmus test for the sustainability of the Indian government’s decision to abolish the region’s special status. A victory for the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party could heighten communal tensions in the region, facilitating governmental efforts to encourage immigration and remove legal restrictions preventing non-residents from owning property. This could lead to social unrest, prompting the Indian government to deploy forces to quell disturbances if they arise.
Moreover, a victory for the Bharatiya Janata Party or any allied party could escalate tensions with Pakistan. Conversely, if opposition or local Kashmiri parties succeed, Pakistan might leverage these parties to renew pressure on India to engage in negotiations regarding the region’s future.
In Bangladesh, the interim government is expected to prioritize reforms in administration, judiciary, and law enforcement, a process that may take several months and result in delayed elections. During this quarter, the government is likely to establish a banking commission to oversee changes in the financial sector and investigate recent outbreaks of violence. Additionally, a review of the national budget for 2024-2025 may be conducted to address macroeconomic instability, inflation, and foreign currency shortages. There is a significant risk of protests driven by wage issues in the garment sector and broader economic instability, particularly due to unilateral policies that exclude the Awami League.
The newly elected Sri Lankan president will likely confront growing social unrest due to austerity measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) aimed at restoring debt sustainability. Changes are expected to broaden the tax base, which may provoke social disturbances due to their impact on living standards. If the new president fails to implement the 13th Amendment to the constitution, which grants considerable autonomy to the Northern and Eastern provinces and addresses Tamil issues, it could renew calls for autonomy or separation. Meanwhile, the country will maintain its strategy of balancing relations between India and China.
Finally, Pakistan’s government is likely to pursue further austerity measures as recommended by the IMF, which may incite political opposition and widespread protests. While potential divisions within the ruling coalition could slow the reform process—particularly in the energy sector—it is unlikely to disrupt the IMF program in the fourth quarter. As long as the coalition remains unified on IMF reforms, it will aim to pass related legislation in parliament.
South America
This report forecasts potential trends in South America for the fourth quarter of 2024 as follows:
1. Continuation of Mexico’s New President’s Policies: The overwhelming victory achieved by Mexico’s ruling coalition, “Morena,” in the presidential and legislative elections will bolster the popular support enjoyed by the country’s president, Claudia Sheinbaum. This support will empower her to pursue a broad continuation of the policies established by her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Internal conflicts faced by opposition parties will likely limit any resistance to the current government.
Sheinbaum is expected to reveal her plans for her six-year term, which are likely to include expanding rights for temporary workers and increasing focus on energy transition initiatives by the end of the year. While markets have priced in most of the negative impacts that the government’s interventionist policies will have on the economy, announcements regarding new reforms or intervention measures from Sheinbaum, her ministers, or prolonged legal battles concerning reforms are likely to fuel further uncertainty and financial volatility.
2. Brazil’s Intent to Strengthen Economic Ties with China: Brazil aims to establish multiple investment agreements with China, while Brasília will see modest progress in its efforts to push the G20 to combat global economic inequality. During a meeting in Brazil in November 2023, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Chinese President Xi Jinping will discuss the possibility of Brazil joining the Belt and Road Initiative. Even if Brazil’s official announcement of joining does not occur in the fourth quarter of 2024, both parties are expected to announce further bilateral cooperation, such as Chinese investments in agriculture, infrastructure, renewable energy, and electric vehicles in Brazil.
3. Anticipated Stabilization of Economic Conditions in Argentina: Argentina’s economy is likely to show positive financial outcomes due to the austerity measures implemented by the government, despite rising poverty and unemployment rates. Monthly inflation is expected to continue declining; however, price levels are likely to remain high enough that the government cannot align official and unofficial exchange rates. Alongside significant debt obligations and negative net reserves, currency controls are expected to persist in the last quarter of 2024.
Argentinian President Javier Milei will continue to pursue control over inflation and liberalize the economy while rebuilding dollar reserves to lift capital controls and attract investment. The country is expected to take steps towards economic normalization and may see modest economic recovery before the year’s end. If social and economic conditions deteriorate further or inflation rates begin to rise again, public support for the current administration may wane, potentially leading to protests and sporadic strikes that could exacerbate political instability. Nevertheless, widespread protests are unlikely to escalate into mass demonstrations.
4. Increasing Domestic Turmoil in Venezuela: Domestic unrest in Venezuela is expected to rise, particularly leading up to January 10, 2025, the date designated for the transfer of power following the country’s presidential elections. The opposition will assert that Edmundo González should replace the outgoing president Nicolás Maduro, amid growing international pressure on Maduro.
Stricter U.S. sanctions on the Venezuelan oil sector are likely to be imposed starting in November 2024. Furthermore, Maduro is expected to take more severe measures against the opposition, increasing the likelihood of violence against protesters or the detention of prominent opposition leaders, especially María Corina Machado. Despite this, diplomatic pressures and internal protests are unlikely to lead to the government’s overthrow.
5. Potential for Increased Political Instability in Bolivia: Bolivia will continue to face shortages of fuel, dollars, and medicines in the fourth quarter of 2024, and it is likely to experience a growing number of protests in the lead-up to the general elections in December 2024, further intensifying political instability in the country. Former President Evo Morales is expected to leverage his ability to rally supporters to undermine the current president Luis Arce’s support, as both seek to run for the presidency in the November 2025 elections.
Challenges in Africa
Political and security instability remains a defining characteristic in Sub-Saharan African countries, as highlighted in the report as follows:
1. Rising Economic and Social Challenges in Ethiopia Following the Floatation of the Birr: Ethiopia is facing a wave of economic and social challenges after the government’s decision to float its currency, the birr. According to Stratfor, this move is expected to lead to rising prices for essential goods and increased internal unrest, reflecting negative impacts on the country’s political and security stability. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed may remain committed to the port agreement with Somaliland, potentially leading to clashes with Somalia. Inflation in Ethiopia is anticipated to rise in the upcoming quarter following the floatation of the birr on July 29, as part of the International Monetary Fund’s support package for the country, which has sharply devalued the currency against the dollar. Although the government has begun to introduce a support program to mitigate social and economic suffering, it is unlikely to fully alleviate the rising cost of living for many families, which could lead to strikes and protests.
Additionally, the increasing social and economic suffering could fuel recruitment by ethnic militias, such as Fano in the Amhara region, leading to an uptick in armed attacks and kidnappings. Tensions in Tigray between the interim regional administration and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front pose a threat of renewed violence in the region. Recent developments involving Sudanese rapid support forces in eastern Sudan could further exacerbate security risks in northern Ethiopia.
2. Likelihood of Monkeypox Threatening Supply Chains in Africa: The incidence of monkeypox is likely to continue rising in Sub-Saharan Africa amid slow vaccination campaigns, potentially leading to the emergence of more lethal and contagious viral strains. Countries may be compelled to impose screening measures that could cause limited trade disruptions. The number of monkeypox cases is expected to increase in several African countries due to a shortage of locally available vaccines, with most cases likely to remain in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, the geographical scope of the disease may expand, leading to new outbreaks outside Central Africa.
There is a strong likelihood that the growth in cases will increase the probability of countries implementing screening mechanisms that could hinder movement. This risk would be amplified if new, more lethal or contagious strains of the virus emerge. Although these measures are unlikely to be as strict as those imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic, they could still disrupt supply chains, especially through delays, with Central African countries being the most vulnerable. Additionally, screening measures could spark trade disputes, placing pressure on the economic growth of affected countries. The ongoing monkeypox outbreak would increase international pressure on Congo and Rwanda to adhere to the ceasefire reached last August in eastern Congo. While this may enhance the chances of reinforcing the ceasefire, the risk of its collapse will remain high throughout the quarter, significantly complicating the vaccination rollout against monkeypox in Congo.
3. South Africa Prioritizing Reforms in the Energy and Transport Sectors: The South African government is seeking to strengthen reforms in the energy and transport sectors, focusing on achieving financial sustainability and expanding private sector participation. The coalition government in South Africa is expected to promote reforms in the energy and rail sectors while maintaining fiscal consolidation plans initiated during President Cyril Ramaphosa’s first term. These government reforms aim to expand private sector participation and investment in these sectors, potentially through the state-owned transport company Transnet. Reforms may also include changes to the governance of state-owned enterprises in parliament.
Although third-party participation will play a crucial role in enhancing the performance of South Africa’s railway system in the medium term, significant improvements are unlikely amid ongoing security challenges. The report notes that left-wing opposition parties are expected to prioritize strengthening their organizational structures rather than actively opposing the coalition government. Labor unions are likely to emerge as the leading opposition force against the government in the coming quarter, which may lead to an increase in strikes.
4. Possibilities of Escalating Internal Tensions Following Elections in Ghana, Senegal, and Tanzania: Elections in Senegal and Ghana may lead to political paralysis and post-election violence, while elections in Tanzania could exacerbate internal tensions within the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party, potentially delaying the pace of reforms. General elections were held in Ghana on December 7, where the opposition National Democratic Congress accused the electoral court of collusion with the ruling New Patriotic Party, opening the door for challenges to the election results, which may lead to widespread violence. Even without contesting the elections, their outcomes may raise concerns among investors, as the Congress party has pledged to renegotiate the IMF program, while the ruling Progressive National Party has vowed to pass an anti-LGBTQ law, threatening international support for the country.
Early legislative elections are scheduled for November 17 in Senegal, following President Basiru Diomai Faye’s dissolution of the National Assembly in an attempt to secure a parliamentary majority for passing his policies. However, the government’s declining popularity could lead Faye’s PASTEF party to fail in securing a parliamentary majority, raising the risk of political paralysis and ongoing tensions that could undermine investor confidence.
Local government elections will take place in Tanzania on November 27, 2024. The government is likely to attempt to disrupt the campaign of the opposition Chadema party. However, strong electoral performance by the opposition may push hardliners within the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party to intensify their criticisms of President Samia Suluhu Hassan, with the threat of internal conflict delaying economic reforms.
In conclusion, instability appears set to remain a key characteristic of interactions across various regions amidst ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, not to mention the anticipation surrounding the outcome of the U.S. elections and their potential impact on the international system. While tensions between China and the United States are expected to remain high during this quarter, China will not be isolated; in fact, China and Brazil are likely to expand their trade and investment relationships, with Brazil possibly announcing its membership in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
