In recent years, several logistical projects have been proposed, with the idea of leveraging the geographical location of one or more countries to establish logistical corridors that serve regional and global trade routes passing through a specific region or across continents, particularly those connecting East Asia with Western Europe and America. These logistical projects vary, ranging from maritime corridors relying on open oceans, seas, and artificial canals for ship transportation to overland corridors using railways, roads, and pipelines for transporting goods and petroleum products. Additionally, there are multimodal corridors that combine land and sea routes in the movement of goods.
These new projects are considered potential future competitors to the Suez Canal, as they may reduce the share of trade passing through this Egyptian waterway, currently the most important artificial waterway in the world. This could negatively impact the canal’s economy and, consequently, the Egyptian economy as a whole. These plans are often met with skepticism and exaggeration; hence, an objective evaluation and analysis of the progress in the implementation and operation of these projects is necessary up until the date of this report’s publication, in order to reach a fair assessment of the possibility that the Suez Canal may lose part of its business in the future.
The second report in the series “Suez Canal Facing Global Competition” will focus on the overland and multimodal corridors that could become new tools for transporting goods between Asia and Europe, making them a rising competitor to the Suez Canal. This is especially significant as new technologies enable the transport of larger quantities of goods via railways and roads at lower costs while being more environmentally friendly by reducing greenhouse gas emissions from train and truck exhausts. In 2019 alone, these emissions totaled approximately 1.89 billion metric tons, accounting for nearly 23% of the global pollution from transportation.
As of now, there are nine overland and multimodal corridors that could potentially compete with the canal, five of which are spread across different continents, while the other four pass through the Middle East.
First: Overland Corridors
China’s Belt Corridors:
Since the last decade of the past century, China has aimed to develop and strengthen its global economic dominance. This led to the establishment of a strategy known as the “Going Global” policy. Strengthening trade ties with Central and Western Asia and European countries was China’s proposed method to achieve this goal, which encouraged the country in 2013 to announce its ambitious project called the New Silk Road. The idea was to establish two logistical corridors, one overland and the other maritime.
Table 1: Land and Sea Logistics Corridors under China’s Belt and Road Initiative
| Corridor name | Corridor type | Countries served by the corridor |
| China-Mongolia-Economic Russia axis | land | Mongolia and Russia |
| New Eurasian Bridge | land | Kazakhstan countries, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany |
| China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Hub | land | Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey |
| Indo-China Peninsula Economic Hub | land | Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore |
| China-Pakistan Economic Hub | land | State of Pakistan |
| China-Bangladesh-India-Myanmar economic hub | land | Bangladesh, India, Myanmar |
| Silk Road across the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean | maritime | All countries located on the Suez Canal sea route between the Yellow and Mediterranean Bahrain |
| Trans-Pacific Silk Road | maritime | Southeast Asian countries and islands |
| Polar Silk Road | maritime | Nordic European countries |
Many countries around the world have expressed their desire over the past decade to partner with China in this promising project. Consequently, the Chinese government expanded its initiative to include more than 150 countries across four continents. China cooperated with these countries by building infrastructure to facilitate local and regional trade and economy. Additionally, China used this positive momentum to increase the number of logistical corridors associated with its initiative—later named the Belt and Road Initiative—to nine corridors, six overland and three maritime. Table 1 highlights the main details of these corridors.
Three of these Chinese overland corridors could be potential competitors to the Egyptian Suez Canal. The first is the New Eurasian Land Bridge, whose first line was inaugurated in July 2011, connecting Chongqing in central China to Duisburg in western Germany, even before the announcement of China’s Belt and Road project. However, the operations of this corridor expanded in the following years, parallel to China’s growing ambitions to strengthen its trade relations with European countries. By 2017, it linked 35 Chinese cities with 34 European cities and facilitated 3,270 freight train journeys between Asia and Europe in that year alone.
Developments on this logistical corridor continued in subsequent years, despite increasing political tensions between Russia and the West, which escalated with the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The six countries involved in operating the corridor agreed to launch the first freight line between Asia and Europe on a fixed schedule, with the inaugural trip completed in November 2022 after the first train covered nearly 10,000 kilometers in eleven days of continuous travel. Additionally, the crisis involving attacks on ships passing through the Bab al-Mandab Strait in November 2023 played a positive role in boosting this corridor’s operations, with demand for its services increasing by 37% in the early months of 2024. The New Eurasian Land Bridge is expected to see increased use in the coming years as the operating countries continue to develop it.
Another of China’s Belt corridors that could compete with the Suez Canal is the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, which is the shortest land route between China and Russia, spanning 1,100 km of railway and less than 1,000 km of highways. This corridor could later connect to European logistical corridors. However, it currently suffers from limited use and weak infrastructure, despite an agreement among the three countries in 2016 to develop and enhance its benefits. The slow progress is attributed to the ongoing tensions on the Ukrainian front, with Russia preoccupied with other issues related to its ongoing military operations on its western borders.
The last of the Chinese corridors that could compete with the Suez Canal is the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor, which follows the geographical path of the historic Silk Road. China aims to establish this corridor in cooperation with Central and West Asian countries and Turkey to open a new trade route to Europe, potentially serving as an alternative to the routes passing through Eastern Europe, where political challenges have intensified over the past decade. However, this corridor faces several major challenges, such as its underdeveloped infrastructure, political instability in the operating countries, weak logistical coordination among these countries, and the sharp fluctuations in climatic conditions in some areas, all of which contribute to higher transportation costs, reducing its attractiveness for international trade.
Siberian Railways:
The Russian Siberian Railway is described as the longest in the world, stretching 9,288 km between the Russian capital, Moscow, and the city and port of Vladivostok in the Primorsky region in southeastern Russia (see Map 2). It is also one of Russia’s oldest railways, with construction beginning in 1891. In recent years, Russian authorities have aspired to take advantage of this line’s features to transform it into an international trade corridor connecting East Asian countries with Europe, especially South Korea and Japan, whose trade with the European Union in 2021 was valued at 107.3 billion euros and 62.4 billion euros, respectively, thereby enhancing Russia’s political and economic standing regionally and globally.
Map nº 2: Siberian railway route
Since 2021, Russia has been implementing a comprehensive modernization project aimed at increasing the volume of goods transported through this corridor to 200 million tons by 2025. The Russian government allocated over 520 billion rubles for this purpose. However, the project has faced numerous obstacles and delays, some of which are attributed to the economic tensions in the country due to Western sanctions imposed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. These sanctions increased significantly after Russia’s recent invasion of Ukrainian territory in 2022, prompting the Russian state to seek investors to inject substantial funds into the project, which is unlikely to be achieved in the near future due to the ongoing military tensions in Ukraine.
Eilat-Ashdod Project:
In early 2012, Israel announced its intention to negotiate with China to finance a commercial railway project that would compete with the Suez Canal by establishing a railway link between the port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba and the city of Dimona in the Negev Desert, connecting with the existing rail line linking Dimona with Israel’s western port cities such as Ashdod and Haifa. The Israeli authorities estimated the project’s cost at $7.9 billion, planning for a route length of 240 km. The high cost was attributed to the proposed project’s reliance on advanced technology and infrastructure serving both passenger and freight transport, as well as the significant number of industrial works along its route, totaling sixty-eight tunnels and bridges. However, no practical steps were taken towards its implementation due to the high costs compared to the limited financial returns.
Israel revisited a similar plan in mid-2023, on a larger scale than before, proposing a high-speed railway line from the city of Kiryat Shmona in the far north of Israel to the city and port of Eilat in the far south. The total estimated cost of the project was about $27 billion, with Israeli authorities planning for the project to connect various commercial and logistical centers across the country. However, these plans have not been implemented on the ground thus far, and there is a possibility that Israeli authorities may integrate part of the project into the framework of the Indian Economic Corridor project, announced by the United States in September last year (2023), to ensure adequate funding.
Second: Multimodal Corridors
North-South Corridor:
The initial idea for this project emerged in the late 19th century during the era of Imperial Russia, which sought access to warm waters via a land trade corridor descending from Russian territory to the Emirate of Afghanistan and then to Persia, which overlooks the Indian Ocean. However, the idea did not come to fruition until 2000, when three countries—Russia, Iran, and India—signed an agreement to establish a multimodal trade corridor linking them. Over the next two decades, eleven more countries, spanning West and Central Asia and Eastern Europe, joined the project. The proposed route was 7,200 kilometers long, with endpoints in Mumbai, India, to the south, and Saint Petersburg, Russia, to the north (see Map 3).
Map 3: North-South Corridor Route Compared to Suez Canal Shipping Route
The work on this project was slow and limited until recent years, with political transformations experienced by Asia and the world contributing to a louder call for the activation of this corridor. Iran, for its part, aims to operate such a line with the hope of becoming a central logistical hub in Central and Western Asia, which will, in turn, strengthen its struggling economic sector. Meanwhile, Moscow seeks to overcome the sanctions imposed by the West that hinder its trade, as well as to shorten the delivery time of goods between the Middle East and Russia to about 20 days, which is 40-50% less time compared to the delivery of the same goods by sea via the Suez Canal. Central and Western Asian countries look forward to increasing their connectivity with global supply chains, which stimulates the growth of their local economies. Additionally, India sees this corridor as an opportunity to access new Asian markets without having to use the corresponding Chinese land corridors or cross neighboring Pakistan.
The construction of the North-South Corridor faces several obstacles for the various participating countries. For instance, the poor infrastructure of transportation services in some countries, such as Iran, is described as unsuitable for commercial transportation due to the poor condition of its rail networks, as well as the deteriorated state of highways and outdated seaports. All participating countries face the challenge of securing necessary funding for development, especially as major financial institutions in the West and China are reluctant to provide the required loans due to political objectives. The project also suffers from poor customs organization between its countries and a lack of clear logistical entities to coordinate its cross-border supply chains. Adding to this are political disagreements and security tensions between some of the Asian countries involved in constructing the corridor.
Participating countries are trying to overcome these obstacles through available means. For example, Iran is working on constructing a railway line in the northern part of the country to serve transit trade towards the Caspian Sea. Turkmenistan, Russia, and Iran are cooperating in developing some infrastructure on the eastern side of the corridor. The founding countries of the corridor are allowing private sector companies to invest in construction and operation, as well as marketing the North-South Corridor by announcing the launch of trial shipments of various goods from time to time. There is also a general lack of objection to proposed new expansions that could help reshape the project’s map in the future to align with the capabilities of the other contributing countries and enhance the logistical value of the corridor.
It can be noted that the North-South Corridor may not achieve the desired benefits in the short term, but the commitment and interest shown by the various participating countries suggest that the corridor will experience developmental accumulation in the medium and long term, which will strengthen its supporting facilities and make it a viable route for handling tens of millions of tons of goods annually.
Turkish-Arab Corridors:
Turkey has sought to leverage the political easing efforts it has undertaken in recent years to benefit its national economy, which has faced many setbacks over the past decade. This motivated Turkey to propose several economic partnership projects with Gulf countries, including logistical corridors that would connect ports in Eastern Arabian Peninsula with southern Turkey, particularly the port of Mersin.
Turkey launched its first logistical corridor connecting with the Gulf in November 2021, named the Sharjah-Bandar Abbas-Mersin Corridor. At that time, the corridor’s route began at the UAE’s Sharjah port, crossing the waters of the Arabian Gulf to the Shahid Rajai port in Iran, then continuing overland to the Turkish port of Mersin. The goal was for the route—once developed—to reduce the time required for transporting goods by 60%, reaching a maximum of eight days, compared to over twenty days using the traditional Suez Canal sea route.
However, discussions about this corridor diminished over the following months, especially with the political and technical challenges that impeded its development aspirations. These challenges are related to fluctuating relations between Iran, Turkey, and the Gulf countries, increasing Western sanctions on Iran, and the deterioration of logistical infrastructure in Iranian territories.
Turkey quickly shifted to another project outlined by Iraq in early 2022, involving the construction of a railway and a road starting from the Grand Faw Port on the Arabian Gulf, passing through several major Iraqi cities like Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul, and ending at the Iraqi-Turkish border north of Duhok Province (see the following map, Figure 4). Therefore, the Turkish president announced at the end of the G20 summit held in New Delhi in September 2023 the intention of his country to participate with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq in the construction of this new corridor.
Map 4: Iraqi Development Corridor Route
The construction of the corridor is planned to be divided into three phases, which will proceed in parallel with the construction plans for the Grand Faw Port. The first phase is expected to be completed by 2028, with the railway and road heading towards Turkey being finished. The second and third phases will be completed by 2038 and 2050, respectively. These final two phases will focus on doubling the corridor’s capacity in line with the increasing capacity of the Grand Faw Port.
Some political speculations suggest a connection between Turkey’s exclusion from the U.S.-backed Indian Economic Corridor project and its move to participate in the development of the Iraqi Development Corridor project. Turkey aims to enhance its presence in the regional logistics arena despite the U.S. exclusion. However, there are predictions that the Iraqi Development Corridor project might face obstacles in financing and execution if Saudi Arabia and the UAE focus their attention on the planned Indian Corridor project.
The Indian Corridor:
On September 9, 2023, the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, France, Germany, and the European Union to develop an economic corridor linking India, the Middle East, and Europe. The stated goal of this corridor is to enhance economic connectivity and integration between U.S. allies in Asia and Europe. It is believed that one of the main objectives of this initiative is to counter China and its global Belt and Road Initiative, as well as to open avenues for economic cooperation between Gulf countries and Israel, complementing the ambitions of political normalization agreements with those countries.
The corridor is planned to start from the commercial ports of Mandra and Mumbai on the west coast of the Indian subcontinent, crossing the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea towards the Jebel Ali Port in the UAE. Trade moving through the corridor will then shift to railways passing through Saudi Arabia before ending at the Israeli port of Haifa. From there, goods will be reloaded onto ships for their final destination at European ports – see the following map, Figure 5.
Map 5: Route of the Indo-Middle East European Economic Hub
The participating countries in the Indian Economic Corridor project aspire to increase intra-trade movement through this corridor by 40%. However, trade alone is not the only focus; these countries also aim to incorporate advanced, environmentally sustainable economic activities. This includes extending clean hydrogen transport lines, electrical cables, and fiber optic lines for digital data exchange and communications. These efforts will ensure the creation of economic and technological linkages between the countries, as well as facilitate communication and normalization between their peoples and societies.
The Indian Economic Corridor project faces a number of challenges despite the high ambitions promoted for it. Firstly, there are political challenges related to the possibility of concluding political normalization agreements between Israel and Gulf countries at the present time. Additionally, the participating countries, especially those in the Middle East, are under the pressure of international rivalries, such as the traditional competition between China and the United States. Other challenges include financing and economic issues related to the allocation of financial burdens associated with infrastructure development and the expected returns over the coming years and decades. Lastly, there are security challenges, exemplified by the ongoing and expanding armed conflicts in the region, such as the current tensions that began in October 2023 and continue to escalate daily.
In conclusion, most overland corridors that are considered competitors to the Suez Canal are still in development stages, and many challenges and problems hinder their progress (see the final table, Figure 6). This will result in some failing while others may succeed in addressing their challenges and enhancing their capabilities incrementally, potentially becoming effective regional or global logistical routes in the future. This represents a challenge to the Suez Canal and underscores the importance for Egypt to develop and implement projects that ensure it retains a fair share of the global transport and logistics networks’ revenues, in line with its strategic geographic location.
Table 6: General picture of land and multimodal corridor projects (current and future
| Aspect | Description |
|---|---|
| Land Use Integration | Multimodal corridor projects aim to integrate transportation planning with land use development, fostering coordination between public and private investments. |
| Corridor Types | Corridors can range from urban/suburban arterials to regional highways, each requiring tailored approaches to multimodal design. |
| Modal Emphasis | Projects focus on balancing various transportation modes, including vehicles, transit, bicycles, and pedestrians, based on corridor type and context. |
| Transit-Oriented Development | Many projects incorporate transit-ready development approaches, using corridors as magnets for focused public and private investment. |
| Incremental Implementation | Multimodal corridor strategies often involve a series of interconnected projects implemented over time as funding becomes available. |
| Safety Improvements | Projects typically include safety enhancements such as improved pedestrian crossings, bicycle facilities, and traffic calming measures. |
| Economic Development | Corridor projects can support economic growth by improving access to jobs, housing, and commercial areas. |
| Environmental Considerations | Plans often address sustainability goals and consider impacts on natural environments. |
| Community Engagement | Successful projects involve extensive public outreach and stakeholder engagement throughout the planning process. |
| Performance Monitoring | Corridor plans usually include strategies for ongoing monitoring and evaluation of project outcomes. |
References Used
First: Arabic References
- Study titled “North-South Corridor: The Boundaries of Role and Iranian Bets,” by Mohamed Fayez Farhat, Issue 7, Iranian Studies Journal, June 2018.
- Report titled “Why Iran Can’t Practically Activate the North-South Corridor as an Alternative to the Suez Canal?” by Ali Atef, Egyptian Press, April 3, 2024.
- Report titled “Accumulation of Crises: Are Disputes Between Iran and Azerbaijan Intensifying?” by Shorouk Ibrahim, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, February 6, 2023.
- Report titled “Development Path in Iraq: Geopolitical, Fiscal, and Border Corridors Issues,” by Harith Hassan, Malcolm Kerr-Carnegie Middle East Center, May 21, 2024.
- Report titled “Israeli Commercial Ports: Local Success and Regional Stumbling,” by Mustafa Abdellah, Egyptian Center for Thought and Strategic Studies, July 28, 2024.
- Study titled “The Global Indian-Middle Eastern-European Trade Corridor: Opportunities and Challenges,” International Institute for Iranian Studies, October 5, 2023.
- Article titled “The Economic Corridor Between India, the Middle East, and Europe: A Very Limited and Very Delayed Step?” by Abdul Moin Khan, Carnegie Center for Global Peace, December 12, 2023.
Second: Foreign References
- The Suez Canal Facing Global Competition (2): Land and Multimodal Corridors
- “How Is the Belt and Road Initiative Advancing China’s Interests?” Report, China Power Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, published May 8, 2017. Updated November 3, 2023.
- Chapter 1: China’s Evolving Ambitions, China’s Belt and Road Initiative Dossier, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, November 2022.
- “The Eurasian Land Bridge: The Role of Service Providers in Linking the Regional Value Chains in East Asia and the European Union,” report by Richard Pomfret, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, January 2018.
- “Mongolia–China–Russia Economic Corridor” report, by B. Otgonsuren, Center for China and East Asian Studies, Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia, December 2015.
- “The Middle Corridor Through Central Asia: Trade and Influence Ambitions” report, by F. K. Chang, Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 2023.
- “Economic Connectivity of International Transport Corridor Projects and the Trans-Siberian Railway” article, by M. A. Khazheeva & E. A. Bondarchuk, Northern Sustainable Development Forum, 2020.
- “The International North–South Transport Corridor: Promoting Eurasia’s Intra- and Transcontinental Connectivity” report, by Vinokurov & others, Eurasian Development Bank, 2021.
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