The fifth Gaza War remains one of the pivotal events shaping regional interactions in the near future. It is approaching, in some respects, the major transformations witnessed in the Middle East over the past four decades, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990), the American occupation of Iraq (2003), and the Arab Spring (2011). The aftermath of this war is likely to differ significantly from what preceded it, extending beyond the confrontation zones in Gaza and the West Bank. This can be illustrated in the following dimensions:
Erosion of Strategic Deterrence in the Region: One impact of the Gaza War is the decline in the effectiveness of deterrence theory, both in the relationships between regional powers and between non-state armed actors and regional or international powers. The Gaza War shook several long-standing assumptions in the Middle East, threatening Israel’s existence as a state and causing the highest human losses in Israel in a single day since the October War of 1973. The continued use of extreme violence to displace Gaza’s population, despite warnings, may lead to increased escalation, especially with Israel’s ongoing failure to defeat Gaza’s resistance factions. This indicates a failure of the deterrence strategy that Israel employs against the regional environment, especially the Iranian threat.
The Houthis continue to threaten the United States, Israel, and Western countries, despite reactions from Washington, Tel Aviv, and the international community following attacks on some commercial vessels. This is evident even after the Houthis were re-designated as a “global terrorist organization,” a decision previously reversed by the Biden administration in early 2021. This highlights the diminishing impact of deterrence directed at the Houthis and other groups within the so-called “Resistance Axis,” to the extent that the Houthis link halting their attacks on Israel to the immediate cessation of the Gaza War, considering the calm in Houthi attacks after Israeli targeting of the Hodeidah port.
It is also expected that attacks on Western military bases, especially American ones, will continue by armed groups as seen in Iraq and Syria, and by terrorist organizations. If the Gaza War persists, the scope of targeting and pressure on the American presence in the region is likely to widen. Tehran might exploit this situation, encouraging its proxies to target American forces to press for their withdrawal and renew discussions on the necessity of their presence. Conversely, there is an opposite trend suggesting a renewed American engagement in the Middle East to protect its interests and address threats, working to re-establish deterrence, particularly after the Gaza War.
The Debate Between “War in the Region” and “Regional War”: There is an ongoing debate about how to characterize the situation in the region following the fifth Gaza War, particularly regarding its scope and participants. Some argue that it is a war within the region between Israel and Hamas, with other regional and international actors working to prevent escalation in the Middle East through direct communication between American and Israeli officials, warning Israel of the consequences of initiating a limited war in Lebanon, and sending messages to Hezbollah to contain tensions while continuing mediation and negotiations for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.
Others adopt the view of a “war between wars,” meaning that the conflict, initially limited to Hamas and Israel and their actions in the West Bank and Gaza, may expand to include a broader conflict between Israel and Iran through its regional proxies. This would involve simultaneous battles on multiple fronts: Israel versus Hamas, targeting Palestinian resistance elements in the West Bank, confronting Hezbollah on the southern Lebanese front, addressing threats from the Houthi militia in Yemen, fighting Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, and engaging with Iran, which leads the “Resistance Axis.”
This suggests that the region, currently experiencing heightened tensions due to the Israeli war on Gaza nearing a year in duration, may face what some observers describe as a “new geopolitical scene,” potentially turning it into a powder keg threatening regional and global security. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s remarks to world leaders about the escalating situation being a risk of regional expansion indicate this.
Synchrony of the “Day After” in Gaza with the West Bank and Israel: Although the end date of the war Israel is waging against Hamas is unclear, the United States and European countries are already considering Gaza’s future and its administration post-war. There are various ideas, including the potential return of Israeli occupation to the sector, given Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s insistence on staying in the Philadelphi Corridor and not withdrawing from Gaza or allowing displaced people to return to the north. There is also debate over the identity of prisoners Hamas demands be released from Israeli jails, alongside Israeli demands to deport these prisoners to other countries.
In this context, despite the various future scenarios for Gaza post-war, it is clear that the “future of Gaza” remains uncertain amid this variety and the clash of international strategies regarding Gaza’s post-war management. The future of Gaza is tied to the situation in the West Bank, the future of the Palestinian Authority, its restructuring, and its dialogue with other Palestinian factions. It also depends on arrangements for the following day in Israel, including the continuation or absence of Netanyahu from power.
The Gaza war appears likely to continue for an indeterminate period, involving the near-total destruction of northern Gaza and the displacement of its residents to the south in an attempt to pressure Hamas to release more hostages, particularly military ones. There is a likelihood that Hamas will lose Gaza and Netanyahu will lose the Israeli premiership, with some analyses suggesting that the “day after” for Israel might be more critical than Gaza’s. Thus, the “day after” will inevitably come, albeit delayed, and is unlikely to extend beyond the end of 2024, though it will be complex. Israel also fears a repeat of the October 7 scenario in the West Bank, inside settlements, or even within Israel itself.
Economic and Social Pressures of the Gaza War on Neighboring Arab Countries: The Gaza War, among other factors, has led to increased inflation rates, rising prices, and difficult economic and living conditions in the region, with varying abilities of each country to absorb these ongoing economic shocks since the COVID-19 pandemic (end of 2019) and exacerbated by the Ukrainian war’s fallout. This is particularly evident in Lebanon, which is facing a severe economic crisis for the sixth consecutive year due to political stagnation, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Beirut port explosion, and the ongoing Syrian crisis. The Gaza War has further impacted Lebanon, affecting the southern residents due to ongoing confrontations between Israel and Hezbollah and extending to sectors like tourism, agriculture, and foreign investment. Jordan is similarly affected, especially with its hosting of over 2.3 million Palestinian refugees.
The “Israeli Exception” in Regional De-escalation Trends: Over the past three years, several regional countries have notably shifted their foreign policies toward enhancing relations with countries they once viewed as adversaries. This includes official and unofficial visits, discussions between delegations, and forming follow-up committees to address outstanding issues or disputes in bilateral relations and regional security challenges. Political understandings and agreements have been reached, and trade and investment flows have increased, moving beyond “zero-sum approaches.” However, the October 7, 2023 attacks have shifted regional interactions toward an escalation path, especially given Israel’s political leadership’s ideological stance.
One of the main features of Middle Eastern interactions is the review of foreign policies by key regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, and Syria, moving away from past positions. This is reflected in various indicators, such as official visits to former adversaries, agreements like the Al-Ula Agreement between the Arab Quartet and Qatar, the establishment of strategic coordination councils between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, exploratory talks to resolve disputes, and political discussions between rival countries like Turkey and Syria. Israel remains an exception to this regional de-escalation trend, with its leadership continuing the Gaza War.
Current data support the option of de-escalation between conflicting parties for a period. The ideological shift among several political leaders has led to the understanding that the cost of peace is less than the cost of war and that resolving disputes can benefit all parties, as seen in recent armed conflicts in the region. However, it is notable that this de-escalation does not necessarily lead to full reconciliation, as trust gaps remain among some parties, requiring specific measures to rebuild trust.
Additionally, the multiple contentious issues may see some agreements and other disagreements, affecting the reconciliation process. The varying decision-making influences within several regional countries can lead to differences in perspectives, causing delays in reconciliation efforts. Gradual changes in the Middle East are visible, but the upcoming phase requires monitoring behaviors that respect or serve Arab interests to ensure the seriousness of the de-escalation option.
Challenges in Israeli-Arab Relations: The continuation of Israeli military operations in Gaza exerts multiple pressures on Arab countries that have normalized relations with Israel in recent years or are considering establishing relations, due to Israeli targeting of Palestinian civilians in Gaza and the West Bank, without distinction between civilians and combatants, and targeting both military and civilian infrastructure. According to the ruling far-right in Israel, Palestinian citizens are to be punished for harboring Hamas and allowing the October 7, 2023 attacks.
As Israeli military operations continue, the pace of new normalization agreements between the United States and Israel may slow down or halt temporarily. Israeli political leaders might bet on former President Donald Trump’s success in the U.S. presidential election to pressure Arab countries or negotiate certain national interest files to advance normalization with Israel. This is particularly relevant given that some U.S. think tanks believe the October 7 attacks were intended to “brake” the normalization train.
Stagnation of Internal Armed Conflicts in the Arab Region: This does not imply “stillness” but rather a lack of deviation from the general conflict model in the region. The persistence of this feature is compounded by the major powers’ focus on more pressing priorities, such as the Ukraine war, alongside a clear trend toward de-escalation among key Arab powers and their regional environment. This is especially evident in the rapprochement between these powers and both Turkey and Iran, given their significant roles in key Arab conflicts (Turkey in Syria and Libya, and Iran in Syria and Yemen).
The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war and the continuation of Israel’s war on Gaza have reduced international and regional attention on resolving armed conflicts in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Sudan. Despite international reports indicating a severe famine crisis in Sudan, global focus has shifted to Gaza due to the complex involvement of various local, regional, and international parties.
Limited U.S. Influence on Regional Arrangements: The ongoing Israeli military operations in Gaza and their potential expansion affect U.S. interests in the Middle East, which have regained importance on the American administration’s agenda after a period of retreat in favor of the Indo-Pacific focus. U.S. support for Israel’s right to defend itself threatens the security of Americans and American forces in the region, alongside rising popular opposition to the U.S., which compels Arab governments to adopt policies contrary to Washington’s goals in the Middle East.
The U.S. administration is currently facing pressure from many diplomats at the State Department, progressive Democratic legislators, human rights organizations, and widespread protests in U.S. streets and universities to change its policies and its unending support for Israel. This has forced the administration to manage domestic outrage and justify its stance supporting the continuation of the Israeli war in Gaza while failing to exert effective pressure on Netanyahu for a ceasefire agreement.
Limited Russian and Chinese Influence on Middle Eastern Dynamics: Despite increasing demands from regional countries for Moscow and Beijing to play roles in various issues and conflicts in the Middle East, both countries have limited leverage. The Gaza War has highlighted American moves, though ineffective in reaching a ceasefire and ending the war, compared to Russia’s focus on the Ukraine conflict and its efforts to strengthen its presence in Africa and maintain interests in Syria and Libya. Meanwhile, China’s influence has been minimal, with the exception of hosting talks between Palestinian factions seeking national reconciliation.
Uncertainty in the Region If Trump Returns to Power: The region faces a period of uncertainty following Israel’s targeting of Hamas leaders and Hezbollah cadres, possible intermittent responses from regional actors, and the lack of Israeli political will for de-escalation, particularly from Netanyahu and his ruling coalition. The U.S. Department of Defense’s deployment of additional fighter jets and warships in the Middle East, along with increased military readiness through additional missile defenses, presents risks of regional escalation and the widening of the conflict. Many powers do not want to expand the battle to new dimensions, which would have significant implications for the entire region, and predicting the timing and mechanism for exiting this phase is extremely difficult, especially with the potential return of former President Donald Trump, who may adopt different policies regarding the Palestinian issue and Iran.
In summary, the Middle East post-Gaza War will differ significantly from before in many dimensions related to power balances, the potential for expanded regional conflict, the future of the Palestinian issue and the two-state solution depending on Netanyahu’s or a new government’s stance, the direction of the new U.S. administration, possible generational shifts in Palestinian leadership, and other factors affecting Arab-Israeli relations.
