Recent Developments in Turkish Mediation
On August 3, 2024, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for a few days of meetings. During this visit, he met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Ethiopian Foreign Minister Taiee Atseke Selassie to continue Turkish mediation efforts between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as to discuss Turkish-Ethiopian relations. This visit was an extension of Turkish mediation efforts that began in early June 2024, when a direct meeting was held between the Foreign Ministers of Somalia and Ethiopia in Ankara. This meeting aimed to address the conflict arising from a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) regarding Ethiopia’s access to the port of Berbera, located in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. The parties agreed to continue discussions in Ankara on September 2, 2024.
The Turkish government stated that Minister Fidan’s visit to Addis Ababa on August 3, 2024, was part of its mediation efforts between the Federal Government of Somalia and Ethiopia. It is anticipated that during his time in Ethiopia, Minister Hakan Fidan will discuss progress on the upcoming mediation meeting with Ethiopia following the renewed conflict between the two countries. This conflict was triggered by Ethiopia’s signing of a MoU with the self-declared Republic of Somaliland on January 1, 2024, which granted Ethiopia a 20 square kilometer area for a naval base and port access for 50 years in exchange for possible Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland and a stake in Ethiopian Airlines. This agreement provoked a strong reaction from the Federal Republic of Somalia, which deemed the move illegal, expelled the Ethiopian ambassador from Mogadishu, and threatened to expel Ethiopian troops assisting in the fight against rebels. The MoU also attracted regional attention, particularly from Egypt.
On August 11, 2024, it was announced that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on August 10, 2024, discussing the enhancement of bilateral relations and tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia. President Erdoğan noted Ethiopia’s actions to preserve the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Somalia, viewing these actions as conducive to the peace process in the region. He emphasized the strengthening of relations between the two countries and expressed Turkey’s readiness to contribute to resolving the current tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as supporting Ethiopia’s stance on the Palestinian issue.
On the same day, August 11, 2024, and as part of continued Turkish mediation efforts, President Erdoğan discussed bilateral relations, regional tensions, and global developments in a phone call with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The Turkish Directorate of Communications stated in a release on Platform X that President Erdoğan highlighted the importance of cooperation between Turkey and Somalia, reaffirming the ongoing partnership between the two countries. He assured that Turkey would continue its mediation efforts and resolve tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia.
As a result of the Turkish mediation efforts, which were reinforced by the phone call between President Erdoğan and the Somali President, a second round of talks took place on August 12, 2024. Delegations from Ethiopia and Somalia met in Ankara as part of the Turkish mediation process aimed at resolving the dispute between the two countries. Reuters reported on August 12, 2024, that Turkey hosted a second round of talks between Ethiopia and Somalia to address the conflict over the agreement signed by Ethiopia with the separatist region of Somaliland. The talks were indirect, with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan holding separate meetings in Ankara with Ethiopian Foreign Minister Taiee Atseke Selassie and Somali Foreign Minister Ahmed Maalim Fiqi. The two African delegations did not meet face-to-face; instead, Turkish officials shuttled between the sides in what was termed indirect talks. In the first week of August 2024, Fidan proposed an arrangement to ensure Ethiopia’s access to the sea through Somalia, with Ethiopia, in return, recognizing Somalia’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty.
It is worth noting that the first round of direct talks between the Foreign Ministers of Ethiopia and Somalia took place in Ankara in early July 2024, and the parties agreed to reconvene for a second round on August 12, 2024.
Parallel to its mediation efforts between Somalia and Ethiopia, Turkey has been advancing its position in Somalia to communicate its message to both conflicting parties, albeit with different contents. For Somalia, the message is: “We are with you, providing protection for your land and interests from Western-backed powers, particularly the United States.” For Ethiopia, the message is: “Do not for a moment think that Somalia is alone; we stand with them, and we are now on their land and in their sea. Will you dare to challenge us?”
On August 13, 2024, www.focusonafrica.info reported that after the failure of the first round of talks, Somalia and Ethiopia agreed to hold a third round of negotiations in Ankara on September 17, 2024. The talks were conducted in separate, non-direct meetings, first with Somali Foreign Minister Ahmed Maalim Fiqi and then with Ethiopian Foreign Minister Taiee Atseke Selassie. The site noted that the deadlock resulting from the MoU signed between Somaliland and Ethiopia might lead Addis Ababa to recognize Somaliland as a decisive factor. Diplomatic sources indicated that the Somali side has requested the withdrawal and resubmission of the agreement without the section related to the recognition of the self-declared Somaliland region, which lacks international recognition. Following the MoU, Somalia/Mogadishu fears the stance of neighboring regions, including Somaliland, Puntland, and Khatumo, which seek to establish themselves as autonomous states without officially seceding from the country.
The Italian site agenzianova.com, closely following Somali events, confirmed on August 13, 2024, that Somalia and Ethiopia agreed to hold a third round of talks in Ankara on September 17, 2024, following the deadlock of the second round of negotiations concerning the agreement that grants Addis Ababa access to the Red Sea in exchange for recognition of Somaliland. This information was confirmed by a statement issued at the end of the talks and reported by the Somali media outlet Garowe Online. The site also noted that previous sources had reported that negotiations reached a standstill after Addis Ababa’s refusal to cancel the MoU signed on January 1, 2024, with the separatist Somaliland region. According to the same sources, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who is hosting the talks, held separate meetings with Somali and Ethiopian Foreign Ministers Ahmed Maalim Fiqi and Taiee Atseke Selassie, respectively. However, no agreement has yet been reached, raising concerns about the collapse of the negotiations.
On the other hand, fr.apanews.net revealed on August 13, 2024, that Ethiopia might consider abandoning the controversial deal with the separatist Somaliland (as outlined in the MoU with Somaliland) after Somalia, encouraged by Turkey, made an “attractive” offer for port access. In other words, Somalia proposed that Ethiopia could have access to one of its ports, thereby leading Ethiopia to abandon the MoU with Somaliland signed on January 1, 2024. A statement from Mogadishu on August 11, 2024, indicated that Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud had emphasized Turkey’s essential role in fostering dialogue and a peaceful resolution to regional issues during a phone conversation with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. President Mohamud reiterated Somalia’s willingness to engage in economic and developmental cooperation with Ethiopia, but insisted that such partnerships must always respect Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, and adhere to legal and international standards. This sentiment was echoed by garoweonline.com on August 13, 2024, noting that a source close to the negotiations, who requested anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the discussions, revealed that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with both parties twice to reduce their differences. The main issues for discussion include the fate of the controversial MoU signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland on January 1, 2024, and Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime security. A diplomatic source, speaking to Garowe Online on condition of anonymity, stated, “There is a dispute over the language of withdrawal from the agreement and the process of Ethiopia’s access to the sea.”
On July 28, 2024, it was announced that the Turkish presidency confirmed that Turkish naval forces would soon arrive in Somalia, working under the framework of the defense cooperation agreement signed in February 2024. This came six months after Ethiopia signed the controversial maritime MoU with the separatist region of Somaliland. Under the Turkish-Somali defense agreement, Turkish forces will train Somali naval forces to address emerging threats such as piracy and illegal fishing, among other maritime security challenges. On July 27, 2024, the Turkish parliament approved a proposal for a two-year deployment of Turkish forces, with a vote in favor of the mission. On January 1, 2024, Somaliland signed an illegal MoU with Ethiopia, granting Ethiopia automatic access to the Red Sea for the construction of a naval base at the port of Berbera in exchange for recognizing Somaliland as a sovereign state.
It should be noted that the area leased from Somaliland, mentioned in the MoU signed between Ethiopia and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, is known as Lugaya. Ethiopia has confirmed that it is leased from the government of the self-declared Somaliland, a historic coastal city located northwest of the Odal region, which administratively falls under Somaliland. Lugaya is situated 50 km south of Djibouti Port and 200 km north of the port of Berbera. It is one of the largest cities in the Odal region, with a population of 182,706, and is known for its fishing and camel milk. The city spans an area of 10,421 square kilometers and includes other nearby towns such as Sial
, Asha Ado, Herer, Jidhey, and Loyakado. The Odal region has a long history, including sultanates, kingdoms, and autonomy. Borama, the capital of the region, is considered one of the most developed areas in the north, particularly in terms of economy, education, religion, and communications.
Why is Ethiopia Establishing a Maritime Infrastructure for Commercial/Military Use?
Since the early 1990s, Ethiopia has lacked an effective naval force despite having had a navy in the past. When Abiy Ahmed became the Prime Minister of Ethiopia in 2018, one of his objectives was to revive the country’s naval capabilities. According to the Ethiopian government’s Fana News Agency, Abiy emphasized that military reforms should align with the rapidly changing world and with economic and political development. For Addis Ababa to reestablish its naval forces, it needs assistance from countries that provide access to the sea in the Horn of Africa region. In 2019, Ethiopia and France signed their first military cooperation agreement, and France appears to be the East African nation providing training and equipment for Ethiopia’s navy. It is believed that Ethiopia aims to influence the region on the eastern side of the Red Sea and secure maritime routes used by Ethiopian commercial vessels. Most of the cargo ships heading to Ethiopia pass through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. News reports indicate that Addis Ababa is rebuilding its naval force after Abiy Ahmed met with French President Emmanuel Macron, who promised to assist Ethiopia in this endeavor. Prior to the 1990s, Ethiopia was not a landlocked country (as Eritrea had not yet seceded), and its naval forces operated at full capacity. However, after the Ethiopian civil war in 1991, Ethiopia lost its coastline, including the crucial port of Assab, making the country landlocked following Eritrea’s declaration of independence. This forced Ethiopia to move its naval operations to a base in Yemen. A few years later, in 1993, the Yemeni government expelled Ethiopian naval ships from its territory, prompting Addis Ababa to relocate its operations to Djibouti and agree to a lease. However, in 1996, Ethiopia failed to pay the lease, leading Djibouti to seize the remaining Ethiopian naval vessels, according to Naval Post. Now, with the revival of its navy, Ethiopia could potentially find a base in one of four countries: Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya (which seems somewhat distant), or neighboring Somalia.
Why Did Ethiopia Choose the Port of Berbera in Somaliland?
The memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between Somaliland and Ethiopia on January 1, 2023, followed a decade of joint diplomatic relations. This 300-page document covers the strategic, economic, and geopolitical aspects of their partnership and represents a formal, mutual commitment to effective cooperation and mutual benefits.
The Port of Berbera, located on the Gulf of Aden, is a crucial asset for landlocked Ethiopia, which has traditionally depended on ports for its imports and exports. Ethiopia has relied heavily on the port of Djibouti as its main gateway to the sea. However, with increasing congestion at this port and rising tensions in relations with Djibouti, there is a growing need for alternative routes. The development of Berbera port and its associated infrastructure offers Ethiopia a strategic option that can reduce transportation costs and facilitate trade.
There are unresolved issues between Djibouti and Ethiopia regarding Ethiopia’s reliance on the Djibouti port. On July 29, a U.S. court ordered the enforcement of a $200 million judgment against Dubai Ports World in favor of the Djiboutian government. This ruling allowed Dubai Ports World to once again win in the East African country’s legal system after Djibouti halted the company’s management of the Doraleh Container Terminal. In 2023, Dubai Ports World filed a lawsuit in U.S. courts to enforce an arbitration award issued by the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), which had allegedly been suspended by the Doraleh Container Terminal management. This decision, which was recently approved by the District of Columbia Court, partially favored the company. Despite Dubai Ports World being a minority shareholder, it does not hold management rights. The dispute began in 2018 when Djibouti ended the company’s management of Doraleh and took control of the terminal, citing new infrastructure agreements.
Regarding the Port of Berbera, the UAE has invested 51%, equivalent to $442 million, while Ethiopia has invested 19%, and Somaliland has received 30%. The 19% share owned by Ethiopia will facilitate a connection between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The MoU signed on January 1, 2024, includes infrastructure projects such as road and rail links between Ethiopia and Berbera. Given that this agreement is expected to boost trade and economic growth in the region, the Berbera Corridor provides investment opportunities in port facilities, highways, and railways, positioning Berbera as a major logistics hub. This infrastructure development is anticipated to create a better environment for enhancing trade, foreign investment, and economic diversification in both Somaliland and Ethiopia.
For instance, the Berbera Corridor is expected to attract investments from other parts of the world, potentially enhancing economic elements in both Somaliland and Ethiopia. The port’s development is likely to create job opportunities and strengthen local economies, as claimed by Ethiopians and their Somaliland allies. The increased economic interdependence between the two regions is crucial for stability and growth. For Ethiopia, diversifying access to international markets through Berbera will enhance its economic security and resilience.
It is noteworthy that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, following his visit to Addis Ababa, announced another round of talks in Ankara in the second week of August 2024. In a press conference on August 9, 2024, reported on August 10, 2024, by Horseed Media, Fidan stated that Somalia and Ethiopia could ease tensions by accessing the sea through Somalia, provided Ethiopia respects Somali territorial unity. He explained, “The conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia will end when Ethiopia can access the sea and recognizes Somalia’s territorial unity and political independence.”
Researcher and analyst Mohamed Hirsi Salad (Djawin) noted that the Turkish Foreign Minister’s remarks showed confidence in both sides and that the time taken to initiate talks suggests progress and hope. He interpreted Fidan’s comments as an indication that the minister enjoys the trust of both Somalia and Ethiopia, which encouraged him to bravely postpone the meeting from September to August, reflecting positive prospects. Lawyer Gulid Davak commented that if Ethiopia withdraws from the agreement, Somaliland might consider it a fraud. He believes that Somaliland would view such a move as a withdrawal from the agreement with Ethiopia and would not welcome it, expressing regret if it occurs and seeing it as deceitful. He added that the reaction of Somaliland will depend on the outcome of the dialogue between Somalia and Ethiopia, stating that the extent of Somaliland’s response will depend on the agreement and where it is signed. On the other hand, Gulid Davak noted that if Ethiopia cancels the agreement, it would be a “victory” for the Somali government, thanks to Turkey’s efforts in this matter.
The Turkish Role as a Mediator:
Turkey’s role as a mediator in the Ethiopian-Somali dispute arises from the mutual recognition by Ethiopia, Somalia, and Turkey of Turkey’s presence and influence in the future of this conflict—if it persists—through its relationships with both parties.
With Ethiopia:
The Turkish and Ethiopian governments have had a long-standing relationship since 1896, before the establishment of the current Turkish Republic. Ethiopia plays an important role in Turkey’s African strategy. The Turkish embassy in Ethiopia was established in 1926, while the Ethiopian embassy in Turkey was founded in 1933. Although the Ethiopian embassy in Turkey was closed in 1984 due to changes in the Turkish administration, it was reopened in 2006. Since then, trade between the two countries has increased, reaching $345 million in 2023. Turkey is one of the top four investors in Ethiopia, with 70 Ethiopian companies and 250 Turkish companies participating in the Turkish-Ethiopian Business Forum in Istanbul at the beginning of 2024. In August 2021, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed visited Turkey while forming new alliances worldwide. At that time, Ethiopia was engaged in the Tigray conflict. His visit to Ankara was productive, where he met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the defense ministers of both countries signed a military and economic cooperation agreement. The main points of the defense agreement between Ethiopia and Turkey included: military training and education, defense equipment industries, intelligence and communication systems, and cyber defense. This agreement was signed by Ethiopian Defense Minister Kenea Yadeta and Turkish National Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, and was approved by the Ethiopian Parliament with a majority vote on May 17, 2022, while the Turkish Parliament approved it on April 13, 2023. Abiy’s visit to Ankara was well-received, and he received military equipment, notably Bayraktar drones, which significantly impacted the Tigray conflict in favor of the federal government in Addis Ababa.
With Somalia:
Turkey is working to build a strong presence in Somalia by investing extensively in the war-torn country. In 2017, Turkey established its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, where it trains Somali soldiers. In February 2024, the Somali government approved a ten-year defense and economic agreement with Turkey, which includes providing training and equipment for the Somali Navy to help protect the country’s maritime resources from threats such as terrorism and piracy. The Somali Parliament approved this agreement on February 21, 2024.
The Role of Turkish Support in Somalia
Military/Security Aspects
Since 2009, the Turkish military has actively participated in international efforts to combat piracy and terrorism in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia, as well as in the Arabian Sea and adjacent regions. On July 27, 2024, it was announced that the presidential memorandum had been approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly concerning the deployment of Turkish armed forces in Somali regions to be jointly determined by Somalia and Turkey. This includes Somalia’s maritime areas for a duration of two years. The memorandum stipulates the assignment of Turkish armed forces to Somalia for two years to support the activities ensuring the security of Somalia against terrorism and other threats. This was also accepted by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The memorandum, signed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, notes that training, assistance, and advisory activities to ensure security and stability in Somalia will continue under existing agreements between Turkey and Somalia. This includes the restructuring of Somali defense and security forces and ensuring their capability to combat terrorism and piracy. Turkish naval forces are engaged in the Gulf of Aden off the Somali coast (excluding Somali territorial waters) and in the Arabian Sea, adhering to international agreements on combating piracy and the UN Security Council Resolution dated December 16, 2008.
The Grand National Assembly of Turkey has actively supported efforts to combat armed robbery and terrorism at sea under the United Nations Charter and the authorization granted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly since 2009, with the most recent extension granted on January 17, 2024. In this context, Turkey has also contributed to ensuring maritime safety off the Somali coast and the Combined Task Force 151, which has been operating for this purpose since July 2024 for the seventh time. This memorandum indicates that while Somali defense and security forces have sufficient personnel and other resources, they have not reached the desired level of performance due to economic difficulties. The goal is to advance to the next phase of developing the capabilities of the Federal Somali Government, anti-terrorism forces, security forces, and other state institutions, aiming to ensure control over economically unassessable maritime areas and to integrate maritime resources into the Somali economy. This goal aligns with the Somali Security Sector Development Plan approved at the Somali Security Conference hosted by Turkey in New York on December 12, 2023, which aims for Somalia to eventually assume full security responsibility in the near future.
In discussions at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Deputy Bursa, Cemalettin Kani Torun, speaking on behalf of the Felicity Party, highlighted the historical ties between Turkey and Somalia. He provided historical context on Somalia and emphasized that Turkey had helped pull Somalia out of civil war. Torun asserted that the relationship between Turkey and Somalia is genuinely fraternal and that Turkey’s investments in Somalia have been beneficial for both parties. He supported the decision to send a warship to the region to secure oil exploration facilities, while also noting the stance of the secessionist region of Somaliland in the north, which had declared it would not allow Turkey to use its territorial waters. Despite this, Torun advised caution but expressed support for the proposal.
Deputy Şilcan Hamçıoğlu of the İYİ Party in Tekirdağ stated that the Turkish Armed Forces symbolize international security against terrorism, piracy, illegal activities, and all forms of smuggling and threats both at sea and on land. He noted that Turkish armed forces continue to contribute to global peace and security in their areas of deployment and emphasized that Turkey’s support is crucial for Africa’s stability and the safety of the Turkish Republic.
Deputy Kamil Aydın of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in Erzurum emphasized that previous accepted bills had led to positive developments and that the memorandum would prevent terrorist acts disrupting Turkey’s commercial presence while contributing to Somalia’s financial development. He expressed confidence that the support would not undermine the effectiveness of Turkish forces and welcomed the proposal.
Deputy Gilan Akça Koybulu of the Democratic Party in Diyarbakır suggested that the proposal should first be reviewed by the Foreign Affairs Committee and criticized the recent working system of the committee. He announced opposition to the proposal, arguing that some bilateral agreements with Somalia had not been discussed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and that the proposal was brought forward hastily.
Deputy Namık Tan of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in Istanbul claimed that the bill was rushed onto the agenda and criticized the lack of discussion on bilateral agreements with Somalia. He questioned why Turkish armed forces should be sacrificed for unlawful gains and stated that the CHP would vote against the proposal.
Fatih Dönmez, Deputy of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Eskişehir, provided information on Turkey’s policy in Africa. He described Turkey’s long-term goals of working alongside African nations rather than pursuing short-term objectives. Dönmez mentioned Turkey’s acquisition of three hydrocarbon exploration fields in Somali waters and criticized the CHP’s reaction. He affirmed Turkey’s intention to become a global player rather than a regional one and stressed the importance of supporting Somalia in its fight against terrorism and ensuring regional stability.
On July 30, 2024, the Turkish Radio Voice of America reported President Erdoğan’s remarks on the opposition’s views, criticizing their stance on Turkey’s interests and accusing them of irresponsibility. Erdoğan emphasized Turkey’s commitment to protecting its national interests and defending the rights of Turkish Cypriots.
Economic Aspects
The Somali Federal Government signed an oil exploration agreement with the Turkish government, which will undertake exploration in three areas of Somali waters. This agreement, announced by Turkish Energy and Minerals Minister Alparslan Bayraktar on July 20, 2024, grants Turkey exclusive rights to explore and extract hydrocarbons – oil and natural gas – from these three areas, each with a circumference of 5,000 kilometers. The Turkish exploration vessel, Oruc Reis, will conduct a comprehensive survey in these areas starting from late September to early October 2024. The agreement is seen as a historic step between the two countries, with the expectation that it will benefit both and strengthen their bilateral relations.
On July 29, 2024, it was announced that the Turkish state-owned oil company would send a seismic survey vessel to Somalia within weeks to begin preliminary exploration in the recently granted marine blocks. This step is part of a broader agreement between Ankara and Mogadishu, under which the Turkish navy will provide maritime defense and training services for two years in exchange for access to three maritime exploration areas. Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar confirmed the plan to send the Oruc Reis to Somalia in early October 2024 for 3D seismic data collection. The vessel, which has previously been involved in disputes over gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean, will conduct the survey over several months, with drilling and extraction expected if feasible.
However, the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in northern Somalia has warned against any Turkish military presence in its waters, stating that such actions would violate international law and Somaliland’s sovereignty. This concern was also echoed by other political figures who questioned the implications of the agreement.
Assessment of the Situation:
Firstly, it is essential to establish a fundamental truth to understand the nature of the situation in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia. This truth is that both Ethiopia and Turkey are building regional roles to achieve their broader interests, regardless of the mild and unproductive anger it causes other parties such as Egypt or the United Arab Emirates. The latter meddles and engages in interventionist policies to support the Ethiopian side simply because it is close to the Zionist entity, which provides protection in return for these practices—practices unbefitting a respectable or genuine state.
Another truth to consider is that Turkey is only undertaking this mediation because it is confident in being accepted by both parties as an objective mediator well-versed in their interests and capabilities. This includes understanding how each party can bear the continuation of the conflict in the context of broader disputes in the Horn of Africa, major power interests and calculations, and local forces directly involved in the dispute. Notably, the Somali people, naturally hostile to Ethiopians, view them as occupying forces with expansionist colonial intentions. Additionally, there is the armed group al-Shabab, which, like other resistance forces globally, is constantly subject to reputational damage. The group is stigmatized as a terrorist entity due to its resistance against the United States, the world’s largest terrorist power engaging in global terrorism, which supports the most infamous contemporary terrorist gang, falsely called a state, referred to politely as the “Zionist entity.”
In light of the above, among the possible outcomes of Turkish mediation are:
- Agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia: Somalia and Ethiopia might agree to the Turkish proposal, which includes granting Ethiopia a maritime outlet from one of three port alternatives in federal Somalia, depending on which option the Ethiopians are willing to accept:
- Option A: The port of Mogadishu, close to Turkish and American presence. This might be preferred by the Turks, as it would place the Ethiopians directly under Turkish observation.
- Option B: The port of Kismayo in southern Somalia. This port was previously a base for the Somali and Soviet navies following the 1969 military coup against President Siad Barre. It is currently vulnerable to continuous attacks and closure by tribal militias and al-Shabab.
- Option C: The port of Bosaso in Puntland, on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden at the mouth of the Wadi Baled. This port is relatively close to Ethiopia. For whichever port option is granted to Ethiopia, the port concession period would not exceed ten years, renewable with both parties’ consent, and the granted area would not exceed 20 square kilometers. Before the agreement with the Federal Republic of Somalia, an implicit agreement would occur between Ethiopia and what is referred to as the Republic of Somaliland to replace the memorandum of understanding signed with Ethiopia in January with an official agreement signed with Mogadishu. This exchange would involve several Ethiopian advantages, including a stake in Ethiopian Airlines and other Ethiopian benefits, but not recognition of the so-called Republic of Somaliland. Turkey might offer some secondary benefits to Somaliland to achieve certain interests and assist in its development.
- Acceptance of the Memorandum of Understanding by the Federal Republic of Somalia: Somalia might accept the content of the memorandum of understanding signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland, with changes to the duration and area to substantiate the Somali position, even if only formally. This change might not be objective but is a possibility.
- Failure of Negotiations: Negotiations might fail due to:
- Internal Somali Rejection: The fundamental rejection within Somalia, based on the belief that Ethiopia is merely an expansionist enemy with historical ambitions in Somalia, such as its acquisition of the Berbera port. This is seen as a stage in a broader expansionist strategy similar to its actions in Ogaden and the practices of the Zionist entity in Palestine.
- Ethiopian Intransigence and Emirati Rejection: Ethiopian stubbornness and Emirati refusal of the clear Turkish role and the covert Qatari role in the Horn of Africa, reflecting past instances suggesting the potential for similar outcomes in the Somali-Ethiopian dispute over the Somaliland-Ethiopia memorandum regarding the Berbera port.
It should be noted that if the indirect negotiations lead to a fruitful agreement, it will solidify Turkish interests in the Horn of Africa and expand Turkish diplomacy to new horizons across the region. Contributing factors include the reduced effective political activity of Egypt, evidenced by Egypt’s failure to thwart Ethiopia’s efforts to build the Renaissance Dam or to promote its viewpoint on Nile waters in the Entebbe Agreement—rejected by Egypt and Sudan but signed by six Nile states and now in effect.
The United States is not far from what Turkey is doing in the Horn of Africa. Turkey operates in the Horn of Africa with the assistance of three effective factors:
- Its imperial legacy from the Ottoman state, which still impacts the region, the state, and the Turkish citizen.
- Turkey’s strategic and active membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which enables Turkey to play a distinguished and productive role in various regions like Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, Syria, and Iraq.
- The dynamic nature of Turkish politics, which has benefited from the state’s structural strength and the productive nature of democratic values since the end of the rigid military era in 2002, alongside the institutional framework within the Turkish state.
