As the third round of Turkish-mediated talks between Somalia and Ethiopia approaches, scheduled for September 17, 2024, in Ankara, and amid the increasing presence of competing regional and international powers in the Horn of Africa, questions arise regarding the challenges facing Turkey’s influence in this strategically important region. Particularly, many indicators point to a significant rise in Turkish influence over recent months.
Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa, which includes Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, has not been isolated from the geopolitical tensions and divisions these countries have experienced, nor from broader African developments, where international and regional powers compete for a foothold in the Red Sea amidst a range of changes.
Turkey aims to bolster its influence and present itself as a key player in the Horn of Africa through defense cooperation agreements, mediation efforts, and energy investments. However, this raises questions about the scope, motivations, and Ankara’s ability to meet these commitments in the face of numerous regional and international challenges.
Indicators of Turkish Influence
Several recent indicators highlight Turkey’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa:
Defense Cooperation with Somalia: In February 2024, Turkey and Somalia signed a framework agreement in Ankara for defense and economic cooperation. According to Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, this agreement aims to build Somalia’s navy and protect the country’s natural resources from piracy, drug and arms smuggling, and terrorism. This agreement, set to last ten years, envisions Somalia establishing its own naval forces to take over these responsibilities.
Military Cooperation with Djibouti: In February 2024, Turkey signed three agreements with Djibouti, covering military training cooperation, financial military cooperation, and a protocol for implementing cash assistance.
Drone Exports to Somalia and Ethiopia: Turkey has sought to export its weapons to Horn of Africa countries, including drones. Turkish company Baykar has supplied Somalia with TB2 drones, enhancing Somalia’s fight against the terrorist group Al-Shabaab. International reports also indicated that Ethiopia’s federal forces used Turkish drones in their war with Tigray. In December 2023, Baykar’s chairman handed Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed a drone model, signaling increased military ties.
Energy Investment Agreements: In March 2024, Turkey and Somalia signed an agreement for cooperation in oil and gas, including exploration and production in Somali land and waters. In July, the two countries signed an agreement for hydrocarbon exploration, with Turkey agreeing to send its research ship, “Oruç Reis,” to conduct seismic studies off Somalia’s coast. In September 2024, Turkey will deploy the ship to explore offshore oil fields in Somali waters.
Mediation Between Somalia and Ethiopia: Turkey has been mediating between Somalia and Ethiopia following the latter’s agreement with Somaliland to establish a foothold on the Red Sea. Although the first two rounds of talks ended without a resolution, Turkey hopes the third round in Ankara will be successful.
Turkey’s Motivations
The Horn of Africa’s strategic importance in international and regional competition is enhanced by its location as a crossroads between Africa, Asia, and Europe, with access to the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, the region’s natural and mineral resources and oil reserves further amplify its value. Turkey’s key motivations for expanding its influence in the Horn of Africa include:
Strengthening Presence on the Red Sea: The strategic significance of the Red Sea has increased, particularly with its importance as a pressure point in conflicts like Israel’s war on Gaza and the Houthi attacks threatening international navigation. About 12% of global trade and 30% of global container traffic pass through the Red Sea. Turkey’s growing presence in African countries bordering the Red Sea complements its earlier steps, such as opening its largest overseas military base in Somalia in 2017 and signing an agreement with Djibouti in 2016 to build a five-million-square-meter free economic zone on the Red Sea.
Military Expansion Beyond Turkey: Although Turkish defense companies are smaller compared to major Western or Russian firms, Ankara aims to gradually become a key arms supplier to the Horn of Africa, securing its interests and expanding its influence. Turkish drones have become increasingly common in African conflicts, contributing to a 27% increase in Turkey’s defense and aerospace exports in 2023, reaching a record $5.5 billion.
For African nations dealing with insurgencies and facing underfunded militaries, such as Togo, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, Turkish drones and counter-terrorism expertise offer crucial support. Unlike the West, Turkey does not impose governance or human rights conditions on the sale of these drones.
Turkey’s increasing arms sales to Africa aim to reposition it as a mid-sized power in a multipolar world. When an African country purchases drones or military equipment, it becomes dependent on the supplier for ammunition, spare parts, and maintenance, creating long-term dependencies that Turkey can leverage.
Diversifying Oil Supplies: Through its agreements with Somalia, Turkey seeks to play a dominant role in energy extraction, an industry it has been eager to enter for years to achieve energy independence and diversify its oil supply. Turkey’s interest in Somali oil dates back to 2020, when President Erdoğan expressed interest in importing oil from Somalia, aiming to reduce Turkey’s reliance on Russian and Iranian energy.
In summary, Ankara stands to gain significantly from its cooperation with the Horn of Africa, given the challenges these countries face, such as ethnic conflicts, armed disputes, and border issues. These issues have destabilized local governments and hindered development, potentially directing some resources into weapons that fuel these conflicts.
Competition Challenges
Despite the changing global order moving toward a multipolar world, which might favor Turkey’s role in Africa, significant challenges remain. Countries like Russia and China see the Horn of Africa as a strategic area, fostering military, economic, and geopolitical competition.
Moreover, international competition, particularly in Somalia, along with the country’s internal security, political, and economic problems, pose additional challenges to Turkey’s defense cooperation agreements and its broader ambitions in the Horn of Africa.
For instance, recent Egyptian military activities in Somalia require Turkey to coordinate with Cairo to avoid conflicts of interest, especially amid the notable improvement in Turkish-Egyptian relations, marked by President Sisi’s historic visit to Ankara on September 4, 2024, following Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo earlier in the year. Both visits reflected mutual efforts to enhance bilateral ties and coordination on shared concerns like Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Gaza, and Libya.
In conclusion, while Turkish influence in the Horn of Africa faces significant challenges, the region remains a top priority in Ankara’s foreign policy. Turkey’s defense and security partnerships in the region will likely lead to greater influence, with Djibouti being another focal point for Turkish military involvement.
