The correlation between social deviance and political violence in colonial settlement communities: “Israel” case study

Prepared by: Dr. Walid Abdel Hay.
(Special to the Zaytouna Centre).


Social deviance sociologists define social deviation as a blatant and repeated departure from the value system’s assumptions in a particular society verbally or indeed, and deviation is measured by three indicators: the degree of repetition, the unity of deviation, and the diversity of its forms. [1] One of the most prominent problems of settlement communities (e.g. Israel, the United States, and South Africa during the period of racial discrimination… The diversity of the social environments from which the settlers came from makes the value system of society conflicting, in terms of the arrangement and composition of the value ladder in general, and the determination of the highest value in this system in particular. The government’s ability to address the issue of the “most important” of the population is also a major concern. [2]

According to a number of specialized studies, the replacement settlement communities, which have liquidated, displaced, destroyed or dismembered the indigenous community, make the ultimate value force, in which most members of the settlement communities participate, despite the sharp disparities in their social and cultural backgrounds. The emergence of settlement communities was done by force, and the success of the exercise of such force, both against the local population and against nature, reinforces the centrality of the idea of force and violence. [3] It is no coincidence that the United States has the highest rate of external military intervention in the world, that the most violent form of racial discrimination recorded in South Africa, or that Israel is the most inviolation of UN resolutions, as its violations of UN Human Rights Council resolutions established in 2006 exceed the total number of violations by all countries of the world. [4]

This means that the source of social and political deviation in Israeli society is not separate from the three factors that glorify force and violence, and constitute the cultural background of every segment of Israeli society:

1. The way the settlement community is formed by force, the Israeli rebel against the original society from which he emigrated, used force to control a new geography, and practiced its survival through cycles of violence with indigenous peoples and their neighbours, and we referred in a previous study to an Israeli public opinion poll that reveals that 64% of them believe that “Israel” can live only “by the sword”,[5] which is reinforced by the militarization Index, in which Israel occupies the first place in the world. [6] The value of power in the Zionist individual was enhanced by his success in achieving most of his goals, which led him to believe that force with its violent content was the solution to all social and political dilemmas.

2. A system of religious values based on a specific idea of superiority, based on a metaphysical knowledge system that makes it “the chosen people”, and according to its religious texts give it the right to control others, which reinforces the idea of power, because it sees it morally justified because it is supported by a religious text, the centrality of Joshua (or Joshua in Arabic writings) ben Noon in The Zionist-Jewish thought came from being the most glorified and powerful against others, and in the Torah texts the cruelty and glorification of unparalleled power. [7]

3. A Western legacy built in some dimensions on a combination of the values of conflict and power (from Greek heritage to Hegel, Marx Marx, Darwin, Freud, Nietzsche, Niebuhr Nebuhr, Morganthu Morgenthau, … And between the values of pragmatism and utilitarianism (David Hume, John Dewey, John Dewey, … It is a dimension that is consistent with the system of values of the replacement settlement communities. [8] It is well known that most Zionist leaders originated in this Western cultural environment, which glorifies power on the one hand, and the idea is as valid as it is, the essence of pragmatism.

First: Manifestations of social deviation
in Israeli colonial settlement society:

due to the different societal backgrounds and value system of the settlement community, due to their multiple societal origins, some aspects of delinquency appear in more segments of society than others, while others intersect despite the different societal backgrounds, as is evident, for example in The influx of Jewish immigrants from the republics of the former Soviet Union, and the 20% increase in the population of Israel during the period 1990-1993, led to high tensions and deviations in the relationship between Soviet and Ethiopian Jews, due to the sharp disparity in social backgrounds. [9] For example, social studies indicate that Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union are the highest among israeli society in relation to their population in three dimensions: [10]

1. They are the highest in the school dropout rate, and the highest in ability to adapt to the Israeli school system.

2. They are the highest in the rate of alcoholism, compared to their older counterparts than other segments.

3. They are the highest in the crime rate they commit, and more than the proportion of the total population, as will be seen with us in this study.

According to Israeli researchers, Israeli society does not adopt the pattern of “integration” of the new immigrant, but rather adopts the pattern of “assimilation”, as the Zionist political philosophy in dealing with immigrants is based on the “assimilation” of these immigrants on the basis of the “assimilation” of these immigrants, namely, the Jewish religion, the Hebrew language, the performance of military service (and any departure from these three dimensions is a deviation), and “Israel” is unique from the rest of the world society in that it imposes on Jews “” these elements, and therefore the ministry of absorption of immigrants was called the Ministry of Absorption of Immigrants and not work. On the “integration or integration” of migrants with their new society integration without the condition of melting into a new national identity, as in the normal societies to which immigrants benefit, and studies of integration and adaptation by the migrant with the new society take a little generation or more, and in aspects of sexual behaviour may be more complex and timeless, which lays the basis for tension in the early stages between society and the immigrant, and according to these studies, the features of this issue are evident in the relationship between The Jewish community and the community. [11] The difficulty of a Russian Jew to adapt to the following indicators is illustrated by an Israeli researcher from Tel Aviv University: [11]

1. The percentage of secularism among Russian immigrants is higher than among other Jews.

2. Distinguish between Russian Jews who came out of “Zionist thought” in the first waves in the mid-20th century, and those who came from the repellents of post-Soviet society. As they make up 20% of Israeli society, they have been able to create less religious parties, trade, business sectors and cultural concerns, making them a subculture that refuses to “assimilate”. They continue to maintain their ties with the Russian society from which they came, and continue to follow Russian satellite channels in Russian and establish business partnerships with them. Rather, they maintained relations with the Soviets who migrated to countries other than Israel, which made them closer to the “global” citizen cosmopolitan, or transnational, community.

3. They suffer from linguistic tension, as most of the elderly do not tend to improve their Hebrew and maintain the use of Russian, which makes them less popular with Hebrew writings.

4. The high incidence of divorces among Russian Jews, the high rate of single-parent families, and the higher proportion of female sex workers among them than in other Jewish groups, especially their cooperation with organized crime organizations.

This means that the separation of social crime (based on the breach of the prevailing social values system) from the political environment (based on the pattern of political behaviour between the authority and the diverse groups and the groups themselves) does not help to build scientific analysis, which means that social deviation in settlement society needs to be seen specifically as a deviation of particular character. A Jew who has lived under the sense of being a “minority” in the communities from which he came from will not act consistently when he finds that he has become a majority in Israel. Thus, the narrow tendency of identity prompts him to look for what sets him apart from the rest of the Jewish community in Israel, as his shift will push for two options, both of which involve violence: [12]

1. A sense of superiority over other minorities in “Israel” in terms of moving from a subordinate or inferior position to a superior or dominant position, which is what we observe in the behavior of the Ethiopian Jews.

2. To find what distinguishes it within the Jewish community from others to strengthen it, to ensure the independence that he was accustomed to when he was “a member of the minority”, which we observe in the conduct of Russian Jews.

Second: Patterns of delinquency
prevailing in Israeli settlement society:

1. Murders, theft, assault on property, etc.: [13]

In 2015-2018, the homicide rate in Israel increased from 1.4 per 100,000 to 1.5, and Israel ranks 149th out of 230 political entities in the world in the level of these crimes, making it almost average, but the data on the number of people hospitalized for violent crime injuries shows that the distribution of victims is not ethnically proportional to the ratio of race in the total population to the rate of victims, as indicated by the following official table of victims. Israeli from 2008 to 2017.

Table 1: Distribution of victims of crimes (death or injury) according to population ratio [14]

Ethnic backgroundTheir proportion of the total community (%)Percentage of victims (%)Percentage of their victims to their proportion in society (%)
Palestinians (1948)*20.646.1223.8
Black Jews13.2320
Jews of the former Soviet Union7.912.7160.8
The rest of the Jews.70.53853.9

* Israeli statistics add the population of East Jerusalem among the Palestinians of 1948, while the percentage of jerusalem not counting jerusalem is 16.8% in 2019.

The previous table indicates that the disproportion between the proportion of the ethnic group (or social) in the total population and the proportion of targeted crimes have political backgrounds of racial content (due to both colour, race or both), and the repercussions of these trends are likely to infiltrate the political structures of parties and trade unions, and to form negative mental images from each other, especially since the proportion of prisoners per 100,000 in Israel during the period 2000-2018 from 158 to 23, up from 158 to 23, up from 158 to 23, up from 158 to 23, is likely to be the same. Some 48%,[15] their ethnic distribution or community background does not differ from the implications of the previous schedule, which reinforces the likelihood that the number of victims of certain races is disproportionate to their proportion of the total population, which is evident in the high proportion of Palestinian victims, followed by Black Jews and Then Russians, while the proportion of other Jews (especially Westerners) is lower than the total population.

On the other hand, the concern of society over the recurrence of crimes creates an environment conducive to the emergence of a neuroticism society characterized in one dimension by a more inclined to interpret simple situations as threats, and minor frustrations as deep and complex frustrations. Israeli public opinion polls for 2017-2020 reveal these aspects, with the following results indicating:

Table 2: Indicators of Crime Anxiety in Israeli Society [16]

Anxiety IndexPercentage (%)
Feeling the increase in crime rates over the past three years53.92
Increase in corruption and widespread bribery42.9
Exposure to theft and vandalism of property35.91
Fear of stealing things from inside the car.34.87
Fear of stealing the house after he left33.59

The high frequency of anxiety can be linked to suicide rates, with Israeli studies and recent official reports submitted to the Ministry of Health on the magnitude of suicides in Israel, which include information on the number and proportion of suicides in 2000-2016, indicate the following results: [17]

A. The annual suicide rate is between 385-390 cases.

B. The highest gender suicide rate occurred for those aged 75 and over.

A. The suicide rate of Jews in Israel is 2.4 times higher than the average suicide rate among Palestinians in 1948.

D. The suicide rate of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union is twice that of the rest of the Jews, while among Jewish immigrants from Ethiopia it is four times higher in recent years than in recent years than in recent years for other Jews in Israel.

E. The suicide rate among married couples is lower than that of divorced and single men.

Aboutone third of suicide attempts among young people were for those around the age of 21.

Some researchers link suicide levels in Israeli society to the tense political environment in Israel. For example, an Israeli study indicates that the suicide rate increases every time in the year after a war between Israel and The Arab States, and an Israeli researcher applied this rule to “Israel” in all its wars during the period 1948-2007, and found it to be true at all times, which means that the war leads after the end to high tensions in the collective sense. Other studies link suicide to factors that help it such as: [18]

A. The level of religiosity: suicide rates among secularists have been observed to be higher than among religious people.

B. Social background: Suicide rates among Western Jews are higher than among Easterners.

C. The level of industrialization: the high suicide rates among Jews from industrialized countries compared to those from agricultural countries.

D. Military service: The proportion of Israeli military suicide bombers is higher than their counterparts of the same age who do not join the army, and the percentage rises after military operations, which was clearly observed after the second Palestinian intifada, which means a lack of cognitive consistency among the military, which fed on the values of force on the one hand, but on the other, which is the same situation for American soldiers after the Vietnam War, and after the Iraq war in 2003.

2. Sexual deviance
(sex trade):

Sexual deviance is two dimensions: sexual slavery (rent or sale) on the one hand, and human trafficking through kidnapping or misinformation for sexual slavery purposes on the other. [19] Global profits from the human trafficking trade are estimated at between $150 billion and $190 billion, of which about 100 billion are for the sex trade. [20]

Although Israel ranks 100th among countries in terms of population, it ranks 20th in the world in income from the sex trade, with sex trade income in 2016 at about $318 million per year, while other sources estimate income at about $500 million. Between 12,000 and more than 17,000 people work in the sector, and 71% have sought refuge in the profession due to economic conditions. [21] The former Soviet republics are the main source of trafficking of women to Israel for sex purposes, as we have mentioned earlier, and the rate has reached between 3,000 and 5,000 per year, which is approximately 40-50% of all sex workers, according to Israeli official reports for 2016. [22]

According to international rankings, the world is divided into three tiers levels or tiers frames depending on the intensity of the sex trade, and “Israel” was classified under the framework or the third belt until 2001, but moved to the second belt in 2009, and then to the first belt in 2011. [23] In 2018, israel’s Knesset approved a law supporting 34 members without objection from any member who prohibits sex trade, but it “criminalizes clients” and does not criminalize a prostitute’s prostitute. [24] However, specialized references indicate that 10,000 Israelis go to brothels every month. [25]

What is striking about this phenomenon in Israeli society is that it is increasing on the one hand and the increase in violence in obtaining it on the other. According to Israeli security reports for 2013-2014, the rate of complaints to security posts regarding sexual assaults is as follows:

A. The number of complaints received by all rape authorities reaches 40,000 annually, of which 15% are for the security services.

B. The annual increase in rapes is 12%.

C. 64% of complainants are between the ages of 12 and 18.

D. There have been 957 cases of sexual assault among the military, more than half of them during the military duty.

E. Four out of five young people have experienced sexual violence in one form or another.

The rate of sexual violence has doubled in 2020 compared to 2019.

In recent times, it has been noted that organized rapes or sexual violence against women, which are run by criminal gangs, have taken on a highly violent nature, resulting in demonstrations and the participation of more than 30 official bodies, particularly in a number of cities, including Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beersheba and others. [27] According to the “Sexual Assaults against Women” report submitted to the Knesset Committee on the Status of Women and Gender Equality, the police opened 6,123 sex crimes cases in 2017, up 7% from 2016, and sexual harassment increased by 13%, and of women who were harassed, two-thirds were between the ages of 20 and 34, 22% between 12 and 18, and 11% of children. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics(CBS) personal security survey, only 3% of victims reported ill-treatment to the police. The Central Bureau of Statistics estimates that there were 121,500 incidents of sexual assault in 2017, reinforcing the phenomenon of the phenomenon in the last five years. [28]

The Israeli feminism has raised the problem of the relationship between “national security and individual security”, particularly violence against women by gender or gender, sexual assault, or in terms of the status that women have in the Israeli army in promoting or joining certain units. [29]


Israel ranks 136th out of 183 countries in terms of drug-related deaths, with a mortality rate per 100,000 inhabitants to 0.67 deaths. [30]

Israeli press reports indicate that Israeli settlers closest to the Gaza Strip border are the highest in drug addiction, owing to their psychological turmoil, and that this proportion is increasing markedly. [31]

According to an epidemiological survey in Israel among adults aged 18 to 65, 27% of the population used cannabis, 2% other illicit drugs, and 0.25% reported heroin use during this period, and it is estimated that 1 5,000 to 25,000 People Who Use Drugs in Israel, although the exact number of people using injecting drugs (PWID) people who inject drugs is unknown, as is the prevalence of HIV/AIDS among them. However, according to the PWID database of the Israeli Ministry of Health – Tuberculosis and AIDS Department, 260 cases were reported in 2017, 56% were infected with HCV, and 5% of patients were HIV-positive. [32]

A report by Elem, which was handed over to Israeli President Reuven Rivlin, states: [33]

A. One in four Young Israelis aged 12 and above are using drugs.

B. The proportion of young people who use drugs in less fortunate areas rises to one in two.

The report indicates that social media has led to a clear increase in access to drugs or to their promoters.

Studies show that from 1967 to 1980, the phenomenon of drug use in Israeli society increased by about 26%, reaching 7.2 thousand addicts in 1980, and the number rose to about 300,000 on occasions, or permanently in 2018, revealing a clear and rapid increase. [34]

4. Corruption:

Transparency International reports that the rate of political and economic corruption in Israel is increasing, especially in recent years, with Israel’s level of transparency falling from 28th in 2016 to 32nd in 2017, and 35th in 2019, with transparency in 2016 at 64 points and then declining to 60 in 2019. [35]

However, the phenomenon that deserves attention is the increasing number of figures in senior political positions who were sentenced to corruption during the period 2000-2020, as shown in the following table: [36]

Table 3: Number of senior political figures sentenced for corruption during 2000-2020

of State
of the Church

Third: The implications of
social deviation on political behavior:

The results of specialized quantitative studies [37] indicate that political violence and social violence share at least one fundamental reason, namely the nature and structure of the prevailing political system. Hybrid political institutions create uncertainty about the basis of legitimate authority in society, and undermine the state’s ability to maintain On the rule of law, there is space for the activities of those who reject the values of society, in such a way that individuals and groups are forced to bear the burden of directly defending their own interests, and political violence is mixed with social violence, which hinders economic growth and undermines the State’s ability to provide public goods, further exacerbating the conditions of poverty and inequality that drive people to commit acts of violence.

Moreover, democratic institutions may reduce the risk of organized violence but increase the risk of social violence, which is generally weak. These studies have shown that the establishment and maintenance of a stable political system is a first-class condition for reducing social violence, but when looking at Israel, the increasing indicators of social violence (which we have addressed) have been associated with the indicator of political instability, and in 2000-2018, Israel’s ranking in the political stability rate ranged from 154to 173. [38]

Another dimension can be identified in the relationship between social deviation and political behaviour in Israeli society, by linking the propensity for violence by specific ethnic groups, namely The Asian-African and Russian ethnic groups, themselves, the poorest groups on the other hand. Around the rich cities, which makes the temptation of theft high, as confirmed by specialized Israeli studies, it has been shown that about half of the thefts of property in cities are carried out by individuals outside these cities but live next to them. [39]

On the other hand, the violent actions of Jewish settlers against Palestinians are characterized by a combination of moral offence (assault on property, theft of money, cars, etc.) Between the political offence, the settler gives his moral offence to religious pretexts, particularly those who belonged to jewish fundamentalist religious movements, a phenomenon recognized by a number of Israeli and Western academics, i.e., the cover-up of the moral offence under the religious pretext, which confused the social motive with the political motive of the crime. [40]

Tracking the electoral behavior of Russian Jews, 75-80% of them vote for extreme right-wing parties, most notably the “Israel Beiteinu” party led by Russian-born Jew Avigdor Lieberman, meaning that the Russian Jewish community feeds both right-wing parties on the one hand, and social crime on the other, making the roots of social violence embedded in the political soil. [41]

Social media plays a role in psychological shipping, reinforcing racism and social neurotic behaviour, and available figures show that an Israeli publication calling for violence against Arabs and Palestinians every 64 seconds on social media, a total of 495,000 violent publications against Arabs and Palestinians were issued in 2019, and the Joint Arab List and its leaders were the main themes of violent Zionist discourse during the parliamentary elections in the same year. The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media published the results of its annual index of racism and incitement on Israeli social media sites for 2019, and the research revealed that the peak of incitement against Palestinians and Arabs in 2019 was associated with the two rounds of Israeli elections, and shows a 14% increase in violent rhetoric towards Arabs and Palestinians between the two rounds, and these statistics indicate a 5% increase in inflammatory publications compared to 2018 statistics.


The relationship between social crime and political crime lies in the interlocking of their roots with each other. There is a parallel rise in this indicator with the rise in social crime rates against the aforementioned segments, and these results are clearly reflected in the language of incitement (especially social media) or in the distribution of votes in the elections in a way that reflects a parallel political polarization to attract victims of social violence, an outcome that explains what we mentioned in an earlier article on the concerns of future Israeli and Western studies about future Israeli social and political unrest.

[1] Cristina Sanches et. al., “Deviant behavior variety scale: development and validation with a sample of Portuguese adolescents,” in Psychology: Research and Review journal, 2016,
[2] Site of Jewish Virtual Library,
[3] Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 75–94.
[4] Eliezer Sherman, Report: Since Inception, UNHRC condemned Israel more than rest of world’s countries combined, site of, 25/6/2015.
[5] Walid Abdel Hay, “Scientific Paper: The Future of Israel in Non-Arab Future Studies,” Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultancy, 1/10/2020:Click here
[6] Max M. Mutschler and Marius Bales, Global Militarisation Index 2019 (Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion),
[7] See details and texts on the philosophy of power in the Jewish heritage: Ihsan Morteza, “The Philosophy of Violence as an Imperative in Israeli Politics,” National Defense Magazine, Issue 44, April 2003, click here
[8] It may be useful to return to the following reference, which compares replacement settlement models, including the Israeli model, and presents the centrality of power in all of these models, see:
Patrick Wolfe, Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native, Journal of Genocide Research, No. 4, vol. 8, Dec. 2006, pp. 387–409.
[9] Shechory Bitton Mally and Ben-David Sarah, Social Dominance, Family System and Deviance Among Immigrant Youth in Israel, Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice, vol. 8, no. 4. Oct. 2010, pp. 290–311.
[10] J. Mirsky, Social deviance among immigrant adolescents from the former Soviet Union in Israel: Data and risk factors, Anales de Psicologia, Vol. 28, Issue 3, 2012, pp. 675–682.
[11] Larissa I. Remennick, Women with a Russian Accent’ in Israel: On the Gender Aspects of Immigration, The European Journal of Women’s Studies, Vol. 6, 1999, pp. 445–454.
[12] Tami Amanda and Brent E. Sasley (editors), Redefining Security in the Middle East Manchester (University Press, 2018), pp. 84–89.
[13] Homicide rate, site of Knoema,; and List of countries by intentional homicide rate, site of Wikipedia,
[14] Abebe Tiruneh et. al., Minorities and foreign born are disproportionately affected by injuries due to violence: an analysis based on a National Trauma Registry 2008–2017, Israel Journal of Health Policy Research, no. 8, March 2019.
[15] Site of World Prison Brief,
[16] Crime in Israel, site of Numbeo,
[17] Site of World Health Organization,
[18] Eliezer Witztum and Daniel Stein, Suicide in Judaism with a Special Emphasis on Modern Israel, Religions journal, vol. 3, Issue 30, 2012, pp. 725–738.
[19] Site of International Labour Organization (ILO),–en/index.htm
[20] 11 Facts About Human Trafficking, site of,; and Havocscope, Prostitution: Prices and Statistics of the Global Sex Trade (Havocscope Books, 2015), E-Book.
This reference estimates that income reaches $186 billion, while the number of sex workers is estimated at about 13.8 million women globally.
[21] Site of The Times of Israel, 1/6/2020,; The Times of Israel, 10/7/2020,; and Havocscope, Prostitution: Prices and Statistics of the Global Sex Trade.
[22] Sam Sokol, Turning Around the Record on Sex Trafficking in Israel, site Hadassah magazine March 2020,
[23] Trafficking in Persons Report (U.S. Department of State Publication, June 2009), pp. 165–166,
[24] The “Scandinavian model” is legislation that imposes a fine on male sex workers, for details see: BBC website, 25 April 2019, in:
see also: The Jerusalem Post Newspaper, 31/12/2018,
[25] Havocscope, Prostitution: Prices and Statistics of the Global Sex Trade.
[26] Statistics from the Association of Rape Crisis Centers in Israel, site of The Association of Rape Crisis Centers in Israel (ARCCI),
[27] The Times of Israel, 23/8/2020,
[28] Cassndra Gomes-Hochberg, A Jerusalem center works to break the silence about rape, The Jerusalem Post, 22/8/2019.
[29] Tami Amanda and Brent E. Sasley, Redefining Security in the Middle East Manchester, pp. 89–92.
[30] World Health Rankings, site of World Life Expectancy,
[31] Site of Middle East Monitor (MEMO), 11/9/2019,
[32] Hagit Bonny-Noach, Harm reduction drug policy in Israel: what has been accomplished and what still needs to be done, Israel Journal of Health Policy Research, Vol. 8, No. 75, 2019,
[34] Nachman Ben-Yehuda, The Politics and Morality of Deviance (State University of New York Press, 1999), p. 170; and site of The Blogs Jacob Maslow, The Times of Israel, 2/3/2018,
[35] The Jerusalem Post, 23/1/2020,
[37] One of these studies included a sample of countries, including Israel, which linked political and social violence, and found a strong relationship between them, see:
Sean Fox and Kristian Hoelscher, The Political Economy of Social Violence: Theory and Evidence From A Cross-Country Study, Working Paper No. 72 (London: Crisis States Research Centre, 2010), pp. 8, 11, 13, 15–16.
[38] Site of,
[39] Boris A. Portnov and Arye Rattner, “Spatial Patterns of Crime in Israel: Investigating the Effects of InterUrban Inequality and Proximity,” Department of Natural Resources & Environmental Management, University of Haifa,
[40] Look at this issue and the details in:
David Weisburd, Jewish Settler Violence: Deviance as Social Reaction (The Pennsylvania University Press, 1989), chapters 5, 6, 7; and Simon A.Wood and David Harrington Watt, Fundamentalism: Perspectives on a Contested History (University of South Carolina Press, 2014), chapter 6.
[41] Site of Israel Hayom,; and The Times of Israel, 26/7/2019,
[42] Site of 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media,

SAKHRI Mohamed
SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and International Relations in addition to a Master's degree in International Security Studies. Alongside this, I have a passion for web development. During my studies, I acquired a strong understanding of fundamental political concepts and theories in international relations, security studies, and strategic studies.

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