A limited-scale war may occur on the side of the Tigrayans on the Eritrean borders to lure the international community mired in the Ukrainian crisis into greater involvement in solving the Ethiopian dilemma, but it is more likely that the war will remain a costly adventure for all and the results are not guaranteed, and there is international consensus on Ethiopian reconciliation.
Remarkable developments have recently taken place in the Ethiopian and Horn of Africa arenas. With the relative calm on the front line of confrontation between the federal army and the Tigrayan fighters, the armed conflict has moved into the government camp with the ongoing confrontation between the Ethiopian government and what it describes as irregular armed forces, led by the Amharic Fano militia, as it emerged in a parallel context Another confrontation with the Oromo Liberation Army.
As a result of the intertwining of the Ethiopian internal and external files, the previous developments coincided with another movement in the inter-relations between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan, amid indications of political changes accepted by the region.
Accordingly, the paper attempts to work on understanding and deconstructing the recent developments, and drawing the features of the new landscape expected in the broader regional context.
First: The confrontation with the “Fano” militia
The confrontation of the Ethiopian government with the Amharic Fano militia represented an unexpected event, given its role in the Tigray War, as it was an important part of the irregular armed formations that counterattacked the Tigrayan forces after the dispersal of the Federal Army following the sudden blow inflicted on it in The first day of the war on November 4, 2020, when these militias, along with the special forces of the Amhara region, took control of the areas west of Tigray, and their role also became more prominent in repelling the Tigrayan forces after their incursion into the Amhara and Afar regions, summer and autumn last year, and their threat to storm the capital. The overthrow of Abi Ahmed’s government (1) .
- Fano Campaign Objectives:
The shift in the governmental position can be attributed to a set of interrelated factors between local, regional and international:
Locally:
1- The prime minister’s desire to market himself as a leader capable of imposing the prestige of the state, especially since one of the most important drawbacks of Ahmed’s government was the security liquidity that the country witnessed during his reign even before the start of the war in Tigray with the spread of ethnic and sectarian conflicts in various regions of the country.
2- Gaining the support of Ethiopian groups that were afraid of the rising influence of Amhara nationalists during the past years, given the Ethiopian historical experience in which the Amhara elite was the ruling class or what some describe as “internal colonialism” (2) of the Ethiopian peoples.
3- Gaining the support of segments of different nationalities in conflict with the Amhara (3) .
4- The liquidation of the irregular armed forces that constitute centers of power capable of creating security disturbances in different regions of the country.
5- Weakening the nationalist Amharic political currents by liquidating the military forces that support them.
6- Getting rid of the forces that may stand in the way of radical transformations that the reconciliation process between the government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front may witness, especially since the Amharic militias have a radical view of the subordination of some of the disputed areas with the Tigrays, which the latter place among their main demands to reach a political settlement with the Addis Ababa government.
Regionally :
1- The liquidation of the Amharic forces capable of provoking regional unrest, especially with Sudan.
2- Denying any party wishing to escalate the situation inside Ethiopia in the future to cooperate with an armed force with a popular base, especially Eritrea, which trained thousands of Amhara militia fighters after the outbreak of the war (4) , while it agreed to train thousands of Amharic special forces in 2018 ( 5) .
Internationally :
1- A message to the international community demanding its withdrawal from the areas of western Tigray, paving the way for the wheel of reconciliation to turn.
- Who is Fano?:
The term Fano has a historical dimension linked to “the free peasant who fights in defense of his motherland, Ethiopia” (6) , but in its present manifestation, Fano represented the youthful counterpart of the Oromo Kiro movement that led the popular movement against the rule of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front ( EPRDF ) that ruled Ethiopia led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front between 1991-2018, this movement that eventually brought down the Tigrayans and led to Abiy Ahmed’s rise to the position of prime minister in April 2018.
Fano is composed of several groups, most notably: (a) Young urban activists and politicians who campaigned since 2016 to include areas such as Walgait and Hamra, then under the Tigrayan authority, in the Amhara region. (B) “Shifta” armed outlaws stationed in the forests and looting, young politicians took advantage of them to mobilize nationalist sentiments against the Tigrayan-led government. (C) Armed tribal militias who enforce the law at the tribe level, and they are mostly former conscripts (7) .
To its supporters, Fano represents “groups of fighters..fighting to save their people from annihilation. They are the embodiment of the spirit of [the people of] Amhara and the defenders of Ethiopia throughout history” (8) , while a joint report by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch accused the Amharic forces, Including Fano, committing violations in the western Tigray region “amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity” (9) .
In any case, the consensus among all these parties is that it is a national movement that puts in mind the defense of the interests of Amhara, based on a long history in which this nationalism represented the dominant group that colored Ethiopia religiously and culturally, and on what it describes as the grievances they were subjected to during the rule of Tigray (1991- 2018) or what one of the writers abbreviated as the “Amhara Holocaust” (10) .
C- Federal government strategy:
The strategy of the federal government in Addis Ababa in confronting Fano is based on three axes: first , a media axis related to the status of the operation under the slogan “law enforcement operation” (11) , and the assertion that the government targets “irregular armed groups” involved in a range of illegal activities , such as provoking security disturbances on an ethnic or religious basis, drug smuggling, disrupting transportation, and seizing land (12) .
The second axis is the demand by the Amhara region authorities for Fano members to register within the “government security forces structure” and the residents’ demand to register firearms, threatening violators with legal accountability (13) , which gives justification for the government forces to engage in armed clashes with the refusing elements and arrest them, as more than 4,500 suspects were arrested. within the framework of the rule of law enforcement process (14) .
The third axis , the attempt to break up the Amhara front by opening negotiation channels with some Amharic parties with the aim of neutralizing them in this conflict, especially those who believe that Fano’s militia activity has dwarfed the role of the Amhara, who historically consider themselves a basic nucleus of the Ethiopian state project.
Second: The confrontation with the Oromo Liberation Army
Unlike the Amharic militias, the clash with the Oromo Liberation Army was expected, as this organization took up arms against the central government for years, and its role became prominent in the fall of last year with its announcement with its ally, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, that they were approaching the encirclement of the capital, Addis Ababa.
A- The objectives of the campaign against the army:
The factors behind the government’s decision to engage in a military confrontation appear similar in some respects to the objectives of the campaign against the Amharic militia, while the following can be added:
1- Weaken or get rid of a personal competitor to the Ethiopian Prime Minister on the popular base within the Oromo nation, which is the largest in terms of population and as a political base in the country.
2- Putting pressure on the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, considering the army as its most prominent military ally.
3- To put pressure on the Oromo Liberation Army militarily to force it to engage in the process of reconciliation and dialogue in the future.
4- Breaking the thorn of the organization, which proved its danger when approaching the encirclement of the capital, Addis Ababa, last fall.
5- Blocking the way for any external forces wishing to use it to stir up the Ethiopian interior within the framework of proxy wars in the Horn of Africa, especially since the Oromo Liberation Front was stationed in Eritrea before its leaders signed a political agreement with Abi Ahmed’s government in 2018, according to which it returned to Ethiopia.
6- Protecting the Ethiopian capital from any future encirclement attempt that cuts off the vital road with Kenya, which the Oromo Liberation Army threatened to seize last fall.
b- Who is the Oromo Liberation Army?
In April 2019, the Oromo Liberation Army announced its separation from the Oromo Liberation Front (15) after it reached a political agreement with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018, according to which it would return to its political activity inside Ethiopia in exchange for laying down arms. The government pejoratively calls it “unak shani” (the five people in the Oromo language, referring to people who opposed their leadership’s direction). Where an internal dispute arose between the political and military leaderships against the background of the latter accusing the Ethiopian government of not fulfilling its commitments (16) .
The number of his soldiers was estimated at 2,800 in 2018, with expectations of an increase in the number later (17) as a result of the disappointment of sectors of the Oromo youth with Ahmed’s policies, which they see as not compatible with their national aspirations. The army claims the right to self-determination for the Oromo, and is led by a million Deriba, known by his nom de guerre Gal Marro (18) . The Ethiopian parliament designated it a terrorist organization in May 2021 (19) .
The Oromo Liberation Army was accused of a large number of attacks against the Amhara people who live in Oromia region, especially in the western regions of the region, which was denied by the army spokesperson (20) .
C- Government strategy:
The government’s strategy in confronting the Oromo Liberation Army is based on military confrontation and imposing a siege on the Oromia region to force the population to expel OLA fighters from their midst, and to prevent their escape to other regions. borders, as well as preventing them from fleeing to neighboring countries by signing security and military agreements with Kenya and South Sudan before launching the campaign on April 9, 2022 (21)
Third: The cooling of Eritrean-Ethiopian relations
After a relatively short period of normalizing relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa with the signing of the Declaration of Reconciliation on July 9, 2018, and thus ending the bloody border conflict between the two countries over the “Badme” triangle, there have been many indications in the recent period that there is a difference between the two parties, as Eritrean criticism of the way in which The Ethiopian government’s abuse of the Tigray file. The Eritrean forces had actively participated in the military operation launched by the federal forces in the Tigray region on 4 November to eliminate the common threat faced by the two allies from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.
The last of these indicators was a “political comment” published by the official website of the Eritrean Ministry of Information on May 17, and the Eritrean Minister of Information shared its details on a group of tweets on his Twitter account (22) , which means official approval of the analysis it included.
This “commentary” is important for confirming the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s planning of an “attack” targeting “Eritrea and the Eritrean people” (23) , as despite previous skirmishes between the two parties in the past 24 weeks, no comment or statement was issued by the Eritrean government regarding it. Which indicates serious changes that Asmara is feeling.
The importance of this “commentary” is increased when noting that it was preceded on 2 May by an open letter from the Secretary-General of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, Debrecion Gebremicel, to the President of the African Union and President of Senegal Macky Sall, in which he stated that President Isaias Afwerki’s goal was to “crush” the Tigrayans, and that He is preparing another military operation to impose his hegemony on the region (25) , and the Eritrean commentary issued a statement from the Tigray leadership confirming their adherence to “the right and duty to voluntarily mobilize our forces for self-defense” (26) .
On the other hand, the comment was not consistent with the positions of Asmara and Addis Ababa, which appeared in previous official statements. Rather, it included a direct and veiled criticism of the Ethiopian government’s policies towards dealing with the Tigray file.
The comment assessed the withdrawal of the Ethiopian government from the Tigray region last summer and its declaration of a ceasefire as the result of external pressures and “mistakes”, which was previously described by Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki as an adventure that should not be repeated (27) .
The comment also described the humanitarian activity to provide relief to the people of Tigray region as a rush by Western governments to “supply… in the name of relief before the start of the war” (28) , referring to the humanitarian truce announced by the Ethiopian government on March 24, 2022 (29) and the subsequent suspension Firing between the two sides, under which some aid convoys began to enter the region.
Based on this, the comment implicitly holds the Addis Ababa government responsible for any possible repercussions on the Eritrean border, because the truce and the ceasefire gave the Tigrayan forces the opportunity to catch a breath on the one hand, and on the other hand, because the Tigrayan forces will not launch any ground attack on Eritrea unless they are reassuring to the Calm on its front with the government.
Apparently, this “suspension” and the official celebration of it was a message addressed to many parties, the first of which was the Ethiopian government, which was remarkable not to have any reaction to what was included in the comment, given the nature of the strategic alliance between Asmara and Addis Ababa during the past years and the field coordination Between the two sides in the Tigray War.
The comment also represented a message to the international community that includes a warning that supporting the Tigray schemes will return the Horn of Africa “to chaos, instability and divisions” (30) .
This was not the only indication of a chill between the Eritrean presidency and the Ethiopian prime minister. While the Ethiopian president and her foreign minister sent congratulations on Eritrean Independence Day to President Isaias Afwerki, it was noted that Abiy Ahmed did not send any similar congratulations unlike previous years.
Considering the nature of the consensus between the Amhara nationalists and the Eritrean government on many essential points, such as the rejection of any kind of reconciliation with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the refusal of the Tigrayans to obtain any outlet to Sudan (31) , and the agreement on the “strict” centralization of the philosophy of governance in Ethiopia, based on Despite all this, the news of the campaign in the Amhara region will not be welcomed by Asmara, which, as a result, loses one of its most important allies within the Ethiopian arena (32) .
Fourth: Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan
During the years of the war in Tigray, the Sudanese-Ethiopian relationship went through many zigzags related to a set of files between the two countries, starting with the Renaissance Dam and ending with the tensions around the Fashaqa Triangle.
In this context, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Demke Mekonnen recently addressed, in his testimony before the Ethiopian Parliament, his country’s relations with Khartoum in two main issues: the war in Tigray and Al-Fashqa; Where he stressed that his government informed “Sudan that the support and harboring of the terrorist Tigray Liberation Front elements is no less than a war against Ethiopia by Sudan because these elements originate from their base in the northern neighbor,” while describing Sudan’s control of the Fashaqa lands as an “invasion” and that his country would restore “the entirety of it.” its lands in every possible way” (33) .
In any case, these statements cannot be separated from developments inside Ethiopia, as the government is trying to pull the rug out from under the Amhara nationalists who consider this area as part of their territory, and the importance of this step increases in view of the raging conflict between the government and the Fano militia in Amhara, which has intensified in recent times. clearly.
In addition, Ethiopia suffers in various regions, including a severe drought and famine-like conditions facing millions of citizens, and is linked to the acceleration of drought cycles in the region resulting from climate changes, which means the recurrence of these disasters in the future, and thus the strategic importance of the fertile Fasha lands as a future food basket. .
While the Ethiopian dissatisfaction with Khartoum’s position on the Tigray war appeared early, as Addis Ababa took Sudan to take a number of steps, the most important of which was turning its lands into a haven for Tigray refugees, as their camps in Sudan became a magnet for media and human rights organizations, which formed a pressure campaign Global control of the Ethiopian government throughout the months of this war.
The Ethiopian government also confirms that among these refugees are Tigrayan fighters, and Addis Ababa has announced that it has responded more than once to attacks by armed groups coming from Sudan (34) .
Although Ethiopian officials confirmed the existence of wings in the Sudanese authority that support the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, which built strategic relations with Khartoum during its rule of Ethiopia (1991-2018), the importance of Mekonnen’s statements increases in view of two factors: the first is that they were preceded by days of Abi Ahmed’s visit to the military headquarters in Al-Hamra bordering Sudan, where he affirmed the readiness of his forces to “restore peace” in the event of any disturbance (35) , and the second is that opening a crossing to Sudan is a strategic goal for the Tigrays.
Mekonnen’s stress that his government is doing everything in its power to “resolve the conflict and disputes with Sudan peacefully and through dialogue” confirms that the Ethiopian statements will not go beyond messages and verbal escalation, a trend shared by Sudan, which denied the Ethiopian accusations, describing “the [recent] Ethiopian escalation came at a time when it needed the region to stability and calm” (36) , which indicates Sudan’s desire to avoid any escalation, given the multiple problems it suffers from following the October 25 coup.
Fifth: Movements between Eritrea and Sudan
The past period witnessed successive visits by an Eritrean delegation headed by the Eritrean Foreign Minister Othman Saleh to Sudan. Eritrea also offered to mediate in resolving the crisis in eastern Sudan, while the Eritrean ambassador in Khartoum Issa Ahmed Issa declared that “Sudan’s security represents security for the African region” (37). .
These Eritrean moves stem from Asmara’s awareness of the ongoing transformations in the region on more than one level, as the deterioration of Eritrean-Ethiopian relations will be a direct result of the possible Ethiopian reconciliation process reaching a political settlement. In this context, Khartoum’s position on future developments appears important to Asmara, where Sudan represented the lung that Eritrea breathed through it in pre-2018 (38) , with the closure of the borders and the “cold war” with both Ethiopia and Djibouti.
On a second level, it seems that Asmara wants to secure the side of Sudan in the event of any future clash with any Ethiopian party, as the previously mentioned “commentary” stated that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front aims to regain control over the areas bordering Sudan and western Eritrea, which raises Asmara’s fears. In view of its accusations against Sudan in the 2000 war of opening its borders from this area for the passage of Ethiopian forces to the western front in Eritrea, and taking off Ethiopian planes from Port Sudan airport to bomb Eritrea (39) .
These data can be placed in the context of the transformations taking place in the region, especially after the Somali elections and the departure of President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, a close ally of the Eritrean president. The media quoted Mahmoud that his first task would be to “return the Somali youth who were taken to Eritrea and participated in the war in Ethiopia” ( 40) , and while the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front were quick to congratulate him, the Eritrean president was the only leader in the region who did not send messages to congratulate Sheikh Mahmoud on his assumption of office.
It seems that Sudan is dealing with caution with Asmara in light of the critical conditions it is going through, especially that Eritrea has direct relations with many movements and forces in hotbeds of tension in the country.
Conclusion and expected scenarios:
The confrontation with the Fano militia cannot be separated from the process of rearranging the Ethiopian internal house by the Ethiopian Prime Minister so that it becomes a central point capable of controlling all the tools of the political scene. (41) , where many Amhara military leaders were removed and arrested, as well as journalists and opinion leaders (42) and others were arrested.
In addition to the awareness of the Amhara leaders of the ongoing replacement and replacement process, it seems that they have serious fears that they will become a scapegoat for the Ethiopian reconciliation, which is expected to take place through the national dialogue announced by the Prime Minister late last year, where the Amharic militias were held responsible for many The horrors of the war, along with fears that the liquidation of Fano would leave them without a protective shield if the conciliatory process failed and war broke out again.
Therefore, there have been many forms of Amharic objections to the current political developments in the country, whether at the partisan or popular level, which threatens to turn the region into a focus for the opposition if the government does not find the appropriate mechanisms to allay the fears of the Amhara.
As for the Oromo Liberation Army, it seems that the operation is not going according to plan, as the regional government had previously announced a month-long plan to eliminate the army, but the operation is about to enter its third month without a clear end horizon.
It seems that the current and upcoming stage will witness greater activity for local mediation through the major Oromo clans (Aba Qada), which indicates that if they fail, some areas of Oromia will continue to be a center for opposition to the government in the future.
The regional scene seems confused as a result of the liquidity situation that the region is going through, making it difficult to reach definitive results that determine future features, but the possibilities can be summarized in the following scenarios:
The first scenario: the state of apathy between Asmara and Addis Ababa develops into a rupture as Ethiopia continues the process of reconciliation with Tigray, and thus delaying the convening of the reconciliation conference until next November to give the government an opportunity to address the legal, political and field files such as liquidating the Fano militia and putting pressure on the Oromo Liberation Army. While Eritrea will embrace the anti-reconciliation wings of these two organizations without engaging in a direct war with Ethiopia. In this scenario, Sudan will turn out to be the biggest winner, as the alliance with it appears as a strategic guarantee for both parties.
The second scenario : the Tigray attempt to break the siege by carrying out a large-scale military attack, which can be deduced from the continuous accusations from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front to both the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments that they continued the siege, and what was reported from them about the failure of diplomatic efforts (43) , with the continuation of all From the Tigray Defense Forces and the Ethiopian army in the crowd, along with the Ethiopian statements about the strong relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara. Here we find ourselves in front of two scenarios:
A- The attack of the Tigray Defense Forces on the Eritrean front, which carries high risks in view of the Eritrean preparations during two decades on this front, and the expected ferocity as a result of the Eritrean popular rejection of the Tigrayans, and it is difficult to imagine such an attack without some kind of agreement with the Ethiopian government, or some role Military forces for Sudan, as it will leave the region exposed to the federal forces and threaten it with falling between the jaws of the pincers. Accordingly, the current discrepancy between Asmara and Addis Ababa is related to the latter’s interim policies with consensus on the strategic goal of eliminating the Tigray People’s Liberation Front completely, even if it requires launching an operation new military. Thus, this attack will be accompanied by an attempt to penetrate the Ethiopian government’s defenses and reach the borders of Sudan, which indicates that such a round, if it occurs, will be the most violent and effectively threatens the disintegration of the state.
B – The attack of the Tigray Defense Forces on the Eritrean front in agreement with the Ethiopian government, which is difficult to imagine, as it is not consistent with the siege policy adopted by Addis Ababa, and it is one of the most important cards in its hand now, so how do you agree to lose its usefulness?! If it is in Abi Ahmed’s interest to weaken the Tigrayan and Eritrean parties, this scenario carries a high risk of weakening him too if it occurs before the final agreement on reconciliation in Ethiopia.
The third scenario: a comprehensive attack by the Eritrean forces on the Tigray defenses, which is indicated by the leaks about Eritrea’s obtaining Russian drones and building a base for Moscow in Eritrea (44) , and this scenario is linked to the ongoing transformations on the international scene and the threat to transfer the conflict between the major powers from eastern Europe to eastern Europe. Africa, but the extent to which this scenario can be achieved is mainly related to the position of Addis Ababa, which brings us back to the second scenario, and what casts more doubts about it is that the aforementioned Eritrean comment was defensive, especially with the indirect call of Western countries to prevent the Tigrayans from carrying out their scheme according to characterization.
Although an escalation or even a limited border war is in the interest of both Tigrayans and Eritrea, as the former are trying to lure the international community mired in the Ukrainian crisis into greater involvement in solving the Ethiopian dilemma, while Asmara’s interest is to confuse the path of the conciliatory process and put pressure on Addis Ababa. To move away from its current course, our assessment is that the most likely scenario is the first, where a comprehensive war now appears to be a costly and dangerous adventure for all and results are not guaranteed, and there is an international consensus on Ethiopian reconciliation. Jeffrey Feltman, the former US envoy to the Horn of Africa, stated that the interests of both America and China That the state in Ethiopia does not collapse under the weight of war, and that cooperation with China, which announced a peace initiative in the Horn of Africa, is possible to achieve this goal (45) .
The importance of reconciliation increases when considering that the resumption of fighting may open the door for terrorist organizations to be active in the Ethiopian arena, as the security authorities announced the thwarting of a scheme by the Al-Shabab group targeting Addis Ababa (46) .
While China, the vital partner of the Eritrean regime, is likely to work to calm the tension between Asmara and Addis Ababa and prevent reaching the brink of war in the event of a successful reconciliation, with the region turning into a new arena of the upcoming Cold War in light of the transformations in the global system With the prolongation of the war in Ukraine, where transformations on the international scene occupied an important part of the Eritrean President’s speech on the anniversary of independence (47) .
About the author
Abdul Qadir Muhammad Ali
Eritrean journalist and researcher interested in issues of the Horn of Africa.REFERENCE
(1)After the Ethiopian government’s victory over the Tigrayan forces, a document was circulated late last year, allegedly issued by the Ethiopian government, discussing security challenges, including “the privatization of arms among civilians and irregular armed groups, especially Fano.”
Addis Standard, Gov’t ‘organizes, not disarm’ Fano members who fought for survival of country: Amhara state, 17 January 2022, (Seen: 23 May 2022), https://cutt.us/dstl5
2 Mergo, Teferi, Ethiopia’s Problems Stem From Internal Colonialism, FP, 22 July 2022, (Seen: 26 May 2022), https://cutt.us/ne1Sc
(3)The Amharic militias clash with a host of other nationalities over issues mainly related to the territorial dependence of these Oromo and Qemuz nationalities.
4Erena, Eritrea, 3rd round of military training for Amhara forces in Kachero area, 15 April 2022, (Seen: 26 May 2022), https://cutt.us/lOUhA
5 Walsh, Declan, The Nobel Peace Prize That Paved the Way for War, WSJ, 15 December 2021, (Seen: 26 May 2022), https://cutt.us/Q6KmH ,
The desire to weaken the forces that received support from Eritrea also explains the Ethiopian government’s reluctance to support the Afrin special forces and militias in its confrontation with the Tigrayan forces in different parts of the Afar region during the past months, as the Afari forces received support from the Eritrean government to repel the invasion of the Tigrayan forces into the region last summer.
6 Labzaé, Mehdi, The war in Tigray (2020–2021), in Bach, Jean-Nicolas, Routledge Handbook of The Horn of Africa, 2022, p 246.
(7)Previous source, same page.
8 Berhanu, Girma, Fano: A Living Saviour of the Amhara People and the Ethiopian Spirit, Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal – Vol. 9, No. 1, 2022, p.114.
9HRW, Ethiopia: Crimes Against Humanity in Western Tigray Zone, 6 April 2022, (Accessed: 23 May 2022), https://cutt.us/s5sJL
10Admassu, Muluken, The Amhara Holocaust: The History of the Amhara People, 19 April 2022, Talem Publishers.
(11)It is a symbolic name in this context, as it was named after the operation launched by the government to control the Tigray region in November 2020.
12 Addis Standard, National Security Council classifies Ethiopia’s “enemies” into three, vows to respond with timely, proportional measures, 23 April 2022, (Seen: 23 May 2022), https://cutt.us/s62mU
13 Addis Standard, Bahir Dar city Security Council Command Post calls on local Fano members to register under gov’t security structure, residents to register firearms within five days, 8 November 2022, (Seen: 23 May 2022), https://cutt.us/Y8QmO
14 Addis Standard, Amhara state security detain more than 4,000 in ongoing crackdown, 23 Ma 2022, (Seen: 23 May 2022), https://cutt.us/9IHvJ
15Endeshaw, Dawit, OLF Politics, Military Splits, The Reporter, 6 April 2019, (Viewed: 23 May 2022), https://cutt.us/slL2y
17EPO, OLF: Shane Splinter Faction, ND,(Seen: 24 May 2022), https://cutt.us/q5ll2
18Hanspal, Jaysim, Ethiopia: The 2016 FIFA World Cup is coming to an end, 11 November 2021, (Seen: 24 May 2022), https://cutt.us/EwcDw
19Aljazeera, Ethiopia to designate TPLF and OLF-Shene as ‘terror’ groups, 1 May 2021, (Accessed: 24 May 2022), https://cutt.us/QAyIn
2020 EPO, OLF: Shane Splinter Faction – ND,(Seen: 24 May 2022), https://cutt.us/r6sp4
21 Addis Standard, The boomerang effect: How political betrayal transformed Oromo youth protest to armed resistance, 15 April 2022, (Seen: 24 May 2022), https://cutt.us/olwKB
(22)Information Minister’s Page: Mr. Yaman Meskel, tweet dated May 17, 2022 (entry date May 26, 2022):
(23)According to a later article published on the website of the Eritrean Ministry of Information, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front has a two-stage plan: the first is to “integrate some Eritrean lands” without specifying them, then to seize “most of the Eritrean highlands, and large parts of the lowlands in eastern Eritrea.” The goal, according to the article, is to “create the Tigrays.” Grand.” And talk about the establishment of this entity increased its momentum on many levels after the outbreak of the Ethiopian war and the escalation of the independence movement within Tigray.
Ministry of Information of Eritrea, TPLF’s War of Insurrection: Fundamentals of the Conflict and Chronology of Events , Shabiat, 27 May 2022, (Seen: 27 May 2022), https://cutt.us/FVr82
24 The Star, Tigray forces clash with Eritrean army – reports, 9 May 2022, (Seen: 25 May 2022), https://cutt.us/n0uxO
(25)Tigray Office of Foreign Affairs page, tweet on May 3, 2022 (accessed May 26, 2022):
(26)Tigray Office of Foreign Affairs page, May 18 , 2022 tweet (accessed May 26, 2022):
27 Shabiat, Interview with President Isaias Afwerki on current regional issues and GOE domestic development programmes, 10 January 2022, (Seen:25 May 2022), https://cutt.us/SvK7Z
28Ministry of Information of Eritrea, Commentary, Shabiat, 17 May 2022, (Viewed: 24 May 2022), https://cutt.us/CiAaQ
(29)FRANCE 24, Ethiopia: The government announces an “open humanitarian truce” with the Tigray region for the delivery of aid, March 24, 2022, (viewed: May 25, 2022):
30Ministry of Information of Eritrea, Commentary, Shabiat, 17 May 2022, (Viewed: 24 May 2022), https://cutt.us/CiAaQ
(31)The Amhara considers that the areas of Hamra, Wulqait and Tsegidi bordering Sudan historically belong to their region, and taking control of it from the Tigrays was one of the most important reasons for their participation in the war, while Eritrea believes that the arrival of the Tigrayans to an outlet to Sudan will give them the opportunity for logistical supply, and makes the idea of a “Tigrai state” more reasonableness and viability.
(32)In addition to what was reported by various media about Eritrea’s training of Amharic forces, the former Amharic Special Forces commander, Tafra Mamo, was recently arrested, and he had a remarkable role in repelling the Tigrayan forces’ attack on Amhara territory, while lawyer Melwa Tadesse said that Mamo “is accused of trying to dismantle the constitution. Unverifiable news is circulating about his involvement in a coup plot backed by Eritrea, which will have dire consequences for the relationship between the two countries if proven true. Look:
Tsegaye, Getahun, Former Amhara State Special Forces Commander Accused of Attempting to Dismantle the Constitution, Addis Standard, May 21, 2022, (See: 26). May 2022), https://cutt.us/NP6qT
(33)Al-Ain Al-Akhbariya, Ethiopia talks about “war” in tension with Sudan, May 17, 2022, (viewed: May 26, 2022), https://al-ain.com/article/1652772064
(34)Yassin, Mohamed Amin, Ethiopia accuses Sudanese army of supporting Tigray rebels, Middle East, September 5, 2021, (viewed: May 26, 2022),
35 Borkena, Ethiopian PM made another tour to a military base in the North West, 8 May 2022, (Seen: 26 May 2022), https://cutt.us/TrhYx
(36)Sudan Tribune, Sudan rejects Ethiopian accusations of harboring the Tigrayan Liberation Front, May 19, 2022, (accessed: May 26, 2022),
https://sudanttribune.net/article258943/
(37)Koko, Murtada, Afwerki’s third message for proof within a month.. What do you carry?, Al Ain News, May 17, 2022, (viewed: May 26, 2022),
38 For example see: Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), 2011, Art,417.
(39)Al-Basha, Mahjoub, The Enemy Brothers The Eritrean-Ethiopian War 1998-2000, International Center for African Studies, Sudan, July 2009, p. 179.
(40)Sudan Barq, Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud shuffles the Farmajo and his allies papers, May 21, 2022, (viewed: May 26, 2022), https://cutt.us/W0h16
Sheikh Mahmoud described the transfer of Somali soldiers for training in Eritrea as “sale.” See: Somalia Today, Former Somali President Hassan Sheikh: Sons of Somalia Bought in Eritrea, June 10, 2021, (viewed: May 26, 2022),
(41) Mohamed Ali, Abdel Qader, Indicators of Ethiopian Reconciliation: The Local and Regional Beneficiaries and Affected by it, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, May 11, 2022, (accessed: May 23, 2022),
https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/article/5367
42 Fasil, Mahlet, Ten journalists, media personalities arrested in Bahir Dar, Addis Abeba in just Three days, Addis Standard, 24 May 2022, (Seen: 26 May 2022), https://cutt.us/Za5wi
43 Borkena, Stand by as we are in the final chapter for self-determination, 12 May 2022, (Seen: 26 May 2022), https://cutt.us/8CHqo
44 Eritrea Hub, Eritrea receives 8 Russian Zala KYB drones – in return for Russian military base, 7 May 2022, (Seen: 26 May 2022), https://cutt.us/7ITaq
45 Brokkinga, Challenges facing the Horn of Africa, 18 May 2022, (Seen: 27 May 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ycsfLQuu0o4
46 Addis Standard, Fed., Addis Abeba police say joint operation foils planned Al-Shabaab terror attack on capital, 26 May 2022, (Seen: 27 May 2022), https://cutt.us/w3aps
47Ministry of Information of Eritrea: Speech by President Isayas Afewerki at the Opening of the Official Independence Day Celebration, Sabiat, 24 May 2022, (Seen: 27 May 2022), https://cutt.us/XneZL
