The orientations of Moroccan foreign policy towards Africa, and the development strategy adopted by the Moroccan authorities at the domestic level, imposed a focus on multipolar partnerships that take into account profit and economic interests, and do not neglect the strengthening of political and geopolitical resources at the regional level. Within this framework, several political initiatives towards countries and economic cooperation projects are included, foremost of which is the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project (2016), which will link Africa and Europe, as it expresses a new vision for structured projects at the African level, and a strategic vision coming from the south. To serve the interests of the south and the north together, independent – to a large extent – from Western directives.
As much as this project is of multidimensional economic and geostrategic importance, it – at the same time – poses major challenges, questioning the possibility of its successful implementation and continuity.
First: The economic importance of the Nigerian-Moroccan gas project
The economic interests of the main actors in the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project are numerous and varied between direct interests and indirect interests, and they differ according to each party.
With regard to Nigeria – as it possesses huge reserves of gas, and produces huge quantities of it; As it ranks 22nd in the world, the third in Africa at the level of gas production, the fifth in the world and the first in Africa at the level of its export, it also has 30% of the African reserves of it, and its production reaches more than 50 billion cubic meters per year (1)-, its direct economic interests It is mainly in two parts; On the one hand, this project will enable it to double the volume of its gas exports, enter new markets, and enhance its financial resources. On the other hand, it will benefit from reducing the combustion and loss of gas shared with oil. It is known that when there is gas in one field mixed with oil, then producing oil means extracting the gas at the same time. And when there is no economic market to sell the latter, it is burned, which means energy loss, economic loss, local pollution and climate change (2).
Doubling gas exports will enable Nigeria to increase its treasury revenues in a way that leads to an increase in its annual growth rate, which has declined since 2016, after achieving a growth rate of 6.8% between 2005 and 2013, especially since energy and petroleum resources are the most important source of revenue for this country. ; It amounts to about 70% of the gross domestic product (3).
As for Morocco, behind this project, it mainly aims to obtain Nigerian gas, and to ensure a joint and multilateral African source of financing, not subject to the contexts of bilateral relations and their possible future fluctuations, given that the gas pipeline will link Africa and Europe, and may know the participation of other countries in the export. ; This makes evading responsibility and breaking the contract difficult and costly, especially for the exporting parties. Added to this is the supply of gas at a low cost, and with few complications.
The economic and development projects launched by Morocco, or planned to be launched in the short and medium term, require additional quantities of energy sources, especially oil and gas. Morocco’s demand for primary energy increases annually at a rate of between 5% and 6.5% for electricity (4), for example.
The Moroccan national production of natural gas does not exceed 100 million cubic meters per year, which is a weak number, with which Morocco is forced to import. The amount of his purchases from him amounted to about 300 million cubic meters in 2019, and about 388.6 million cubic meters in 2018 (5). Expert estimates confirm that the rate of final consumer demand for gas in Morocco is estimated at about 1.11 billion cubic meters by 2025, 1.7 billion cubic meters by 2030, and 3 billion cubic meters by 2040, which will be mainly used for electricity production (6).
From this angle, this project serves the strategic orientations of the Moroccan political authorities in the field of energy based on a kind of energy transition. After signing the Paris Agreement, Morocco seeks to produce about 52% of its electrical energy from renewable and alternative sources by the year 2030. In this context, it has built two power plants, each with an estimated capacity of 1,200 megawatts, in Jorf Lasfar, south of the city of El Dar. Al-Bayda, and Dahr El Doum, south of Tangier, will mostly depend on imported gas.
Access to ample quantities of Nigerian gas provides Morocco with important possibilities to move from heavy dependence on oil and coal to dependence on gas and alternative energies (7).
In contrast to Morocco’s increasing need for gas, it is noticeable that natural, liquid, petroleum gas and other gaseous carbohydrates for West African countries are few in the Moroccan market (8); As the volume of Moroccan imports of petroleum gas and other energy materials imported from Nigeria does not exceed 24% of the total volume of imports, which is a small number, and the construction of the aforementioned gas pipeline would increase the volume of Moroccan-Nigerian trade exchanges, which currently do not exceed 1.7 billion dirhams. 9). The Moroccan market provides an important space for the growth and increase of Nigerian exports of energy materials, especially gas, butane and propane (10).
The pipeline also allows Morocco to compensate for the Algerian gas, which it used to receive as payment for the passage of the gas pipeline linking Algeria and Spain over its territory, which stopped at the end of the contract period on October 31, 2021; Reducing the cost of gas, especially since imported gas has a high cost.
From another angle, Morocco – through this project – is seeking to strengthen its position and its contribution to the complementary economic projects in the African continent, and to strengthen its role in the South-South economic cooperation relations. As the gas project contributes to regional economic integration at the level of West and North Africa, bearing in mind that Morocco considers this integration among its strategic priorities on the African continent.
As for the African countries through which the Nigerian-Moroccan gas pipeline will pass, the desired economic benefit varies between those countries that have gas reserves. As this project will allow it to export its gas and sell it to African countries and Europe at a lower cost, especially since a huge joint field between Senegal and Mauritania was discovered in the width of the borders between the two countries, its content is estimated at more than 450 billion cubic meters, and production is expected to start in 2023(11 ), and among those countries that do not have gas resources, and for which this pipeline will enable them to easily obtain gas at a low cost, especially since most of these countries suffer from a severe shortage of electricity and other energy sources, which limits their economic development opportunities and affects the standard of living its inhabitants; As about 200 million residents of West African countries are deprived of electricity (12).
Second: The geopolitical dimensions of the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project
The Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline is an energy project with multiple stakes and geopolitical dimensions. Because it passed through about 16 African countries, before reaching Europe in its final stage, means establishing economic interdependence between these African countries, enhancing investment opportunities in them, and cooperation between them that is directly reflected in their economic and social development, and their economic integration (13).
The Nigeria-Morocco gas project has industrial and agricultural repercussions. Gas enables the production of electric power and the manufacture of fertilizers. The latter means improving agriculture, raising agricultural production, satisfying the needs of citizens at this level, and developing the industrial sector. All of these benefits contribute to achieving economic development and strengthening stability. Social and political in these countries, and to ensure economic integration between countries with a gross domestic product of about 670 trillion dollars, and a population of more than 340 million people.
This project, in its comprehensiveness, will enable Nigeria to achieve more presence in the regional and international gas markets, and enhance its competitiveness in this field, whether at the African level or at the level of the European market, especially since Nigeria has well experienced the benefit of such projects. So that it has been exporting its gas, through a gas pipeline, for years to Benin, Togo and Ghana.
The geopolitical dimensions extend to the countries of the European Union. So that the Nigerian-Moroccan gas pipeline will constitute an additional source of natural gas, and will achieve part of its strategic goals on the energy level, represented by diversifying its sources of obtaining gas. The European Union has been looking for years to diversify its sources of gas imports outside its main supplier, Russia. It has begun to achieve this through the Azerbaijan gas pipeline, which cuts through the Caspian Sea, and which began to be exploited a short time ago.
The European Union, which obtains natural gas from the United States of America, Qatar, and Russia, and in view of the challenges posed by Russian gas in light of the Russian-Ukrainian war, may seriously discuss ways to activate the Nigerian-Moroccan gas pipeline, and take it as an important alternative within its energy strategy.
In addition, this project serves the Moroccan long-term strategy towards Africa, which is adopted by the highest authority in the country, which is a comprehensive strategy based on building a common development future among West African countries, and strengthening South-South cooperation in light of a win-win partnership. 14). It also serves undeclared political goals, represented in neutralizing the position of an influential country in Africa on the Sahara issue, namely Nigeria, and gaining this country a supportive friend for the proposed Moroccan project to solve this issue, along with the rest of the countries through which the gas pipeline will pass.
Third: Potential winners and losers from the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline
This strategic project, if successful, will bring great profits to a number of parties, just as it may reflect negatively on the interests of other parties.
1- Potential winners
On top of these we find Nigeria, which is a winner in all possible scenarios for the gas pipeline, whether it is launched to its conceived end; As it will be able to export more quantities of gas to Europe, and increase its share in the markets of these countries, which are one of the largest consumers of gas in the world. or the pipe was not delivered to its intended destination; Where Nigeria will benefit from exporting its gas to West African countries and Morocco.
Nigeria is the main winner of the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project in all scenarios, except for the final failure of the project, which is very unlikely, as it will become the main supplier of gas that will pass through the pipeline (15).
Morocco is the second beneficiary of this project. Because it will give it great potential to position itself strongly in the economy of the West African region in particular, and in Africa in general, and it will strengthen its African orientation. So that Morocco’s investments have become a present reality in the economies of more than 20 African countries. This will also enable it to diversify its sources of gas and cut off some traditional sources that are financially and politically costly.
The countries through which the gas pipeline will pass will also benefit. It will get Nigerian gas at a lower cost, in addition to the chances of it contributing to its regional economic integration, building its infrastructure, and enhancing its economic resources.
And since the European countries are among the largest consumers of natural gas, and in light of the high cost of extracting raw gas and converting it into liquid gas, which European countries obtain from the United States of America in particular, and in light of the major challenges posed by the Russian-Ukrainian war on the level of supplying Europe with Russian gas, And taking oil and gas as a political and military card, the European countries are among the winning parties from the project. It will diversify its import alternatives and expand its strategic options in the field of importing natural gas, especially reducing dependence on Russia. For example, Germany alone imports about 30% of its gas and oil needs from Russia (16).
2- Potential losers
– Russia
The Nigerian-Moroccan gas project will put Russia in front of a new competitor in the European market, as it was Europe’s main supplier of gas and oil. It is likely that the completion of this project will affect, in one way or another, the proportion of Russian gas exported to Europe. Perhaps Russia’s obsession with preserving its position in the field of gas exported to Europe was behind its inauguration of new gas pipelines to Europe, especially the Turkstream pipeline and the Nordstream 2 pipeline. Therefore, it is natural for Russia to look suspiciously at every project that could compete with it in the future in the European market (17).
– Algeria
Given that Algeria is an important source of gas to European countries, whether through the Algeria-Spain gas pipeline or through other routes, the completion of the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project will negatively affect Algeria’s strategic position in the European oil and gas market. In order to avoid this scenario, it is noted – in recent years – a kind of revival of the gas pipeline project linking Nigeria, Algeria and Europe via Niger, which was put forward as an idea in 1992.
In addition, the success of the Nigerian-Moroccan project will undoubtedly mean the loss of the friendship of a number of West African countries in the file of the Sahara issue, led by Nigeria, which was – until recently – considered one of the most important countries in the alliance supporting the Polisario in Africa, along with Algeria. and South Africa. The success of this project would enhance economic and political cooperation between Nigeria and Morocco at the expense of rapprochement between Nigeria and Algeria.
In light of the intense competition between Morocco and Algeria, the success of the Nigerian-Moroccan project, in the event of the failure of the Nigerian-Algerian gas project, will be considered an economic and political victory for Morocco as the leader of South-South cooperation in North and West Africa. Certainly, this would – in return – be considered a major loss for the Algerian political and military elites, which depend on the issue of their competition with Morocco to preserve their political legitimacy.
Fourth: Mobilization for the benefit of the Nigeria-Morocco gas project
Considering the enormity of the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project, and the economic, financial and political capabilities required for its completion, the mobilization and the extent of the ability to persuade active parties, at the African and European levels – and even globally – with it, remains one of the most important determinants of the progress of this gas project. As no matter how good the ideas are, their realism and downloadability are linked to the economic and financial capabilities, and the involvement of the parties concerned and the beneficiaries of the project. This is taking into account that such projects are neither strange nor new to the region. In the year 2000, an American company, Van DyKe, headquartered in Texas, put forward the idea of establishing a project to link West Africa with Europe, but it remained in contemplation (18)!
Accordingly, Morocco and Nigeria have been working, since announcing the idea of the Nigerian-Moroccan gas project in 2016, to involve the most important parties involved in the project in the tribal studies, which were launched in May 2017; With the aim of expanding the circle of supporters of the project, and convincing the concerned countries of its feasibility for economic and social development. In this context, it comes:
Nigeria took the first steps to join, through its sovereign fund (NSIA), the African Green Growth Initiative (GGIF), launched by the World Bank and the Moroccan Investment Fund, during the “COP 22” climate summit held in Marrakech in November 2016. (19).
– Moroccan King Mohammed VI directed a request to Arab and Islamic financial institutions, during their annual meeting in Rabat, in April 2017, urging them to contribute to the financing of this project, which aims to enhance prospects for partnership and cooperation south-south.
Morocco won the support of three Arab Gulf countries, namely: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, to contribute to the financing of this project. Through loans and sovereign fund investments. It is an important gain. Because of the financial capabilities of these countries, and strong and traditional political relations with the Moroccan state.
Persuading the countries through which the gas pipeline will pass to contribute to financing part of the project; And that is through the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NN.PCL), the Moroccan National Office for Hydrocarbons and Minerals, and the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the content of which is the confirmation of these countries contributing to the implementation of this project, and the commitment of the signatory countries to provide about three billions of cubic meters of gas to West African countries via Morocco; And then to Europe (20). This agreement expresses the conviction of the African side of the gas project of its economic importance. The mobilization of the West African Community; To contribute to this project, it expands the circle of its supporters at the regional level, and achieves legitimacy for it on the economic and developmental levels.
The approval of an OPEC fund (OPEC) to finance the second phase of studies, especially detailed engineering studies.
Defending the gas project in international economic and financial forums. In this context, the participation of the Director General of the Moroccan National Office for Hydrocarbons and Minerals, Mrs. Amina Ben Khadra, in the 33rd extraordinary session of the “Crans Montana-Africa” forum, comes in the beginning of July 2022. There is no doubt that such forums, which know the participation of institutions European organizations, international organizations, official authorities, and business communities around the world represent an important opportunity to search for funds and establish partnerships for the benefit of the project (21).
The signing of two memorandums of understanding between four African countries in the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott, on October 15, 2022; the first between Morocco, Nigeria and Mauritania, and the second between Nigeria, Morocco and Senegal regarding the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline; So that the first memorandum was signed by the Moroccan National Office for Hydrocarbons and Minerals, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company and the Mauritanian Hydrocarbons Company, and the second memorandum was signed by the Nigerian National Petroleum Company, the Moroccan National Office for Hydrocarbons and Mines, and the Holding Company for Petroleum in Senegal (22).
The announcement of the President of Liberia, “George Weah”; The guest of honor of the fourteenth session of the “MEDAYS Forum”, organized in Tangiers in November 2022, expressed his full support for the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project, and his country’s willingness to invest in this vast project (23).
The mobilization of the parties involved in the project and its beneficiaries, and the mobilization of a number of national and international financing institutions, contribute – significantly – not only to confirming the economic feasibility of the project, but also to confirming its realism and feasibility in the medium term, seven years after the announcement of the project, although That the European Union countries did not show much interest in the project, and did not contribute – so far – in financing the feasibility study and engineering studies related to it.
The two main parties in the Nigeria-Morocco gas project continued to mobilize their political capabilities, and maintained the unity of their discourse regarding the common interest for themselves and for the rest of West African countries. So that it has not been affected in seven years, and their conviction in the project and its economic importance has not diminished. Rather, the leaders and officials of the two countries express, on every occasion, their increasing actual involvement in the implementation of the project, and their will to start works, especially the extension of the West African gas pipeline that connects Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana.
The persistence of the common will of the two countries, expressed through a number of meetings and statements, and the signing of memorandums of understanding, is a strong indication of the transition from perception to action and implementation. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation announced, in June of this year, its intention to start completing the first part of the project, which will enable Nigeria, in the near future, to export its gas to its neighboring countries as a first stage (24), which will not cost much Investments, which means that the gradual implementation of the gas pipeline could be a solution to overcome the coercion of the huge financial resources required by the project, which are estimated at about $25 billion.
Fifth: Structural and circumstantial challenges facing the Nigeria-Morocco gas project
Although many reports indicate the high cost of the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project, and the difficulty of relying on the self-financing capabilities of the countries involved in this project, it can be said, in light of the developments the project is aware of: that its funding is no longer on the table now; As financing a project of this size has become almost certain; In view of its economic and financial benefits, whether by the contractors and companies concerned with relying on their own capital, or by relying on loans, or from national, regional and global banking institutions, or by countries friendly to the two countries; Therefore, the challenges facing the Nigeria-Morocco gas project are not related to financial financing, as much as they are related to other basic challenges, among which the following can be emphasized:
1- Time challenges: the problem of delaying implementation and its repercussions
The length of the geographical route of the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline, which ranges between 5,600 and 7,000 km, and that it crosses 13 countries, poses difficulties related to the implementation of the project in its previously expected time. As the different levels of countries, the variation in their economic capabilities and infrastructure, and the security challenges in some countries… may be a source of challenges that delay the project and prolong the life of completion and implementation. This affects financial mobilization efforts and external partnerships. If Europe’s gas needs are growing, in light of Russia’s increasing pressures and bargaining with European countries, after the Russian-Ukrainian war showed Russia’s transition from emphasizing the economic and commercial nature of energy transactions between Russia and Europe (25), to energy bargaining, and the use of the gas card and energy Generally, in war and political conflict; Energy security may prompt European countries to seriously engage in financing and political mobilization for the benefit of the project.
2- The weakness of the democratic environment in African countries
The countries hosting the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project are characterized by their weak democratic indicators. As most of the thirteen countries are classified among non-democratic states, which raises challenges to the legality and acceptability of this project politically, as well as challenges stemming from the succession of rulers, which is not always smooth and peaceful, and may produce elites who are not enthusiastic about the project, but rather obstruct it and disavow it. their obligations in connection with this project.
Partisan pluralism, the relationship between election results and the formation of political institutions, the rotation of power, the flexibility of political competition, and the existence of common public policies among the majority of actors and citizens… are factors that form a solid base for internal political stability, and legitimize regional and international cooperation and partnership projects, as they are led by elected governments. , with political legitimacy. It also constitutes an important component of any fruitful coordination and effective partnership. The unity of the political language, and its convergence, are among the essential elements for the success of regional cooperation projects, and for accelerating integration into such grand strategic projects.
The regional democratic environment opens up great prospects for the success of economic integration, multilateral cooperation, and the realization of the collective goals and interests of states and peoples, foremost of which is the achievement of economic and social development. As the countries concerned with regional cooperation and multilateral partnership are democratic states that know democratic political traditions and practices, and reasonable boundaries of separation between political and economic powers, the greater the chances of states’ continuity in the field of economic and integration cooperation, and the chances of avoiding collisions and crises between them are possible.
The disputes over how to benefit from the transit rights, and the problems related to the transit fees, especially with the possibility of their rejection by some of the countries involved in the project, and the possibility of some countries being unable to pay consumption dues; As happened in similar projects; such as the gas pipeline linking Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana (26), and pushing slogans; Such as “solidarity among African countries,” “symbolic contributions,” and “deteriorating or majeure economic conditions” by some countries to evade their obligations to benefit from the gas project… remain in place.
Also, the combination of the political and economic authorities, which most countries associated with the gas pipeline project know – albeit to varying degrees – strengthens the possibilities of the influence of the dominant and dominant elites in a number of these countries on the gas project, and strengthening their interests, even at the expense of the project and its economic and social benefits. This may lead to its obstruction and continuation in the event that its interests conflict with the project, or decline; This is because the combination of the two powers, political and economic, in these political systems, favors the economic and political interests of the dominant and influential elites in these countries, and strengthens the influence of pressure groups, which are not always independent of the outside world and its dictates.
In addition, the weakness of the democratic environment in these countries limits the possibility of resolving traditional and emerging differences between these countries in a peaceful and civilized manner, and the possibilities of rapid and stable understanding. The relations between a number of countries through which this project passes are dominated by conflict and tension, and the settlement of disputes between them takes a long time (27), and is in a way that negatively affects the time of stability and the time of development in these countries.
3- The weakness of the economic structure of the countries concerned with the gas pipeline
So that most of them lack an economic structure capable of keeping pace with this project, and the true benefit from it. It knows a great weakness in electrification, paved roads, and industrial structures, which affects the prospects of this project, limits the possibility of effective benefit from it, and thus limits positive interaction with it and actual involvement in it. A recent report by the German “Der Spiegel” website revealed the alarming extent of the weakness of the infrastructure of the project countries, including Nigeria, which suffers from a shortage of electricity, and the spread of the phenomenon of gas theft along the lines extending from the production fields to the export ports (28).
4- Security challenges
The area hosting the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project is experiencing fragile security conditions. Due to the presence of the activity of terrorist groups in the first place. For example, Nigeria has been facing, for years, the threats of the “Boko Haram” group, and a number of countries in the region are concerned with the threats of terrorist groups that are active in the Sahara and the Sahel.
The region remains a candidate for foreign military interventions, which are carried out under the pretext of combating terrorism and extremism, and protecting human rights. It is also governed, in depth, by protecting the economic and political interests of the intervening countries (29).
In addition, a number of countries concerned with the project are witnessing indicators of escalation of ethnic, racial and religious conflicts, in a way that threatens their stability, and strengthens political domination and military intervention in the political authority within them. What makes these security threats a real challenge is that most of the countries through which the gas pipeline passes are poor countries. Therefore, social tremors and explosions are possible at any time. Such factors may affect the continued stable and safe export of Nigerian gas.
5- Geostrategic accounts
The Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline is located in an important strategic triangle for Africa and European countries. So that it brings together the countries of North and West Africa, and concerns countries in competition and conflict with other African countries. We refer, here, to the traditional political conflict between Morocco and Algeria, which supports the Polisario, and which stands against resolving the Sahara problem. It also concerns European countries that have complex relations with African countries. It is often difficult to reconcile their poles and build distinct economic and political relations, which is what It limits the serious involvement of Europe in this project, more than seven years after the project was announced, and four years after the initialing of the agreement between Morocco and Nigeria in 2018. This explains the European countries’ delay and reluctance to be convinced of the economic feasibility of the project. The matter led to the devaluation of the project by the French President, Manuel Macron, who previously stated that there is no economic feasibility for the project (30)!
The political and strategic interventions remain influential – without a doubt – in the successful implementation of this project, and determine the interaction of European countries with it.
Conclusion
Seven years after the announcement of the Nigeria-Morocco gas project, the two countries involved in the project were able to gain many positive points for the benefit of the project, especially convincing many countries of its realism, economic benefit, and their willingness to contribute to the financing of this project. Despite the reluctance of European countries to interact with the project, which explains its geostrategic effects, the great rapprochement between Morocco, Nigeria and a number of West African countries, and the discovery of a joint gas field between Senegal and Mauritania, strengthen the possibilities of overcoming the economic, security and political constraints facing this project.
Source: Al Jazeera Studies – article entitled Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline: Its Stakes and Challenges, published on 11/16/2022
About the author
Muhammad Al-Radwani
Professor of higher education, director of the “Legal and Political Studies of the Mediterranean Countries” Laboratory, Mohammed I University-Oujda.
Reference
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19- The same reference, p. 6.
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27- One of the most important issues of conflict between some countries of the gas pipeline project is the dispute between Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea over the “Mato” River, and the border dispute between Mauritania and Senegal over the “Senegal River” region, as well as their dispute over the ownership of a huge oil field located along the shores of the city of “Sinluy”. ; Where each party claims the right of ownership and sovereignty over it.
28- “Is Europe moving to accelerate the completion of the gas pipeline between Nigeria and Morocco?”, previously mentioned.
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30- “Is Europe moving to accelerate the completion of the gas pipeline between Nigeria and Morocco?”, previous reference
