Soft power has become a pivotal focus of China’s international outreach and foreign policy strategy. This reflects recognition that shaping positive perceptions, narratives and preferences globally can support China’s interests and leadership aspirations. However, China’s soft power efforts have sparked much debate regarding its intentions and efficacy.
This article provides an in-depth analysis of the origins, motivations, mechanisms and impacts of China’s soft power policies. It examines the major instruments China employs spanning public diplomacy, media expansion, cultural exports, educational exchanges, and more. The analysis evaluates successes and limitations of China’s soft power projection, and implications for relationships with key nations including the US. It argues that while China has made substantial gains, structural constraints persist.
Conceptualizing Soft Power
Joseph Nye defined soft power as getting desired outcomes through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion [1]. It derives from perceived legitimacy and moral authority, advanced culture and values, and credible policies and institutions. Sources of soft power include culture, political values, foreign policies and economic model [1].
For China, soft power cultivation is linked to assuaging threat perceptions, expanding overseas influence, and reshaping the global narrative on China’s rise [2]. It also supports domestic legitimacy by showing the Party’s elevating China’s international standing. Soft power is seen as essential for a comprehensive power strategy combining hard military and economic might with ideological appeal [3].
Early Soft Power Neglect and New Prioritization
In the early reform era, China prioritized fast growth and domestic stability over soft power projection [4]. But from the 2000s, China’s leaders became more concerned with the country’s negative global image as an authoritarian regime with relatively limited cultural appeal. This perception deficit was deemed detrimental to China’s core interests [5].
In response, Hu Jintao formally endorsed soft power policies in 2007, establishing Confucius Institutes worldwide to promote Chinese language and culture [6]. Under Xi Jinping from 2012, soft power strategy expanded substantially. Xi described it as vital for realizing the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation [7]. The Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013 also aimed at increasing China’s ideological draw abroad alongside commercial links [8].
Key Instruments and Mechanisms
China deploys diverse instruments to build its soft power globally:
- Assertive public diplomacy and foreign propaganda, including vast state media expansion overseas [9].
- Generous cultural exports like heritage promotions, giant panda gifts, and artistic showcases [10].
- Educational exchanges through Confucius Institutes and scholarships for foreign students [11].
- Tech advancements as models for developing countries, including 5G equipment exports [12].
- Promotion of governance values like state-led development and social harmony [13].
- Foreign assistance and investment framed as South-South cooperation [14].
- People-to-people dialogue like the Boao Forum for Asia annual conference [15].
- Sports megavents such as the Beijing and Hangzhou Olympics and Asian Games [16].
Some platforms like the Belt and Road Initiative and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank encompass multiple soft power instruments spanning projected via cultural appeals, media content partnerships, university networks, think tank dialogues and more [17].
Key Target Nations and Regions
China tailors soft power efforts by nation and region [18]:
- Developing countries across Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia are priorities to deepen economic and diplomatic ties. Initiatives like the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and China-CELAC Forum support this.
- Regional powers like Australia, Japan and India are critical for China’s neighborhood diplomacy so receive concentrated public diplomacy.
- Western Europe is a hub for cultivating China-friendly elites and countering US influence. High-level exchanges with the EU bolster this.
- Former Soviet states are strategic for Belt and Road access so receive strong cultural and educational outreach.
- The US is the key global force China seeks to positively engage through media expansion, academic exchanges and PR campaigns.
Successes and Limitations
China’s soft power push has seen tangible achievements:
- Growing global media presence, with state outlets like CGTN now accessible to hundreds of millions outside China [19].
- Surging popularity of Chinese culture, especially youth interest in Chinese music, film and TV stars [20].
- Major infrastructure projects across Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America hailed as development milestones [21].
- Expanded commercial ties and investment accords through Belt and Road [22].
- Improved public perceptions in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia [23].
However, significant constraints hamper China’s soft power ambitions:
- Suspicion of propaganda and economic coercion undermining the Communist Party’s moral credibility [24].
- Limits of state-sponsored cultural exports and restrictions on organic creativity [25].
- Concern over academic censorship and influence operations restraining educational soft power [26].
- Criticism of opacity, debt risks and neo-colonialism on Belt and Road [27].
- Conflicting territorial claims and pressures on regional neighbors like India and Japan [28].
- Authoritarianism, human rights abuses and repression in Xinjiang and Hong Kong denting China’s aspirational appeal [29].
So while gains are evident, negative perceptions linger and progress remains gradual. Structural conditions restrict China’s global sway.
Implications for Major Power Dynamics
China’s soft power strategy centrally targets constraining US influence and legitimacy. This fuels US fears of China rapidly converting growing economic strength into ideological dominance [30]. Countering China’s soft power projection has become a national security priority [31].
But direct US-China soft power rivalry may be self-defeating [32]. Overly politicized public diplomacy on both sides polarizes global perceptions [33]. Still, China’s assertive turn under Xi Jinping encourages reactionary policies.
For other established powers like the EU, China’s soft power expansion carries risks of interference and weakened solidarity with liberal democracies [34]. But decoupling is also costly. Naive engagement has given way to more cautious balancing [35].
Among developing nations, China’s soft power brings valuable resources but also wariness of dependence [36]. Overall, China is reshaping power dynamics via influence rather than outright confrontation. But consolidation as a cultural and moral leader remains incremental.
Conclusion
In summary, effective soft power projection is critical for China’s great power ambitions. Major investments have produced notable gains. But suspicion of Chinese intentions and political constraints on its global appeal persist. Lasting soft power arises from diffuse processes over long timeframes [37], not state orchestration. China has made advancements but still falls well short of overturning US dominance or achieving deep affinity across societies. Nevertheless, in an increasingly multi-polar world, China’s soft power focus reshapes complex ideological balances. Managing both cooperation and competition will be vital for major powers navigating this terrain.
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