The expanding nuclear risks amid the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

Since August 9, 2024, when Ukrainian forces managed to breach the border with Russia and enter the Kursk region, Russia has been warning about the possibility of Ukrainian forces attacking the nuclear power plant in the Russian region with a dirty bomb. This added yet another accusation to the list of claims Russia has long made about the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, located in Ukrainian territory, which Russia declared as part of its annexation.

Ukraine and its allies have consistently denied these allegations, including the latest claims about the use of a dirty bomb. Ukraine, in fact, often accuses Russia of threatening nuclear safety by storing weapons at the Zaporizhzhia plant and using it as a base for launching military attacks.

Since the onset of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in February 2022, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been striving to ensure the security of nuclear facilities in the conflict zone. This effort includes several visits by the IAEA Director General, Rafael Grossi, the most recent being to the Kursk plant, where he warned about the dangers of military operations near nuclear facilities. He emphasized the importance of adhering to the seven pillars essential for ensuring nuclear safety during armed conflicts and the need to apply the five principles designed to protect the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, principles that apply to all nuclear facilities.

So, what are these pillars and principles, and to what extent have they been followed during this conflict? What about the mutual accusations from both sides of the conflict? How does the IAEA verify these claims, either confirming or denying them? Why does the situation around nuclear facilities in this war remain so perilous? And, given that the presence of nuclear plants in conflict zones increases the risk of nuclear accidents, could these sites potentially serve as deterrents to military operations around them? What is the future of nuclear security and safety in combat zones?

Two Conflicting Nuclear Narratives

From the start of the military operations between Russia and Ukraine, nuclear facilities have been a central topic. Initially, Russian forces seized control of the Chernobyl nuclear plant, which continues to undergo operations to manage the fallout from the famous April 1986 disaster, a time when both Russia and Ukraine were part of the vast Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union dissolved, Ukraine was one of the republics that relinquished the nuclear weapons on its territory, leaving Russia with the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal. While Ukraine gave up its nuclear arms, the peaceful nuclear power plants, research facilities, and other nuclear installations remained under its full sovereignty.

There was no initial dispute over this. Four days after the start of what Russia called a “special military operation” in Ukraine, Moscow informed the IAEA of its intent to “ensure the necessary nuclear safety and security of all nuclear facilities in the special military operations zone.” Russia stated in the same notice that it had fully secured the perimeter of the Chernobyl plant to “prevent Ukrainian nationalist formations or other terrorist groups from exploiting the situation to commit provocative nuclear acts.”

From the beginning, Russia has referred to potential “provocative nuclear acts,” an assertion it has repeated frequently. Russia recognized the importance of nuclear safety and security for the facilities in the conflict zone. Initially, Russia did not hesitate to refer to these nuclear facilities as Ukrainian, as stated in its note to the IAEA, where it described the situation regarding “the safety of the Ukrainian nuclear facilities located in the special military operations zone in Ukraine.”

However, this Russian narrative shifted dramatically after Moscow announced the annexation of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics, along with the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, the latter being home to Europe’s largest nuclear plant. Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree transferring ownership and full control of the Zaporizhzhia plant to Russia. Since then, Russia has referred to it as a “Russian nuclear facility” in its communications with the IAEA.

While Russia accused Ukrainian nationalist or terrorist groups of attempting provocative nuclear acts, Ukraine, from the outset, accused Russia of committing “nuclear terrorism against Ukrainian nuclear facilities, their infrastructure, and staff.” Ukraine has repeatedly dismissed any information coming from Russia regarding these facilities, stating that “Russia, as an aggressor state, is committing war crimes on sovereign Ukrainian territory.”

Ukraine continued these accusations even after Russia had changed many dynamics, including the ownership and management of the Zaporizhzhia plant. Ukraine’s parliament expressed concern about Russia “planning a terrorist act or deliberately causing an incident at the Zaporizhzhia plant.” Ukraine also considered the transfer of ownership of the plant an act of aggression and dismissed Putin’s decree as illegitimate, calling for sanctions against Russia’s Rosatom, the company now managing the plant.

The conflicting narratives between Russia and Ukraine regarding nuclear facilities extended to almost every development, including incidents near the plants. One of the earliest incidents occurred near the Zaporizhzhia plant on the evening of March 3, 2022. Ukraine immediately accused Russia of shelling the plant, calling it an act of “nuclear terrorism,” and reported casualties among the plant’s staff due to the attack.

Russia, however, completely denied any shelling of the plant, stating that a Russian patrol near the plant had come under heavy fire from one of the nearby training buildings and that the assailants were a group of saboteurs who had set fire to the building before fleeing. Russian firefighting teams later extinguished the blaze. Russia dismissed the exaggerated reports about the incident as “manufactured hysteria.”

Since then, the two narratives have clashed over every incident involving nuclear facilities, whether regarding the safety of staff, missiles landing near or passing over plants, or even incidents at other nuclear plants besides Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl, including the Kursk plant in Russia. Just three days after Ukraine launched its attack on Kursk, Russia reported finding debris believed to be fragments of intercepted missiles near the plant’s grounds, including in the area of the radioactive waste processing complex. Russia argued that “the reckless actions of the Kyiv regime not only threaten the Russian nuclear power sector but also put the entire global nuclear industry at risk.”

Both sides have warned of global dangers: Ukraine warning of potential nuclear disasters that could affect Europe and the world, while Russia claimed that Ukrainian provocations could have global repercussions. Is Russia now experiencing the “hysteria” it once accused Ukraine and the West of displaying?

At various levels, Russia has spoken about the threat to its Kursk nuclear plant, with concerns raised by the Russian Foreign Ministry, members of the Russian parliament, and even President Vladimir Putin.

Similarly, Ukraine had, three weeks before its attack on Kursk, warned about Russian drones near its nuclear plants in Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, and southern Ukraine, at different times. Ukraine claimed these drone activities violated the first principle of the five concrete principles laid out by the IAEA Director General. In a statement to the IAEA on August 23, 2024, Ukraine reiterated this concern, listing incidents where Russian drones flew near or left debris close to its nuclear facilities. Ukraine concluded that this posed a serious threat to the open distribution systems of nuclear power plants and the main substations connected to the power lines of those plants.

Russia had made similar claims just a day earlier, accusing Ukraine of similar provocations involving drones targeting the Zaporizhzhia plant, stating that Ukraine aimed to carry out attacks and provocations against both the plant and the nearby city of Enerhodar.

The contrasting nuclear narratives are part of the broader divergence in the Russian and Ukrainian perspectives on the conflict, not just since 2022 but dating back several years. Each side’s overall narrative is internally consistent, as are their nuclear narratives. The difference with the nuclear issue is that it could lead to a catastrophic event, for which no arguments, however valid or fabricated, could justify the consequences.

The Dirty Bomb Controversy

A dirty bomb is a device that combines conventional explosives with radioactive materials, though these materials are not as pure as those found in a nuclear bomb. As such, it is not classified as a weapon of mass destruction, but rather a weapon of mass disruption, given the impact it can have on an area, which may vary in size depending on factors such as weather conditions. Its psychological effects on the inhabitants of the affected area, in addition to the physical harm it can cause, remain significant.

Russia has accused Ukraine of preparing to use a dirty bomb against the Kursk power plant. The Russian Ministry of Defense warned that “the Kyiv regime is planning to target the Kursk power plant with a dirty bomb and blame Russia for causing a radioactive leak.” Russian sources also indicated that the Kursk plant was not the only target of these Ukrainian dirty bomb attacks; the Zaporizhzhia plant was also listed as a potential target. It is worth noting that even before the war with Ukraine began, Russia had been warning about the U.S.’s use of biological and chemical laboratories in Ukraine to develop contaminated weapons or produce viruses that could be used against Russia and other countries.

In October 2022, Russia presented a full scenario that it considered to be Ukraine’s plan to use a dirty bomb and frame Russia for the act. According to this scenario, Ukraine would build a model of the Russian Iskander missile, and the warhead of this model would contain radioactive materials. Ukraine would then carry out a provocative action by launching this replica of a Russian missile. When this occurs, Ukraine’s air defense forces would announce that they had intercepted a Russian Iskander missile over the restricted zone around the Chernobyl plant. This would be accompanied by a global media campaign showing fragments of the model made by Ukraine, presenting it as the actual Russian missile.

These accusations are not new; Russia has been making them since the beginning of the conflict. They have drawn responses from Ukraine, its allies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Ukraine has completely denied seeking to manufacture such weapons or intending to use them, asserting full control over its research facilities in these areas, which contain no foreign entities. Ukraine emphasized that these facilities are purely scientific with health-related goals, and their work is entirely transparent. Ukraine did not stop at simply denying the accusations; it also suggested that Russia, under the cover of these accusations, could use such bombs on Ukrainian soil and blame Kyiv. Alternatively, Ukraine viewed these accusations as a pretext for what it described at the time as an illegal attack on a peaceful nuclear facility since Russia had not yet seized the Zaporizhzhia plant. Ukraine also argued that this could be a form of threat aimed at the West, which supports Ukraine. Furthermore, Ukraine claimed that Russia had failed to provide convincing evidence for its accusations, prompting Ukraine to call for an international investigation into these Russian claims, considering them a “direct nuclear and radiation threat to Europe and the world.”

In April 2024, Ukraine once again responded to Russian accusations regarding the dirty bomb, asserting that Russia’s campaign aimed to shift responsibility for its reckless actions at the Zaporizhzhia plant. Ukraine also pointed out the timing of the campaign, suggesting it was related to the increasing international focus on the safety of the Zaporizhzhia plant or the criticism Russia was facing.

Alongside the positions of Ukraine’s main allies, the G7, which has supported Ukraine from the start, took a clear stance on this issue. In November 2022, the G7 foreign ministers rejected Russia’s accusations, stating that the IAEA inspections had proven these claims to be baseless. The ministers went further by praising what they saw as Ukraine’s transparency in this matter.

The IAEA, in a decision adopted on November 17, 2022, concluded that “it found no evidence of undeclared nuclear activities or materials related to the development of radiation-dispersal devices (or ‘dirty bombs’) at three sites in Ukraine, following supplementary inspections requested by Ukraine, in accordance with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with Ukraine, in response to claims made by the Russian Federation, which were thus found to be groundless.”

Thus, between Russian accusations and Ukrainian, Western, and IAEA denials, the issue of the dirty bomb remains unresolved. Will everyone be caught off guard by its use, or will the surprise lie in its impact, which may be far greater than that of such bombs in the event of a nuclear accident at any of the nuclear power plants in the conflict zone, where fighting has been raging for more than two and a half years? And will the IAEA succeed in maintaining the safety and security of the nuclear power plants in the conflict zone despite ongoing combat operations?

Between the Seven Pillars and the Five Principles

Since the war in Ukraine began, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been on high alert regarding nuclear issues related to the conflict. As noted, there are nuclear power plants in the battle zones. The IAEA has dispatched numerous missions to these nuclear facilities, some of which have been led by the agency’s Director General. His most recent visit was to the Kursk plant in Russia in the last week of August 2024. The Director General has made numerous trips to Russia to meet with Russian officials and coordinate with them on the safety and security of nuclear plants in Ukraine. Naturally, he has also visited Ukraine several times, with his upcoming trip to Ukraine in the first week of September 2024 marking his tenth visit. The IAEA has also regularly issued updates on the situation at nuclear plants in the conflict zone, with nearly 250 statements since the war began. These reports often follow visits conducted by the agency’s experts, and IAEA personnel are present on the ground to monitor developments.

This activity stems from the agency’s responsibilities, which require swift and decisive action when nuclear safety and security are threatened. The Director General has emphasized that the IAEA’s presence helps stabilize the situation, reiterating his clear message since the war’s start: “A nuclear incident must be avoided at all costs.” He stressed that nuclear plants should never be targets of any attack.

Throughout the war, the IAEA established a set of essential pillars to ensure the safe operation of nuclear plants in the conflict zone. The agency has monitored compliance with these pillars and has also developed additional principles as the war continued and risks increased.

The seven pillars outlined by the IAEA are as follows: First, maintaining the physical integrity of nuclear facilities, including reactors, spent fuel pools, and radioactive waste storage areas. Second, ensuring that safety and security systems and equipment remain fully operational under all circumstances. Third, ensuring that the staff responsible for operating nuclear facilities can carry out their duties without pressure and are able to make decisions freely. Fourth, ensuring that all nuclear sites have a secure external power supply. Fifth, guaranteeing the uninterrupted operation of logistical supply chains and transport to and from the sites. Sixth, ensuring effective radiation monitoring systems and emergency preparedness measures within the site. Seventh, ensuring reliable communication with regulatory authorities and others.

In its reports, the IAEA has consistently monitored the application of these pillars. Without delving into specific details, the agency’s November 2022 report on the Zaporizhzhia plant concluded that there had been continuous breaches of these seven pillars, making the situation at the plant dangerous, fragile, and highly complex. Similarly, in its September 2022 report, the agency noted that all seven pillars had been compromised and provided detailed recommendations for each pillar. In its report issued at the end of February 2024, covering the period from mid-November 2023 to February 23, 2024, the IAEA found that six of the seven pillars had been partially or entirely breached.

It is clear from the IAEA’s reports that there have been partial or complete violations of most or all of the seven pillars that were set out in the early days of the war. These pillars were discussed at the IAEA’s Board of Governors meeting on March 2, 2022, and the Director General issued a statement on March 4, following an incident near the Zaporizhzhia plant, which was mentioned in the first part of this study. In response to that incident, the United Nations Security Council held an emergency meeting, with several subsequent sessions focused on nuclear power plants during the Russia-Ukraine war. During the Security Council meeting on May 30, 2023, the IAEA’s Director General presented five concrete principles to ensure the protection of the Zaporizhzhia plant. These principles are as follows:

No attacks of any kind should be launched from or against the plant, particularly targeting reactors, spent fuel storage areas, critical infrastructure, or staff.
The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant should not be used as a storage site or base for heavy weapons (such as multiple rocket launchers, artillery systems, ammunition, or tanks) or for military personnel that could be used to launch attacks from the plant.
The plant’s external electricity supply must not be jeopardized. All necessary efforts must be made to ensure that external power remains available and secure at all times.
All essential structures, systems, and components required for the safe and secure operation of the Zaporizhzhia plant must be protected from attacks or sabotage.
No actions should be taken that would breach these principles.

Subsequent IAEA reports began to assess compliance with both the five principles and the seven pillars. In the report covering the period from September 1 to November 14, 2023, the IAEA noted that it had found no indications of violations of these principles. However, the report added a caveat that “the inability to access the site in a timely and unrestricted manner limits the agency’s ability to fully verify adherence to these five concrete principles at all times.” This assessment remained unchanged in the February 2024 report, which noted no breaches of the five principles, though it expanded on the previous caveat, adding that “there are observations suggesting that some principles were at risk during the reporting period.” The report also pointed out that restrictions on the IAEA’s support and assistance mission at the plant limited its ability to fully verify compliance with the principles at all times.

These pillars and principles have clearly expanded beyond the Zaporizhzhia plant and other Ukrainian nuclear plants. They are now being applied to Russian plants as well, especially as Russia has confirmed attacks against at least one of its nuclear plants, with certainty that Ukraine was responsible for these attacks. The Director General’s visit to the targeted Kursk plant and his firm stance that any attack on a nuclear plant is categorically unacceptable underscore this.

What’s Next?

The complex situation that arose with the start of Russian military operations in Ukraine, specifically regarding Ukraine’s peaceful nuclear facilities, was unprecedented. This complexity has only deepened as the war developed, accompanied by political decisions concerning one of these nuclear plants. Now, the battlefield includes Russian territories, with a nuclear power station nearby that could also become a target. Could Ukraine be planning to replicate the Russian scenario at the Zaporizhzhia power plant with the Kursk station? Could there be a nuclear plant-for-plant negotiation, much like a land-for-land strategy?

Undoubtedly, the situation is growing more dangerous as military operations expand, with no sign of negotiations to stop the war due to the total conflict between both sides’ demands. Could there be agreements specifically to neutralize nuclear power stations and protect them from risks? Even this seems extremely difficult. However, efforts must continue on all levels to prevent a nuclear disaster, a sentiment echoed consistently by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

As the direct Russian-Ukrainian conflict is the first of its kind in areas with nuclear facilities, it has created a new set of important rules concerning how the international body responsible for global nuclear safety and security—the IAEA—should act. Yet, the primary concern remains whether the warring parties will adhere to these rules. Simultaneously, questions arise: What consequences will there be for violating these rules? Who has the authority to determine which side breached them? What if all parties are violating these rules? If sanctions are to be imposed, who will enforce them? And what happens if these sanctions fail to achieve their intended results?

With the world showing an increased interest in building nuclear power plants after overcoming the fallout from Japan’s Fukushima disaster, caused by the earthquake and tsunami of March 2011, there is a global need for stronger assurances to prevent any nuclear accident caused by military action—even if the nuclear plant is not the direct target.

The Russian-Ukrainian situation has proven that the presence of nuclear plants does not deter military operations in the surrounding areas. These operations have expanded, affecting the functioning of nuclear plants either directly or indirectly. Can we say that the operations have been restricted around these plants? A clear answer is difficult to reach, especially since nuclear power stations have become military targets for control, operation, maintenance, and even complete transfer of ownership.

Many conclusions have indeed been drawn by the IAEA regarding the status of nuclear power plants during armed conflicts. This goes beyond the seven pillars and five principles mentioned earlier, extending into numerous technical details. However, in such cases, the issue is not merely technical. It is connected to strategic visions, military plans, and political moves. These visions and plans require legal regulations regarding the peaceful nuclear facilities during armed conflicts. Perhaps existing regulations need to be developed further. Yet, the question remains: What guarantees are in place to ensure compliance with these rules?

A notable aspect of the nuclear issue surrounding peaceful facilities in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is that fears about terrorist groups exploiting nuclear materials to carry out so-called nuclear terrorism or nuclear blackmail—by damaging peaceful nuclear installations or creating bombs with radioactive materials known as dirty bombs—are now being attributed to states. Countries are leveling such accusations, specifying locations where these bombs are allegedly manufactured, while other countries deny them. This raises the question about Russia’s renewed accusations against Ukraine concerning the Zaporizhzhia and Kursk stations. Will the IAEA launch new investigations after dismissing previous Russian claims on this issue? And will Ukraine request an international investigation as it did in the past regarding these allegations?

Historically, wars have always affected the sovereignty of the warring nations. However, the Russian-Ukrainian war has added a new dimension to such impacts, one that could be termed “nuclear sovereignty.” This type of sovereignty, if it can be called that, is now at risk of being completely obliterated.

Adding further complexity to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is the convergence of nuclear risks, both civilian and military. While the previous paragraphs provided a picture of the civilian nuclear side, the military side has seen a sharp escalation in nuclear rhetoric. This has been accompanied by measures and countermeasures in international agreements between nuclear powers. Additionally, there are actions related to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in areas where they were either never present or had been removed. This, in turn, raises questions about changes to nuclear doctrines. Coupled with ongoing efforts to develop nuclear arsenals, these developments cast a long shadow over the possibility of nuclear disarmament by states outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Moreover, the possibility of new countries joining the nuclear arms race suggests that the international system for nuclear non-proliferation faces significant, unprecedented challenges that could lead to its complete collapse.